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Abstract 
With empirically-grounded and theoretically-inferred consideration in 
this thesis, I bring into focus a vast ‘collection’ of components entailed in lived 
experiences of pregnancy losses and, in particular, foreground the ways in which 
spaces and places are intimately involved. This includes, for example, attending 
to medical settings such as hospitals, workplaces, homes and gardens, online 
support communities, cemeteries and other memorial locations in addition to 
bodies which are simultaneously material and emotional. Since pregnancy 
losses are inter-personal, I also discuss social relations between women, their 
embryos, foetuses, babies and/or children, medical staff, partners, family 
members, friends, work colleagues, online group users and ‘wider society’. 
The multiplicity of components within, and across, participants’ 
experiences serves to simultaneously break apart and reassemble the label I 
selected for the research of ‘pregnancy losses’. I utilise several sub-disciplines 
across the thesis, finding a particularly significant and tricky tension between 
two particular areas I wish to engage: feminist geographies and the geographies 
of death and dying. My research weaves together feminist, embodied, emotional 
geographies through which I seek to understand experiences of pregnancy 
losses. In doing so, I foreground the richness, depth and complexity of lived 
experiences by developing understandings of pregnancy losses which embrace, 
rather than sanitise or marginalise, bodily materiality and social relations as 
well as emotional dynamics. 
My thesis serves to bring together and explore the recollections of 
pregnancy loss experiences, organised around a number of spatial contexts and 
activities. These are reflected in the focus of each chapter in terms of interior 
bodies, social relations, bodily fluids, online sites, external skins and practices of 
memorialisation. My discussions work to ‘collect’ together understandings 
about the somewhat paradoxical fullness and variety of accumulated meanings 
that can be held about pregnancy loss experiences.  
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Introduction 
“Written on the body is a secret code only visible in certain lights; 
the accumulations of a lifetime gather there”  
Winterson (1996 p89, from the novel ‘Written on the Body’) 
Pregnancy losses are experiences comprised of multiple bodies, 
emotions, materialities, social relations and meanings, and, as such, are much 
more than simply medical ‘events’. Through the lens of my disciplinary 
affiliation as a geographer, I seek to respond to Layne’s (2003a p239) call that 
“[f]eminists must frankly acknowledge the frequency and import of such events 
in women’s lives and create a woman-centered discourse of pregnancy loss”. My 
research engages with narratives about pregnancy losses to consider a variety of 
embodied, visceral, emotional and relational aspects. With empirically-
grounded and theoretically-inferred consideration, I attempt to bring into focus 
the potentially vast ‘collection’ of components entailed in meanings of ‘loss’ and 
foreground the ways in which ‘spaces and places’ are intimately involved in 
pregnancy loss experiences. In addition to bodies as simultaneously material 
and emotional spaces, this includes: medical settings such as hospitals, Early 
Pregnancy Units (EPUs) and General Practitioner (GP) surgeries; homes and 
gardens; online sites; workplaces; cemeteries and other memorial locations. To 
focus solely or primarily on the emotionality of pregnancy losses, as I suggest 
much existing pregnancy loss research has, risks neglecting the physical body.  
My research will emphasise that “the physical and mental state of the body, its 
fleshy reality, is central” (Hall 2000 p28) to understandings of pregnancy loss. 
The argument that academic research has largely overlooked pregnancy 
losses, and that this is reflective of but also potentially contributory to wider 
social dismissal, has been made prominently by Layne (1999, 2000, 2003a, 
2003b) amongst others (Peppers and Knapp 1980; Reinharz 1988; Cecil 1996). 
Pregnancy loss grief is now well established in the academic literature and a 
number of UK charity-organisations have relatively prominent public profiles, 
including Sands (Stillbirth and Neonatal Death Society) and MA (The 
Miscarriage Association). Subsequently, there is also growing recognition of 
these experiences within the public domain as statistically frequent yet 
potentially devastating occurrences (Letherby 1999; Moulder 2001). Yet, 
dismissive or hostile modes of ‘grief policing’ (Walter 1999; Small and Hockey 
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2001) for pregnancy losses remain for many, conveying expectations that 
‘appropriate’ or ‘normal’ grief is brief (if at all necessary) and mourning discrete 
(private and quiet). Pregnancy losses ‘breach’ particular societal norms, 
expectations and linear trajectories, and are often responded to with 
invalidation and/or blame by social others such as by family members, friends, 
medical staff, and work colleagues. Social circles frequently retract socially-
produced conferment of ‘baby’ and accompanying parental identities, despite 
their prior participation (Lovell 1983; Murphy 2012a). Subsequently, there 
tends to be a dearth of recognition, support and consideration regarding 
pregnancy losses, which stands in marked contrast to the often intense inter-
personal interest in ongoing pregnancies (Longhurst 1999, 2008). 
This introductory chapter will outline the framework used in my 
research, drawing on aspects of existing academic literatures which I have 
identified as significant. I will firstly elaborate on my use of the term ‘pregnancy 
loss’ which signifies openness to the multiple material and emotional 
interpretations. Following this, I will discuss the relationship between feminist 
research and pregnancy loss to highlight some of the tensions entailed, 
including that of foetal personhood. I will then outline the ways I situate my 
interest in pregnancy loss experiences in relation to the discipline of geography, 
before offering an overview of the structure for the thesis.  
Defining ‘Pregnancy Losses’ 
I chose the umbrella label ‘pregnancy losses’ in my research owing to its 
amenability to different interpretations and contexts, permitting “an approach 
that is non-hierarchical in that it does not try, or want, to categorise experiences 
of loss in a way that some might be seen as more ‘serious’ or more ‘traumatic’ 
than others” (Earle et al 2012 p2). Subsequently, a variety of physiological and 
medical circumstances featured in my research: chemical, early, ectopic, 
anembryonic, missed and/or late miscarriages (<24 weeks); terminations (early 
and elective, as well as one late following positive prenatal diagnosis); pre-
partum stillbirth (>24 weeks, officially/legally recognised as deaths) and early 
neonatal death (<one week after birth). Medical classifications, however, do not 
adequately convey the complexity within and across circumstances, since 
“[w]omen miscarrying at the same gestational stage can react very differently 
depending on their own definitions of the experience” (Moulder 1994 p66).  
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The ways pregnancy losses are ‘lived’, understood and narrated are not 
merely matters of individual outlook or disposition but, rather, concern wider 
socio-cultural, historical, political and economic contexts (Malacrida 1999; 
Reagan 2003). The pervasive narrative of ‘naturally’-achieved, medically-
monitored pregnancies culminating in live births means that pregnancy losses 
in the contemporary Western context tend to be deemed both abnormal and 
unnatural (Layne 2012; Peel and Cain 2012). Subsequently, Layne (2003a) 
argues that pregnancy loss remains a taboo topic for discussion in society which, 
in effect, contributes to feelings of isolation and shame. Many who experience 
pregnancy losses, especially early losses, frequently encounter social responses 
of trivialisation characterised by dismissive comments like ‘better luck next 
time’ (Letherby 1999). As Layne (2003a) and Malacrida (1999) note, a plethora 
of seemingly minor aspects such as the lacking availability of specific ‘Hallmark’ 
sympathy cards can imply that miscarriages and stillbirths are not socially 
acceptable in terms of occurring, grieving or mourning. The cultural response of 
‘silence’, often leading to emotional suppression and social isolation, continues 
to be experienced by many following their pregnancy losses (Davidsson 
Bremborg 2012; Gold et al 2012; Peel and Cain 2012). 
Jenkins and Inhorn (2003) argue that research on ‘successful’ human 
reproduction has boomed in the social sciences in recent decades whilst 
‘reproduction gone awry’ has continued to be comparatively neglected. This is 
surprising given the frequency of pregnancy loss occurrences, with an estimated 
quarter of pregnancies ending in miscarriage (The Miscarriage Association 
2013a) and the UK stillbirth and neonatal death average rate of 17 babies a day 
(Sands 2013). There are also issues in the existing academic literature regarding 
which pregnancy losses have been researched and from which disciplinary 
perspectives this work has been conducted. Cecil (1996) comments that when 
she first began research on pregnancy loss, namely miscarriage, the topic was 
almost exclusively written about by psychologists and medical practitioners with 
very little contribution from social researchers. There have been calls and 
responses to rectify this omission, with Davidson (2007) noting a distinct strand 
in pregnancy loss literature during the 1990s of feminist research seeking to 
acknowledge women’s experiences and validate their ‘voices’ (Simonds and 
Rothman 1992; Layne 1996, 1999; Letherby 1999; Malacrida 1999). Feminist 
scholarly commitments have thus been crucial to the production of a significant 
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proportion of the social research on pregnancy losses; however, this situation is 
not without tensions (Kevin 2011) and Layne (2003a p239) argues many 
feminists have instead “abandoned their sisters in hours of need”.  
 Much research on pregnancy loss originates from the domains of 
biomedicine regarding prevention, treatment and management of losses, and 
from psychology (Cecil 1996). Whilst these continue to be important, other 
kinds of knowledge with different disciplinary and theoretical underpinnings 
are also valuable. Qualitative work on pregnancy loss now exists in, for example, 
sociology, theology, philosophy, and anthropology. However, as will be 
discussed in more depth below, the discipline of geography has not produced 
much work on the lived experiences of pregnancy loss. This is despite the fact 
that some research from other disciplines has considered themes of space and 
place, such as Bleyen (2010, 2012) and Woodthorpe (2012). The profound 
emotional responses to pregnancy losses are prominently evidenced in both 
quantitative and qualitative research (Peppers and Knapp 1980; Lovell 1983; 
Toedter et al 1988; Goldbach et al 1991; Slade 1994; Slade and Cecil 1994; Layne 
1996, 1999, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2006, 2012; Letherby 1999; Malacrida 
1999; Zucker 1999; Kohner and Henley 2001; McHaffie 2001; Simmons et al  
2006; Davidson 2007; Cacciatore et al 2008; Murphy 2009, 2012; Gaudet et al 
2010; Rowlands and Lee 2010; Séjourné et al 2010; Davidsson Bremborg 2012; 
Gold et al 2012). Within this, it is frequently demonstrated that pregnancy 
losses are often incredibly distressing experiences for women, their partners and 
families, pertaining not only the events of pregnancy losses themselves but also 
particular social responses to these. This is not to preclude that a range of views 
and responses to pregnancy losses are possible, including relief and 
inconvenience (Reagan 2003; Keane 2009). 
Throughout this thesis, I expand on a number of significant themes 
within the existing pregnancy loss literatures, such as the complexity of grief/ 
emotions involved (Murphy 2009) and how pregnancy losses are often 
responded to by some social others with silence and/or trivialisation (Letherby 
1999). In addition, I acknowledge that: some social others involved in 
pregnancy loss, such as partners (Puddifoot and Johnson 1997), are often 
overlooked (Chapter 4); that reproductive technologies like ultrasound 
(Moulder 2001; Peel and Caine 2012) and urine test kits (Layne 2010b) impact 
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on experiences of pregnancy loss (Chapter 3); and that many contemporary 
memorial practices suggest a shift to ‘continuing bonds’ (Silverman and Klass 
1996; Woodthorpe 2012) from ‘severed ties’ (Chapter 8). Although only 
pregnancy losses at 24 weeks or more gestation are currently legally certified as 
deaths in the UK, earlier pregnancy losses may be considered as deaths by those 
involved regardless. Others prefer the word ‘loss’ or use it to additionally denote 
a range and collection of meanings. As Collis (2005) demonstrates in relation to 
hysterectomy, ‘loss’ can refer to: the physical organ; associated processes such 
as menstruation; the potential for children/childbearing; sexual desire; and 
‘femininity’ or ‘womanhood’. Despite different understandings, vocabulary and 
definitions, social responses of silence and denigration of one’s emotions and 
responses can be experienced towards all forms of pregnancy losses. 
Feminist Research and Tensions Regarding Embryos and Foetuses 
It is likely that many feminist scholars, geographers included, have been 
reluctant to engage with the topic of pregnancy loss owing to contentious 
reproductive choice struggles (Layne 1999, 2003a, 2003b). As Kevin (2011) 
notes, different strands of feminism are relevant here: whilst the women’s 
health movement can be understood as a feminist endeavour in some ways 
(Burt Ruzek 1978), Layne (2003a, 2003b) argues that this has entailed 
overemphasising the happy outcomes of pregnancies as controllable, natural 
and joyful. Pregnancy loss events can undermine the efforts by women’s health 
movements to de-medicalise pregnancy by adding to: 
the knowledge that birth can be dangerous, fertility is not always 
assured, breasts and uteri are vulnerable to the growth of tumors 
and fibroids, the body is difficult to proof against the aches and 
pains of aging (Kaufert 1998 p287-288).  
In addition, much feminist research and activism has been critical to hard-
fought, ongoing struggles to ensure women have access to safe contraceptive 
and termination methods. Acknowledging embryonic/foetal entities as ‘life’, and 
therefore subjects to be grieved and mourned, has therefore been thought to 
undermine these efforts (Layne 1999, 2003a, 2003b). In relation to 
biomedicine, feminist explorations have highlighted how women as whole body-
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persons with agency have largely been displaced by the centring of other 
subjects, including those of the foetus and the couple (Spallone 1989).  
However, Michaels and Morgan (1999) and Ludlow (2008) argue that a 
feminist and women-centred account of reproduction must engage with the 
multitude of meanings that women themselves attribute to their pregnancies, 
embryos and foetuses. Although attempts “[t]o recuperate the fetus in feminist 
terms necessarily forces us into dangerous territory”, it is an important 
endeavour (Michaels and Morgan 1999 p2; Ludlow 2008). To this end, 
Morgan’s (1996) ‘foetal relationality’ and Layne’s (2003a) model of foetal 
subjecthood, concerned with socially constructed rather than biologically or 
universally given identities, can alleviate some reproductive political tensions. 
These frameworks recognise that “who or what is called “person” is […] made 
possible by as well as produced and sustained in and through social relations” 
(Hartouni 1999 p300); hence some embryos and foetuses are grieved whilst 
others are not. The adoption of a subject constructionist model (Layne 2003a) 
enables recognition of termination without moral insistence extrapolating 
embryo/foetus to the equivalent of a baby, child or person whilst respecting that 
some individuals do imbue (some of) their pregnancies with subjecthood. 
Resonating with Franklin (1991) and Morgan (1996), this reinstates the 
centrality of the ‘social’ in the production of foetal personhood, crucially 
resisting a move to ascribe legal personhood and the use of biological 
development markers in theoretical viability.  
For Addelson (1999 p32), Morgan’s (1996) ‘foetal relationality’, by 
emphasising relationships in the production of embryonic and foetal  identities, 
“represents a theoretical effort to seize the public problems back from 
biomedical professionals and old-fashioned believers in essential characteristics 
of individuals”. Distinguishing between social- and biological- life (Hallam et al 
1999), these approaches permit recognition that some persons—including those 
who may eventually terminate for elective or medical reasons—do imbue their 
ova, embryos and foetuses with subjecthood and that, when ‘unhappy endings’ 
(Layne 2003b) disrupt a related ideal or anticipated future, they may grieve, 
mourn and memorialise these. As noted, the term loss is amenable to different 
understandings and receptive to a variety of lived experiences: a pregnancy loss 
may not be seen as a loss of a person or an otherwise life, but as the material 
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loss without assuming or requiring any particular form of emotional, 
psychological nor moral consequence.  
The distinction between those embryos/foetuses which are not grieved 
and those which are does not neatly map onto a differentiation between 
termination and other pregnancy losses like miscarriage. My research was open 
to participation by those primarily or additionally with termination experiences. 
Terminations are not necessarily instances of freely, autonomously chosen 
endings to pregnancies even if labelled ‘elective’. For instance, terminations can 
arise out of the use of prenatal medical diagnostic tools with detected foetal 
anomalies (Stanworth 1987; Sandelowski and Jones 1996; Ginsburg and Rapp 
1999; Woliver 2002; Sandelowski and Barroso 2005). The language of ‘choice’ is 
troublesome in such contexts, whereby individual women are left with traumatic 
decisions whilst “we as a society are absolved of collective responsibility to 
better the lives of different children” (Woliver 2002 p30; also: Lock 1998; 
Saxton 1998; Sandelowski and Barroso 2005). As Gemma (pseudonym) said, 
regarding foetal anomalies detected at a routine ultrasound, “I felt like either 
way we would be playing god – an operation to keep a baby that would 
otherwise die alive, or a termination”. Solinger (1998) highlights that there can 
also be significant tensions between the language of ‘rights’ and ‘choice’: 
presuppositions that one has ‘choices’ can mask de facto denial of termination 
access and resources. ‘Choice’ is a rhetoric familiar within consumerist 
frameworks of empowerment, implying unbridled, unrestrained options which 
often entail limitations in practice regarding finances/poverty, interpersonal 
relationships, and discrimination including racism and ageism (Solinger 1998; 
Hartouni 1999). Thus, ‘choice’ can be empty, illusionary and disempowering in 
the reality of power differentials, curtailed options including that regarding 
social/welfare support and the furthered medicalisation of pregnancy with only 
limited abilities to ameliorate many foetal defects (Lock 1998; Williams 2006). 
I therefore sought to neither conflate all instances of pregnancy loss nor 
diametrically oppose them as incompatible. Judgements about different 
pregnancy loss experiences cannot rely on a dichotomous approach which 
simplifies the complexity of situations to having either full agency or none at all. 
I advocate resisting a move which unanimously lumps all terminations as 
merely ‘chosen’, oppositional to and conflicting with other kinds of pregnancy 
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losses. Presuppositions about the emotional responses entailed in different 
forms of pregnancy loss are also challenged: the decision to terminate a 
pregnancy can be extremely difficult and distressing whilst the response to 
miscarriage can be of relief and inconvenience (Reagan 2003; Keane 2009). 
Since agency is a continuum, the category of ‘pregnancy loss’ simultaneously 
expands and fragments by foregrounding that there is no singular experience. 
Recognising the complexity of situations brings into focus the often 
“unacknowledged ambiguities” (Solinger 1998 p390) of ‘choice’ and the diverse 
ways that agency is present in participants’ narratives as they make sense of 
their pregnancy loss experiences in social contexts. Thus, in negotiating the 
“fraught task of a feminist articulation of the impact of pregnancy loss” (Kevin 
2011 p851) in the context of reproductive debates, Layne’s (2003a) and 
Morgan’s (1996) theoretical frameworks are vital. My interest in the multiple 
circumstances, contexts and responses regarding pregnancy loss experiences 
(Moulder 1994) has also been influenced broadly by engagements with 
‘difference’ in social and cultural geography (McDowell 1995; Sibley 1995; 
Mitchell 2000; Murdoch 2006); I now turn to discuss further the ways in which 
I situate my research within the wider discipline. 
Geography and the Marginalisation of Pregnancy Loss 
Geography—as a way of thinking with attendance to space, place, 
location, relations and boundaries—has produced little scholarship on the topic 
of pregnancy loss experiences. Geographical work has, however, highlighted the 
significance of global disparities regarding reproduction ‘events’, as shown by 
Dorling et al (2010) in proportional maps based on statistical data of: maternal 
mortality (defined as death during pregnancy and up to six weeks after giving 
birth), stillbirth (taken as foetuses born dead >28 weeks gestation) and early 
neonatal mortality (understood as baby deaths within one week of birth).1 
However, engagements with the experiences of pregnancy loss in the global 
context remains limited, with van der Sijpt’s (2010) anthropology work 
regarding Cameroon being an exception. Van der Sijpt (2010) argues that the 
                                                          
1 These cartographic representations highlight global disparity, as reiterated in a 2011 series of 
papers on stillbirth in the medical journal The Lancet. Bhutta et al (2011), for example, argue 
that stillbirth has been invisible in policies and programmes worldwide despite 98% of 
stillbirths occurring in low- and middle- income countries (see also Frøen et al 2011). 
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predominant omission pertains to reductionist discourses regarding global 
health so that studies on fertility in Africa often overshadow pregnancy losses 
with other pregnancy-related issues or adopt a medicalised approach rather 
than situating these events within women’s everyday social lives. Whilst the 
global context is certainly important for further and sustained consideration by 
geographers, including of women’s lived experiences in the global South as van 
der Sijpt (2010) demonstrates, the disciplinary attunements of geography also 
highlight a range of other spatial contexts and approaches for further research 
including on pregnancy losses in contemporary Western societies. 
‘Experience’ denotes the processes of ‘living out’ and ‘living through’ 
existence, and is comprised of multiple temporal, spatial, emotional, material, 
bodily, sensorial, discursive and social dimensions. My approach as a social 
geographer to pregnancy loss therefore entails attending to a variety of the 
‘spaces and places’ involved in these experiences. The social dynamics of some 
locations have been part of previous pregnancy loss scholarship within, for 
example, anthropology and sociology. For instance, Bleyen (2010) considers 
memorial objects within the homes of parents who have experienced stillbirth in 
Belgium and Layne (2003a) discusses US face-to-face support groups as well as 
their circulated newsletters. In the UK context, Woodthorpe (2012) explores the 
setting of baby gardens/cemeteries and Letherby (1999) remarks on the medical 
encounters of some of her participants put on general gynaecology or post-natal 
wards during miscarriage. However, I suggest that a geographical approach can 
further articulate the ways in which space matters to pregnancy loss experiences 
and expand the array of locations which can be understood in these terms. This 
includes attendance to ‘the body’, described by Rich (1986 p212) as the 
“geography closest in”. Doing so can elicit some of the complexities of 
pregnancy loss experiences, with better understanding supporting better care, 
and further advance various sub-disciplines within geography.  
One reason behind the seeming overlooking of pregnancy loss 
experiences within geography likely pertains to historically dominant 
hierarchies of patriarchal power relations at the forefront of knowledge 
production. With implications for the ‘who’ and ‘what’ of scholarship, women 
have been historically excluded both as producers and subjects of geographical 
knowledge (Rose 1993). Pregnancy and therefore pregnancy loss may have been 
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largely overlooked or dismissed as plausible areas of geographical study owing 
to the ways in which these are inseparable from women’s physiological and 
psychological lived experiences. Drawing on the work of Rothman (1989), 
Woliver (2002 p123) highlights how “pregnancy and motherhood are 
continuously described from a male perspective”: 
[t]o say that women first hold their babies after they are born is to 
say that the nine-month experience of pregnancy was nothing. 
One reason pregnancy does not “count” here is because men 
cannot experience it. As an exclusively female experience, 
pregnancy is often discounted and belittled in powerful men’s 
discussions about babies. 
This may help explain why ‘male-stream’ geographical scholarship has had little 
interest in the spatial nature of pregnancy and pregnancy loss experiences.  
However, supported by wider scholarly turns to ‘bodies’ (Longhurst 
1997a, 2001, 2005), ‘emotions’ (Davidson and Milligan 2004; Bondi et al 2005) 
and ‘touch’ (Paterson et al 2012) in recent years, vibrant feminist geographies 
have emerged (McDowell 1992; Rose 1993; Blunt and Rose 1994; Hanson 1999; 
Blunt and Wills 2000; Staeheli and Martin 2000; Bondi and Davidson 2003). 
Subsequently, feminist geographies have brought many important issues into 
focus, including in relation to health, reproduction and maternity. This involves 
topics such as: chronic illness (Moss and Dyck 2002; Crooks 2006); 
agoraphobia (Davidson 2000) and links with pregnancy (Davidson 2001); 
‘sized’ bodies and shopping (Colls 2006); family photographs (Rose 2010); the 
public scrutiny of pregnant bodies and emotions (Longhurst 1997b, 1999); 
maternity clothes (Gregson and Beale 2004; Longhurst 2008); online 
pregnancy/mothering websites (Madge and O’Connor 2002, 2005); 
breastfeeding (Boyer and Boswell-Penc 2010; Boyer 2011); midwifery (Fannin 
2007); childbirth (Sharpe 1999; Longhurst 2009); cord-blood banking (Fannin 
2011); placentas (Colls and Fannin 2013); and hysterectomies (Collis 2005), as 
well as furthering feminist methodologies (Rose 1997; Sharp 2005) and 
pedagogies (Dowler 2002; Davidson et al 2009). These works, attending to 
women’s experiences, are important for the ways in which they “spill, soil and 
mess up, clean, hard, masculinist geography” (Longhurst 2001 p25).  
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My research also seeks to contribute to the developing sub-discipline of 
the geographies of death and dying (Hartig and Dunn 1998; Kong 1999; Teo 
1999; Yeoh 1999; Maddrell 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2013; McLoughlin 2010; 
Hockey et al 2010; Maddrell and Sidaway 2010). Yet, if culturally pervasive 
normative notions of death, bereavement and grief prevail over the 
understandings of those intimately involved, pregnancy losses are unlikely to be 
recognised as bereavements (including even those medically/legally regarded as 
such). Qualifying life and death biologically and post-partum neglects the 
myriad ways social life comes to exist as “family lives are dreamed into being” 
(Hockey and Draper 2005 p54) via thought, speech, material accumulations and 
practices (Layne 2000). I am in agreement with Casper (1999 p110) that “[f]etal 
ontology, like other social categories, is produced within social interactions 
rather than biologically or naturally given”. I argue that dismissive attitudes 
towards the potential significance of pregnancy losses arise from a failure to 
take into account the distinction between biological- and social- life and death 
(Hallam et al 1999). Constituting ‘ambiguous losses’ (Boss 1999; Cacciatore et al 
2008), pregnancy losses are often rendered forms of ‘disenfranchised grief’ 
(Doka 2002; Rowlands and Lee 2010), frequently met with ‘silence’ and/or 
trivialisation from social others. Those who have pregnancy losses thus may 
encounter various kinds of social and medical silencing and insensitivity 
towards their experiences with their emotions (like grief) and responses (like 
mourning and memorialisation) potentially dismissed as pathological, 
unhealthy and hysterical, with the latter drawing on the longstanding statement 
pertaining to women’s reproductive bodies (Shohat 1998).   
Despite relatively little work in geography on pregnancy loss experiences, 
the discipline does nonetheless afford relevant theoretical resources. 
Subsequently, I draw from geographical work on themes of feminism, bodies, 
emotions, material culture, death and dying, and online activities to articulate 
the spatio-temporalities of research participants’ pregnancy loss experiences. In 
bringing together multiple literatures, I develop a response to Layne’s (2003a 
p249) comments that “[i]t is high time we recognize pregnancy loss and offer 
our support”. In articulating “a woman-centered discourse of pregnancy loss” 
(Layne 2003a p239), I will foreground bodies as physical, emotional, social 
spaces, as well as the spaces they occupy, to consider dimensions which are 
seemingly absent or only partially addressed in much existing pregnancy loss 
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literatures. I seek to not only demonstrate the presence of bodies in pregnancy 
losses, which seems relatively obvious, but to address the ways vital 
interconnections between bodily materiality and emotions matter. Murphy and 
Philpin (2010) suggest that early miscarriages are (or can be) about 
bereavement but also physiological manifestations, such as bleeding, which are 
somewhat paradoxically neglected in nursing practice (Murphy and Philpin 
2012). Similarly, I argue that, in an effort to legitimise pregnancy loss grief, 
much focus in the academic literature has been on the ways cognitive efforts are 
made to (re)create and (re)confer subjecthood/personhood onto lost/deceased 
embryos, foetuses and neonates. Subsequently, the material bodies of 
pregnancy loss ‘babies’ have prominently featured; for example, Layne’s (2000) 
work considers ‘baby things’, like clothes and toys, in addition to photographs 
and scan images as constituting ‘evidence’ of past bodily existence.  
In effect, I find the focus on embryonic/foetal baby bodies to have 
eclipsed the bodies of pregnancy-losing women themselves. I am not claiming 
that women’s pregnancy-losing bodies are altogether absent from the previous 
literature, indeed they are always implicitly present, but rather that there is 
more to consider. Equally in my research, I do not discard the significance of 
embryonic and foetal subjects but agree with Michaels and Morgan (1999 p2) 
and Ludlow (2008) that feminist scholars must “recuperate” and take seriously 
‘the foetus’ by attending to the social meanings attached to these by different 
women (and men). My interest in foregrounding embodied experiences of 
pregnancy loss is intended as a feminist endeavour which recognises that there 
have been some important changes since the conduct of the 1990s strand of 
feminist research as noted by Davidson (2007). Such bodily experiences are not 
asocial or temporally fixed and there are a number of contemporary factors with 
implications for pregnancy losses. These include: the routinisation and 
diversification of medical technologies involved in conceiving, diagnosing and 
managing pregnancy and pregnancy losses such as urine tests, ultrasonography 
and prenatal testing (Chapter 3); the further normalised construction of foetal 
personhood including with more involvement encouraged for persons such as 
partners (Chapter 4); particular understandings of encountering deceased 
bodies in grief/funerary practice (Chapter 5); the proliferation of online 
technologies permitting easy and sustained participation in computer-mediated 
support groups (Chapter 6); trends of tattooing as a popular body modification 
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practice generally and in relation to memorialisation specifically (Chapter 7); 
and an age of ‘memorial mania’ (Doss 2010) involving a plethora, and extensive 
deployment, of other forms of memorial activities (Chapter 8).  
Research Agenda 
In the absence of providing specific research questions, in this short 
section I will outline how I arrived at conducting research on pregnancy loss in 
order to highlight some of the conceptual and empirical elements which feature 
in this thesis. My relationship to the research topics can be characterised as 
iterative, as interests preceding the doctorate coalesced and connected with 
new/other themes, meaning that the process involved looping back and forth as 
ideas intersected and altered the directionality of thought. For instance, during 
my MA degree, I developed an interest in body spaces and body modifications—
underpinned more broadly by concern with feminist research (geographical and 
otherwise)—in relation to traumatic experiences like bereavements. This 
included, for example, researching about participants’ narratives of memorial 
tattoos and the usage of material objects previously owned by the now-deceased 
– two themes which also feature in this doctorate work. My commitment to 
feminist theory and the value of practices of meaning-making and expression 
regarding experiences, especially those which are troubling or traumatic, remain 
dominant presences in this doctorate research on spaces of pregnancy losses. 
It was an interest in memorial practices, and particularly those 
concerning photographs, through which I became aware of memorial websites 
for stillborn babies. The spur to further research these developed as I became 
aware of some seemingly widely-held reactions regarding these sites and 
especially to the photographs of stillborn children: of shock, horror and 
repulsion alongside trivialisation. These responses became evident as I searched 
online for further information, coming across numerous blogs and comments 
characterised by hostility, in addition to informal conversations with peers who 
had enquired about the changed direction of my research project away from the 
circulation of images of the now-deceased, pre- and post- mortem, in the news 
media. The notion that these sites were somehow inappropriate and offensive to 
others, for marking grief and enacting mourning for stillborn children, both 
shocked and surprised me initially. As I reflected on this, at the base of 
responses of rejection there seemed to be a fundamental misunderstanding. For 
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me, the memorial websites did not feature ‘gore’, even if/when depicted bodies 
were not always aesthetically ‘contained’ and ‘sanitised’ (a recognition of the 
fleshy and fluid experience of bodies being at the core of many underpinning 
feminist critiques), but rather were emotionally powerful expressions of love 
and loss. Broadening out to think about other forms of pregnancy loss, my 
doctorate research sought to elaborate understanding about these experiences 
as more than medical events in order to rectify the seeming misconceptions I 
observed, and which Layne (2003a) demonstrates to be socially prevalent, to 
make an intervention through offering recognition and opportunities to talk. 
Layout of the Thesis 
The thesis is comprised of nine chapters in total, including six empirical 
chapters into which the relevant literatures are woven. Chapter 2 will outline my 
methodology, emphasising the centrality of feminist, sensitive, and online/ 
multi-communication research practices. All the empirical chapters in the thesis 
attend to different elements of spatial contexts in thinking about the body as a 
space, or series of spaces, and as occupying/moving through other kinds of 
spaces. Chapter 3 will consider internal/interior body spaces in relation to 
human chorionic gonadotropin (hCG) tests, ultrasonography and quickening. 
Encounters with medical interventions, technologies and staff will be 
foregrounded in relation to experiences ‘prior’ as well as ‘during’ and ‘after’ the 
occurrence of pregnancy losses. Chapter 4 elaborates on themes of grief 
legitimacy, recognising that pregnancy losses entail wider social and inter-
personal contexts including partners, family members and work colleagues. 
Chapter 5 will then attend to bodily experiences of encounters with pregnancy 
loss fluids/flows such as uterine bleeding, lactation, tears and the accompanying 
spaces such as toilets. Although such bodily experiences are heavily connoted as 
‘private’, they are also discussed in relatively public domains: Chapter 6 will 
reflect on online pregnancy loss activities as involving (reconstituted) bodies 
and social hierarchies of belonging. Following this, bodily experience will again 
feature prominently in Chapter 7 in relation to surfaces of skins, contours and 
bumps which participate in pregnancy loss narratives. This will include 
discussion of forms of modifications to external skin topographies and bodily 
contours such as stretch-marks, maternity clothes, and memorial tattoos and 
jewellery. Chapter 8 will then build further on the theme of mourning and 
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memorialising pregnancy losses in relation to themes of ‘absence’, ‘presence’ 
and ‘continuing bonds’. Finally, the concluding chapter will draw together key 
themes of the research and their implications in terms of contributions to 
various sub-disciplines and relevance for future research.  
16 
 
Methodology 
Introduction 
The processes of ‘doing’ research and the data produced are, far from 
being separate entities, “reflexively interdependent and interconnected” 
(Letherby 2003; Mauther and Doucet 2003 p414). With this in mind, this 
chapter will outline the methodological underpinnings of my project, reflecting 
on: participant recruitment; ethics and sensitivity; qualitative interview practice 
by face-to-face, telephone, email and Skype; positionality; reflexivity and power 
relations, including around ‘voice’. Subsequently, it will blend pragmatic details 
about the research and conceptual considerations, connecting particular issues 
with potentially significant (practical, ethical, theoretical) implications for the 
kinds of ‘data’ (narratives) produced. In seeking fit between the topic and 
research methods, three sets of non-mutually exclusive literatures were 
particularly pertinent for me: those attending to feminist, ‘sensitive’ and online/ 
multi-communication research contexts. After providing a brief overview of 
some key points regarding the research, I will discuss each of the three key sets 
of academic literatures in turn. I will then bring together respective insights to 
consider my research focus on pregnancy loss entailing potentially intimate or 
difficult conversations about bodies and emotions. Within this, I will reflect on 
some of the ways ethical tensions were approached in practice with constant 
vigilance and readiness to respond, yet sometimes without ‘resolution’ as such. 
Before closing the Methodology chapter and moving onto the first empirical 
chapter, I will outline the approach taken to research data analysis.  
My research mobilised around the term ‘pregnancy loss’, stemming from 
an effort to acknowledge a variety of physiological circumstances, to allow 
participants to identify with (or challenge) such a label at their discretion 
without imposing implicit judgements about which losses ‘matter’. Recruitment 
was enabled through ‘Call for Participants’ posts which I placed on various 
pregnancy loss support web-forums and social network sites. Though 
recruitment via online opened participation to many locations, most 
participants were based in the UK, which provided an opportunity to, for 
example, address the “particular dearth of insight” into UK pregnancy loss 
memorialising practices (Woodthorpe 2012 p144). Multiple qualitative 
interviews—in face-to-face, telephone, Skype and email formats—were 
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conducted with each self-selecting participant when possible, sometimes 
extending over a period of many months to suit participants’ preferences and 
schedules. In total, I spoke to 24 persons: 21 women discussing primarily their 
own pregnancy losses, one male partner and two siblings (one male, one 
female). All participants are attributed a consistent pseudonym name and, 
related to feminist research efforts for participants ‘voices’ to be ‘heard’, I quote 
from interviews often and sometimes extensively. As a result, the circumstances 
of some participants will accumulatively become familiar to the reader and short 
participant vignettes are also provided to consult in Appendix 1 (pp255-265). To 
minimise the risks of participants being identifiable, I have also removed 
reference to the names of social others (their family, children, friends, work 
colleagues), specific dates (of births/deaths), place names (cities, towns, 
hospitals) and any particularly rare medical details if known to be as such.2  
Feminist Research Practice 
A historical overlooking of women’s experiences, especially regarding 
reproduction, is noted throughout academia, including in the discipline of 
geography (Rose 1993). In response, feminist research is fundamentally 
interested in the “reclaiming and validation of women’s experience” since these, 
“not fitting the male model, […] [are often] trivialized, denied or distorted; our 
perceptions are systematically pathologized; we are crazy women, imagining 
things, making a fuss about nothing” (Kitzinger and Wilkinson 1997 p566). I 
consider pregnancy loss a topic particularly amenable to feminist exploration, as 
does Layne (2003a p239) who calls for the creation of “a woman-centered 
discourse of pregnancy loss”. However, there are aforementioned tensions 
between the topic of pregnancy loss and feminist research, such as around 
termination and reproductive justice (Layne 2003a, 2003b; Michaels and 
Morgan 1999). Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1997) highlight that feminist 
researchers can face dilemmas when confronted with participants’ views or 
experiences which differ from their own theoretical and political positions. 
Since feminist researchers “do not simply ‘validate’ every women’s experience”, 
                                                          
2 Participants were also invited to inform me if they had disclosed any information which they, 
at the time or later, felt uncomfortable about or which might risk their anonymity so that I could 
remove or alter these in the write-up. Despite these efforts, as the informed consent document 
reiterated, it may still be possible that others could identify them. 
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the authors encourage reflection on “[h]ow are we to address the experience of 
such women, which does not fit our (feminist) theoretical frameworks?” 
(Kitzinger and Wilkinson 1997 p568 italics in original, p567). I  subsequently 
sought to adopt “a politics of ambivalence [which] is not about ‘sitting on the 
fence’, but about creating spaces in which tensions, contradictions and 
paradoxes can be negotiated fruitfully and dynamically” (Bondi 2004 p5).  
Interview Methodologies in Feminist Research 
A method cannot be inherently feminist, though my deployment of semi-
structured interviews is part of a commitment to ‘feminist research practice’ 
(Letherby 2003, Sharp 2005). The research was intended as part of wider 
feminist endeavours to ‘give voice’ to women’s experiences and, specifically, to 
contribute to ‘breaking the silence’ around pregnancy loss as identified by Layne 
(2003a, 2003b). Whilst other methods are amenable to feminist aims (Kwan 
2002 on feminist GIS; Sharp 2005), qualitative interviews have often been used 
since these enable opportunities for participants to speak extensively about their 
lived experiences. This is a key way in which ‘the personal is political’, a slogan 
attributed to Hanisch (1970), has been translated into grounded scholarship. In 
my pregnancy loss research, I used semi-structured, multiple, qualitative 
interviews, seeking to interview each participant at least twice, in the formats of 
face-to-face, telephone, email and Skype. The heavy use of quotations from 
participants in this thesis connects to wider feminist endeavours to convey the 
voices of participants (Holloway 1989). However, influenced by Kitzinger and 
Wilkinson (1997 p567), I do not wish to present myself “as no more than 
amanuensis or conduit for other women’s experiences” but instead acknowledge 
that I have unavoidably selected and framed in particular ways participants’ 
experiences and words in the write up of my thesis.  
Qualitative interviews are conversational and interactional encounters 
with complex emotional dynamics (Bondi 2005). This includes: participants’ 
emotions as they reflect on, and narrate, their remembered experiences (hopes 
and fears); my own emotional responses; and the interaction of both of these 
with bodily gestures, verbal/textual responses and interview atmospheres 
(Bondi 2005). Attending to the emotional dynamics in research relationships 
can highlight aspects requiring alteration or rethinking to foster more sensitive, 
careful and supportive interview interactions (Bondi 2005). In addition, 
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recognising—rather than negating—emotions within research settings can 
constitute an important set of interpretive resources, bearing upon analysis and 
understanding since “our feeling states and our thinking are closely 
intertwined” (Bondi 2005 p236). In the context of my research, a recognition 
that “emotions are integral to research relationships” (Bondi 2005 p232) is 
linked to the overtly feminist framework adopted. This pertains to the ways in 
which emotions have historically been dichotomised and de-valued in gendered 
ways in contrast to ‘rationality’, ‘objectivity’ and ‘reason’ (Williams 2001). 
Explaining dualisms as “the belief that there are two mutually exclusive types of 
“thing,” physical and mental, body and mind, that compose the universe in 
general and subjectivity in particular”, Grosz (1994) considers the ways 
feminists have worked beyond the legacies of phallocentric, binarised thought. 
Valuing emotions as knowledges can therefore constitute a challenge to the 
masculine privileging of disembodied ‘rationality’ which has tended to represent 
emotions as a feminine, distracting and deceptive ‘other’ (Williams 2001). 
Positionality and Pregnancy Loss 
 Franklin et al (1991) argue that a focus on knowledge and power relations 
in academia can enable consideration of the links between personal experience 
and theoretical approaches/questions. Autobiography is now more overtly 
incorporated in social sciences and humanities scholarship than previously, 
with recognition that personal experiences can be rich interpretive resources. 
Within this, emotions are foregrounded in the production of poetic and 
‘heartful’ autoethnographies (Ellis 1999). Autobiographical reflections have also 
featured prominently in some of the qualitative research on miscarriages and 
stillbirths (Cotterill and Letherby 1993; Layne 2000, 2003a, 2003b; Reagan 
2003; Davidson 2007, 2011; Murphy 2009; Forhan 2010), terminations (Ellis 
and Bochner 1992), and both voluntary and involuntary non-motherhood 
(Letherby and Williams 1999).3 The ‘confessional turn’ in scholarship has 
extended the feminist project in highlighting connections between individual 
and social experience, that ‘the personal is political’; however, it is not without 
criticism (Swan 2008). As cautioned by Swan (2008, drawing on Boud and 
                                                          
3 In addition, autobiography features in some research generally on reproductive experiences, 
such as Ivry (2010) on differing cultural approaches towards prenatal testing in Israel and Japan 
in her experience of pregnancy. 
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Walker 1998), it would be an error to consider personal experience ‘raw 
material’ when our articulations of these are always already culturally framed 
through particular interpretations and analytical categories. This comment 
resonates with my ambivalence regarding the autobiographical trends which 
can risk implying that ‘personal experience’ is a necessary and/or privileged 
position in order to legitimately research on, for example, pregnancy loss.4 
 My decision to not disclose either way whether I myself have experience 
of pregnancy loss in this thesis is, of course, not a simple one to have made. In 
doing so, I wished to disrupt what I felt to be a pressure or coercive imperative 
to ‘self-tell’ (Swan 2008, drawing on Skeggs 2002) emerging from some of the 
existing literature and from queries in response to, for example, my academic 
presentations. By no means do I wish to imply disapproval of other researchers 
who do disclose their personal experiences of pregnancy loss as a central 
justification or resource in their research, but I am stating that I myself did not 
wish to or consider it vital for this to be the case in my own work. This may seem 
to go against the grain in the sense that much feminist research practice has 
emphasised the importance of reciprocal ‘openness’ with participants and the 
ways in which, by sharing information about themselves, researchers can foster 
better rapport (Oakley 1981). Thus feminist research has fronted a significant 
encouragement to consider ethics and power relations in order to protect 
participants, but attempts to do so can also be problematic. Irwin (2006 p170) 
comments, “subjectivity is not more or less exploitative than objectivity […] If 
researchers and research participants enact inequalities when they are intimate, 
intimacy can be even more damaging and problematic than objectivity”. 
Subsequently, that the encouragement to ‘self-tell’, as a form of interactional 
                                                          
4 The notion that one must have experience of something in order to understand it underpins 
self-help movements. However, in Chapter 6, I argue that this this is a potentially unhelpful 
notion, risking the valorisation of ‘shared’ experiences regardless of the differences actually 
entailed and the exclusions. My hesitancy towards self-disclosure, therefore, derives not from 
viewing it as ‘anti’ or inappropriate to academia but rather owing to the ways in which it can 
become a demand with some problematic consequences.  
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intimacy, can unintentionally exert expectations on or ‘set the parameters’ of 
discussion for participants’ talk was one reason for my non-disclosure.5 
There is something of a tension between protecting participants’ privacy 
and the vulnerability of the ‘exposed’ self-telling researcher since “[t]o 
undertake such [autobiographical] projects involves [the researcher] taking 
exactly the kind of personal risks and exposure from which feminist ethics seek 
to protect research participants” (Inckle 2005 p243). As with this research, 
participants are attributed pseudonyms to reduce identification by others; yet 
such a protective endeavor is not afforded to the author whose name is 
necessarily evident. There may be particular assumptions made about 
researchers based on their academic interests but this is not the same as self-
disclosure or doing so in all contexts/settings of one’s life (Valentine 1998). As it 
transpired, perceiving me to be ‘young’ and not describing myself as a mother, 
some participants assumed that I would not have personal experience of 
pregnancy loss either.6 Some participants adopted relatively protective stances 
towards me in offering advice, demonstrating how my young, female body 
“shaped how people understood and responded to me” (Ellingson 2006 p306). 
For instance, regarding the invasiveness of vaginal examinations in relation to 
her miscarriages, Caroline made a comparison to smear tests and brought me/ 
my body, history and anticipated future of cervical checks to the fore: “you can 
imagine and that is [very invasive], well, I’m sure you’ve been to see it [smear 
test] or if you haven’t, you SHOULD because you’re a young woman”. My 
reproductive future again emerged in a subsequent interview as Caroline 
implored: “that’s my advice to you if you ever have children, don’t be rushing 
down the shop to buy these [HCG urine test] kits, WAIT”.  
                                                          
5 I did not mention whether or not I have personal experience during recruitment, including in 
conversations with the online group gatekeepers, nor with participants unless I was directly 
asked and/or it was deemed significant in that particular context for the participant to know.  
6 Normative assumptions about who has, or ‘should’ have, children probably also featured. As a 
‘young’ female, it seemed largely assumed that my pregnancy/child-bearing experiences were 
forthcoming rather than having a history and/or current. Linked to this, there were moments 
when participants drew on or challenged particular judgements/assumptions regarding ‘teenage 
pregnancy’ as fraught with, for example, ageism (‘too young’) and classism (socio-economic 
poverty/deprivation). For further critiques, see Pillow (2006) on the bodies of pregnant 
students in schools and Ladd-Taylor and Unmansky (1998) on mothers labelled ‘bad’. 
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(Non)Disclosure and Knowledge Produced 
In effect, I enacted a form of management largely through inaction 
regarding self-telling which, in an academic field where disclosure is somewhat 
a norm, is a deliberate action. However, since “the location and perspective of 
the researcher is both inseparable from, and integral to, the knowledge 
produced” (Inckle 2005 p233), there were implications nonetheless. Reflecting 
on this dimension of my positionality, I recognise that my non-disclosure 
decision—with the simultaneous operation of assumptions seemingly being 
made in the absence of disclosure either way—will not have been a neutral 
presence, as the aforementioned examples from Caroline highlight. However, as 
is the way with all attempts at reflexivity, determining exactly what the 
outcomes were—in different situations and in different ways with/for 
participants—of how I was positionally perceived is near-impossible (Rose 
1997). Crucially though, I would not necessarily agree that a sense of reciprocity 
in sharing experiences of, for instance, pregnancy loss inevitably means that 
participants disclose more; what is disclosed, however, may well be different.  
Contrary to concerns that, without reciprocal self-disclosure of shared 
experiences, participants would not ‘open up’ about their experiences, being 
perceived as reproductively inexperienced meant that participants sometimes 
gave incredibly detailed accounts. Had they perceived me as having had the 
‘same’ experiences as theirs such as of prenatal tests in pregnancy, it may 
otherwise have been assumed that my familiarity did not necessitate their 
elaboration. Although I have suggested that participants assumed that I did not 
have personal experience of pregnancy or, hence, pregnancy loss, tentative 
uncertainty was present on some occasions. Rosie, for example, commented “I 
don’t know if you know the pain of ectopic” before then following this up with 
quite a detailed description of her felt sensations regarding medical 
investigation in recognition that I may well not have experienced this physical 
scenario: 
but it’s sort of up in your shoulder blades but erm... because they 
pump your stomach full of gas to be able to get a clear shot at your 
fallopian tubes as you then sit up and recover, all that also 
migrates up your body cavity and into your shoulders, so it was 
‘I’m still in pain!’ 
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As the first participant spoken to with experience of fertility treatments, Rosie 
was also valuable—being very thorough in her explanations and generous in her 
clarifications—in helping me grasp a range of medical terminologies and 
treatments (including the UK brand names of pharmaceuticals such as Clomid). 
Although I was sometimes positioned as academically knowledgeable about, for 
example, pregnancy loss grief, the fact I was largely deemed to be an ‘outsider’ 
without personal experience of pregnancy loss could yield very rich ‘data’. Some 
of these narratives may not have been articulated in this way had participants 
deemed me to be an ‘insider’ with the ‘same’ or similar experiences as theirs.   
Sensitive Research 
The emotional, embodied nature of pregnancy loss meant that 
considering sensitivity was crucial to minimise the risks of contributing 
additional distress and psychological harm. My interest in facilitating 
‘sensitivity’ in interactions with others drew upon professional/academic ethical 
guidelines such as that of the British Sociological Association (BSA), 
methodological discussions generally (like Lee 1993) and on pertinent topics 
(such as: Dickson-Swift et al 2007 on health research; Adamson and Holloway 
2012 on death and bereavement), previous research experiences (with my MA 
dissertation on bereavement narratives) and volunteering background. 
Although these literatures do not always have consensus, some important 
considerations were located. Professional ethical guidelines like that of the BSA 
(2002) state that social research ought not to cause physical or psychological 
harm to participants and that, accordingly, the project design and conduct 
ought to be tactful, sensitive and prepared with adequate provisions in cases 
where there are needs for additional support. The notion of protecting 
participants from harm in a research project premised on a fundamentally 
distressing topic like pregnancy loss, however, is tricky. Still, to not research 
pregnancy loss can be understood as partaking in the academic and wider social 
silencing or self-censoring of these experiences; as Layne (2003a p239) argues, 
“[i]n retaining a studied silence on pregnancy loss”, (feminist) researchers “have 
contributed to the shame and isolation that attends these events”. To deem 
pregnancy loss too sensitive or taboo to talk about, in effect, enables a 
continuation of the longstanding silencing derived from the notion that it is too 
‘insignificant’ to talk about or research. 
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Risks and Rewards 
Faulkner and Tallis (2009), in the context of mental health survivor 
research, argue that it is important to recognise that distress is not necessarily 
the equivalent of harm and that we must not unnecessarily jump to conclusions 
that participant upset is caused by the researcher. Indeed, it seems deeply 
problematic that, on the advent of the signs/expression of ‘challenging’ 
emotions such as anger or sadness, a researcher might terminate the interview 
and thus silence or condemn what may be, as Faulkner and Tallis (2009) note, a 
valuable cathartic experience for the participant. Researchers need to be 
simultaneously sensitive to the needs of an interviewee for support during/after 
a distressing interview but also respect participant needs and autonomy to 
participate. Corbin and Morse (2003 p341) posit that, with careful management, 
“risks are often contained and mitigated by the benefits that participants receive 
by telling their stories”. This pertains to the fact that the conditions of trust and 
conversational intimacy involved in talking about sensitive topics which 
threaten to cause harm are also those enabling potential ‘therapeutic’ benefits 
(Corbin and Morse 2003). Bondi’s (2005 p240) reflections on her research 
experiences certainly resonate with my own at points throughout the research: 
if people freely consent to participate in research interviews, they 
probably really do want to make use of the opportunity to talk that 
it affords them! […] researchers like myself should, surely, respect 
their capacity to make decisions, which was something I was at 
risk of forgetting in my preoccupation with my own sense of guilt 
[…] I did not know better than those I interviewed about the pros 
and cons of participating in the research, but I was at risk of 
allowing my feelings of guilt to convince me that ‘really’ the cons 
must outweigh the pros regardless of what participants said to me. 
Subsequently, the researcher should not position themselves as ‘knowing 
best’ in a paternalistic fashion over that of the participants and it ought to be 
acknowledged that the benefits of research can be two-way. Adamson and 
Holloway (2012 p739) encourage recognition that “[p]articipants volunteer 
because they want something even if this is unconsciously and is only to talk to a 
sympathetic listener”. Participants reporting beneficial outcomes from revisiting 
their experiences during research can be found in the perinatal loss (for 
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example: Kavanaugh and Ayres 1998), as well as other forms of grief/ 
bereavement (for example: Hentz 2002; Dyregrov 2004) and feminist (for 
example: Finch 1984) literatures. This seemed to be the case for some of my 
participants also, including for those who had not spoken about their 
experiences at length with anyone else before partaking in the research.7 For 
example, Penny commented “it[’]s been good to talk to [yo]u as well as its good 
to get it all of[f] my chest and you being interested shows that [I’]m not alone 
and that well what happened to me is important”. This links to discussions 
about the ways researchers, in the practice and production of their research, can 
facilitate the unsettling of particular norms held by participants (Sinding and 
Aronson 2003). In another example, Fiona said: 
I'd like to say thanks also, I know you were just conducting your 
research for your job but just being given the opportunity to talk 
about my experience has helped me so much and I hope in turn 
that anything I've mentioned has been able to help you also. 
Isabel also found that participation in the research could yield therapeutic 
benefits: “I found it tremendously helpful speaking to you and I’ve sort of 
treated it a bit as my therapy, being able to just talk, talk the whole thing 
through with you”. It was made apparent within the informed consent form that 
I am not a trained counsellor/therapist (hence this was not actually therapy) but 
nonetheless the opportunity to talk could be therapeutic and, as Adamson and 
Holloway (2012) advise, I was able to provide information on sources of help 
(professional counselling services) when requested or deemed suitable.  
Enacting Sensitivity 
                                                          
7 I am aware that this may not have been the case for all participants or at all times. In addition, 
Kavanaugh and Ayres (1998) comment that it is not necessarily possible to assess participant 
experiences of the research based on words spoken in an interview alone. Therefore, it is 
important to also keep a record of participant behaviour throughout the research which includes 
details such as cancelled interviews and non-returned contact (Kavanaugh and Ayres 1998). For 
instance, contact from Carla ended without explanation when she did not attend our 
(rescheduled) second interview and, although I contacted her after the missed interview, I have 
not heard from Carla since. This leaves me to speculate that the ceased contact may pertain to 
her finding it too distressing to revisit the experiences and/or embarrassment/awkwardness 
regarding the missed interview. 
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It is vital not to designate some research topics as ‘out-of-bounds’ but, 
providing that there are informed and consenting individuals willing to take 
part, to concentrate on enacting sensitive encounters in research design and 
practice. Adamson and Holloway (2012 p739) suggest that “[t]he researcher can 
provide support, often in silence, just by being present”. In contrast to many 
other social encounters, a research interview about pregnancy loss constitutes a 
setting with another (the researcher) in which talking about these experiences is 
not a transgression. Whilst respectful that participants may wish to pause the 
interview, and were free to suspend it or their future participation at any point, I 
sought not to shy away from emotionally intense discussions and displays. As 
Kavanaugh and Ayres (1998 p94) comment, “crying is not always the cue for the 
interviewer to intervene”. I hoped that my ‘being with’ participants could offer 
some comfort in the sense of companionship with a listener quietly present. 
Inevitably, participants manage their emotional displays differently and I 
sought to accommodate these preferences during the interviews. In addition to 
being able to talk at length about their pregnancy losses, some participants may 
have found it beneficial to be expressly emotional. This can contrast with 
existing (familial) relations, as highlighted in the following excerpt with Anne 
speaking about her grief following a stillbirth and her mother’s avoidance of 
this: 
if she says anything and I start to cry, she can’t handle it and she 
goes ‘arrrr I’m sorry, I’m sorry, I won’t talk about it’ and give[s] 
me a hug or something and all I want to do is just to be able to 
express myself and sometimes that means crying and that’s alright 
[…] you know, it’s fine to cry, I don’t quite understand where this 
thing comes from about it not being okay to cry, it’s perfectly 
normal to cry, you know, your baby’s dead, it’s {laughs} it would 
not be very normal to not cry. 
Hence, part of the sensitive research methodology I employed entailed 
recognising that distress about an experience does not necessarily require 
removal or sanitisation from the interview but sometimes its very recognition 
and, indeed, validation.  
Recruiting Participants 
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The practical and ethical difficulties of researching sensitive topics 
include access to and recruitment of participants, owing to their awareness of 
potential emotional risks and varying willingness to talk about difficult 
experiences (Adamson and Holloway 2012). Constituting the first interaction 
with most potential research participants, the process of recruitment was one in 
which I wished to convey sensitivity. I placed my ‘Call for Participants’ (CFP) on 
a number of online pregnancy loss support forums/threads and social network 
groups after negotiating permission to do so with the site owners/admins. As 
many researchers caution (Valentine 2005), my own encounters with 
‘gatekeepers’ entailed long and sometimes difficult processes in seeking to 
negotiate permission to post. This included unanswered or delayed replies to my 
emails and sometimes ambivalent or hostile responses. Whilst anyone with 
Internet access could register and, often without a delay in awaiting approval, 
then be able to post on the online groups, I felt it was important that I sought 
permission from the website/forum owners or moderators before posting about 
my research. This pertains not only to general (n)etiquette and practical benefits 
that gatekeepers can potentially facilitate, such as validating the legitimacy of 
the research, but also shared recognition that pregnancy loss research carries 
risks and is likely to involve emotionally vulnerable persons (Chen et al 2004).8 
The online posting of my CFP meant that recruitment entailed 
individuals’ self-selection, resonating with the earlier comments by Bondi 
(2005) about the autonomy to balance ‘pros and cons’. Of course, this did not 
preclude later revision of partaking in the research and the option to end 
participation at any point, for any reason was openly reiterated. In addition to 
the online support groups in which I posted my CFP, it was also independently 
forwarded on and re-posted. Thus an element of Internet-based snowballing 
also occurred which, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, enabled participation by 
                                                          
8 As it manifested, I did not develop any noteworthy relationships with ‘gatekeeper’ owners/ 
moderators. This may have been due to my writing style in communication, being a young PhD 
researcher or that such research is a lesser priority over the everyday work put into the groups. 
The explicitly qualitative and open nature of the research, since I did not outline a particular 
question or challenge to tackle, may have been another factor in the seeming lack of interest.  
Later in the research, with interviews ongoing, I again contacted some group owners to enquire 
about any topics that they would be keen to receive feedback on and to shape the research 
agenda, however, responses received again ranged from lukewarm to indifferent. 
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some individuals who did not otherwise use these online support groups. The 
self-selection recruitment of participants is, therefore, part of a commitment to 
sensitive methodologies and a prioritisation of a research sample able to provide 
depth of understanding as illustrative rather than representative (Valentine 
2005). Additionally, potential participants were provided with flexibility in 
terms of, for example, communication methods such as face-to-face, telephone 
and email interviews; for an overview, see Appendix 2 (p266). 
Online and Multi-communication Research 
In addition to interest in how the Internet features within participants’ 
experiences of pregnancy loss (elaborated in Chapter 6), the research was 
enabled methodologically by the Internet.9 A specific research email account 
was set up to manage exchanges with potential participants. When individuals 
contacted me about participating in the research, I emailed back and thanked 
them for their interest, reiterated the CFP and attached a four-page informed 
consent form which, if preferable, I would print off and post to them with a 
stamped return envelope. Aware of the multiple ethical difficulties and 
sensitivities entailed in the research, the informed consent form covered 
numerous aspects such as the use of pseudonyms and rights to withdraw from 
the research. In addition, this document highlighted communication flexibility 
to provide participants with various degrees of suitability to their (practical and 
emotional) circumstances. For instance, email interviews offer asynchronous 
communication, allowing the participant to write in sections over a period of 
time and accommodating to interruptions, preferred pace and time away for 
thinking/rewriting (Ayling and Mewse 2009; Hamilton and Bowers 2006; Beck 
2005; Brownlow and O’Dell 2002). As such, email interview exchanges could fit 
around other priorities such as work and/or childcare as well as enable the 
participant to determine their preferred pace. This is especially important to 
support ‘self-care’ given the possible emotional distress that may arise from 
                                                          
9 In addition to email interviews, email contact was helpful for: setting up face-to-face, 
telephone and Skype interviews; exchanging follow-up comments (such as after interviews), 
updates and transcripts; and receiving documents (including participants’ creative writing) and 
images (of memorial objects in the home, but also, from some participants who had been 
pregnant during the research, new-born arrival notifications/photographs). Some participants 
emailed me web links to their memorial pages, poetry/creative writing accounts and blogs about 
pregnancy loss, as well as online shops selling ‘memorial’ items they owned. 
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recollecting the experiences and I sought to implement flexibility around the 
participants’ preferences and priorities with all modes of communication. For 
example, as some participants had young children and/or daytime jobs, 
telephone interviews were sometimes conducted relatively late in the evenings. 
Different Modes of Communication 
Participants’ engagements in my research were mediated through 
different modes of communication, as summarised in Appendix 2 (p266). Some 
participants used one sole mode—for example, Diane with email—whilst others’ 
evolved during the course of the research. This latter scenario was the case for 
four participants: the first interview with Ben was via Skype and the second via 
email; for Gemma, the first was via email and second by face-to-face; and 
respective to both Isabel and Marie, the ‘first’ interviews were in the form of two 
email and the second interviews were conducted by telephone (I also received a 
third follow-up email from Isabel elaborating some themes further). The option 
to change the mode of correspondence was directly reiterated to participants by 
me if, for example, they commented on difficulties of continuing in the current 
manner or if delays of several weeks in their replies implied this might be the 
case. For instance, Isabel’s second email included “[a]pologies for [the] slow 
reply - I want to help you and am ok about doing it, but am finding it difficult to 
find the time to reply”. I subsequently enquired as to whether speaking by 
telephone would be preferable and we then arranged a time convenient for her 
to fit around other commitments including childcare. Similarly, the decision to 
move from email to face-to-face interview for Gemma pertained to having found 
the first interview email to be time-consuming given writing and editing on such 
complex topics. Although not stated overtly as such by Gemma, Marie or Isabel, 
the shift from email to face-to-face or telephone may also have been prompted 
by a wish for more synchronous and embodied companionship—such as the 
face-to-face presence, or vocal responsiveness enabled by telephone, of me/the 
interviewer—whilst they recounted distressing experiences. 
Communication with participants concerned not only different, and 
sometimes multiple, modes of correspondence but also entailed various 
durations, rhythms and intensities. Some communications with participants 
were quite fast-paced (with only hours or a couple of days between replies) 
whilst others were slower (with weeks between replies from participants to my 
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follow up questions). This factor of interactional speed could impact on the 
quantity of time in total that correspondence between participants and myself 
extended, but other issues regarding depth and spread of discussion are also 
relevant to the temporal quality of these interactions. For instance, Fiona 
contacted me in early September 2011 and, after informed consent documents 
were processed, spoke about her miscarriage experiences. Fiona’s emails were 
very prompt, in-depth and detailed—constituting 31 pages of email 
correspondence, excluding creative writing documents which she also shared 
with me—which allowed us to cover a great deal of topics. My replies to her 
tended to be somewhat slower as a consequence of my juggling multiple 
participants correspondence—continuing interview conversations, arranging 
face-to-face and telephone interviews, transcription—and the preparation I 
undertook each time before replying email participants of re-reading our 
communications to date. Fiona and I mutually agreed in December 2011 that we 
had reached a point suitable to bring the hitherto comprehensive and relatively 
fast-paced dialogue to a draw. However, much later, in August 2013, Fiona 
contacted me and we resumed discussion about some of the memorial activities 
and pregnancy loss support projects that she had been involved with since.  
Owing to differences with forms of offline communication, online 
research methods require the negotiation and adaptation of ‘traditional’ 
methods as well as ethics (Hine 2000; Madge 2007). Different communication 
methods such as by telephone can also invite reflection on important questions 
regarding interviewing, listening and the use of transcripts (Cook 2009). 
Translating qualitative interview methods from largely offline, face-to-face 
settings to online and/or telephone contexts included, for instance, considering 
the pace of questions posed in asynchronous email interviews in contrast to 
those of face-to-face or telephone interviews. In the first email exchange 
interview, as with face-to-face and telephone interviews, I started by asking one 
very open question; ‘could you tell me about [your experiences of pregnancy 
loss]’ (Kvale and Brinkman 2008) was intended to allow the participant to 
elaborate as much or as little as they wished to. As with the other modes of 
communication, participants partaking in the email interviews tended to 
provide extensive elaborations of their experiences of pregnancy loss(es), thus 
highlighting a range of subtopics which I could follow up on. In subsequent 
email interview exchanges, I did not want to ‘overload’ participants with 
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questions, but equally I did not want to draw out the interview to such a slow 
exchange that participants would become tired of the research. As such, I 
tended to provide a handful of questions, allowing elaboration to the degree of 
the participant preference and sometimes requesting clarification.10  
In addition to the implications for the style and pace of my questions, it is 
also apt to recognise that different modes of communication can shape 
participants’ narratives. For instance, email interviews offer opportunities to 
edit out unintended or ‘slippery’ comments prior to being ‘heard’ by the 
researcher in a way that telephone, Skype or face-to-face dialogue cannot; 
however, as I will shortly discuss, written text can lack important tone and body 
language for clarifying intended meanings. Smith (2001 p34) highlights that 
qualitative interviews do not simply yield transcripts but are valuable also “for 
the conversation as it takes places”. Partial speech, “utterances”, without clear 
logics can be considered “a practice, knowable only as it is said in one context or 
another” (Smith 2001 p34). The differences between speaking- and typing- 
about one’s experiences were sometimes brought to the fore when participants 
had engaged in multiple communication methods: comments made via one 
mode of communication may be disagreeable when revisited in another. For 
example, Ben distanced himself in an email interview from comments he had 
previously said over Skype and which I had reiterated in a question. This is not 
to imply that only one of these narratives, regarding his views on pro-choice 
politics, constituted his ‘true’ feelings and I recognise that misinterpretation by 
myself as the researcher is always a possibility; however, I believe that the 
example highlights the ways in which complex topics can yield different (and 
potentially conflicting) responses at different times. It also demonstrates that 
different modes of communication can permit various opportunities to reflect 
on what, and how, meaning is expressed: the implications of Ben’s spoken 
comments when re-viewed as written text in an email provided an opportunity 
to reflect before responding and permit revision and nuance in ways that the 
flow of synchronous dialogue cannot easily accommodate.  
                                                          
10 Throughout the research exchanges, I attempted to clarify with the participants as to whether 
they considered the number of questions posed suitable and foreground that there is no rush to 
reply, that they did not have to answer all or any of the questions if they did not wish to, and that 
I was understanding of other commitments which might prevent them from replying for some 
time and/or require them to suspend participation in the research. 
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Another methodological concern regarding the different forms of 
interview communication pertains to the ways in which body language is 
apparent or not. As Parr et al (2005 p97) comment, “the words of human 
language cannot adequately do the work of representing many interior mental 
and emotional states”, and body language can often be very ‘telling’. It is not 
only in research interview interactions that body language and emotional 
conversing matters. Andrieu et al (2012), for instance, consider the use of body 
language, including gestures and physical proximity, as ‘quasi-linguistic’ when 
used to act out words in medical consultations. Owing to the sensitive topic, 
body language was particularly important for comprehending the emotional 
dimensions and personal significances of pregnancy loss experiences. In the 
context of email and telephone interviews, much of the body language which 
might facilitate and enrich a listeners understanding and the interaction 
between listener and speaker is obscured. This is because the embodied 
presence of interviewee and interviewer are hidden by the technological 
interfaces mediating their interaction and because email communication allows 
both parties to edit their messages. Whilst I agree with the importance Charmaz 
(2002) places on the need to attend to body language in relation to silences in 
participant narratives, doing so over the telephone (with time lags and sound 
quality disruptions) and emails (where communication is knowingly expected to 
be asynchronous and delayed) can be particularly difficult.  
Beyond/Extra-linguistic Communication 
In the telephone interviews it was usually possible to identify some vocal 
intonations and auditory-denoted embodied actions (such as sighs of 
despondency, tearfulness and/or crying) whereas email interviews largely 
lacked both bodily cues and evident auditory tones. In one sense, this meant 
that the intensity of feeling behind comments was not always immediately 
obvious and I was aware that uncertainty of tone could risk misinterpretation of 
words/phrases for both parties involved. Unintended evaluations of words and 
phrases can occur in all forms of communication, but I suggest that the lack of 
body language and vocal tone of online communication renders it particularly at 
risk of such an occurrence. Hence, in composing questions in email interviews, I 
was cautious about possible misunderstandings that may be conveyed and 
vigilant to try and minimise any assumptions in my questions and responses. 
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Although I carefully composed and checked my replies, the fact that some typos 
and grammatical errors remain in my dialogue highlights the ever evasive 
potential of ‘something slipping past’, although I am not aware of any significant 
misunderstandings actually occurring via the email interviews. As Markham 
(2004) encourages, alternate spellings such as ‘fetal’ and numbers such as ‘2’, 
and grammar present in participants’ words have largely been retained when 
quoted in the thesis, with a few occasions in which I have augmented with 
capitalisation of proper nouns, additional punctuation and context clarification 
in order to aid comprehension without significantly altering the excerpt.  
Some participants drew upon typed conventions to render present some 
of the otherwise absent body language and tone ‘data’. Emoticons, for instance, 
were used in email interviews to stand-in for some kinds of emotional 
expressions which facial gestures or vocal tones might otherwise convey (Dodge 
and Kitchin 2001). Hall et al (2004) note that particular forms of language are 
often used within online groups with specific jargon, abbreviations and 
emoticons, some of which I found also emerged in the research interviews. For 
instance, participants sometimes abbreviated ‘trying to conceive’ to ‘TTC’, 
although other terms familiar and in use regarding pregnancy loss groups, such 
as ‘angel-versary’ and ‘rainbow baby’, were not mentioned in the interviews. 
Smilies like :) and :-D can be seen to denote friendliness within email interview 
text, and sometimes featured in the ‘chat’ before and after, akin to the general 
dialogue that tends to happen before and after a face-to-face interview is 
conducted. Similarly, the use of typed kisses like ‘xxx’, also indicating 
friendliness, emerged as some participants signed off (some of) their messages 
with these. I was aware that, in the absence of body language such as smiling 
and other friendly gestures, the use of typed kisses could indicate a level of 
rapport as advocated in much feminist methodology. I reciprocated where 
deemed appropriate, based on my assessment of case-by-case as to whether a 
suitable sense of closeness and care had developed or seemed to be developing.11 
                                                          
11 Although I do not agree with this interpretation, the use of typed kisses could be read as a 
transgression of ‘professional’ researcher-participant boundaries which, through my mirroring 
in emails, could be problematically read as encouragement. It may also have been the case that 
the x’s were not intended to ‘mean’ anything in particular but were habitual or accidental. The 
concern being that, if this was the case and I were to reciprocate signing off with x’s in my 
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Continuing on the theme of emoticons and typed details of bodily 
composure, humour and (occasionally simultaneously) distress were sometimes 
conveyed. For instance, ‘winking’ smilies were sometimes used, read alongside 
the wider context of the typed text and my general impression of the individual 
as built up through our dialogue, to signify sarcasm. For example, when I asked 
Graham to elaborate on his comment that “a huge proportion of people have 
seen me as little more than furniture”, he wrote back saying “I'm pretty good at 
reading [ultrasound] scans sideways on the angular limit for the screen these 
days ;-)” and mentioned some spatial dynamics at play in medical settings 
which tend to place partners like himself on the periphery during pregnancy loss 
(discussed further in Chapter 4). As they recalled their experiences, participants 
sometimes also typed details about their bodily demeanour and visceral 
responses which might otherwise have been evident in a face-to-face or 
telephone interview but not necessarily apparent via email. For instance, Isabel, 
speaking about the haunting image of foetal death at an ultrasound scan, said: “I 
will never forget the image on the screen of our little baby lying on his side so 
peaceful (thinking about it now is making me cry)”. In Chapter 6, I elaborate 
further on some other ways in which bodies and bodily processes feature in 
Internet-facilitated communications around pregnancy losses. 
Benefits of the Multi-communication Approach 
Despite anxieties and difficulties in translating methodological 
approaches, the research ‘data’ (narratives about experience) generated through 
the multi-communication interviews allowed me to attend to a range of topics. 
The temporal pace of email interviews, at the discretion of participants and my 
own abilities to respond, meant these often stretched over several weeks and 
even months. As a result, some participants experienced, and were able to 
discuss, major ongoing changes in their lives such as subsequent pregnancies, 
moving jobs, pursuing adoption and changes in relationship status as well as 
more minor events like recent events in their workplaces which could have a 
bearing on their feelings regarding pregnancy loss and their abilities to ‘talk’ in 
the research. Attending to the temporality of pregnancy loss experiences, 
extending prior to and after the actual ‘event’ of occurrence, was further 
                                                                                                                                                                          
emails, it might draw attention to their unintended habit and cause embarrassment or make 
participants feel discouraged from the research, hence my careful consideration. 
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facilitated in the ‘stretched-out’ process of email interviews – allowing for 
reflections on different life events and changing future opportunities, if 
participants were willing. Although this was most easily facilitated by the 
frequency and ease of contact via email, it was also possible with multiple 
interviews by other communication forms (face-to-face, Skype and telephone).  
I originally opted for multiple interviews to allow adequate opportunities 
to discuss what could be highly distressing experiences at a slower pace than a 
single interview would provide as well as for any clarifications. However, as 
mentioned, one helpful outcome of multiple face-to-face and telephone 
interviews was to permit discussions of a more longitudinal nature than one 
interview at a single interim point in time could. For instance, during our first 
face-to-face interview, Holly informed me that she was currently seven weeks 
pregnant with her second pregnancy after her first pregnancy ended in 
miscarriage. Echoing Rothman’s (1994) ‘tentative pregnancies’ and work on 
subsequent pregnancies after loss (Gaudet et al 2010; Côté-Arsenault and 
Donato 2011), Holly was acutely anxious about miscarriage during her second 
pregnancy and the ways in which the two pregnancies interacted became a key 
feature in our interview discussions. Temporality was crucial to this; Holly 
recognised her fears regarding her current pregnancy as she approached the 
stage at which she miscarried previously (nine weeks) and requested that we 
postpone our second interview until after this had been passed. When Holly and 
I met for our second face-to-face interview, she was 26 weeks pregnant and able 
to speak about—for example—how she had felt passing the ninth week as well as 
the 12 week/first trimester points and multiple scans. Such discussions would 
not have been possible had only one interview been conducted or if both 
interviews had been conducted in such quick succession to one another.  
Alternative Methodologies? 
 Although interview methodology was chosen, I initially also considered 
online ethnography or netnography. This would have entailed utilising the 
online support groups to extract data about the topics being discussed and the 
ways in which users interact, allowing the discussions to be treated as textual 
data and thus potentially directly quoted. There has been debate, with diverging 
opinions, regarding the ethical propriety of conducting online research (Dodge 
and Kitchin 2001; Brownlow and O’Dell 2002; Clegg-Smith 2004; Jones 2004; 
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LeBesco 2004; Thomas 2004; Langer and Beckman 2005; Madge 2007; Seale et 
al 2010). Whilst Langer and Beckman (2005) argue that netnography is an 
‘unobtrusive’ and useful method for researching sensitive topics, my primary 
reason for rejecting online ethnography pertains to an ethical discomfort with 
the presupposition that online communication is ‘public’ and thus available for 
intensive use in research. I persevered with seeking permission to post the CFP 
owing to my belief that this research required a sensitive and patient approach, 
despite my experience of the sometimes frustrating, drawn-out coordination 
with online group ‘gatekeepers’.12 Subsequently, a two-layered consent was in 
action: firstly from the admins of the groups to permit me to post the CFP and, 
secondly, with completion of consent forms from each individual participant for 
interviews. Therefore, to additionally, or instead, ‘take’ the online discussions 
and interactions may well have yielded some interesting empirical and 
theoretical insights, but I feel it would have compromised my commitment to 
sensitive, feminist research in seeking to minimise exploitative power relations. 
Seale et al (2010) suggests that there are differences between ‘traditional’ 
interview data and netnography data, finding that the former tend to feature the 
recalled past and anticipated future whilst netnography data entails more 
emphasis on the current ‘now’. However, Seale et al (2010) acknowledge that 
different temporal orientations could be built into interview questions to 
mitigate the differences observed. In my use of multi-communication and 
multiple interviews, I was able to minimise the loss of these purported ‘benefits’ 
of online ethnography data over interview data by conducting multiple 
interviews over periods of time and/or the longer-than-anticipated duration of 
email interactions. Whilst netnography is one way to ascertain insightful 
information about the online support groups (Hine 2000), interviews in 
whatever mode of communication can also facilitate exploration of these. As 
Hitchings (2012) argues, interviewing remains an important method for 
learning about participants’ practices. Thus, carefully directing conversation in 
interviews can potentially address similar topics to those being discussed in the 
online support groups, as was also the case with my interest in online activities 
(see Chapter 6). Deliberate questions yielded information about, for instance, 
                                                          
12 Gold et al (2012) also faced difficulties in recruiting women from online pregnancy loss 
support groups in their questionnaire research, resonating with those encountered in my own 
such as difficulties obtaining permission from site owners and the quick turnover of group posts. 
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the interactions and practice of online support group users in ways which do not 
compromise informed consent and which continue to protect the anonymity of 
online users. Since it was important to have some familiarity with this in order 
to contact admin/moderators for permission and appropriately post my CFP, I 
have an informal knowledge and familiarity of the functioning of different 
online support groups which helped contextualise some participant comments 
about the online pregnancy loss support communities without a need for me to 
conduct what I consider to be ethically dubious netnography.13 
Reflexive and Responsive ‘Ethics-in-practice’ 
Each of the aforementioned domains of feminist (politics, voice, power 
relations, positionality), sensitive (ethics, recruitment) and online/multi-
communication (adapting existing ‘offline’ methods, tone, emoticons) research 
methods were important for my project. Across these, ethics have been crucial 
and relate to the ways in which ethical considerations ought to saturate research 
through all stages from the design of a project, to practice and in write-up 
(Dowling 2000). In this section, I will discuss how the three domains of 
literature regarding research practice were significant for considering my 
primary focus on bodies and embodiment in relation to the often already 
distressing topic of pregnancy loss. Whilst I hoped for the project per se to hold 
merit as a positive ‘intervention’ into otherwise silenced or silencing 
experiences, negotiation of harm and benefit regarding many aspects, including 
seemingly mundane actions and gestures, within actual research encounters 
remained crucial; hence, a reflexive and responsive ethics-in-practice was 
enacted. 
Elaborating Themes in Interviews 
As mentioned, pregnancy loss poses a threat to ‘squeamish academia’ in 
geography (Longhurst 2001) and, subsequently, I consider it a feminist research 
endeavour to bring elements of these lived experiences into focus which may 
otherwise be particularly prone to ‘silencing’ or ‘sanitisation’. With my 
                                                          
13 One way netnography could be rendered more ethically appropriate is through ‘ethnographic 
fiction’ (Angrosino 1998; Inckle 2005, 2010). For instance, Letherby’s (2012) conference paper 
outlined ongoing research with Deborah Davidson involving the combining of nethnography 
with ethnographic fiction in the context of online pregnancy loss support groups. 
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particular research interest in bodies, I was conscious that some especially 
intimate and taboo topics would require extra care and sensitivity to broach. In 
the context of cemeteries, Woodthorpe (2010 p62) found that participants were 
often willing to talk about some aspects, like tending to the surfaces of graves, 
but retained “a simultaneous reluctance to discuss the reality of what was 
happening below ground”. In my CFP, I sought to clearly foreground an interest 
in bodily spaces and inter-bodily relations, linking to body surfaces, fluids/flows 
and interiors as well as emotions, memory and social attitudes. I am aware that 
this will likely have been off-putting for some individuals who may have been 
willing to participate in pregnancy loss research if it had a different focus. 
However, it is important to be open about the nature of topics that may be 
discussed in interviews. For me, this entailed the embodied materiality of 
pregnancy and pregnancy loss, including processes such as uterine bleeding, 
onset lactation and childbirth as well as physical engagements with bodily fluids 
and bodily materiality (of deceased embryos, foetuses and/or babies). In total, 
interviews were conducted with 24 participants and covered a range of topics 
involving different spaces, materialities, temporalities, bodies and relational 
experiences, as evidenced in the empirical chapters of the thesis (Chapters 3-8). 
The broad opening question in the first interview asked participants to 
tell me about their experiences, presenting them with an opportunity to narrate 
in whatever manner, order, choice of words/topics and with disclosure of as 
much or as little as they wished (Corbin and Morse 2003). Often, participants 
were very forthcoming and required little to no additional prompts to elaborate, 
providing me with an ‘overview’ of their experiences which I could then ask 
about in more depth later in the interview or in the subsequent interview(s). 
This open-ended elaboration was also important in terms of informing me about 
the emotional complexity and dynamics so that I could (try to) become more 
attuned to certain aspects in participants’ stories around which there seemed to 
be hesitancy or omission and for which sensitivity was especially important. I 
kept an overarching topic guide with me at interviews along with, for secondary 
or additional interviews, a set of tailored topics/questions but I tried not to 
depend too much on this as a structuring framework for the conversational flow. 
Instead, I attempted to pick up on particular topics, sometimes making brief 
notes to aid my memory, which I could re-direct attention to when appropriate. 
As such, this constituted an open approach to the interviews, allowing themes to 
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emerge from participants’ accounts and permitting them to direct the 
conversation in ways which they deemed significant. At the end of interviews, I 
asked whether there were any other topics, elaborations or clarifications which 
they wished to talk about, either in terms of being of interest in the research but 
also for their own benefit/welfare, and thanked them for speaking with me. 
Adamson and Holloway (2012) comment with reference to themes of 
death and bereavement that some phenomena are particularly methodologically 
challenging to research. This pertains not only to emotional sensitivities but also 
the ways in which some topics are elusive, especially—as is the case for bereaved 
individuals thinking of the multifaceted ways in which the deceased are absent 
and yet present—if there is intangibility entailed (Adamson and Holloway 2012; 
Holloway and Jefferson 2000). Indeed, there were times within interviews 
when participants clearly struggled to find the words or expressions which 
would adequately convey their experiences, feelings and meanings regarding 
pregnancy loss and other life experiences. This relates to the ways in which 
many emotional experiences disrupt or otherwise elude “attempts to determine 
and specify meaning” with language and yet efforts continue not “in spite of this 
interval but rather because of it” (Harrison 2002 p591, p606; Parr et al 2005). 
Thus we must not disregard what individuals “do manage consciously to ‘say’ 
about what they think is occurring” in terms of their efforts to “find the words, 
or at least some words” and “bodily gestures as well as tired clichés and 
embarrassed mumblings” to ‘speak’ or communicate about particular 
experiences (Parr et al 2005 p98 italics in original). As such, I hoped for the 
interview settings to be spaces in which it was okay to ‘talk’ about experiences 
that might be otherwise marginalised or rejected in other social scenarios as 
with unsupportive friends or uncomfortable family members, whilst remaining 
aware that there are ‘speakability’ gaps and ‘legibility’ limitations.14  
I was keen for the interviews to be opportunities for participants to talk 
as they wished and it seems that some participants found this to be the case. 
Heeding Adamson and Holloway’s (2012 p739) comments, I sought to be a 
                                                          
14 For instance, Victoria commented that she “just didn't 'feel right'” during her second 
pregnancy which later ended in miscarriage, reflecting that “[m]aybe it is woman's intuition?!” 
As an elusive topic (Adamson and Holloway 2012), elaboration would be tricky but I encouraged 
Victoria to say more  which, as discussed further in Chapter 3, yielded some limited expansion.   
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“sympathetic listener” and “provide support […] [even if just by] being present” 
and/or by virtue of conducting the research. Given that pregnancy losses can be 
socially-isolating or marginalising experiences, I considered it all the more 
important that the research interviews go some way to counter this wider 
context. This led me to reflect on the ways in which, for instance, gestures 
within a research relationship and specific interview setting can embody 
‘consolation’. A dominant, socially prevalent way of offering consolation such as 
for adult deaths is through condolences such as saying ‘I am sorry for your loss’. 
However, a plethora of emotional responses (Keane 2009), philosophical or 
spiritual standpoints on pregnancy loss make it unclear as to what would be 
appropriate for each person. In early points of contact with research 
participants, usually over email, I often had little to no contextual information 
which could support an informed decision as to what might be appreciated. 
Subsequently, efforts to cultivate the research and each interview encounter as 
caring and supportive were complex and ultimately ambiguous.15 During the 
research, with different individuals and at different times, I enacted a range of 
attempts to console and experienced a variety of responses. The concept of 
consolation, and attempts to knowingly incorporate this into a space and/or set 
of relations, highlights—I argue—precarity and need for flexibility which I 
consider to be pertinent more generally to social research ethics. 
Negotiating ‘Sensitivity’: Minor Decisions, Major Consequences? 
Relatively ‘small’ comments or gestures can have potentially ‘big’ 
implications within the careful negotiation to balance risks and benefits. As 
Irwin (2006) suggests in her paper on field relations, ‘micropolitics’ and 
                                                          
15 For those who initially emailed some details on their losses, I felt it could be offensive and 
even undermining of the project to withhold sympathies. However, I was aware that others may 
find such comments uncomfortable and/or highlight a disjuncture between different ways to 
understand and live with events of pregnancy loss. Appropriate consolation is a negotiation 
regarding how words or gestures are likely to be received. Consequently, since I have no 
certainty regarding the individual specific instances of my research, no concrete conclusions can 
be given that could function as guidelines for future researchers in their interview encounters. 
However, as with the literature more broadly around sensitive research (Corbin and Morse 
2003; Kavanaugh and Ayres 1998; Lee 1993), my research experiences reiterate the importance 
of familiarising oneself with possible scenarios whilst remaining vigilantly receptive to 
unanticipated situations which one must try to negotiate to support research participants. 
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structural harm are not separate or unrelated. Rather, Irwin (2006 p169, p157) 
argues that intimacy can be “the vehicle through which we all reinforced larger 
structural relationships” and that being overly focused “on a litany of minor 
research decisions” can overlook this. Therefore, as I sought to exercise, it is 
important to retain recognition that relatively small gestures can also be 
embroiled in larger structural inequalities. Adding to the difficulty of 
negotiating these, I found that some scenarios featuring seemingly minor 
decisions with potentially quite significant implications could not be always be 
anticipated or adequately prepared for, despite heeding calls to remain vigilant 
to ethical or otherwise sensitive issues (Ramos 1989). As Kavanaugh and Ayres 
(1998) emphasise, enacting sensitivity depends significantly on the abilities of 
the researcher to assess and respond to the emotional state of participants. This 
also links to issues of researcher wellbeing (Rowling 1999; Hubbard et al 2001; 
Rager 2005; Sampson et al 2008). However, the emotional dynamics between 
participants and the researcher are subject to alteration with the risk of 
misinterpretation, making reflexive responsiveness both crucial and inexact. 
Kavanaugh and Ayres (1998 p95) summarise that “[r]esearch interviews 
are inherently uncertain […] [since] [n]either respondents nor interviewer can 
predict everything that will emerge during a research encounter”. Owing to this 
indeterminacy, I support an ethical approach which is reflexive rather than 
prescriptive and multiple rather than singular or dualistically ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
(Alty and Rodham 1998; Rowling 1999). As noted, a preoccupation with 
potential harm in research and attempts to “meticulously apply the many ethical 
codes in the literature” can, ironically, cause harm to the participants, the 
researcher and research produced (Irwin 2006 p164). Hence, during the 
research I strived to become more adept at handling aspects of encounters 
which I felt to be fraught or difficult. Emotional intelligence featured 
prominently here as I sought to translate ethical standpoints and preferences 
into research practice. However, this is always complicated by the fact that 
“emotions are never simply surface phenomena, they are never easy to define or 
demarcate, and they are not easily observed or mapped – although they inform 
every aspect of our lives” (Bondi et al 2005 p1). Although each interview 
encounter differed and there could never be any guarantee that I was doing the 
‘right thing’, I learnt from past experiences, including those outside of the 
research such as in my volunteering experience and personal life, and my skills 
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in attempting to ‘read’ emotional dynamics and appropriately respond to the 
specifics were constantly being revised and adjusted in practice.  
Flexibility was therefore a central component; for instance, as Kavanaugh 
and Ayres (1998 p95) state, “[t]he structure of the interview must adapt as 
necessary to the respondents’ need for pacing, such as taking breaks or 
postponing all or portions of interviews”. In addition, keen not to intrude on the 
scope for participants to direct and remain the focus of interviews, I sought to 
balance my role as a quiet or silent empathetic listener (Rowling 1999; Adamson 
and Holloway 2012) with my participation as a researcher asking questions for 
elaboration and clarification. The interviews and subsequent transcripts 
featured my voice encouraging and reassuring that I was listening (‘okay’, 
‘hmm’, ‘yeah’) but I also tried to accept and respect the importance of some 
silences. Rather than seeing these as ‘voids’ to fill or as denoting failed 
comprehension, some pauses and silences can be saturation with meaning and 
constitute very ‘loud’ forms of “speaking in their “not” speaking” (Mazzei 2003 
p356). Thus I support the notion that researchers must “be carefully attentive to 
what is not spoken, not discussed, not answered, for in those absences is where 
the very fat and rich information is yet to be known and understood” (Poland 
and Pederson 1998; Mazzei 2003 p358). Silences can highlight, for instance, 
occasions of thinking and gathering thoughts, hesitancy to speak, deliberate 
refusal to answer/respond to an objectionable preceding question or, linking 
back to the discussion of Parr et al (2005), an expression of the inadequacy of 
words. Silences, omissions and fragmentary or short responses from 
participants can also indicate that the topics being discussed are, or are 
becoming, ‘too’ difficult to think/talk about. 
Assessing and Negotiating When Research Becomes ‘Too’ Painful 
I am in agreement with Kavanaugh and Ayres (1998) that it is 
unacceptable for researchers to advance their research agendas knowingly at the 
psychological cost of participants. However, given that silences amongst other 
body language/gestures or vocal tones can indicate many different things, it can 
sometimes be difficult to know when (if at all), or how, to intervene. Since it is 
not only the content of participants’ experiences which can be upsetting but also 
the very questions of researchers (Kavanaugh and Ayres 1998), one response 
would be to altogether abandon a particular set of questions/themes. Within my 
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interviews, there were occasions in which I held back from particular lines of 
conversation when I felt that the participant would prefer not to discuss these 
due to being of an especially distressing nature, or it being the ‘wrong’ time. As 
such, “[s]ituations may arise that necessitate abandoning further investigation 
of any area that is too painful for the participant to discuss despite potential 
usefulness to research” (Kavanaugh and Ayres 1998 p95).16 It is difficult, 
however, to ascertain what exactly constitutes a scenario in which a topic is ‘too’ 
painful to talk about, linking to my earlier discussion on the ways in which some 
ethical approaches demonstrate an aversion to, and enact censorship of, signs of 
emotional expression which may in fact be cathartically valued by the 
participant. Since even tentatively asking whether someone felt able to talk 
about a difficult topic might induce a sense of obligation for them to do so, as 
well as cause upset (Kavanaugh and Ayres 1998), it is often at the researcher’s 
judgement as to whether or not to redirect the unfolding conversation.  
Depending on the situation, it was sometimes possible to explicitly 
foreground the option to not talk about a topic within the question which, in 
addition, was always a choice throughout the research for all participants. At 
other times, I would tentatively repeat a phrase or comment the participant had 
previously made to invite elaboration but equally be amenable for them not to. 
In other situations, I made the decision, based on attempts to be attuned and 
vigilantly aware of (verbal, non-verbal/bodily, emotional) cues from 
participants (Corbin and Morse 2003 p347), to circumvent some topics 
altogether. However, retrospectively, I do not know if this was always the most 
fitting choice. For instance, I decided not to ask Isabel about her experiences of 
delivering a late miscarriage after interpreting a number of comments about 
privacy and embarrassment as cues not to ‘push’ the topic. Towards the end of 
our second interview, I was startled when Isabel queried why I had not asked 
and told me that she had been gearing herself up to talk about it:  
Isabel: I was quite surprised though that you didn’t actually ask 
what, all about what happened on the day, about what happened 
                                                          
16 It is important to bear in mind that there can also be multiple tensions regarding harm and 
benefit between individual’s interests, collective interests and research interests. Hence, what 
may be considered ‘good’ for the collective may be harmful to particular individuals, as will be 
discussed briefly in Chapter 6 in relation to online disclosure/awareness of pregnancy loss. 
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when I had baby [surname], it’s more about like emotions isn’t it? 
Abi: yeah, it’s such a broad set of things I’m looking at, but if you 
wanted to speak more about what happened on the day – but, I 
wanted to sort of leave it up to everybody to decide how much they 
said about all sorts of things  
Isabel: yeah  
Abi: was that something you felt there was more to say about? 
Isabel: erm well no I was just expecting you to go into, to ask more 
details about what had happened, what I went through sort of 
thing 
Abi: in terms of the medical events?  
Isabel: yeah, I ‘spose, but, I ‘spose you’ve got to be very careful 
about what you ask people and because you don’t want to upset 
them and make it an unpleasant experience for them and put them 
off 
Abi: hmm, hmm. Are the medical details things you do want to 
talk about, but haven’t been able to talk about before, but would 
like to?  
Isabel: erm… no, I ‘spose not, it’s just the terminologies really. 
I tried to facilitate discussion on the physical experience of birthing which I 
previously thought constituted a topic that was ‘too painful’ for Isabel, as based 
on my reading of ‘cues’ of discomfort/reluctance. However, the realisation that I 
had been operating on this decision and my stilted response about it produced 
discomfort for us both which meant that it was not suitable to do so.  
Learning from ‘Failures’ 
 I continued reflecting on the above interview experience, thinking about 
the decision I had made to not raise the topic, worrying about whether it may 
have been detrimental to Isabel and trying to make sense of the mixed emotions 
I subsequently felt (confusion, embarrassment, remorse). Whilst I initially saw 
it as an instance in which I had ‘failed’ as a competent social researcher, I later 
came to identify it also as a learning opportunity. In doing so, I found the 
comments of Nairn et al (2005 p239) helpful: 
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[i]t is important that we do not ‘write off’ data that initially does 
not appear to be useful, but re-consider it in order to find out more 
about who we are in relation to the people we research, the 
tenuous nature of the production of knowledge, and the struggles 
and desires we have as researchers[.] 
Bondi’s (2005) encouragement to reflect on the emotional dynamics of 
interviews for practical, methodological and analytical reasons is again a salient 
point, as are Irwin’s (2006) comments regarding the ways in which power 
relations can be entrenched even as some ethical protocols are followed. This 
example can be understood as a scenario in which there was an incompatibility 
or disconnect between my reading of the emotional dynamics at play in the 
interviews and what Isabel expected/prepared to discuss. It speaks to the 
complexity of assessing emotional dynamics which neither ‘belong’ or ‘reside’ 
solely in me or Isabel, but are co-created and subsequently negotiated. This 
example also entails ways in which I had unintentionally imposed power 
relations between myself (the researcher) and Isabel (the research participant); 
it was I who made the decision not to broach this particular topic on the basis 
that I thought the balance between risk and harm swung most to the former. 
Despite theoretical familiarity with themes of feminist research, seeking to 
equalise power relations and ‘give voice’ to participants, the decision was rather 
paternalistic: made by me about Isabel and without any open consultation with 
her regarding this. Whilst the decision had been well-intentioned, to protect 
another from possible harm, and Isabel herself recognised this (“I ‘spose you’ve 
got to be very careful about what you ask people and because you don’t want to 
upset them”), it ultimately negated her right to participate in this decision-
making process, thus reinstating my own power in the research.  
Prior to this situation, it had not occurred to me that Isabel was expecting 
and perhaps even hoping to be encouraged to talk about particular aspects by 
me. Motivations behind participation are often multiple and varied (Clark 
2010); I was aware that participants may be drawn to contribute as an 
opportunity to talk extensively to someone (potentially preferably a stranger) in 
contrast to a lack of other opportunities in their wider lives to do so. In addition, 
a frequent comment made about taking part in the research was the possibility 
that doing so might be of benefit to others with similar experiences. Hence, 
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participating in research potentially provides “a forum [in which] to engage in 
socially valued activity, including teaching, informing, and generally displaying 
the possession of special knowledge” (Miczo 2003 p484). At this point I had not 
yet considered in sufficient depth that, in contrast to being dismayed by the 
overt emphasis on bodies in my CFP, perhaps it was the challenging nature of 
this that some people were interested in exploring through talk in their own 
lives and/or for the possible benefit of future/unknown others. In thinking that 
my omission of the topic was complicit with Isabel’s preferences and that this 
was in fact a sensitive, respectful thing to do – I consequently closed down an 
avenue for discussion that the participant (at least during the second interview) 
had in fact wished to pursue. This example therefore alerted me to the 
complexity of reading emotional dynamics, enacting ethics in practice, the 
unintentional reinstating of power relations and the risks of perpetuating 
emotional aversion, silencing or censorship in one’s research.  
Research Agenda 
About Analysis  
An iterative approach was used to analyse the data, facilitated by multiple 
interviews, in which I drew upon the emphasis in grounded-theory on 
understanding emerging out of the research data rather than hypotheses 
‘imposed upon’. Although a relatively small number of participants were 
interviewed, vast amounts of data were generated owing to the length and use of 
multiple interviews. Adamson and Holloway (2012) suggest this presents a 
challenge encountered by many qualitative researchers on bereavement. Whilst 
the abundant quantity of data generated, in the form of interview transcripts 
and photographs/creative writing sent by participants, prompted uncertainties 
about how to best utilise this material in analysis and write-up, it was also 
incredibly qualitatively rich, allowing me to attend to a range of themes and 
examples. Empirical chapters draw heavily on participants’ interview narratives, 
often focusing on a few individuals whose experiences were particularly relevant 
to the themes under consideration. Subject matter varied between interviews, 
tailored to the context of the participant’s experiences and negotiated according 
to the emotional dynamics and ethics-in-practice; likewise, the depth/length of 
talk about topics differed. Since the research aspired towards understanding 
rather than a representative sample (Valentine 2005), I do not consider this to 
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be a hindrance. Subsequently, my approach in the interviews—as with 
analysis—was flexible and open to exploration, following research ‘threads’ 
rather than systematically pursuing answers to set questions/problems. This 
ethos resonates with Agee’s (2009) description of the constant (re)developing of 
research questions permitted within qualitative research which can entail a 
dynamic and multi-directional approach with processes of reflection, iteration 
and dialogue. Analysis, therefore, involved interwoven and looping practices of 
coding, interviewing, reading, theorising and writing.  
As with research design and practice, sensitivity is of paramount concern 
and I sought to treat participant narratives in a careful and considerate manner. 
At times, however, I am conscious that the academic and/or medical language I 
use may be unfamiliar or unsatisfactory to some participants, such as when I 
refer to an ‘embryo’ when the participant tended to use/would prefer ‘baby’. I 
have attempted to reconcile this with the use of quotes whilst simultaneously 
seeking to manage my comments within a context which I am acutely aware is 
peppered with issues of reproductive politics. In addition, I realise that 
participants may feel that I have misunderstood or examined some of their 
quotations in ways which they did not intend. It is not my intention to cause 
upset to participants, whom I am extremely grateful to for contributing to the 
research, and I openly recognise that I may well have misinterpreted comments 
despite best efforts to avoid doing so. At times, I have examined some 
quotations and examples through a critical lens to highlight tensions, ambiguity 
or contradictions. As Adamson and Holloway (2012) comment, it is important 
that researchers do not take interview narratives purely at ‘face value’ and 
naively celebrate them; rather we must also consider how politics (discourses, 
power struggles, boundaries) may be at play. I hope that participants 
understand that this is not intended to cause upset and appreciate the value of 
such academic inquiries, with potentially wider implications, which are 
inevitably connected to my own evaluations and views such as on termination.  
Analysis was ongoing throughout the research as I listened during (or, in 
the case of email, read) the interviews/exchanges, transcribed, annotated as 
part of coding, prepared for subsequent interviews events/exchanges and wrote-
up. Using multiple interviews when participants permitted provided additional 
impetus to reflect on areas for clarification, elaboration and any new themes 
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that may have emerged. There was a dialogue between data generation and 
analysis as they inform one another: particular themes present in my interview 
questions were sometimes complicated or nuanced in the narratives of 
participants and their transcripts, allowing for other code categories to emerge 
which might then direct further inquiries within subsequent interviews subject 
to further nuance. This was also the case across interviews with different 
participants, as topics emerged in interviews which I had not previously 
intended to ask about/considered relevant, allowing opportunities for me to 
incorporate these into interviews with other participants for whom the topics 
might also be germane. As such, I drew upon grounded theory in my approach 
to research practice and analysis, allowing themes to emerge from the data 
rather than using the data to ‘test’ predetermined hypotheses, and seeking to 
identify gaps to further inform data collection. Linking back to the previous 
discussion on ‘silence’, I also sought to remain attuned to omissions, absences 
and what is not spoken (Adamson and Holloway 2012). 
Concluding Remarks 
 I have outlined several underpinning interests which have shaped my 
choice of methods, conduct of research practice and subsequent use of 
generated data. This involved drawing together: feminist research practice; 
sensitivity and care whilst not imposing prohibition or silence; and the use of 
multiple communication modes for interviews (face-to-face, telephone, Skype, 
email). My approach to reflexive and responsive ethics drew upon dimensions of 
these feminist, sensitive and multi-method research contexts, shaping the ways 
I have approached thinking and talking about particular topics and tensions. 
The importance of emotional dynamics has been present throughout my 
discussions on methodology, alongside recognition that there can be no 
guarantee that balance will always be achieved between risk and reward, harm 
and benefit. Openness about such methodological processes, some of which 
with hindsight might have been handled differently, facilitated my attention to a 
range of considerations. This concerns not only the emotional impacts of 
research on participants and researchers but that emotions can constitute a 
valuable interpretive and analytical resource (Bondi 2005) which I sought to 
utilise throughout the thesis in the forthcoming empirical chapters.  
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Chapter 3: Bodily Interior Geographies of Pregnancy Loss 
Introduction 
Reproduction is now a highly medicalised and technologically-mediated 
experience for many in contemporary Western societies, encompassing aspects 
from egg harvesting, conception, pregnancy/gestation, to labour and delivery 
(Ginsburg and Rapp 1991; Rothman 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Simonds 2007a, 
2007b; Simonds and Rothman 2007; Cherniak and Fisher 2008; George 2008; 
Kirkman 2008) as well as beyond (see Godderis 2010 on postpartum 
depression). The medicalisation of pregnancy, with the widespread use of 
reproductive technologies such as ultrasonography, can be seen to participate in 
constructing the foetus as ‘patient’ and ‘person’, potentially marginalising 
women involved in the process (Woliver 2002; also Casper 1999 on the 
production of patienthood in foetal surgery). Evidenced in my own research, 
biomedical interventions and knowledges are often also core to experiences of 
pregnancy loss. For example, many participants had attended official medical 
spaces like GP surgeries and hospitals, sought medically ‘legitimate’ 
information, and undergone tests/procedures including medical and surgical 
miscarriage management. However, biomedical approaches to interior bodies in 
pregnancy losses are not the only, nor necessarily the most desirable, way to 
understand such bodily experiences and events. This chapter will consider some 
of the processes, movements and sensations of the ‘bodily interior’ in pregnancy 
loss experiences, drawing upon literature and empirical material attending to 
themes of medical technologies (visual, diagnostic) and sensory knowledges. 
The medical model positions medical workers as ‘mechanics’ in relation 
to ‘broken’ machines, rendering the patient an object to be acted upon 
(Rothman 2007b). Martin (1987) also suggests the metaphor of the factory 
owner supervising labouring women’s ‘machines’ (uteri). These metaphors, 
mobilised in medical practice, have a propensity to disavow particular aspects of 
‘lived’, ‘felt’ bodies and experiences of patients, for instance, dismissing 
emotions and relations with other people as subjective or irrelevant (Martin 
1987). The image of Nilsson’s Life magazine cover in 1965, Michaels (1999) 
argues, introduced ‘middle America’ to a particular representation of the 
interior womb, since which numerous other images and discourses ‘revealing’ 
pregnancy have proliferated. Internally felt sensations in pregnancy are now 
50 
 
likely to be explained through the “interpretive frame provided by biomedicine”, 
rendered intelligible and (re)confirmed through measured outcomes of 
‘evidence’ (Abel and Browner 1998 p321). Medical lexicon thus features “vividly 
both in women’s perceptions about how medicine views their bodies and in how 
women view their own bodies” (Martin 1987 p14). Duden (1993) highlights a 
historical shift in privileging knowledge about pregnancy from that directly-
experienced and pronounced by women (quickening) to that visualised and 
pronounced by ‘medicine’ (ultrasound).  
In this chapter, I will outline the dominant ways a medical model lends to 
conceptualising pregnant bodies as signifying disorder, danger, abnormality and 
risk (Lupton 1999; Rothman 2007b, 2007c) and which justifies medical-
technological ‘access’ to bodily interiors. I will then consider medically-
sanctioned ways of confirming and tracking pregnancies, focusing on urine- and 
blood- hCG detection tests before discussing ultrasonography spaces and 
accompanying waiting rooms. In addition to employing widespread ‘objective’ 
medical knowledges, some participants mentioned sensations and elusive 
feelings akin to ‘intuition’ which can potentially evade biomedical framings. 
These latter aspects will be discussed as participating in ‘feeling’ pregnant and 
no longer ‘feeling’ pregnant, including experiences of transitioning from 
‘pregnant’ to suspecting, anticipating and accepting pregnancy loss. 
Biomedical Approaches to Bodies and Bodily Interiors 
Whilst knowledges gleaned through biomedicine, including for 
preventing and treating pregnancy losses, are clearly important, medicalisation 
can result in the objectification and fragmentation of patient bodies into 
mechanical components. Rothman (2007b p7) describes the medical model as 
one in which “[p]roblems in the body are technical problems requiring technical 
solutions”. In the ‘heroic’ depiction of medicine (Casper 1999), the ‘sick’ body is 
a system of material parts and processes which can be overridden through the 
administration of drugs, replaced or otherwise ‘fixed’. However, this approach 
means that lived, emotional, holistic body-selves, including the identity beyond 
the patient role, can easily be overlooked (Martin 1987). Subsequently, work in 
the medical humanities has offered critiques of the reductive approach to bodies 
in biomedicine and, though by no means the sole investment (Pattison 2003), 
encouraged efforts to ‘re-humanise’ medical practice through training. Yet the 
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implications of the dominant approach to bodies as objects remains a cause for 
concern, particularly for feminists conscious of the ways women’s pregnant 
bodies especially have been subject to monitoring, control and discipline 
(Lupton 1999; Shildrick and Price 1999; Lupton 2011).  
A set of long-standing gender-biases around what constitutes a ‘normal’ 
body, reformulated and concretised through the proliferation of risk discourses, 
renders pregnancy a state of ‘abnormality’. Rothman (2007b p8) argues that: 
[t]he source of the pathology orientation of medicine toward 
women’s health and reproduction is a body-as-a-machine model 
(the ideology of technology) in which the male body is taken as the 
norm (the ideology of patriarchy). From that viewpoint, 
reproductive processes are stresses on the system, and thus 
disease-like. 
The perception of pregnant embodiment as dysfunctional (Young 1984) and 
risky (Lupton 1999) appears to stem from the normative assumption regarding 
the ‘healthy’ and ‘stable’ masculine ideal (Eckman 1999). The kinds and rapidity 
of bodily changes during pregnancies (and affected behaviours, like the more 
frequent need to urinate) are considered ‘abnormal’ in contrast to the relatively 
static male human body. Consequently, pregnancy is considered “a perilous 
journey, requiring eternal vigilance [and compliance with medicine] on the part 
of the woman travelling through it” (Lupton 1999 p66). Rhetoric of risk thus 
justifies constant surveillance and mitigation, chiming with historic perceptions 
of the pregnant body as effectively ill/sick, disordered and dangerous.  
Feminist accounts have critiqued the institution and practice of medicine 
as characterised by masculinist, patriarchal legacies (for example: Spallone 
1989; Rogers 1995; Rothman 2007b). This is not to suggest that all medical 
encounters are sexist or that the binaristic scenario of cis-male doctors in 
relation to female patients monolithically holds. However, now underlying the 
practices of ‘gendered medicine’, particular patriarchal values and norms were 
historically foundational (Lorentzen 2008). This includes the delegitimising of 
female birth attendants with the scientific professionalism of male doctors 
markedly during the eighteenth-century (Donnison 1988; Carter and Carter 
1994; Parker 1996; Simonds and Rothman 2007; Rothman 2007b). During the 
52 
 
1960s, the midwifery model and women’s health movements developed in 
resistance to the medical approaches towards pregnancy and birth (Burt Ruzek 
1978; Layne 2003a, 2003b; Rothman 2007b). However, in (over)emphasising 
the happy outcomes of pregnancies as controllable, natural and joyful, women’s 
health movements have arguably contributed to the dismissal and silencing of 
pregnancy loss events and their socio-emotional impacts (Layne 2003a, 2003b). 
However, this is not to ignore that, at the other end of the spectrum, “[e]arlier 
and more intensive medical management of pregnancy encourages earlier and 
more intensive social construction of foetal personhood in wished-for 
pregnancies and to the view of pregnancy as something that can and should be 
controlled” (Layne 2010 p103). It seems, therefore, that both the medical and 
midwifery models of, and practices regarding, pregnancy and childbirth can 
have difficult implications in the context of pregnancy losses.  
Women’s uses of reproductive technologies are complex and ambivalent 
(Kirkman and Fisher 2008; Lorentzen 2008; Gorenstein 2010; Layne 2010a). 
As Casper (1999 p104) states, many women have had disquieting experiences 
pertaining to the disciplining surveillance of their bodies via medicine, yet some 
still welcome medical ‘intrusion’ “if it means better prenatal care and healthier 
babies”. Lock and Kaufert (1998 p2, italics in original) note that women’s 
engagements with medicine can range from “selective resistance to selective 
compliance, although women may also be indifferent”, arguing:  
women’s relationships with technology are usually grounded in 
existing habits of pragmatism. […] If the apparent benefits 
outweigh the costs to themselves, and if technology serves their 
own ends, then most women will avail themselves of what is 
offered. 
Thus, the nexus of medicalisation, feminism and pregnancy loss is fraught. 
Medicine can prevent some (but not all) pregnancy losses and treat some 
aspects that go ‘awry’ (Jenkins and Inhorn 2003), including around gestational 
diabetes, placenta praevia and pre-eclampsia. However, the acceptance of (or 
desire for more) medical involvement in pregnancies is accompanied by risk 
discourses that demand further submission to the control of medicine, with 
potentially blame-inducing and punitive consequences for women if/when their 
pregnancies result in, as Layne (2003b) terms it, ‘unhappy endings’. The 
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perspectives of participants about medicine (actual as well as hypothetical 
encounters, procedures and potential future medical advances) in relation to 
pregnancy losses were diverse and conveyed a range of perspectives about 
bodies, reproduction and agency. Participants’ experiences of pregnancies and 
pregnancy losses included a variety of medical aspects, including the very modes 
through which pregnancy is potentially achieved, such as conception through 
IVF. For different women and in different circumstances, some forms of medical 
technology were actively sought and sometimes enjoyed, such as receiving a 
wanted ‘positive’ pregnancy test result. It was not the case that all participants 
in this research simply or wholeheartedly rejected nor embraced biomedicine, 
but rather their reproductive health experiences often entailed different 
elements on a “fuzzy, shifting continuum” (Casper 1999 p104).  
Still, many participants felt their experiences of medical settings and 
procedures compounded the distress of pregnancy losses. Numerous 
participants described feeling disempowered and incredibly distressed by the 
medical experiences undergone, sometimes by highly phallic medical 
investigation tools. For Caroline, when a foetal heartbeat could not be located 
using standard abdominal ultrasonography, a transvaginal ultrasonography 
probe was used. Caroline recounted “invasive” repeat experiences of this 
alongside other medical encounters such as a hysterosalpingogram to check for 
fallopian tube blockages and with three of her four early miscarriages managed 
by Dilation and Curettage (D&C).17 These experiences can be considered to 
constitute “micro-spatial invasion[s] within the macro-spaces of the medical 
environment” (Bingley 2012 p78). Using the language of phallic penetration, 
Caroline described transvaginal ultrasound probes as “a long thin willy basically 
of hard plastic and they put like a condom over it and then they insert it inside 
you, so basically you’re just opened”. She described a harrowing occasion when 
a transvaginal ultrasound was requested in a routine (12 week) scan:  
I said ‘okay, fine’, not realising anything was wrong at all, thinking 
‘oh, he just wants a closer look’, and he actually told me that the 
baby had died whilst he had this thing inside me […] I’m lying 
                                                          
17 D&Cs and ERPCs (Evacuation of Retained Products of Conception), now collectively known as 
Surgical Management of Miscarriage, are surgical interventions in which the cervix is dilated in 
order to scrape and/or aspirate the uterine contents. 
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there with my legs splayed open… yeah, with this THING stuck up 
me which he’s prodding around and I... I... I... I just, WELL, you 
can imagine. 
The use of anaesthetics meant that Caroline was not awake during the D&C 
procedures, prompting a poignant and chilling uncertainty regarding invasive 
medical technologies whilst unconscious. A sense of her body being violently 
treated as a mechanical object was highlighted in Caroline’s comments: 
because I don’t know what they’re doing [when anaesthetised] but 
I know my legs are splayed all over the place and they’ve got 
clamps and all sorts up me to open up my cervix, to DRAG out 
whatever is inside, you know, that’s invasive. 
Such medical procedures, therefore, are not merely neutral practices of 
‘knowing’ about bodily interiors but markedly shape the emotional experiences 
about pregnancy losses as recalled, for instance, in research interviews.  
Medical ‘Knowing’ 
The medicalisation of female reproductive bodies produces particular 
knowledges about, as well as physical access to, bodily interiors. This includes: 
the removal and implanting of reproductive matter, including egg harvesting 
and embryo transfer; the measurement/assessment of interior processes, such 
as from the blood and urine; genetic counselling; diagnostic visual technologies 
like ultrasonography; and foetal medicine. In this section, I discuss urine hCG 
tests, mentioned by most participants, as a form of medically ‘knowing’. These 
tests work by detecting the hormone human chorionic gonadotropin (hCG), 
produced following egg fertilisation, in the urine. As Layne (2010b) notes, urine 
pregnancy-tests are a medical technology which has moved from being only 
accessible in medical spaces to now prolifically available. As a ‘domesticated’ 
medical technology, these urine tests are now used in ‘non-medical’ 
environments such as toilet spaces at home, work or the supermarket. The near-
ubiquitous use of urine pregnancy tests in Western societies pertains to 
mutually reinforcing availability in pharmacies/convenience shops and the 
socio-emotional status of the test. These tests can partake in the production of 
foetal identity/personhood and, though only Caroline mentioned doing so for 
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her first miscarriage pregnancy, used tests may be kept as a ‘memento’ akin to 
ultrasound images and postpartum artefacts such as the first lock of hair. 
Urine Pregnancy Test Kits Outside of Medical Settings 
The emotionality of using urine test kits at home for pregnancy detection 
was a prominent theme in many participant accounts. For some, the repeated 
experience of miscarriages and/or arduous infertility treatments tainted 
pregnancy tests with simultaneous dread and excitement. Participants held 
different notions about when it is suitable to test in relation to missed menstrual 
periods. Victoria conveyed the intensity of this for a much-wanted pregnancy: “I 
did a test on the first day of my missed period, I was desperate to do tests before 
but I held off until the day I should have come on [menstruating]”. Marie 
reiterated a similar sentiment:  
I’ve never tested early in the whole three years [of trying to 
conceive] because… it’s really hard not to {laughs} believe me it’s 
really hard not to […] [but] I think you have to get to the day you 
were due and at least miss by a few days. 
As such, many of the women felt there are emotional risks around home-testing 
early for desired pregnancies. However, Caroline developed a routine in this way 
so as to gather data (the quantity and timing of repeat miscarriages) in order to 
secure medical support for what she suspected was ‘sticky blood’ syndrome. 
Caroline explained that she began testing several days before her period was due 
because “the recommendation for the treatment anyway is that you [are 
required to] test early, so I was, I cottoned onto this”. Whilst this is what she 
did, using it as a strategy “to prepare for the next anticipated loss” (Layne 2010b 
p103) and pre-emptive of biomedical investigation, Caroline cautioned against 
others doing early testing (“but you shouldn’t, no, no”). 
Acutely aware of the emotional dimensions, several participants 
described their cautiousness about, and occasionally made pleas (rhetorically to 
unknown others and directly to me) to defer, the use of urine pregnancy home 
test kits. In a subsequent interview, Caroline reiterated her belief that this 
readily-available technology has altered pregnancy experientially which, as 
Layne (2010b) also argues, brings the frequency of early pregnancy losses to 
awareness. Caroline explained: 
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if you think back, sort of, 30 years ago when you got pregnant, you 
waited till you missed probably TWO periods and then you went 
off to the doctor and you got a result whereas now if you’re four 
days before your periods due, you go off down to the chemist, you 
buy this great kit that will give you very early indications that 
you’re pregnant […] and what you need to remember is that the 
majority of these pregnancies sometimes end and you have your 
period as you would normally have your period and you would 
have been none the wiser, that’s nature, you know. 
Caroline felt it was “dangerous for women to assume […] they’ve had a 
miscarriage before their period was actually due because 30 years ago you 
wouldn’t of known you were pregnant”. Resultantly, she considered testing 
before a due period as “setting yourself up for a heartache”. This resonates with 
Layne (2010b p102), that the “[u]se of the home pregnancy test means that 
women who in the past would have been spared the experience now must deal 
with a loss, and do so in a culture that denies and belittles this experience”. In 
both sets of comments, there is a tension and indeed Caroline recognised that 
she might sound “quite heartless”. Certainly, technologies such as urine test 
home-kits enabling ever earlier chemical detection can mean that a particular 
pregnancy is invested in emotionally at an earlier stage than previously. 
However, the notion that one might be better off not knowing could denigrate 
(some) pregnancy losses and resonate with trivialising historical, as well as 
contemporary, social responses to individuals who lose pregnancies. The notion 
that ‘you could never have known’ risks reconfiguring the dismissive ‘better luck 
next time’ comment (Letherby 1999), especially for women whose much-wanted 
pregnancies never progress past this early biochemical point. Thus, Caroline’s 
and Layne’s (2010b) comments can appear complicit with particular trends of 
the social policing of pregnancy loss grief in assuming ‘ignorance is bliss’.18 
                                                          
18 Layne (2010a) acknowledges that a reviewer also raised the issue that postponed testing could 
deprive some women who might value the opportunity to know that they were pregnant, even if 
this be only short-lived.  Sharing this concern, I prefer the approach later on in Layne’s (2010b 
p108) chapter in which she advocates early pregnancy detection by ‘self-knowledge’ and 
suggests a “feminist pregnancy test” which would include information on an array of topics, 
such as on miscarriage, termination, contraception and infertility, for different women. 
57 
 
The example of urine pregnancy tests highlights some tensions and 
ambivalences surrounding the use of medical-technologies which are 
inseparable from the wider socio-cultural contexts of their design and 
involvement in a multiplicity of practices (Johnson 2010; Jutel 2011). For some 
participants, such tests can be distressing and were recognised as only ever 
precariously ‘truthful’; for others they could be exciting and informative, 
resonating with Gemma’s experience of her first pregnancy: 
I always think there’s this interesting thing about pregnancy tests 
where you almost feel like... you know, I’m kind of goal-orientated 
{laughs} and with these tests you kind of feel like you’ve won or 
something {laughs} you’ve achieved it, you get the plus, you know, 
it’s like getting an ‘A’ [grade] {laughs} so I don’t know if it was as 
naive and simple as that and I still think that with the subsequent 
pregnancies as well, I think ‘I’ve got to get the line’  {laughs} 
Urine pregnancy tests, it seems, are tied up with wider discourses about 
‘achievement’ and ‘success’ as well as notions of motherhood and gender 
propriety. Subsequently, it can be devastating to see a negative pregnancy test 
result when hoping for a positive (Abbey 2000). As Marie explained: 
I didn’t want the disappointment, I didn’t want to see that 
negative, to not get the lines […] it’s difficult to… to… it’s 
disappointing enough as it is when your period comes when you’re 
trying, but then to have a test and it’s negative AND THEN your 
period comes – it’s like a double whammy. 
Successive menstrual periods, even if one is not trying to conceive at the time, 
can bring back emotions and memories of pregnancy losses. Penny, having 
experienced a diagnosed missed miscarriage at 12 weeks after trying to conceive 
for nearly a year, remarked: “every time [I’]ve had a period[,] it makes me feel 
sad and emotional as it feels like another reminder of  the fact [I’]m not 
pregnant anymore”. The biomedical depiction of menstruation as “failed 
(re)production” is therefore painfully felt in such scenarios of wanted 
pregnancies (Martin 1987 p105), with the devastation of ‘innocent’ mentalities 
regarding pregnancy (Layne 1996, 2006) and dispositions of ‘invulnerability’ 
(Janoff-Bulman and Berger 2000) constituting additional ‘losses’. 
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Using urine pregnancy tests can be highly emotional endeavours with 
effects that far exceed ‘merely’ yielding medical (chemical) information. This is 
the case for much-wanted pregnancies, as for Marie and Penny, but also for 
pregnancies neither planned nor necessarily wanted following contraceptive 
failure. Carla described finding out that she was pregnant for the first time as a 
young teenager, to which her best friend, unaware that she had been sexually 
active, thought she was joking as they were only “little kids”. Shocked and in 
denial about the results of the urine pregnancy test and, owing to being under 
the statutory age of consent, Carla feared that both she and her partner would 
be in legal and familial trouble. Eventually, over a couple of months, her mother 
noticed that Carla was no longer asking for or using a supply of tampons: 
she collared us and went ‘[Carla], ‘are you pregnant?’ and I was 
like ‘I don’t know’, [I] blatantly knew—crap, there’s something in 
me—but naively thought if I ignored it, it’d disappear. […] But no, 
erm, my mam took me to [a supermarket], [I] peed on a stick, two 
pink lines appeared INSTANTLY, my mam was like ‘maybe it’ll 
disappear’ […] bless her {laughs} it was like no mam, once they’re 
there – they’re there forever. 
In this instance, Carla’s pregnancy culminated in the birth of her living child; 
however, as in her subsequent miscarried pregnancies, the visible positive 
pregnancy test lines are not always guarantees of pregnancy outcomes. Holly 
commented that she wished “there was a test they could do that just says ‘you’re 
pregnant but actually it’s not going to happen so prepare yourself for that’ erm… 
or ‘you’re pregnant and it’ll probably be okay’ {laughs} I realise that’s not going 
to [happen]”. Since urine home tests “fragment, isolate, identity, and measure a 
single element of these [incremental and multiple pregnancy] changes” into the 
presence of the chemical hCG, they can thus mask over the complexity of what 
may be occurring – including non-viable pregnancies (Layne 2010b p97).  
In addition to an inability to determine viability or pre-empt loss, several 
participants expressed hesitancy or scepticism about the quality of urine-test 
kits, including that the tests are not scientifically infallible regardless of the 
perceived quality of the brand. Home-use kits are not always considered to 
provide ‘authoritative knowledge’ as “women often do not trust the result of the 
test either because they believe the product may be flawed, or they fear they 
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have erred in using it and so perform repeat tests” (Layne 2010b p95). With 
initially very faint results on a twin pack of supermarket tests, as “there seemed 
to be something almost there where I needed the line to be, but I wasn't sure”, 
Helen used a variety of brands as she re-tested. Later that day, she “bought a 
fancy expensive test” but:  
to my dismay, the test was inconclusive and hadn't worked for 
some reason. So, I called into [another] chemist […] and bought 2 
cheap strip tests [which were again faint] […] I bought another 
twin pack from [supermarket] a day or two later and got a much 
clearer line[.] 
Helen articulated her mixed emotions as she sought a reliable test result across 
a variety of brands with different cost-quality connotations and that “[as m]uch 
as I was willing the line to appear, I was also scared of that line and all that it 
would lead to. I hadn’t expected that facing miscarriage was one of those things 
though”. Whilst urine test kits can offer some insight into the internal processes 
at work within women’s bodies (chemical pregnancy or not), they cannot inform 
of the viability and physiological context of the pregnancy which could end in a 
matter of only hours, days or, due to a lag before bleeding, already have done so.  
Pregnancy Tests Within Medical Settings 
Despite praise that urine pregnancy-tests available to purchase in stores 
can decrease dependency on medical institutions to manage reproductive 
choices (Oakley 1976, quoted also in Layne 2010b), many women still seek and 
appreciate medical institutional legitimacy. The evidenced-yet-precarious status 
of a positive result arrived at through urine-based home-kits prompted many 
participants to visit their GPs for blood tests, and/or additional urine tests, and 
‘official’ confirmation. Thus, professionally trained individuals instated in 
spaces coded as ‘medical’ were sought to authoritatively affirm pregnancy as 
well as to provide access to particular resources like contact with a midwife or 
termination referral. Resultantly, ‘learning’ that one is pregnant is now very 
much “a multistep, technologically dependent, diagnostic process […] [in which] 
not one, but two and often more scientific tests are undertaken. Home 
diagnostic kits do not replace doctors’ tests; they are just an additional, prior 
step” (Layne 2010b p96). After conceiving on the fertility drug Clomid and 
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positive home-kit urine tests, Esther visited her GP where she then had blood 
tests taken and an external examination. However, the legitimacy attributed to 
medical professionals is sometimes challenged. Esther’s GP referred her onto a 
local EPU with suspected ectopic pregnancy for an ultrasound, although the 
validity of her GP’s approach was contested: “if you’ve poked me, it hurts 
because you’ve poked me – not because there’s a problem”. On arrival, the EPU 
refused a scan, providing blood tests instead, and an ectopic was ruled out, 
adding to Esther’s scepticism about her GP’s examination. Whilst the 
examination was discredited as unable to provide biomedical ‘fact’, the blood 
test results came to feature prominently in Esther’s experience.  
Esther was telephoned later that day by a doctor at the EPU to inform her 
that her hCG blood tests likely indicated an ended pregnancy: a finding which, 
although mixed with disbelief and disappointment, turned out to be the case. 
The delivery of this information was coarse: “I kid you not, his words to me were 
‘your hormone levels have dropped, your baby’s not viable, you need to come in 
in two days for another blood test’”. Subsequently, though dubious of the 
medical validity of the external exam, Esther described her rapport with her GP 
in much more positive terms than her experiences, stretched over nearly two 
weeks, with EPU staff. In addition to denying her request for a ultrasonography 
scan and the brisk phone call, Esther’s experience at the EPU included: multiple 
(excessive?) blood tests; being left her in waiting rooms for long stretches of 
time, on one occasion, being told she was “forgotten about”; ‘cold’ staff 
communication; and insensitive/non-consenting exposure to what both parties 
knew would likely be an ultrasound image of foetal death. In contrast, Esther’s 
GP conveyed a degree of emotional care by being “a bit more human certainly”. 
The relationship with her GP had built up over time—from initial fertility 
investigation, confirming the pregnancy, referring to the EPU—and, after her 
miscarriage, the GP “remembered us... and obviously our history and what had 
gone on in the past and stuff and yeah she was very, very good, very 
compassionate and very kind”. Thus, whilst there is an expectation that medical 
staff should be proficient in deploying their medical knowledge (through forms 
of medical assessment) – a sensitive, understanding demeanour was also 
important and, as in Esther’s evaluation of her GP, could potentially 
compensate for medical uncertainty.  
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Blood tests offer an informational advantage over urine-test home kits in 
that the hCG count can be numerically tracked and interpreted in line with the 
curve of levels for normal pregnancies, peaking around 10 weeks since last 
missed period (Beischer et al 1997). An unexpected stagnation or dropping of 
hCG levels can indicate miscarriage in advance of the onset of uterine bleeding. 
Thus blood tests were sometimes used to check for ‘completed’ miscarriage in 
with hCG levels return to a ‘non-pregnant’ baseline. Beth’s knowledge as a 
doctor aided her understanding as to why urine or blood pregnancy tests might 
yield positive results despite uterine bleeding indicative of miscarriage: 
my GP made me do a pregnancy test in the office while I was 
bleeding.  I guess he wanted to prove that I was pregnant at all and 
that this wasn't my period, but as the pregnancy hormones hang 
around for a few weeks post miscarriage/termination etc. a 
positive result did nothing but upset me and confuse my non-
medical husband. 
The testing was emotionally distressing despite her medical understanding and 
Beth recognised that this could be especially so for ‘laypersons’: 
I was then even more upset thinking about all the other women 
who might have a pregnancy test like that and think it meant they 
were still pregnant when in a lot of cases they weren't, and then I 
had to wait 2 days for a scan (knowing all the while it was likely 
going to show no baby, but some women would have hung onto 
that positive test). 
Subsequently, the meanings yielded by positive pregnancy tests, whether the 
‘achievement’ described by Gemma or the definitiveness remarked upon by 
Carla, become particularly complicated in some instances of pregnancy loss. 
Blood tests involve physical elements of pain/discomfort and additional 
layers of psychological distress, including needle phobia and of bodily invasion. 
These entail direct ‘touch’ and ‘penetration’ by the needle, an external object, 
moving into the interior of the body and extracting blood. In contrast to the 
relative ease and painless provision of urine samples, blood tests can thus be 
particularly negative bodily experiences. During Esther’s visits to the EPU, she 
had nearly double-figures of blood tests taken in quick succession, leading her 
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to feel like “a pin cushion”. A sense of vacated agency, whereby one comes to see 
their body as a physical object, was reiterated by other participants also. With 
years of medical tests and recurrent miscarriages, Caroline perceived her body 
as an object which medical staff were entitled to prick, poke, probe, measure 
and detachedly discuss between themselves: “I got really, really tired of it and 
just felt like this [body] is anybody’s but mine, that this is just not me, this part 
of my body has been taken over by scanning, prods and dyes, and the blood tests 
and oh god, it was just never ending”. Many of the women spoke about medical-
technologies and procedures as negating their bodily autonomy in attempting to 
gain insight into the functioning of the interiors of their bodies. Bodily 
disassociation/detachment emerged as a response to, but could also heighten, 
vulnerability with the separation of self from body as one was “passively being 
done to” (Martin 1987 p86 italics in original). This was exacerbated by lacking 
emotional support from medical staff who breached ‘normal’ circumstances of 
privacy by intervening in the interiors of the women’s physical bodies through 
medical instruments and approaches. As Caroline recounted, “in between all 
that you’ve no one to talk to. I used to go downstairs in the hospital and sit and 
cry and I thought I don’t know how much longer I can do this”.  
Echoing Casper‘s (1999) comments, many participants emphasised that 
they would be willing to put up with a great deal of physical pain and 
psychological upset from medical interventions, providing there would be a 
‘happy’ end result. For instance, in relation to the iatrogenic side-effects of 
fertility medication Clomid and the symptoms of pregnancy which share 
similarities such as nausea and breast tenderness, Esther explained how she saw 
the latter suffering as invested with hope and therefore made tolerable: 
there was finally a point to them [side-effects, symptoms] – there 
was, there was a positive [pregnancy result]. So before everything 
went wrong with it, I’d always said to myself I didn’t… CARE if I 
had the worst pregnancy in the world so long as at the end of it 
there was a healthy baby, so I didn’t care if I was going to be sick 
or I was going to be, I don’t know, having headaches or fat ankles 
or whatever else came with it as long as there’s a healthy baby at 
the end of the day. I always said to myself I would never moan 
about being pregnant so as far as I was concerned, I felt sick and 
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this that and the other but there was going to be a positive 
outcome to it, so it was worth it. 
However, faced with pregnancy losses and medical complications, including the 
removal of fallopian tubes following ectopic pregnancies or otherwise hampered 
fertility diagnoses, many participants experienced diminished and/or lost hope 
of having a (biologically own) living infant. This was particularly the case for 
those who had undergone long, arduous infertility treatments or whose 
relationship circumstances presented additional difficulties (see Peel and Cain 
2012 on conceiving in lesbian relationships). When the ‘promise’ of a much-
wanted pregnancy and, fundamentally, delivery of a living child is compromised 
or removed, the physical pain of procedures, tests, examinations and so on can 
become experiences of suffering without recompense.19 In light of subsequent 
‘promising’ pregnancies, some participants’ experiences of the physical 
endurance of pregnancy loss retrospectively acquired new significances. For 
instance, 26 weeks pregnant at the time, Holly suggested that her naturally-
managed miscarriage may, to some degree, prepare her for the level of pain and 
blood loss pre-empted in the forthcoming birth:  
I think I’ll be better able to cope with the labour and {laughs} I 
don’t know how naïve I am, that I can handle the pain {laughs} but 
in my head it’s kind of, I got through that and so this is a positive 
thing, this means that I’ll get a baby at the end of this. 
Hence, the anticipated outcome—contrasting the reward of a living baby with 
the grief of a pregnancy loss—is a key and highly emotional factor shaping how 
                                                          
19 Scarry (1985) argues that intense physical pain is a ‘world-destroying’, isolating experience 
which perpetuates and amplifies vulnerability. Refuting a clear separation between physical and 
emotional pain (see Bendelow and Williams 1995), Harrison (2002 p594) articulates how 
“[s]uffering does not have a limit; like an event which does not concern you it continues 
regardless of the point where you can no longer go on”. This is relevant for understanding some 
of my research participants’ experiences. For instance, Gemma commented about the use of 
medical pain-relief allowing some disengagement: “[a termination delivery is] very different to a 
live birth because [in the latter] you wanna be as there as possible, you don’t want to have lots of 
drugs”. In contrast to seeking “a sense of wholeness” with “the functional integration of all of a 
woman’s parts – her memories of the past, hopes for the future, her mind and body” (Martin 
1987 p158) in live births, biomedicine can enable detachment of body and self, offering 
psychological cushioning in the case of such a traumatic scenario as for Gemma.  
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participants viewed their involvements with medicine. This, as will be discussed 
in the next section, was pertinently the case in relation to ultrasonography also.  
Ultrasonography Spaces and Accompanying Waiting Rooms   
External ultrasound, with a transducer moved over the stretched skin of a 
pregnant woman’s abdomen, is an example of a technology “of the visible that 
reveal women’s bodies to others and to themselves” (Weiss 1999 p124). In 
contrast to transvaginal probe ultrasonography, this form of ‘accessing’ the 
interior through the external skin/bump was most widely experienced by the 
women spoken to, including Caroline who had also experienced the former. 
Abdominal ultrasound images are salient in the popular contemporary Western 
imaginary of pregnancy (Matthews and Wexler 2000). Produced through the 
emission of electrical pulses to assemble a digital image from returned sound 
waves of the embryo/foetus in utero, ultrasonography images are medical 
representations with diagnostic and treatment purposes, yet they are also 
attributed powerful socio-emotional meanings. Many feminist scholars have 
highlighted the non-neutrality of ultrasonography, related imagery and the 
emotive discourses which circulate well beyond medical settings and agendas, 
including for pro-life/anti-abortion purposes in the public domain. In addition 
to termination, I argue that we need to also reflect on the ways ultrasonography 
features in other kinds of pregnancy loss experiences and in relation to the 
prevalent norms and values in which wanted pregnancies are deemed joyful/ 
happy (Layne 2003a, 2003b) and linear trajectories of birth to death.  
Ultrasonography is often associated with intensely emotional 
connotations of hope, anticipation and excitement, pertaining to, as Penny 
summarised, the fact that “[yo]u just presume you[’]r[e] going to have a healthy 
pregnancy”.20 Ultrasonography rooms and their accompanying waiting places 
are medical, diagnostic and treatment spaces which retain and facilitate links to 
a particular set of normative notions around pregnancy as the beginning, not 
end, of ‘life’ and medical heraldry. Rothman (2007c p50) argues that “[f]rom 
the grey blur on the ultrasound image, a fully formed fetus is read into being”, 
with sonographers participating in constructing foetal personhood through 
                                                          
20 As with urine- and blood- pregnancy tests, we might add that this is the case in ‘expected’ 
and/or ‘wanted’ pregnancies but in other scenarios ultrasound practices and imageries are 
clearly not benevolently experienced given their complex relations to termination politics.  
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‘showing’ and ‘baby-ising’ (Mitchell 2001). Narrations about ‘waving’ and 
‘thumb-sucking’ ‘babies’ are therefore produced in the ultrasonography room, 
and in non-medical others’ responses to viewing the resultant images/videos, 
“with or without the participation of the mother” (Rothman 2007c p50). Yet 
women can find their ‘baby’ “quickly de/reconstructed as a “fetus” or even a 
“genetic mistake”” with the diagnosis of foetal anomalies (Rothman 2007c p50) 
and, I add, in other forms of pregnancy losses such as missed miscarriages. 
For many persons, ultrasonography—as a practice and the concomitant 
images—appears to be largely divorced from the fundamental ‘monitoring’ 
medical roles (Petchesky 1987; Hartouni 1997; Jutel 2011; Peel and Cain 2012). 
Ultrasounds tend to be perceived in particular emotional-affective terms as 
opportunities to ‘meet’, ‘bond with’ and ‘see’ their ‘babies’ (Rothman 2007a, 
2007c), including attempts to determine foetal sex for ‘gendered bonding’ 
(Larkin 2006). Constituting one of multiple foetal anomaly detection tests 
available to pregnant women in affluent Western contexts (Rothman 1994), 
actual experiences of ultrasonography can be ambivalent, fraught or deeply 
distressing. This was the case for a significant number of participants in the 
research, either recognisably at the time or retrospectively so. For instance, 
Caroline explained how, excited about the prospect of ‘seeing’ the baby for the 
first time, she attended a routine ultrasonography scan at 12.5 weeks: 
[I] had gone up [to the hospital] with my youngest child who was 
three [years old] then and a couple of family members to come 
with me because, you know, it was like a day out really and [then] 
to be told the baby had died so it was […] a huge shock. 
‘Shock’ denotes a feeling of vulnerability as one experiences the impact of 
external conditions which can be neither understood nor accepted in the 
moment (Seltzer 1998). With Caroline’s first miscarriage of four diagnosed as a 
‘missed miscarriage’, the actuality of the encounter in this medical space starkly 
contrasted to her (and her family members) expectations. Within this setting, 
‘normal’ linear trajectories of time and pregnancy progression were sharply and 
suddenly ruptured, leaving Caroline overwhelmed and, at “the lowest point” 
following a second miscarriage detected in a similar manner, even suicidal.  
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Across participants, ultrasonography rooms were visited for different 
reasons, at various times, and subsequently resulted in diverse encounters. This 
included attending ultrasounds: as part of the routine tests for ‘normal’ 
pregnancies; as an additional service for women who had had previous 
pregnancy losses; if particular symptoms emerged, such as bleeding or pain, or 
disappeared, such as the cessation of morning sickness; and to check that there 
was no remaining ‘conception material’ which risked infection or other 
complications. Especially for women who have previously had very early 
pregnancy losses, ultrasonography scans can be important milestones relating 
to their psychological and emotional approaches to subsequent ‘tentative’ 
pregnancies (Rothman 1994). As such, these occasions were sometimes 
reassuring of foetal health and development, offering opportunities to ‘see’ the 
‘baby’ with scan images to circulate between family and friends. If pregnancy 
losses later occurred in these pregnancies, the images sometimes retained or 
acquired great significance and value (see Chapter 8). However, as noted, scans 
were not unanimously ‘happy’ or ‘promising’, and could instead be highly 
traumatic occasions of learning that pregnancies had or would/might have 
‘unhappy endings’ (Layne 2003b), including with termination as an option with 
diagnosed foetal anomalies (Ginsburg and Rapp 1999; Williams 2006). 21 
Rather than always involving the ‘joyful’ beginnings of life or pre-life, 
ultrasonography rooms can be spaces of intrauterine death. On such occasions, 
‘death’ or otherwise cessation of ‘another’ (or potential other) within one’s body 
is encountered through the ultrasound scan screen and operating technician. 
These specific experiences can be considered as ‘out-of-place’ and ‘out-of-time’, 
linking to ideas also utilised by Convery et al (2005) in the emotional 
geographies of livestock slaughter during the 2001 Cumbrian foot and mouth 
disease outbreak. In this latter context, the death of many (pregnant) ewes 
occurred at the wrong place, in the farm rather than abattoir, and at the wrong 
time in the farm calendar and life cycle of lambing (Convery et al 2005). In 
relation to my research, the loss of wanted pregnancies can be understood to 
occur in the wrong place, the ultrasound room, and at the wrong time in terms 
of being before (postpartum) ‘life’. Whilst the vocabulary of death and dying in 
                                                          
21 Missed miscarriages—in which the pregnancy has ended but not been reabsorbed or expelled 
with uterine bleeding—are only detectable through ultrasonography technology and thus this 
diagnosis depends on the contemporary availability of ultrasonography (Peel and Cain 2012). 
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relation to embryos/foetuses is not without concern nor is it used by all 
individuals who experience pregnancy losses (Kevin 2011), acknowledging that 
some do has important implications for burgeoning areas of scholarship such as 
the geographies of death and dying. The topic of encountering the blood and 
other materials of ended pregnancies will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
Other emotional responses to unexpected and unpleasant circumstances 
of ultrasounds included sadness regarding the shattered expectations about 
ultrasonography as a happy, rites of passage life event. Aware that she was 
pregnant for the first time shortly before the onset of heavy uterine bleeding, 
Lara’s first experience of ultrasonography was following a visit to Accident and 
Emergency (A&E) in order to check if the miscarriage had been ‘complete’:  
I found it really… I don’t know, a bit intrusive, it wasn’t the 
experience that I imagined in my head, obviously I thought the 
first time I’d have an ultrasound that I’d be so happy to see my 
baby inside like moving or whatever and then it turned out the 
first time around was to check that it was gone. 
The circumstances of Lara’s pregnancy, as well as this first experience of uterine 
ultrasound, departed significantly from what she had imagined for herself in 
terms of biologically having children when she was older and in a stable 
marriage. As Zucker (1999 p783) highlights, women who become pregnant 
unintentionally “may experience feelings of failure at controlling their 
reproductive lives [rather than, or in addition to, such feelings being caused by 
the event of ended pregnancy itself]”. Women may be in the process of 
reconciling their expectant ‘mother’ identity and forthcoming roles, or only 
recently come to terms with this, before disruption by pregnancy loss (Price 
2008). Thus there are multiple components coalescing in experiences such as 
Lara’s, with various points of disjuncture between imagined reproductive 
future/hopes, belief in self-mastery regarding this and the actual situations 
experienced. 
The emotional geographies of ultrasonography spaces and interactions 
are complex, concerning medical ‘situations’ such as anembryonic miscarriage, 
foetal death and anomalies which contrast sharply with hopes and expectation 
for wanted pregnancies. Other aspects of these medical settings include: staff 
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demeanour, in terms of tone, conversation content and body language; the built 
and adorned environment, with details like chairs, posters and magazines; the 
practicalities of service provision such as scan availability over weekends and 
bank holidays; and the multiple socio-symbolic messages of value which these 
can be read as conveying. The material, symbolic and social dimensions of 
ultrasound spaces can have important consequences for those who experience 
pregnancy losses, impacting on emotional encounters as recalled in interviews. 
Participants recounted different material resources in ultrasonography 
provisions, as well as various social interactions with staff (medical, 
administrative) and other patients/visitors. Alongside variable availabilities, 
locations, opening hours and services of ultrasonography including of/at EPUs 
(McLean and Flynn 2012; National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
2012), participants suggested that the physical constitutions of such spaces 
could convey particular meanings about the sociocultural marginality of, for 
instance, threatened or suspected miscarriages.  
Returning to the example mentioned earlier, Esther enquired about why 
her GP’s scan request was rejected: “when I asked why, why not – it was ‘we 
haven’t got anyone to do one, we haven’t got the time’”. Following the message 
that Esther/her pregnancy was not a top priority for the medical staff, blood 
tests were taken instead. Abruptly informed that her pregnancy had ended but 
with no onset of uterine bleeding, Esther was finally offered an ultrasonography 
scan several days later. Numerous components of this eventual ultrasound 
experience were distressing, including the demeanour of the staff and their 
habitual practices of showing visual outcomes, rather than turning the screen 
away, despite knowing the image would likely be of foetal death: “there was no 
thought, there was no compassion, there was no empathy for the fact that I 
might not want to see what she was going to see on that screen”. An additional 
factor involved other patients since: 
[the EPU] waiting room is the same waiting room where couples 
are coming in and out, having, you know, good scans, successful 
scans […] happy occurrences erm… there was very little sensitivity 
to separate people from each other […] in the sense that, you 
know, if you’re grieving a miscarriage, the last thing you want is 
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the couple opposite you to be cooing and all excited over a scan 
picture in their hands. 
Esther, having spent a significant amount of time in this waiting room, was 
acutely aware of the material constitution of the space. She described it as: 
very VERY… I want to use the word grubby […] I remember the 
walls were a sort of dirty yellow colour that BADLY needed 
refreshing and there was no, in that waiting room, there was no 
literature on the walls, there was a box of toys in the corner and 
like a coffee table covered in old tatty looking magazines […] it was 
very… soulless […] and it was a very uncomfortable room to be in. 
Esther’s comments suggest that such waiting room spaces can compound upset 
about pregnancy loss through the aesthetics of décor and provisions, especially 
when occupied over a protracted portion of time awaiting a conclusion on 
whether a wanted pregnancy had ended. Such dismal and tired spaces convey a 
lack of consideration for those waiting in such circumstances and can 
foreground the deprioritised place pregnancy losses are attributed in the wider 
social (as well as medical) context. 
 The experience of an ultrasonographer “seeing something unexpected on 
the screen” (Rothman 2007c p51) can set in motion a series of incoming staff 
and their exchanges. During a routine scan in Penny’s third pregnancy, a foetal 
heartbeat could not be found. At this point: 
[the ultrasonography technician] said she will [get] someone else 
to check and went out the room[.] [I] turned to my husband and 
told him then ‘[I] think the baby has died’. Then the lady 
[technician] c[a]me back with someone else and she [second 
person] looked again at the screen and did another scan and she 
confirmed that my baby had died and she just got back up and left. 
Meanwhile the other lady [technician] just kept saying sorry and 
gave us 5 minutes then came back in and told us to wait in another 
room next door. I just felt like [I] was being shoved into a room 
without any thought or explanation at all[.] 
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Drawing from Edvardsson et al (2003) on narratives of distressing ward 
atmospheres, the social dimensions of this medical situation entailed Penny 
‘experiencing chaos’ and ‘not being seen’. The relative lack of engagement with 
Penny from the second member of medical staff, who instead focused on the 
screen, can be seen as pertaining to ultrasound facilitating thinking “of fetuses 
[and embryos] as separate patients more or less trapped within the maternal 
environment […] The woman is erased, an empty surround in which the fetus 
floats” (Rothman 2007c p49). Indeed, the location of the foetus is 
technologically displaced from inside the woman’s physical body to a distanced 
screen, making it possible to ‘look’ at the real-time interior uterus with one’s 
back physically turned to that very pregnant woman. This echoes with Martin’s 
(1987 p146) comments regarding foetal heart monitors as also having “the effect 
of removing the mother”. Whilst the negation of one’s own embodiment may be 
accepted or overlooked in pursuit of ‘healthy’ and ‘happy’ pregnancies, it can be 
additionally upsetting and confusing when pregnancy losses occur, potentially 
prompting the kinds of bodily detachment previously discussed. 
 Thinking through the socio-political implications of such technology, 
Taylor (2004a) ‘maps’ some of the many locales at which ultrasound images 
become visible, including car advertisements. Feminists have criticised the co-
option of foetal-centric discourses and visual imagery for anti-abortion 
purposes, expressing concerns about the prolific use of ultrasound and the 
presence of subsequent images widely dispersed in society (Petchesky 1987; 
Hartouni 1998; Casper 1999; Michaels and Morgan 1999; Stabile 1999; Fox 
2000; Woliver 2002; Taylor 2004a; Kevin 2011). An additional consideration I 
have concerns the impact of distributed scan imagery on some women who have 
experienced various pregnancy losses. Some women whose pregnancy losses 
were diagnosed with ultrasonography had subsequently encountered its visual 
and auditory presence. With the diagnosis of intrauterine death, Isabel recalled 
how “[s]eeing the picture of our little baby on the [ultrasound] screen still 
haunts me. I still shudder every time I see a scan picture”.  
Aspects of ultrasonography experiences can spatially and temporally 
‘travel’ – emerging abruptly, disrupting expectations of futures and ‘haunting’ 
those “who are enjoined to publicly gloss over the loss[es]” (Peel and Cain p87). 
Isabel had since encountered ultrasonography beyond the medical sphere in 
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numerous locations and scenarios – sometimes anticipated, like in television 
shows like One Born Every Minute, but also in unexpected locales. This 
included: in her home/living room with the aforementioned maternity ward 
show and in nappy advertisements; online social network sites via others profile 
pictures and posts; outside churches, with Christmas posters depicting scan 
images of ‘baby Jesus’; and in café-restaurants when another person played a 
foetal heartbeat sound clip. This latter aspect highlights that it is not only visual 
sights but also sounds which can trigger emotional responses. Komaromy 
(2000) makes such an observation in her research whereby the sounds of death 
include squeaking trolley wheels in residential and nursing homes. For Isabel, 
hearing a foetal heartbeat sound clip at a later date can be understood to 
reiterate the disjuncture between her expectations and the deeply distressing 
scenario of silence. In the following section, I turn to consider some of the 
interior sensations (feelings, touch) involved in pregnancy and pregnancy loss 
which have arguably been displaced by the proliferation of ultrasound (Duden 
1993).  
Self-knowledges and Intra-body Touch 
Medical-technological ‘access’ into the pregnant body produces “the 
foetus as a subject at the expense of the pregnant woman’s own visibility” (Tyler 
2001 p78), allowing the overlooking and denigration of pregnant women’s self- 
or embodied-knowledges. Ultrasonography then enables the (re)presenting of 
foetuses to a vast array of persons, sometimes without the pregnant woman’s 
knowledge/consent (Duden 1993), including multiple medical staff, partners, 
family and friends with the Internet/email allowing quick and potentially 
unfettered circulation of ultrasonography images. Embodied sensations of foetal 
presence such as quickening, the feeling of foetal movement, have been 
delegitimised and disembodied by the proliferating use of such technology, 
since the pregnant woman relinquishes at least some control of ‘knowing’ and 
‘perceiving’ her own pregnancy and its involved changes/processes (Duden 
1993, 1999; Stabile 1998). The intimate experience of internally feeling a foetal 
kick or twist is detracted from by medical-technological abilities to externally 
represent, such as through ultrasonography, as are the relational sharing of such 
sensations which may be perceptible to others later in pregnancy development 
with the knowledge of where to place a hand preferably remaining with the 
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pregnant woman. It is also significant that the production of an external 
representation of this interior space of the uterus, normally considered private 
and personal, occurs in semi-public institutional settings of medical spaces, 
occupied by otherwise unknown medical staff, and the images are then often 
circulated.  
The scientific ability to ‘picture’ the foetus in utero, alongside the wide 
cultural dispersal of images such as Nilsson’s 1965 Life photographs, has 
underpinned discourses attributing ‘foetal independence’ (Petchesky 1987; 
Hartouni 1998; Stabile 1998; Michaels 1999; Tyler 2001; Draper 2002a). Within 
this, the foetus assumes a free floating “discrete and separate entity, outside of, 
unconnected to and, by virtue of its ostensible or visual independence, in an 
adversarial relationship with the body and life upon which it is nevertheless 
inextricably dependent” (Hartouni 1998 p213). Subsequently, “[a]s fetuses in 
their “maternal environment” become ubiquitous, women seem to vanish” 
(Michaels and Morgan 1999 p4). However, speaking of the nude pregnant Demi 
Moore on the 1991 Vanity Fair cover, Tyler (2001) argues that other visual 
representations are possible, such as those foregrounding the pregnant woman 
and her external skin (also Matthews and Wexler 2000). In addition, the theme 
of ‘touch’ can prompt a rethink of hierarchised senses in which vision has 
dominated, including within geography (Paterson et al 2012), in order to 
challenge the ways that ‘maternal space’ is effaced by the notion of the alone 
foetus occupying the ‘uterine environment’. Indeed, some participants conveyed 
a sense of the emotional value of embodied movement as supplementary or even 
advantageously over ultrasonography. Helen, having had a miscarriage 
previously, spoke of her two subsequent successful pregnancies: 
[b]eing able to feel the baby move was also another significant 
milestone – it made it even more real – a scan shows you that 
there is a baby developing in there, and that's amazing – but not 
the same as being able to feel that baby inside you – both as a 
bump and through movement. 
Such felt movements—which are simultaneously interior to, and yet always a 
part of one’s, fleshy self—offer a particular way of ‘knowing’ pregnancy which 
resonates, I argue, with Tyler’s (2001 p81) calls to “re-envelop[e] the foetus 
within the pregnant body”.  
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‘Embodied’/‘self’ knowledges of lived experience can contrast with, and 
potentially critique, biomedical understandings of the body as a mechanical 
object. In the medical model, bodies are monopolised by a focus on biological 
functioning. Measurable, quantifiable changes are seen as particularly relevant, 
such as hCG levels in the blood and ultrasonography showing size/development 
of the foetus, and are primarily interpreted in relation to the teachings of 
physiology and anatomy. Particular bodily dimensions such as amenorrhoea 
and breast tenderness are deemed relatively reliable ‘indicators’ for medical 
consideration, whilst other ways of ‘knowing’ or ‘feeling’ can be altogether 
overlooked or discounted as irrelevant or inadequate. Thus social meanings and 
understandings attached to such bodily experiences may be recognised to a 
limited degree in medical practice, such as social bonding in ultrasonography, 
but are not the primary interests/purposes as focus remains on ‘objectivity’ 
rather than the ‘subjective’ experiences. Dimensions ‘other’ to biomedical 
functioning, like notions of social parenthood and thus ‘parental bereavement’ 
(Murphy 2012a, 2012b), can be systematically refuted in medical practice. For 
instance, Anne recounted the hurtful language used by medical staff which 
conveyed a sense of her stillborn son “like he was a bit of meat that was going 
off”. Foregrounding the complex interconnections between materiality, social 
meanings, subjectivities and emotions offers an alternative approach, critiquing 
the dominance of medical/medical-technological engagements with/in human 
bodies which, Sobchack (1998) argues, can be highly disempowering.  
The concept of intra-body touch can highlight that bodies involve 
constant, dynamic corporeal contact with themselves (Colls 2012). In the 
context of pregnancy, this can displace prevalent biomedical understandings, 
now socially very potent, of a separate foetal entity merely in the ‘vessel’ of a 
pregnant body. Rather, the situation is far more complex: 
[t]he pregnant woman’s external skin is the boundary between 
herself, as a discrete being, and the world. Within this external 
skin, there is a membrane or skin sac within which the foetus 
floats [in amniotic fluid]. The membrane that coats the foetal body 
is both part of her skin and the skin of an other who is not yet a 
separate self. It is very difficult to distinguish between her skin 
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and the foetal skin while the foetus is alive; the pregnant woman 
experiences the foetal skin as part of her-self (Tyler 2001 p80). 
Additionally, it is not until two weeks after conception that the cells of the 
embryo and placenta differentiate (Franklin 1991, 1999). The placenta, attached 
to, and vital for, sustenance of the foetus, is thus a mediating organ constantly 
connecting multiple maternal and foetal tissues. In subverting the 
immunological defences of a pregnant woman, the placenta refutes the notion of 
a discrete foetal being simply occupying the ‘inside’ cavity of the uterus. It is 
pertinent that Nilsson’s iconic and influential images of ‘free floating’ foetuses 
omit (Tyler 2001) or only partially acknowledge (Stabile 1998) the placenta, 
embryonic sac and, indeed, uterus. Wolvier (2002) argues that our dominant 
cultural conceptions of pregnancy and birth are envisioned from a male 
perspective, citing Rothman (1989 p17) in saying: 
[o]ur bodies grow out of the bodies that surround us [including 
those of our mothers]. We don’t, as our language would have us 
believe, ‘enter the world,’ or ‘arrive.’ From where? Women who 
give birth, I have often pointed out, don’t feel babies arrive. We 
feel them leave. 
Hence, “[t]o say that women first hold their babies after they are born is to say 
that the nine-month experience of pregnancy was nothing” (Woliver 2002 
p123). This is also relevant, I add, for the duration of any pregnancy and 
regardless of whether it cumulates in live birth/living infants. Ben recognised 
this tension in relation to the stillbirth of his niece: 
I remember thinking we measure people’s age through their 
BIRTHDAYS, that’s why it’s called birth days […] we don’t count 
any of their time in the stomach, yeah, and I remember then 
thinking well ‘this is at odds with my sister’s kind of philosophy’ 
Quickening—the felt foetal movements usually perceptible in the second 
trimester—prominently highlights pregnancy as a constant, inter-relational 
touch with sometimes intense, startling sensations.  
Foetal movements were sometimes discussed in relation to the dual 
benefits and discontents of medical technologies. With her first pregnancy 
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successful and her second ending in miscarriage, Jane described anxiety during 
her third pregnancy which was ongoing at 26 weeks at the time of interview. 
Illustrating the pregnancy as ‘tentative’ (Rothman 1994), Jane said she had not 
“realised how stressed I was about the 12 week scan until after it had happened, 
and then the sense of relief was enormous”, adding that “luckily I started feeling 
the baby move quite early, before 16 weeks[,] which was extremely reassuring”. 
In an attempt to augment the sanctioned medical knowledges from routine 
check-ups and ultrasonography scans, Jane bought a hand-held doppler for 
home use to assess foetal blood flow and thus heartbeat: 
[buying a doppler is] something I said I would never do, and I 
have actually talked friends out of buying one in the past as I 
understand the risk of hearing your own heartbeat and thinking 
the baby is fine. 
When I asked Jane further about reconciling her decision, she explained her 
concerns were abated with the advantages of her healthcare professional 
knowledge on how to use and interpret the machine effectively.22 The doppler 
permitted benefits for Jane, such as allowing anytime assessment of foetal 
heartbeat and the opportunities to “share the experience” with her husband and 
son. She found there was often an unexpected result in that “listening in with 
the dopplar makes her [the foetus/baby] move around a lot, which tends to 
alleviate any worries before I even find her heartbeat!” Thus, whilst medical 
technologies like dopplers can yield auditory evidence of a current foetal 
heartbeat, internal movements can too be highly informative, in a quick and 
obvious fashion. In addition to the doppler prompted foetal movements, Jane 
had an extensive knowledge about these in relation to time of day and scenario: 
I know she doesn't move a lot in the mornings. [My son] still has 
an afternoon nap where I can put my feet up for a while, and she 
usually has a little kickaround then which reassures me. I can 
make her move by laying down and cupping my belly with my 
hands, or by drinking something cold which I do before getting the 
                                                          
22 As Jane explained, it can be difficult to locate the foetal heartbeat so that she knew that if she 
could not, it “wouldn’t be an immediate worry”. She also recognised the need to take her own 
pulse before use to be sure that the doppler is not only returning the maternal heartbeat. 
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dopplar out. She also responds a lot to [my husband] talking to her 
or putting his hands on my belly […] and when [my son] cries. 
These sensations were prolifically experienced yet ambivalently described: “I 
didn't think it was a particularly nice feeling”. Additionally, Jane spoke about 
impressions from within visible on the bump/skin; she explained how “[l]ast 
night in the bath I could actually see my stomach move for the first time and it 
was so reassuring to actually see something physical and know she's okay”. 
The respective pregnancies discussed in this section regarding Jane and 
Helen culminated in live births but were impacted or recollected in ways 
influenced by previous miscarriages. Internal foetal movements were also 
spoken about by participants who had experienced these during pregnancies 
which later ended in loss/death. This included the highly distressing experience 
of felt internal movements during pregnancies that one had been told had ended 
or would soon be ending. For instance, following a reassuring 12 week scan, 
Gemma described her enjoyment of feeling foetal movements alongside reading 
pregnancy books during her first pregnancy: 
[p]articularly as the pregnancy progressed and the descriptions of 
developmental stages became more exciting, as we became closer 
to that stage at which you know the pregnancy could be viable if it 
was to end early, as the baby started to move; more and more we 
were at the point of obsessive[ness] about the whole thing - what it 
was doing, what we would call it, what we needed to buy. 
However, spina bifida was diagnosed at the 20 week scan and the difficult 
decision was made to have a termination. Gemma spoke about the medical 
process of preparing her body for delivery several days later and requesting an 
injection to conclusively end the pregnancy and thus foetal movements:   
what you have to do is you take some kind of medication that 
prepares your body for labour {sigh} ‘cos obviously it’s not a 
natural, to be induced erm and I also had an injection which was 
kind of a lethal injection into the baby’s heart so at that point, at 
that moment in time that day, the baby wasn’t alive anymore. So 
all the moving and the stuff... stopped […] which was something 
that I had pushed, consciously pushed for. Erm and then I think it 
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is kind of two or three days you have to carry the... foetus... erm 
before you can deliver because your body needs that time to 
prepare to deliver the baby. 
In asking for the injection, as it was not offered and was only reluctantly 
provided, Gemma suggested that the prompt cessation of foetal life was an 
important but nonetheless upsetting component to accepting that her 
pregnancy would end: 
if you imagine you’ve taken a drug which means that that 
pregnancy is definitely no longer viable but you can still feel your 
baby […] moving and what happens if you then change your mind, 
you know, it’s too late, it’s already happened, so I kind of wanted 
to know that it had already happened and have no ambiguity 
about that, I guess […] it was to protect myself basically.   
Without the injection, Gemma thought the foetal movements would further 
amplify the distress around deciding to terminate which, with the medication to 
induce such premature delivery, was already occurring. The doctor’s reluctance 
towards the injection highlights possible emotional impacts on medical 
practitioners carrying out such procedures (Chiappetta-Swanson 2005; 
Williams 2006; Ludlow 2008). Whilst some people may have found this 
frustrating or additionally burdensome, Gemma implied that seeing the doctor’s 
emotional response was in some ways valuable in validating that her 
experiences were distressing: “I kind of respect the fact that he found that a 
difficult process to be involved in. Erm if he, if he’d sort of taken it lightly or 
been flippant about it then that wouldn’t of, I wouldn’t of appreciated that”. 
 With diagnosed intrauterine death, potential felt interior sensations can 
be disturbing, abject and confusing. Isabel’s second miscarriage was diagnosed 
at the 20 week anomaly scan when a foetal heartbeat could not be found. As 
mentioned, the ultrasound image featured prominently in Isabel’s memory:  
I remember lying on the bed and just bursting into tears after she 
told us she could not find a heartbeat. She left the screen showing 
the baby directly in front of us and I could not take my eyes off the 
screen, wishing everything was ok. 
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In the time between taking the medication to induce labour and the delivery a 
few days later, Isabel became particularly anxious about internal sensations 
since, if these were foetal movements, then the diagnosis of foetal death would 
be incorrect. Isabel talked to her sister-in-law, who had been a nurse as well as 
having previously experienced multiple miscarriages and stillbirths, the evening 
before going into hospital to deliver:  
I was on the phone to [her] for a long time talking about how I 
thought I still felt movements and although the doctors were 
telling me that I had to go in and have the baby, I really did not 
want to because I found it really hard to believe there was 
something wrong (most probably wishful thinking on my part and 
being anxious about the next day). 
Isabel’s sister-in-law suggested that “it most probably [wa]sn’t the baby moving, 
it’s just erm… just my internal organs and just sort of liquid in my body”. Isabel 
spoke to a nurse the following morning and was offered an ultrasonography 
scan to “put my mind at rest and just to confirm that what they said was actually 
true”. Although she declined the scan, as the medication to induce delivery had 
already been taken, the offer was reassuring and bolstered her confidence that 
the medical staff “knew what they were talking about”. Whilst nonetheless an 
upsetting experience, with Isabel’s internal sensations and enduring hope 
juxtaposed to the medical diagnosis, the reassurances provided by  her sister-in-
law and the nurses seen on the day of her delivery were greatly appreciated. 
Elusive Sensations, Memory and Affect 
Whilst many of the women drew on biomedically-affirmed knowledges, 
such as urine and blood- tests and/or, depending on the stage of pregnancy, 
perceptible ‘intrabody touch’ (Colls 2012) like internal foetal movement – 
several participants also spoke of other kinds of interior feelings and sensations. 
This included, with a degree of hesitancy, sensorial attunements which were not 
externally or medically evidenced at the time. For instance, Jane described 
having had “gut instinct” that something was wrong early on in a pregnancy, 
leading her to request an earlier scan which her GP declined. As the pregnancy 
progressed, Jane put aside some doubts as she perceived bodily changes 
deemed reassuringly ‘normal’ within pregnancy. On diagnosis of anembryonic 
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pregnancy, Jane questioned her bodily experiences of having felt 
physiologically, progressively pregnant in disjuncture with the outcome. Being 
told by medical staff that her pregnancy bump had been hormonal rather than 
physiological had been especially upsetting as this had been:   
one of only a few things that made me 'feel' pregnant at the time, 
apart from the lack of periods and the nausea. I remember saying 
to the nurse practitioner at the EPU that I still felt pregnant 
because of these things, and she said it was all down to strong 
hormones, but she didn't say more than that. Maybe I did imagine 
that I had a bump, but enough people commented on it to make 
me believe now that I did at the time. 
A few other participants also spoke about feelings and perceptions which did 
not yield an obvious explanatory biomedical elaboration; lacking validation as a 
source of ‘knowing’, these potentially highly emotive sensorial experiences were 
often dismissed by others. For instance, Jane’s GP had previously “said [that] 
they didn't offer anyone earlier scans unless circumstances were exceptional, 
and to go home and stop worrying”. Given that a biomedical approach is likely 
to deem as unreliable a pregnant woman’s ‘sense’ that she was, for instance, 
miscarrying in the absence of sanctioned biomedical symptoms like uterine 
bleeding, such feelings were particularly difficult to convey and interpret. 
Linking to this is the culturally-prevalent scepticism towards alternative 
‘holistic’ approaches of complementary and alternative medicines like 
acupuncture (Gatrell 2002). Practices such as yoga and acupuncture, “based as 
they are on concepts of the body not recognized by Western science, have 
occupied an ambiguous position in Western culture. They are not quite 
denounced as superstitious, yet not quite accepted as efficacious” (Classen 2005 
p348). Isabel attended an acupuncturist initially for a different health issue 
which had not responded to biomedical treatment; in  trying to conceive in her 
third pregnancy, she had taken vitamins and used ovulation kits as her cycle was 
irregular, but “in the end, I went for acupuncture again and that – I’m sure 
that’s what did it”. Isabel explained the logic as the acupuncturist had told her: 
“different parts of the body control different organs and things like that and so 
he was saying about erm the amount of heat and cold in the body [being 
important]”. From a Western biomedical perspective, using suction cups and 
80 
 
lamps to introduce more ‘heat’ into a person’s body in order to prompt regular 
menstrual/ovulation cycles is likely to be treated with suspicion in tension with 
biomedical understandings of the physiological body (Classen 2005).  
Sensations—ever-escaping external classification or firm grasp (Benthien 
2002)—can defy verbalisation or easy accommodation to particular logics of 
how the body functions. For instance, Victoria described having had a ‘feeling’ 
about her pregnancy which was later miscarried. Though she included details 
that might be deemed more fittingly biomedical in this, such as the absence of 
morning sickness and a lack of tiredness, she also implied something else was 
‘felt’ that she could not neatly translate with, or into, medical interpretation: 
I know this may sound odd but I just didn't 'feel right', there was 
this feeling all the time in my mind that something wasn't right. I 
just tried to ignore it and I put it down to the fact that I had a little 
one [infant] to look after and I had to carry on normal for him. But 
there was always this nagging feeling that something wasn't 'right'. 
I did not really get a chance to say anything to a dr because I 
miscarried before I had a chance to see a dr again. […] Maybe it is 
woman's intuition?! 
Victoria reiterated her comments when I encouraged elaboration on ‘woman’s 
intuition’, emphasising that she was not alone in having this feeling. She drew 
on her friend’s words whilst signalling the difficulty of expression: “[w]hen I 
spoke to my friend who miscarried [around the same time] she said she just 
didn't feel right and I think that is the best way to describe it”. ‘Intuition’, 
Victoria implied, is a form of body-self knowledge which involves an involuntary 
attentiveness to one’s bodily habitus as being unsettled in some additional way:   
[a]lthough it is not nice to feel sick constantly and tired [during 
pregnancy], they are signs that your body is busy doing something 
so to not feel any different, felt wrong as if your body isn't doing all 
it should be doing to help the pregnancy along. I think your body 
tells you when it is doing what it should be doing [and thus the 
contrary]. 
Drawing on her felt bodily memories of a past experience of successful 
pregnancy, Victoria implied that the different bodily feelings were registered on 
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some level of her body-consciousness as a sign that the (later miscarried) 
pregnancy was not developing in a sustainable way.  It seems that remembered 
‘dys-appearing’ bodies, such as those of previous pregnant embodiment, can 
echo and ricochet, potentially highlighting divergence from the subsequent 
embodiment of a (non-viable) pregnancy. Leder (1990) suggests that bodily 
processes tend to be backgrounded until events of ‘dysfunction’, such as 
physiological change, illness, and disorientation, at which point they ‘dys-
appear’.23 In other words, I am suggesting that some sensations—whether 
described as ‘gut feeling’, ‘intuition’ or more vaguely that something is not 
‘right’—can be understood as entanglements between multiple emotions and 
temporalities (past memories and fears for the future) which are embodied and 
felt but may not be understood or validated by external others.  
Relevant to this suggestion are the concepts of rememory (Hirsch 1994 
and Prosser 2001, referring to Morrison’s 1988 novel Beloved) and postmemory 
(Hirsch 1997) in combination with trauma theory insights such as on belated 
and unassimilable temporality described by Caruth (1996). Meek (2010 p5) 
argues that “[t]rauma may not be consciously registered at the time of its 
occurrence but it returns in the form of intrusive memories, nightmares, 
compulsive acting-out and flash-backs” as well as resurfacing on the body 
(Takemoto 2001). Prosser (2001) suggests that rememory can highlight the 
ways in which additional cultural and historical layers are unearthed, even if/as 
they remain unconscious.24 In the context of Morrison’s (1988) Beloved, Prosser 
(2001) argues that the scar of (returned) Beloved’s slit throat allows Sethe to 
work through the rememory of infanticide in the context of racial and gendered 
slavery. Subsequently, this narrative of maternal rememory demonstrates “how 
                                                          
23 Leder (1990) argues that ‘healthy’ human beings background vital bodily processes and 
rhythms sustaining life, including breathing, heart-beating and digestion, in addition to 
engagements with familiar tools/objects. Moments of ‘dysfunction’ like illness or otherwise 
physiological change cause the ‘dys-appearance’ (bringing into awareness) of the body (Leder 
1990). However, deeming pregnancy to be a ‘dysfunction’ chimes problematically with historic 
perceptions of the pregnant body as ‘ill’ in contrast to the ‘stable’ male body. Additionally, 
particular assumptions are embedded in Leder’s (1990) arguments as to for whom such 
activities privilege bodily backgrounding – thus overlooking different forms and fluctuations of 
embodied being (see Moss and Dyck 2002 on women with chronic illness). 
24 Morrison (1990 p205) argues that “the act of imagination is bound up with memory”, 
including in emotional and bodily ways, as utilised in the ‘texturising’ of ideas in her novels. 
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unspeakable memories might in fact be spoken, how a story that should not be 
passed on can in fact be transmitted” (Hirsch 1994 p109).  
Postmemory denotes the possibility that memories and emotions can be 
partially transferred between persons, such as across family generations (Hirsch 
1997). Tucker (2010) provides an example to show the partial presence and 
simultaneously concealment at work in ‘postmemory’. Tucker (2010) describes 
seeing a model fighter plane with a printed swastika symbol on the tailfin in a 
shop window. Faced with the dilemma of altogether destroying the object (a 
negation of history that would allude complete erasure) or displaying it (risking 
being seen as glorification of deeply traumatic experiences/legacies), the shop 
owner sought a balance by sticking a piece of masking tape partially over the 
swastika. Such a remnant, capable of stirring emotions and culturally-dispersed 
memories, even for those without direct experience, had a compromised 
existence as neither entirely concealed or erased nor fully visible. For Hirsch 
(1997 p22), postmemory is not the recollection of an individual’s own direct 
experiences but a generationally displaced memory form:  
[p]ostmemory characterizes the experiences of those who grow up 
dominated by narratives that preceded their birth, whose own 
belated stories are evacuated by the stories of the previous 
generation shaped by traumatic events that can be neither 
understood nor recreated. 
I argue that such a notion of postmemory is especially relevant here given that 
numerous participants, prompted by the event of their own pregnancy losses, 
learnt of other women in their families (their mothers, grandmothers, distant 
ancestors) who had also experienced miscarriages, stillbirths and neonatal 
deaths. Thus, it is possible that even if the events of traumatic pregnancy/infant 
loss are never verbalised by the parents, it may retain a presence (albeit 
inconclusively and perhaps unconsciously) in the lives of their offspring which—
during their own reproductive experiences—can emerge (see also Kempson and 
Murdock 2010 on siblings never known). Such a possibility about transference 
might also help explain why the experience of some anxious or ambivalent 
sensations can be intense, inducing one to act yet evade firm grasp of meaning.  
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Perhaps precisely because of the slippery, unconscious processes at work 
– participants did not (could not?) describe their experiences in such 
psychoanalytical terms of transferring memories, emotions or affects from one 
person to another. However, as mentioned in the Methodology chapter, Parr et 
al (2005 p98) remind us that difficulties in attempts to articulate experiences 
should not silence or disregard “what situated individuals within these places do 
manage consciously to ‘say’ about what they think is occurring”. For instance, 
Holly found out during her miscarriage that her mother had also experienced 
several, though “it took her two days to tell me because she didn’t want to go 
through [remember] it herself again, she didn’t want to talk about it”. Later in 
the interview, Holly suggested that perhaps she had already known about her 
mother’s miscarriage prior to this, but that the timing (when Holly was a young 
infant) and quantity of losses (multiple rather than singular) were somewhat 
confounding. Holly expressed shock at the fuller discovery of her mother’s past 
of miscarriages which disrupted her previous memories and understandings of 
her parents, their shared family history, and even her childhood: 
I thought it was before me… but it wasn’t, it was with my step-dad 
after me, so when I would have been about four [years old] and 
she had two [miscarriages] in a row and then they stopped trying 
because she was… she just said that she was worried it was 
something to do with their compatibility and she didn’t want to 
put herself through it.  
Holly felt all the more anxious when her mother held back details: “she didn’t 
want to talk about it [miscarriages], but she could see that was the thing that 
was scaring me most, but so when she told me that was such a big relief that I 
knew what was going to happen and I didn’t need to be terrified about it”. Thus, 
postmemory of her mother’s losses, with distress both present and absent, may 
have played a part in how Holly experienced her own miscarriage.  
There seems to be socially-encouraged ‘amnesia’ or censorship around 
the fact that there can only be provisional and limited reassurance of pregnancy 
outcomes, as Ginsburg and Rapp (1999) demonstrate in relation to prenatal 
testing. For me, this resonates with Layne’s (2003b) observations of pregnancy 
and women’s health books which tend to amass ‘exceptions’ after otherwise 
linear chapters on ‘normal’ pregnancies and births. By marginalising pregnancy 
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losses to the ends of such books, the attitude is conveyed that “[t]hose lucky 
ones whose babies survive, one infers, need not trouble themselves by reading 
about such unpleasant topics” (Layne 2003b p1887). For those who experience 
pregnancy losses, or know those who have, the belief that there is ever a ‘safe’ 
point at which anxiety can be vanquished is exposed as fallacy. Rothman’s 
(1994) account of ‘tentative pregnancies’ delineates a sense of pregnancy-as-
precarious until (continual) reassurance of viability/development is given. The 
embodied sensation that something is or could be wrong can therefore be 
understood as relating to a realisation that is otherwise repressed in wider 
society, with the transfusion and movement of particular affects and emotions 
previously felt by oneself or another, such as that of sadness, vulnerability and 
fear for the future. Therefore, emotions and (post)memories can (re)surface 
sensorially in/as the body, across body-selves and stretches of time. 
In some situations, the origins of anxiety regarding pregnancy are more 
traceably known. Gemma explained that she had been relatively unconcerned 
about foetal anomalies during her first pregnancy with no known family history 
of this and perceiving Down’s Syndrome as primarily applicable to later 
maternal ages, making it feel largely irrelevant to her. However, with memories 
from her childhood in which a close family friend experienced a stillbirth, her 
concerns concretised around the possibility of a similar occurrence. In addition, 
Siobhan’s involvement with her sister’s pregnancy, in which one baby of twins 
died postpartum, was reflected on regarding the implications for her own 
reproductive hopes and anticipated future. Given that the cause of neonatal 
death pertained to a recessive hereditary condition which Siobhan may also 
carry, this was an especially pertinent concern and one for which she was 
considering genetic counselling/screening in the near future. Describing her 
family as very “baby-orientated”, Siobhan explained:  
I think I’ve always had a bit of a fear that I wouldn’t be able to 
have children or that something would be wrong with them and I 
think it has become even worse […] the fact that I’ve seen babies 
be born and I’ve seen a baby die, that has really affected me, really 
affected and I think it WILL affect when it comes to me choosing 
to have children. 
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Subsequently, it seems that anxieties regarding pregnancy can be dispersed 
amongst persons in ways which range from largely known (as for Siobhan who 
recognised the impact of her sister’s experiences on her own fears for a 
prospective family) to more unconsciously so (as may have been the case with 
Holly in relation to her mother’s miscarriages, discussed also in Chapter 5). 
Concluding Remarks 
 In exploring the theme of interior/internal bodies in pregnancy loss, I 
have considered understandings that are biomedical as well as more/other- 
than biomedical (sensation, movement, intra-body touch, intuitive feelings, 
postmemory).  My consideration  of ways of ‘knowing’ about pregnancy and 
pregnancy losses—such as urine and blood tests, ultrasonography, dopplers, felt 
movements and intuitive sensations—highlights participants’ diverse emotional 
experiences. For instance, urine tests are ‘domesticated’ and now prolifically 
used in Western societies sooner/earlier during pregnancies, evoking 
excitement but also dread, reluctance and restraint. Whilst uncertainty about 
the materiality and processes of their interior reproductive bodies can invoke 
anxious ‘tentative pregnancies’ (Rothman 1994), seeking to counter this with 
biomedical practices of ‘knowing’ and intervening can also be highly emotionally 
and physically distressing, with potentially triggering consequences for 
subsequent reproductive experiences. The range of possible diagnostic 
outcomes from the medical-technology of ultrasound are often overlooked or 
overshadowed by prevalent cultural notions emphasising the practice and 
subsequent scan images as being about social ‘bonding’ (Peel and Cain 2012). 
Participants’ experiences of ‘reproduction gone awry’ (Jenkins and 
Inhorn 2003) counter cultural notions of pregnancies as always joyful (Layne 
2003a, 2003b) and highlight the temporal, provisional and chemical precarity 
of some medically-sanctioned ‘knowledge’. Biomedical, mechanical 
understandings tend to downplay other notions of the body and embodiment 
concerned with the interconnectivity of affect, emotion, sociality, materiality 
and subjectivity. A focus on the embryo/foetus as an independent being can 
background pregnant women which ‘intra-body touch’ (Colls 2012), in relation 
to pregnant embodiment, can counter. However, internal sensations can be 
highly valued as reassuring in some contexts but deeply disturbing during a 
pregnancy loss. Additionally, sensations of ‘gut feeling’ or ‘intuition’ featured in 
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some participants’ narratives of pregnancy losses as denoting feelings which did 
not neatly fit with the biomedical approach. However, since these ambivalently 
or antagonistically sit with biomedical scientific logic and socially-sanctioned 
experiences, it seems participants were not able to elaborate extensively on 
these in the research. Whilst recognising the limits of attempts to linguistically 
represent such sensations, I suggest that possible understandings of these 
feelings include the reverberation of previous/remembered ‘dys-appeared’ 
bodies (Leder 1990) and the (re)surfacing of memories and emotions of familial 
others (Hirsch 1997) which are unintentionally ‘transmitted’ and embodied. 
This chapter has considered bodily experiences entailing efforts to ‘know’ 
interior processes of pregnancy/pregnancy loss through particular bodily fluids 
externalised (urine, venous blood) or ceasing to be externally evident 
(menstrual bleeding, morning sickness), returned soundwaves producing visual 
or auditory representations (ultrasonography, doppler), and physiological 
changes read as signifying the occurrence (or not) of particular interior 
processes (pregnancy bumps). Felt movement and elusive sensations also 
highlight relationality since “touch lies at the interface between the perceived 
interiority of an embodied subject and the exteriority of the world they bring 
into existence through actions and relations” (Paterson et al 2012 p9-10).  
Further discussion of bodily experiences in the thesis will include Chapter 5 on 
bodily fluids/materials which cross interior-exterior bodily boundaries and 
Chapter 7 attending to the skin as an altering bodily exterior able to 
accommodate interior processes/matter, as indicated by a bump, potentially 
leaving visible marks and changed skin elasticity. This chapter has also included 
the presence and sometimes quite significant consequences of medical staff.  
Next, in Chapter 4, I will further consider the inter-personal context of 
pregnancy loss, involving familial and familiar social others. 
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Chapter 4: The Social and Inter-personal Context of Pregnancy 
Losses 
Introduction 
Pregnancy losses are heterogeneous experiences, involving different 
persons, spaces, emotions, sensations, practices, temporalities (past, futures, 
legacies) and materialities. Thus, ‘pregnancy loss’ cannot be said to denote a 
singular, universal experience or have a uniform essence – nor necessarily entail 
only one ‘individual’: the pregnant woman which, as Franklin (1991) points out, 
is actually always already more than ‘one’ body by virtue of pregnancy. Rather, 
at least for interviewees in this research, a myriad of different kinds of social 
actors in terms of individuals, groups, organisations and institutions participate 
in experiences of pregnancy loss in various ways. More than simply medical 
events, since bodies are both ‘private’ and constituted by social relationships, 
pregnancy losses entail “temporal and spatial dimensions” meaning that these 
“experiences change according to different social situations, times and places 
during a life course” (van der Sijpt 2010 p1775). In other words, pregnancies 
and pregnancy losses occur and are made meaningful (or not) in relation to the 
wider social world, history and projected future of each woman.  
Taking a woman-centric approach in this research has meant 
foregrounding the voices and experiences of women discussing primarily their 
‘own’ (biologically lived) pregnancy losses. However, their narratives also 
highlight a range of individuals who participated in shaping these experiences. 
Without foreclosing the scope of whom this might refer, examples relative to 
pregnancy-losing women in the research included: male partners or ex-partners 
(boyfriends, fiancés, husbands); male and female siblings; offspring (daughters, 
sons) and step-children; parents and step-parents; grandparents; family-in-law; 
friends (close, distant, of the family); and work colleagues. Researchers have 
called for, and directed attention to, persons characterised as often intimately 
but not directly/physiologically involved in pregnancy loss experiences, like 
male partners and siblings (Puddifoot and Johnson 1997; Worth 1997; Murphy 
2009; Forhan 2010; Kempson and Murdock 2010; Hooghe et al 2012). 
Recognising this, I sought to also recruit such persons and subsequently 
interviewed one male partner (Graham), one female sibling (Siobhan) and one 
male sibling (Ben). In addition, those participants who were women with ‘direct 
88 
 
experience’ often spoke about the roles played by other social actors and 
occasionally passed on messages from their partners who were not officially 
participants in the research but had comments they wished to add. 
This chapter will consider some examples of relationships and 
encounters involving persons beyond/other than women who have directly, 
physiologically experienced pregnancy loss. Whilst uptake of individuals who 
did not personally experience of embodied physiological pregnancy-losing was 
relatively low, those who did participate provided valuable and insightful 
contributions to the research. In this chapter, I will firstly consider Graham and 
Siobhan who had been involved in the care and support of pregnancy-losing 
women and were deeply affected by their experiences. This will involve 
reflecting on themes of socio-spatial marginalisation, grief hierarchies and care 
roles. In the second main part of the chapter, I will attend to the ways in which 
pregnancy loss entered into some work places and relations which were largely 
deemed ‘everyday’ and ‘mundane’ settings shared with familiar persons and 
‘acquaintances’. With a focus on spaces of work/employment, I will explore a 
number of participants’ experiences of disclosure and communication about 
‘events’ of, and ‘progress’ within, pregnancy and pregnancy loss.  
‘Familial and Close Others’: Care Relationships 
Categories of kin relations are not indicative of actual emotional or 
practical support, and judgements about socio-emotional proximity (‘close’ or 
‘distant’) can be contested by different actors involved. Thus, I do not wish to 
impose a scalar template of presumed intimacy or quality of relationships since 
the diverse range of relationships exist which between and across families belie 
simplistic categorisation. Whilst some individuals had highly supportive 
partners and/or family members, other participants’ relationships with these 
persons were unhelpful, distressing and sometimes proliferated upset. Some 
people have ‘close’ relationships with their siblings whilst others do not and may 
be estranged. For some, ‘closeness’ designates practical support, whilst for 
others this may be more about emotional intimacy. As such, there is need to 
resist a hierarchy of relationships which relies upon categories based on 
position in a family structure with supposed implications as to proximity to 
events, emotional intimacy/impacts and subsequent roles.  
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The topic of social others also highlights home spaces which, for some 
participants, were preferable environments compared to that of medical 
settings.25 For instance, cumulative medical experiences meant that Caroline 
opted not to go into hospital during her fourth miscarriage: 
I know it sounds the bizarrest thing, but I thought ‘I’m not going 
to hospital. I’m clearly losing the baby, I’m losing a lot of blood 
and I’m not going to hospital. I’m going to do this on my own [at 
home] and I’m going to deal with it as I wanna deal with it’. 
Caroline explained that this miscarriage “was the easiest one to deal with 
because I was in control” as opposed to “allowing someone [a doctor] to take 
from me what I hadn’t wanted taking away in the first place”. Some participants 
also described returning home after a medical procedure as preferable to 
remaining in hospital. For instance, after surgical management of a missed 
miscarriage in the morning, Natalie was able to leave the hospital in the 
afternoon. She found this: 
really nice because you’ve been through something very upsetting, 
very traumatic but then can come home and be in your own space, 
in your own bed with your own family [including my two young 
sons] around you. If you want to talk – they’re there, and if you 
don’t want to talk – they’re still there.  
For Natalie, being at home and surrounded by her family provided a familiar, 
emotionally supportive environment. Not only did this provide choices, to talk 
or just be together, but also granted her additional identity dimensions as a 
mother and wife, thus moving beyond being merely a patient/body. 
The notion emerged in my research that medical staff and wider social 
others seemingly expected male partners to be central to offering/providing 
support whilst rendering their own needs for support peripheral. As Peel and 
Cain (2012) highlight, heterosexual norms are evident within much of the 
literature on pregnancy losses and this seems to be the case when considering 
                                                          
25 Home spaces are not necessarily comfortable or supportive for all (Massey 1995; Mallett 
2004), and can instead, or simultaneously, be sites of loneliness, fear such as about blood loss 
and indeed ostracism during pregnancy loss, including for women who are circumstantially 
alone in their accommodation at the time and/or are without supportive partners/family. 
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(monogamous) partners. Though aware of such a limitation, no participants in 
this research spoke of being in lesbian or polyamorous relationships; hence 
male partners will be the focus of discussion in this section since this most 
accurately reflects participants’ experiences. The involvement of male partners 
is increasingly encouraged in pregnancies, from experiences of pregnancy test 
confirmation (Draper 2002b), ultrasound scans (Draper 2002a) to labour and 
birth events (Draper 2003). Yet they are often overlooked in relation to 
experiences of pregnancy loss (McCreight 2004; O’Leary and Thorwick 2006; 
Puddifoot and Johnson 1997). This may link to commonplace notions that male 
partners are less emotionally expressive (see Murphy 2009 for a comprehensive 
discussion of gender in relation to grief and mourning in stillbirth experiences). 
Graham spoke in the research about his wife’s 12 miscarriages in which 
he recounted occasions whereby he was physically excluded and emotionally 
marginalised in a number of ways. Graham explained that he and his wife had 
“been put through pretty much the entire range of well meaning, but insensitive 
help from the medical profession” as well as “some good examples of care, with 
compassion and wellbeing”. However, a fairly consistent aspect, Graham noted, 
was that “[t]hroughout the entire process, a huge proportion of people have seen 
me as little more than furniture. Simple things like not having a chair for me 
during a consultation, or having the chair placed on the back wall out of the 
way”. Graham elaborated on this in a subsequent email and, whilst adopting a 
joking tone at times, described the upsetting implications: 
I'm pretty good at reading scans sideways on the angular limit for 
the screen these days ;-) […] The overwhelming number of 
[medical staff] people that we saw barely spoke to me. I'd be stuck 
on a chair, away from my wife with the doctor talking directly to 
her and not involving me. I just felt uncomfortable, surplus to 
requirements and ignored. 
These kinds of spatial arrangements and dynamics in medical encounters 
can therefore prompt further distress, making male partners feel marginalised 
and unwelcome, and have additional upsetting consequences. For example, 
Gemma described that her partner had been seated away from her in the room 
during a routine 20 week ultrasonography scan: 
91 
 
the [ultrasound scan] screen was directed towards me but away 
from my partner who was sitting some distance away in the corner 
of the room […] I remember the image appearing as an open zip – 
the base [of the spine] had not fused together and the baby had 
spina bifida. I was in tears uncontrollably – [my partner] didn't 
really know what was going on, because he hadn't been involved in 
the conversation [owing to the seating arrangement]. 
Such problematic seating situations may stem from a lack of physical space in 
the room, including with cumbersome medical technologies potentially limiting 
available capacity and occupancy, or result from the preferred use and layout of 
the space by medical staff. Other seemingly minor aspects of buildings and 
signage could also convey attitudes of exclusion regarding male partners or male 
relatives and friends accompanying women who were pregnant or pregnancy-
losing. For instance, Gemma recalled that her partner had:  
made a comment actually, that we had to go up for a scan in [name 
of hospital] and there wasn’t a male toilet in the unit and he was 
like ‘WOW!’ It’s a really old place and it might of changed, or he 
might of missed it, but there was something like that, whereby he 
was like oh and it was kind of signage referred to like ‘Women 
Wait Here’. 
Whilst acknowledging that pregnancy-losing women are rightfully the 
focus of medical procedures and treatments if required, the dearth of offered 
emotional support resources is also revealing. Many of the women interviewed 
who had directly experienced pregnancy losses remarked that counselling 
services and information about support groups had often not been forthcoming 
from the medical staff encountered, verbally or in the form of informational 
leaflets. Though some of the women had looked into or attended professional 
counselling, often through referrals from later visits to their GPs, none of their 
male partners had been offered or been able to acquire similar support services. 
In this dominant approach, “[t]he feelings of the female partner are considered 
to be primary and legitimate, whereas those of the male partner are secondary 
and may easily be construed as extreme” (Puddifoot and Johnson 1997 p840). 
Graham explained that this was both a matter of professional services and 
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informal social support from friends and family, perhaps reflecting and 
reinforcing one another, in overlooking the fact that he might need support also: 
[my wife] was offered counselling, I wasn't. In fact, I wasn't ever 
really offered much of anything. An occasional cup of tea was 
about the limit [in medical settings], and sometimes not even that. 
People in general seem very geared up to working with women, 
but nothing for men. That kind of includes family and friends too.  
Seemingly entrenched, mutually exclusive expectations can stipulate who 
is seen to be a support provider and who a support receiver. There is little to no 
guidance on this, since “such male grief is rarely discussed, it is presumed not to 
exist” (Puddifoot and Johnson 1997 p844). As Puddifoot and Johnson (1997 
p844) explain, “[i]f he were to openly discuss his feelings with his partner, it 
may be suggested to him, subtly or otherwise, that this will be upsetting for her, 
and that after all it is his role at this time to support rather than to grieve with 
his partner”. Graham spoke of an occasion in which he informed a member of 
management at work that he would need to take the day off since his wife had 
undergone an ERPC. The colleague proceeded to show Graham numerous baby 
photographs of his new-born grandchild. Whilst recognising that his colleague 
may have been unintentionally uncaring, Graham also acknowledged 
accountability: “I [am] fairly convinced that if you start off your sentence with "I 
know you won't want to see this, but" then you already know you shouldn't be 
wanting to do it”. This example demonstrates the ways familial and close others 
can be positioned as central to giving care whilst their own grief-work and needs 
for care are simultaneously negated and eclipsed. That is, Graham was 
acknowledged as a care-giver, provided the time off to attend to his wife, but not 
recognised as deserving of care or sensitivity himself, as implied through the 
inconsiderate behaviour of his colleague. Social groups can thus withhold, as 
well as grant, permission to grieve and openly mourn (Peskin 2000). 
Sometimes physically and emotionally marginalised in various settings, 
male partners are then often expected to primarily grapple with the distressing 
aftermath; as Graham phrased it, being left “to pick up the mental pieces”. This 
is not to denigrate the value placed upon care-giving by persons such as 
Graham, or the numerous comments by women in the research who spoke of 
tremendous appreciation to their supportive partners or warned of the severe 
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negative impacts of seemingly apathetic partners. As such, these accounts 
resonate strongly with Tronto (1993 pp117) that “[c]are is difficult work, but it is 
the work that sustains life. That care-givers value care is neither false 
consciousness nor romantic but a proper reflection of value in human life”. 
However, my concern is that positioning partners and familial/close others 
predominantly as providing support can mask them as candidates for the 
reception of care and support, and dismiss the additional burdens this may 
place upon them. Some research has looked at the impacts on romantic/marital 
relationships, finding that marital strain is oft-reported following pregnancy 
losses (Gold et al 2010) as well as other forms of infant deaths (Riches and 
Dawson 1996), although this may be relatively temporary and in fact give way to 
strengthened relationships over time (Rosenblatt and Burn 1986). In the 
context of neonatal death, McHaffie (2001) argues shared trauma brings 
parents together to create a ‘honeymoon’ period followed by subsequent 
deterioration of relationships. In relation to this, the care roles within such 
relationships following pregnancy loss seem a highly relevant consideration.  
Whilst women who experience pregnancy losses can “find themselves 
forced into the role of reluctant “patient”, their partners are often left to adjust 
to the role of ill-prepared “carer”” (Puddifoot and Johnson 1997 p844; 
McCreight 2004). I am not suggesting that familial and close others necessarily 
require the same support as women who physiologically experience pregnancy 
loss nor am I attempting to delineate the content in terms of the words, actions, 
procedures, or gestures, of ‘good’ care or support. Rather, I argue that the 
context of care matters and thinking about care as a relationship can expand the 
scope of roles for all involved to occupy. Many participants suggested that their 
close relationships were often already characterised by mutual and reciprocal 
exchanges of support/care in practice, although the content of what these 
entailed differed. Such an approach emphasises the relational nature of care by 
underscoring connections between actors rather than being unidirectional. For 
instance, Macpherson’s (2012) research on the relationships between guides 
and visually impaired persons in rural walking tours emphasises that these 
entail both the ‘gift’ of responsibility and the ‘gift’ of trust. This recognition 
complicates and challenges a notion of care as involving fixed roles of an 
altruistic, active ‘giver’ and a pitied, passive ‘recipient’ (Macpherson 2012). I 
suggest that emphasising inter-personal, multi-directional support regarding 
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pregnancy loss might be beneficial in terms of extending recognition to those 
largely deemed to be ‘support providers’ and allow scope for more varied subject 
positions than either care ‘provider’ or care ‘recipient’.26  
The Precarious Legitimacy of ‘Familial and Close Others’ 
Focus so far has been on the ways that ‘external’ others, like medical staff 
and work colleagues, participate in negating recognition of the potential for 
‘familial others’ to be support-recipients (as well as providers); although 
internalisation is also relevant. The distinction between ‘discreditable’ aspects 
and ‘discredited’ identities highlights the possibility that stigma can be felt by 
individuals without any direct social coercion/conveying of this (Goffman 1963). 
Even if not actually treated as ‘discredited’, the individual can anticipate and/or 
treat themselves in such a manner, particularly so if the circumstances deemed 
‘discreditable’ are not immediately visible (Goffman 1963). In relation to the 
neonatal death 45 minutes after birth of one baby from her sister’s twins, 
Siobhan struggled with the intensity of her own emotions of grief which she felt 
she ought to suppress in order to properly support her sister. Even in the 
absence of any overt instances whereby social others conveyed this notion, 
Siobhan felt uncomfortable, perhaps even fraudulent, with the prospect that she 
might too be deserving of support: “I felt, like, whenever I was in the hospital I 
shouldn’t cry because I shouldn’t make it any worse or I could set her [my sister] 
off or I was making it worse when I was supposed to be there supporting her”.  
Peskin (2000) highlights comparative bereavement monologues used to 
assess one’s own felt needs to grieve and mourn against those of others, 
producing a ranking with subsequent implications for behaviour. In relation to 
pregnancy loss, ‘familial and close others’ may disqualify themselves from 
‘deserving’ support or recognition even without such a message being overtly 
conveyed by others. Subsequently, Siobhan positioned her own grief as on a 
secondary ranking and sought to suspend or subsume her own feelings for those 
(namely her sister) ‘higher’ up the rank (Peskin 2000). Siobhan conveyed 
feeling a lack of legitimacy in relation to her sister’s pregnancy loss: although 
                                                          
26 Linked to conceptualising care as a relationship are themes of exchange, generosity and the 
rhetoric of ‘the gift’. In relation to this, it is worth highlighting that some work has drawn upon 
experiences of motherhood and/or pregnancy (Clarke 2004; Taylor 2004a, 2004b; Hird 2007) 
as well as pregnancy loss specifically (such as Layne 1999, 2000, 2003a, 2004; Murphy 2009). 
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she did not have direct physiological experience of the pregnancy and giving 
birth, Siobhan had been very close to the situation socially, emotionally, tactilely 
and practically. Owing to the circumstances of the delivery of the twins, Siobhan 
spent time with her nephew whilst her sister delivered the second baby and had 
the epidural removed. Whilst appreciative of this opportunity to be with her 
nephew, Siobhan was aware that her sister had missed out on such a scenario 
and that, whilst he was alive, her sister “never got to see his body and she never 
got to see his toes or she never really properly got to see his head because they 
[medical staff] covered it up [with a hat]”. The tension Siobhan felt between 
appreciating the intimacy she had shared with her nephew whilst he was alive 
and the sadness that her sister did not have this was marked:  
I was obviously devastated for my sister but I was devastated [for 
myself] as well because I’d lost my nephew… but I felt, and I still 
do feel a bit strange because I feel like I can’t really talk about my 
loss because… it isn’t MY loss, it’s my sister’s loss, I didn’t lose a 
baby, but I think I have a bit of a strange, erm… a strange idea of it 
because I had him, I had more of him, I had more of his life – he 
spent more of his [postpartum] life with me than he did with his 
mother and that’s one thing I feel a bit guilty about because I got 
to spend more time with him alive and talk to him, erm, and... sing 
to him and spend time with him. 
Siobhan described feeling simultaneous devastation and joy, as one baby 
dies and another baby lives from the same pregnancy. The starkness of this 
situation was recalled in the example of being in a quiet room akin to a chapel of 
rest: “my sister was on the bed […] on one side we had a living, healthy baby 
that was sleeping peacefully and [on the other side] we had a baby that had 
passed away”. Negotiating these intense and contrasting situations, Siobhan 
explained that, building upon the aforementioned close engagement during her 
nephew’s short postpartum life, she principally cared for him post-mortem also, 
whilst her sister focused on the living baby: 
we took him home [from hospital] in the coffin, we took the coffin 
in, but I was the one who put him in the coffin. I know some 
people find it really strange but I, I was the one who had to like 
place him in the position that we put him in and we took him 
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home in the car, in the coffin, but he sat on my knee the whole way 
home because my sister had the new [alive] baby, but I felt like I 
couldn’t really show, show anything or the relationship that I had 
because it still wasn’t my loss, so, so I had a… weird, weird, 
emotions {crying} 
Siobhan’s experience of attempting to manage her emotions demonstrates that 
additional distress can be produced when the role of support-provision is seen 
as incompatible (or at least ambivalently positioned) with support-reception. 
Having one’s grief evaluated as lower than others, including by oneself, can have 
implications like trying not to cry or show her emotions which can deepen 
anguish (Peskin 2000). 
The suppression of her distress, particularly around her sister, 
constitutes a form of emotional labour (Hochschild 1983) which I suggest 
Siobhan may have been able to articulate owing to the alternative context of the 
research interview. Whilst there had been no tangible encounters in which 
family members or medical staff had implied that her grief ought to be hidden 
or was diminished in significance compared to that of others, Siobhan had 
nonetheless clearly internalised this as necessary or ideal. Participating in the 
research, with a researcher outside of her everyday social context, meant that an 
opportunity was provided which allowed Siobhan to focus on her experiences 
without demanding the same degree of emotional suppression that speaking 
with family or friends might. Such a sentiment about the benefits of speaking to 
a researcher otherwise detached from the situation was also expressed by a 
number of other participants; for instance, Fiona explained “that it's a lot easier 
to be so open with someone I've never met”. Resonating with Lupton’s (1998; 
see also Davidson and Milligan 2004) work on metaphors of emotional 
expression—of flows, pressure and safety valves—Fiona described our email 
correspondence as validating that she is “allowed” to talk about her experiences:  
thank you again for giving me the opportunity, because by talking 
about it, it helps to deal with it. It stops the experience turning 
over and over in my head and it gets it out there. To put it plainly, 
it stops me from bottling it up and ending up one day just 
cracking. 
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As Lupton (1998 p90-91) notes, such “language recalls the dam 
metaphor, where the body is conceptualised as an inner, fluid or gaseous mass 
of emotions that are held back by the external skin and the will”. In addition to 
talking, crying was sometimes spoken about by participants as permitting the 
release of emotions from “the self which sees it as residing within a ‘body-
container’ filled with intensities and flows” (Lupton 1998 p98). Crying and 
tearfulness were most evident (visually, audibly) in face-to-face and telephone 
interviews but occasionally also in email correspondence. For instance, Isabel 
wrote of her second miscarriage diagnosed at a 20 week ultrasonography scan: 
“I will never forget the image on the screen of our little baby lying on his side so 
peaceful (thinking about it now is making me cry)”.  Whilst not wishing to imply 
that all participants experienced talking and/or crying in the research to be 
therapeutic or beneficial, nor to overlook the fact that the “logic of self-
management” doubtlessly persists (Lupton 1998 p96), it seemed that the 
research could provide helpful opportunities for some. Hence, I hoped that the 
research, constituting a space to talk and be listened to, might provide 
‘legitimacy’ for Siobhan that she is entitled to support. Through our research 
encounters, I sought to acknowledge not only her distress at the loss of her 
nephew but also the additional emotionally-fraught work of hiding the extent of 
this from her family. Whilst she remained reluctant, despite encouragement 
from her partner and her mother to consider counselling, I was at least able to 
tell Siobhan that online support is available for relatives like her who are more 
readily positioned, or internalise themselves, as support-providers but not 
support-receivers: 
[first interview]:  
Siobhan: I don’t feel like I should do that [attend counselling] if 
my sister isn’t doing it, I don’t know, I feel like I don’t really have 
the… have the…  
Abi: is it like the rights to?  
Siobhan: yeah, I don’t have the rights to […] yeah, I might look 
into it maybe, erm, but, at the moment, like I feel like I just 
wouldn’t feel like I have the right to talk about somebody else’s 
loss, essentially, as if it was my loss.  
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[second interview]:  
Siobhan: I would always assume that the [online support] groups 
would only be for, really, for parents because I think that if 
somebody said to me ‘oh what happened?’ or somebody assumed 
that it was my baby, then I would feel out of place   
Abi: Hmm  
Siobhan: you know  
Abi: yeah, I think that there are some groups that are for, like - 
erm, there’s, I think, grandparents and siblings and like   
Siobhan: I didn’t know there were 
Abi: yeah, I think they’re not as easy to find when you search for 
them but they are there and I can help, if that’s helpful. 
Drawing predominantly on the narratives of Graham and Siobhan, this 
section has reflected on themes of care and support. Their experiences highlight 
the wider social contexts in which other persons ‘accompany’ women who 
physically/directly experience pregnancy losses. This includes, for instance, 
attending ultrasound scans and other medical appointments and being a birth 
partner during labour and delivery. Recognising care within the context of 
relationships with others can attune us to the fact that support-providers may 
also benefit from support-reception. Being exclusively cast as a care-provider, 
by others or oneself, eclipses one’s own support needs. This might include 
support and recognition from at least some of the sources that pregnancy-losing 
women also encounter and negotiate, such as other family members, friends, 
medical staff and, as I now discuss, work colleagues. 
Status Disclosure and Work as a ‘Closet’ 
 Many participants found disclosing their reproductive experiences in the 
‘workplace’ incredibly difficult and distressing. Although I did not specifically 
inquire about experiences concerning employment in interviews, many 
participants raised associated themes, such as working from home, being self-
employed, occupations in medical settings, office place politics, maternity 
provisions (leave and entitlement) and going back to work after pregnancy loss. 
Not all participants had employment at the time(s) of pregnancy loss(es) nor 
spoke about work in the interviews and it is also noted that “women ‘do’ 
pregnancy in different ways, in different workplaces” (Longhurst 2008 p20). 
99 
 
Across an array of employed work spaces and contexts, participants recounted 
various experiences of disclosure and communication about ‘events’ of, and 
‘progress’ within, pregnancies and pregnancy losses. Some of the difficulties 
around the disclosure of one’s ‘pregnant’ status entail at least an implicit 
acknowledgement of pregnancy loss and risk, with the commonplace approach 
being to refrain from ‘pregnant’ disclosure until surpassing the first trimester 
(>12wks) owing to higher chances of miscarriage during this earlier period. In 
this section, with regards to the implications of pregnancy loss experiences, I 
will elaborate on Longhurst’s (2008) use of the ‘closet’ metaphor on the 
ambivalence of disclosing one’s status as ‘pregnant’ in the workplace. Following 
this, I will discuss experiences of returning to work and accompanying relations 
which suggest that workplaces can be precarious environments, rife with the 
potential for insensitive or unwanted comments, gestures and encounters.  
It is worth noting that some participants’ jobs/training, such as in human 
or animal medicine, had particular implications for their experiences of 
pregnancy losses. Beth’s occupation as a doctor provided her with background 
medical knowledge to assess her situation yet, in the context of her own 
miscarriage, this was also distressing. Her medical training and experiences of 
everyday work meant that she could visually identify foetal materiality, but she 
dreaded the possibility that she would do so: “I really thought it would upset me 
to see a fetal sac etc even though I see them every day”. She explained: 
I avoided looking at anything I was passing as I was quite happy in 
my acceptance of the miscarriage in a medical way, loss of an 
embryo, probably a non-viable pregnancy anyway. It was just 
something that happened every day to thousands of women.  But 
somehow if I could have seen the fetal sac, some you can see fetal 
parts, then I would have lost a baby.  I didn't want to grieve over a 
baby that never was.  I didn't want to torment myself.  
When Tessa’s pregnancy ended at 15 weeks, her mother-in-law took over her 
home-based employment of rearing parrots. Whilst it was a relief for Tessa that 
the practicalities of attending to hatching eggs and baby birds would be covered 
whilst she recovered, knowledge from her veterinary work history remained 
troubling. In particular, Tessa described abject horror in the wait for the D&C 
procedure: “maybe because I had worked at a vet and seen a lot of dead animals, 
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[I] don’t know, but I couldn’t take the idea that I was already carrying the baby 
for two weeks and all the time it was dead”. Trulsson and Rådestad (2004) also 
found that this aspect of a diagnosed intrauterine death can be psychologically 
traumatising and prompt an intense desire to have the deceased body removed 
immediately. Additionally, Tessa was deeply distressed at possible resonance 
between her veterinary experience of dissecting deceased animals and what 
might occur in a post-mortem investigation: 
[t]hat really creeped me out […] you know what they do [in 
histology], putting everything in formalin and cutting it in thin 
slices. I was crying the whole day, because I thought that is what 
they would do to our baby. But I couldn’t tell my husband, I didn’t 
want him to know this. 
Thus, there were some participants for whom their work lives provided some 
additional layers to their experiences of pregnancy loss, informing fears about 
physical encounters with and possible treatment of foetal materiality. 
Work spaces can be understood as simultaneously professional, semi-
public environments with ‘acquaintances’ and familiar, semi-private and shared 
settings with friendships of varying degrees. Subsequently, they can be difficult 
places to socially negotiate. Longhurst (2008) uses ‘the closet’ concept, based on 
queer and sexualities research, to think about the disclosure of one’s ‘pregnant’ 
status in the workplace. Drawing on Brown’s (2000) articulation of ‘closet 
space’ as entailing simultaneous concealment (absence) and materiality 
(presence), Longhurst (2008) demonstrates this as pertinent to a range of issues 
around disclosure. Workplaces are just one ‘closet’ of many in which careful 
negotiations are made as to one’s pregnant status (Longhurst 2008). Initially 
interested in practices of showing or hiding pregnancy bumps in public spaces, 
the research behind Longhurst’s (2008) discussion on the workplace ‘closet’ 
highlights a range of issues which also featured in the narratives of my 
participants. This includes: pressures from employers; physical exhaustion; 
reputation and career trajectories; and not wanting to be seen as ‘incompetent’, 
‘troublesome’, ‘overly emotional’ or otherwise ‘disruptive’ to/in the workplace 
(Longhurst 1997b, 2008; Thomson 2011). Longhurst (2008) recognises that the 
complex reasons as to why such announcements at work of ‘being pregnant’ can 
feel risky, shameful and anxiety-inducing actually include concerns about 
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pregnancy loss: a fear of miscarriage, particularly if this occurred in a previous 
pregnancy, and recognition of sensitivity given that others in workplaces may 
have experienced pregnancy losses themselves. Thus, pregnancy losses feature, 
albeit in somewhat largely unspoken ways, in the negotiation of disclosing one’s 
status as pregnant and I argue that the workplace can also be a ‘closet’ when it 
comes to disclosing the occurrence of pregnancy losses. 
Expanding Longhurst’s (2008) work on the difficult negotiation of 
disclosing ones status as ‘pregnant’, pregnancy loss can then necessitate an 
additional and distressing ‘untelling’. Both Beth and Jane explained how their 
jobs in hospitals meant that their colleagues became aware of their pregnancies 
quite early which, following miscarriages, meant having to also disclose these. 
Beth explained how particular non-verbal gestures/practices and verbal 
clarifications in her work context functioned to disclose her pregnant status: 
although I had not told my friends or family, I was forced to tell 
everyone at work [that I was pregnant] so that I could avoid 
transferring people to the MRI scanner, avoid the patient with 
Swine flu and chickenpox etc etc. […] [Additionally, gestational 
diabetes meant that] I was forced to test my blood sugar after 
meals - well in the hospital it is not a very private place and when 
lunch is had in a meeting you have to test your blood sugars in that 
meeting and when you start doing that when you have never done 
that before people start asking questions[.]  
Since Beth had been required to tell her colleagues about her pregnancy, after 
her pregnancy loss she “then [had to] untell them...” Such a situation of one’s 
colleagues knowing about a pregnancy means that the potential range of 
persons to then inform of pregnancy loss can be extensive. If snowballed, the 
range and number of these individuals may exceed that which the person had 
told or thought knew about the pregnancy. As Jane commented, “the gossip 
grapevine on our unit moves very fast! I think I only told one or two people, but 
it only took a week or two before everyone else knew [that I was pregnant]”. 
Subsequently, the experience of ‘untelling’ colleagues can be suspended 
across a significant period of time after the event of pregnancy loss and entail 
unwanted encounters with near-strangers. During participation in the research, 
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nearly three months after her miscarriage, Jane said: “I have found it hard when 
colleagues who knew I was pregnant, had not heard what had happened, like a 
few weeks ago when I was asked how many weeks pregnant I was now, which 
caused a lot of embarrassment”. In contrast, for some women, their work 
colleagues were the first people to know that pregnancy loss had occurred or 
was occurring due to physical proximity, social familiarity and time spent 
together in the workplace. Lisa described first discovering uterine blood loss, 
indicating her second miscarriage, whilst at work and that the colleagues in her 
office had been aware that she was nearly 10 weeks pregnant. In this instance, in 
the context of relatively few staff in her office, Lisa’s colleagues were ‘un-told’ 
about the pregnancy through the physiological symptoms of miscarriage that 
she was experiencing then-and-there, and with one colleague also 
accompanying her in seeking medical assistance. She explained: 
I had gone into work but didn't feel right and just put it down to 
slight morning sickness. I went to the loo and saw some blood 
spotting and panicked. I went back into the office to ring an 
ambulance but one of my colleagues offered to drive me to the 
hospital instead. When I got to the hospital I was examined and 
told that everything looked fine but I would have to go and drink 
some water before I could have a scan. My colleague waited with 
me until my partner arrived. 
Participants suggested that different working environments and specific 
inter-personal contexts had a bearing on whether they felt able (or not) to 
disclose fertility difficulties, pregnancies and/or pregnancy losses. Rosie 
described her work office, consisting mostly of women and many of whom were 
of ‘child-bearing age’, as one in which reproductive and mothering ‘chat’ 
featured significantly. However, as Longhurst (2008 p36) highlights, “[b]eing in 
a female-dominated workplace doesn’t necessarily guarantee that disclosing a 
pregnancy will be ‘easy’ and that just the right amount of support/advice (not 
too much, not too little) will be forthcoming”. Notable ambivalence towards 
such a scenario was recounted by Rosie and also extends to difficulties of 
disclosing pregnancy losses such as miscarriages: 
there was one other girl [at work] who was very open […] that she 
had had one bout of IVF because she had polycystic ovaries and it 
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had worked and then she’d had another and she was pregnant 
with twins, so everybody knew about that but you still had to be 
very… secretive I think. Another girl had a miscarriage and nobody 
talked to her about it, openly with her, everybody whispered about 
it and that gave me that ‘oh okay, I need to be secretive about this’ 
sort of atmosphere […] [My colleagues will] sit there and talk 
about their little boys potty training and they’re very open about 
those aspects of their lives whereas I talk about it [fertility, trying 
to conceive, pregnancy, miscarriage] to a trusted few and that’s it.  
Just as Martin (1987) suggests that menstruation does not ‘belong’ in the realm 
of work according to cultural categories, it seems that a similar message can be 
spelled out that neither do miscarriages or other reproductive difficulties as 
Hazen (2006) also found. Rosie had spoken with her employer about the 
company policy on flexibility for time-off from work to attend IVF treatment 
appointments; however, in doing so, she sought to negotiate how much 
information about her IVF treatment she divulged with her employer and 
colleagues as well as family and friends. She did not want to have to explain the 
details of, and give updates on, which steps of IVF were happening (such as 
follicle-stimulation injections, embryo implantation and check-ups): 
I had to tell my boss ‘this [IVF] is what my appointments are for, 
please don’t tell me that day is not good for you because I really 
can’t change it’ sort of thing and told the girls at work that ‘look, I 
am going through IVF’ – the people that you see every day we said 
to ‘we’re going through IVF, please don’t try and tickle me; if I’m 
covered in bruises - it’s not because I’ve got a drug habit all of a 
sudden’ {laughs} sort of thing but we only really told people on a 
need to know basis because they were going to see me with bruises 
and disappearing for appointments. I didn’t even tell my best 
friend, just said we were waiting for IVF and on the waiting list. 
Erm, then we lost the first one, we just sent an email to our 
parents and best friends saying we’d been through one cycle and 
unfortunately this is what’s happened, we’re going to wait a few 
months and then try again sort of thing. 
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Whilst not specifying which steps/processes she was undergoing in IVF per se, 
the pattern of time-off for appointments that Rosie’s work colleagues observed 
did play a part in establishing their knowledge of what may be occurring. Rosie 
explained that, prior to seeking fertility treatment, she experienced a 
miscarriage which no one at work knew about since this had been a naturally-
conceived pregnancy and thus for which “they hadn’t seen me going for any 
appointments”. In contrast, the regimen of appointments ‘revealed’ the 
(prospect of) pregnancy, necessitating the telling to some familial and close 
others, which then entailed an ‘untelling’ with subsequent loss: 
everyone began to notice when we were having appointments this 
time round, it’s just they went on and on because we were having 
weekly scans – we did tell people {sigh} because it gets so hard 
hiding it and it’s easier to say ‘this is what’s happening, we’re not 
sure what the outcomes going to be and we don’t really want to 
discuss it but just to let you know’, but then when it was all over 
[with a miscarriage] and [my  husband] was away, obviously I 
needed to tell people pretty quick because obviously I needed the 
support. 
Returning to Work and Colleague Relations 
Many participants spoke about the experience of going back to work after 
their pregnancy losses as anxiety-inducing, with uncertainty as to how 
colleagues would respond. The potential for insensitive and intrusive comments 
or questions was a concern for some whilst, for others, the prospect that their 
experiences might be ignored altogether was also upsetting. Several participants 
explained that the news of their pregnancy losses had been broken to their work 
colleagues in their absence through either their boss or a key colleague-friend. 
For instance, on diagnosis of a late miscarriage, Isabel initially requested that 
her employer not tell others in her office and then, after the delivery, gave 
permission for this news to be shared. She received some text messages of 
condolences from colleagues, although Isabel felt strongly that she did not want 
to talk to colleagues about it. Concerned about her return to work one month 
after her late miscarriage, Isabel explained that she had her hair cut and dyed as 
a way to deflect some of the attention: 
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it was very awkward when I went back to work, so I’d decided to 
[...] change my hair so I got it all cut short and went brunette, just 
sort of like as a talking point, you know, just so that when I went 
back to work everyone went ‘oh wow, I like your hair’ and […] so 
they didn’t have to talk about what had happened. 
Isabel explained how this aesthetic change “was a HUGE thing for me to do 
{laughs} I’ve always had long blonde hair so for me to go short brunette was a 
big change” which, in addition to being a decision deliberately intended to 
manage her return to work, it was also “symbolic, it was representing my erm… 
period of mourning I suppose. So, erm, I was brunette for a good few months, 
for about six months”.  
Though speaking in another context, of women who have experienced 
violence during their adolescence, Springer (1997) highlights that alterations to 
one’s own physical body can be understood as acts which deliberately 
demonstrate the exercise of agency. Particular forms of ‘pathological’ body 
modifications, such as self-cutting and eating disorders, have been closely 
aligned with trauma theories in the literature (Favazza 1996; Strong 1998) 
However, other forms of less harmful bodily modification may also to be linked 
to efforts to assert ones’ agency, particularly following circumstances that have 
been deeply upsetting and beyond ones control. Therefore, Isabel’s act of dyeing 
her hair can be understood as an exertion of her agency in response to her 
powerlessness to prevent the traumatic pregnancy loss and the anticipated 
difficulties of her return to work. The topic of body modification will be 
discussed in Chapter 7 in relation to skin-based marks like memorial tattoos and 
Chapter 8 will attend to memorialisation and mourning in more depth. As a 
result of her hair dyeing change, Isabel implied that her return to work had been 
largely uneventful in the manner that she had hoped and thus ‘successful’ in 
terms of exercising her agency as to others’ responses to her: 
[a member of management] came over to me and said ‘oh it’s good 
to have you back, I’m pleased to see you’ and I thought awr that’s 
really nice for her to say that – whereas everyone else, they just 
sort of… they didn’t really acknowledge it apart from erm… which 
was what I wanted, that’s what I asked for, I said to my boss that I 
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didn’t want a fuss or anything and… so I’m pleased they didn’t 
make a fuss because it would of upset me. 
  As with Graham’s experience mentioned earlier, disclosing pregnancy 
loss at work can entail vulnerability to insensitive or awkward remarks, actions 
and gestures; however, there can also be scope for unanticipated solidarity. 
Sometimes, as was the case for Jane and Holly, participants had not been able 
to ‘untell’ all their colleagues and work-related acquaintances prior to being 
asked about the progress of their pregnancies. Holly commented: 
within my first week back at work [after my miscarriage], a couple 
of women that I’ve worked with for years and years and years, that 
I’ve known for a long time, had known I was pregnant and I went 
to a meeting and they were there and they hadn’t known I’d lost 
the baby and they were ‘how’re you doing, how’s it going?’ and so 
on and I said ‘I lost the baby’. 
Whilst having to ‘untell’ was distressing in recalling difficult and ‘raw’ 
experiences, the responses from Holly’s colleagues on this occasion were 
appreciated as supportive. As it turned out, the women then disclosed that they 
had all experienced pregnancy losses and/or fertility difficulties but had not 
previously shared this with each other.  
However, some participants recognised that comments or 
encouragements, such as to talk, from work colleagues, which may be seen as 
‘supportive’ for one person who has experienced pregnancy loss are actually 
intrusive and uncomfortable for another. Isabel discussed the difficulty of 
gauging suitable responses or approaches preferred by other people who 
experience pregnancy losses:  
[pregnancy loss] is a really awkward subject and even now say, 
god forbid, somebody at work did have a miscarriage, even though 
I’ve been through it, I still wouldn’t know how to deal with them 
because it is, you know, it is… it’s tricky, isn’t it {laughs} it’s really 
awkward to know what to say to people, like my mum saying to me 
‘ohh don’t worry, you can have another’… you just don’t want to 
hear that {laughs} it’s a terrible thing to say {laughs} 
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Isabel described an occasion in which a colleague took her aside to tell her that 
her grandchild had been born “because she didn’t want me to find out through 
the grapevine, but erm… yeah but it didn’t help {laughs} she didn’t do the right 
thing {laughs} because I got just so upset about it”. Whilst this forewarning may 
have been appreciated by some, it was not the case for Isabel; equally, what 
helped Isabel in this situation may not have been appreciated by others: 
after she [the colleague] talked to me and told me, I was trying to 
sort of like hold myself together so I went to go and talk to 
somebody else about work and I was talking to her and I was just 
like crying as I was talking to her and my tears were dripping all 
over the paper {laughs} and she said ‘[Isabel], just go for a walk, 
just go and pull yourself together’ sort of thing so I was like ohh 
okay, so that’s what I did. 
Disclosing one’s experience of pregnancy loss could potentially partake in 
the creation of relatively fleeting connections or new relationships with work 
colleagues, entailing scope for empathy and sympathy. Notably, the event of one 
person sharing the fact of their pregnancy loss can serve as a catalyst for 
bringing together multiple generations of individuals with similar/related 
experiences whom one might not have previously known much or at all. In the 
earlier example of Holly’s untelling, it seems that the recentness of her 
miscarriage triggered some of her colleagues own memories of pregnancy losses 
from decades ago which they then felt compelled to share: 
I don’t know them that well and we’re not immediate colleagues, it 
just happened to be that they all knew I was pregnant […] and had 
just asked basically how I was doing and they just, I was just 
amazed – all three of them [had had pregnancy losses or fertility 
difficulties] just kind of, yeah, and they obviously had never 
mentioned it to each other but then why would you, if you’re not 
going through it then and there. 
In such encounters in which others share their experiences of pregnancy losses, 
the difficulties of reproduction are exposed and the frequent occurrence of 
miscarriage is somewhat normalised rather than remaining hidden. For Holly, 
this also offered hope of a future healthy pregnancy: “it’s nice to know that 
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people have been through it and also they all had children since which makes 
me feel a lot better”. Pregnant for the second time during our interviews, Holly 
was acutely aware that others who knew/saw that she was pregnant might 
assume, as she had previously of others, that her conceiving and carrying the 
pregnancy had been straightforward. Occasions in which one discloses 
experiences of pregnancy loss, sometimes with reciprocal disclosures by others, 
can thus be understood as important on a wider scale. That is, talking about 
pregnancy losses and reproductive difficulties with others can de-mystify the 
dominant discourses Layne (2003a, 2003b) identifies which equate pregnancy 
with being joyful and natural. As Holly explained:  
people assume that if you’re pregnant or if you’ve just had a baby 
that everything’s been easy for you and fine but most people I’ve 
heard from have had a niggle or worry or whatever it might be or 
it’s taken them years to conceive or something but people just 
don’t talk about it and I think if you did, if people did {laughs}, 
we’d just help each other out a bit more […] [In relation to a 
conversation with a friend] I know it’s horrible to think that me 
telling her I lost a baby makes her feel better about me being 
pregnant now, but it does and you can’t kind of deny that fact. If 
it’s dead easy for everyone around you, ‘cos that’s how I felt, like 
everyone around you is just quite happily getting pregnant, having 
an easy pregnancy and then having a lovely baby at the end of it – 
[…] now I kind of think you can’t assume that. 
Supporting the notion that ‘untelling’ can help form bonds between 
women who have experienced pregnancy losses, these relationships may also be 
drawn on in coping with subsequent triggers in the work environment. Whilst 
Rosie’s employer was accommodating to her needs regarding IVF treatment, 
such as giving time off to attend appointments, occasions cropped up at work 
which were sometimes triggering of her experiences of miscarriage and fears 
about infertility. Rosie explained how, when work colleagues announce their 
pregnancies, “I always have to go and take myself off to the toilet for five 
minutes to feel sorry for myself and have a little sniff and just sort of compose 
myself as it were”. On one occasion, this scenario became one of mutual support 
between Rosie and an otherwise scarcely-known colleague as they shared not 
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only their sadness at their experiences of ‘reproduction gone awry’ (Jenkins and 
Inhorn 2003) but also practical information and reassurance: 
I could hear someone sobbing away next door in the cubicle, so we 
were both sobbing away together. I said ‘are you okay?’ and she 
was like ‘not really, are you okay?’ and I was like ‘not really’ and I 
knew she wasn’t going to say anything first so I went ‘oh, well, I’m 
sad because [another colleague] is pregnant and I’m not’ and she 
went ‘well, I’m sad because [colleague] is pregnant and I’m not’ 
and so we came out and gave each other a hug and so forth […] she 
was like ‘I’m on this [fertility] drug called Clomid’ and I was like 
‘yep, been there, done that!’ and she was like ‘did you notice any 
differences?’ and I was like ‘yes, I was a BITCH’ and she was like 
‘yeah! Me too!’ and she’d never talked to anyone about it, she 
hadn’t even read the books that I [had] read, so it all sort of came 
tumbling out and I was able to say ‘you’re actually absolutely fine 
and completely normal to be acting that way’ – so that’s been… not 
nice, but sort of good that I’ve been able to help her. 
Many toilets beyond the home, including in workplaces and public toilets in 
shopping centres, are committed to sexual segregation and gendered certainty 
with separate toilets for men and women (Schapper 2012). Whilst toilets can be 
a site of fear around ‘dirt’/contaminants but also the threat of physical and 
sexual violence (Schapper 2012), disgust and repulsion (Longhurst 2001) – the 
above example of Rosie also highlights the potential ways in which these spaces 
can be conducive to emotional support and reciprocated care. ‘Private’ locations 
may be used in subversive and solidarity-inducing ways (Martin 1987) and, 
given the wider context in which pregnancy losses are dismissed, I argue that 
this example can be read as such. Online pregnancy loss support groups are 
another location where people (usually women) who otherwise would not know 
one another offline can potentially share their experiences openly and 
unapologetically. The emotional ‘risks’ of sharing one’s thoughts with semi-
strangers may, with relative anonymity of oneself and others, actually be 
beneficial and the relations between online support group users facilitated by 
the groups can be very rewarding, providing sympathy and/or empathy and 
practical information (as will be discussed in Chapter 6). 
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Whilst there is potential for new, valued relations to be forged with 
others in the workplace and sub-spaces within these, some participants were 
conscious of the risks of sharing their experiences across multiple domains of 
their lives. With hindsight, some encounters of disclosure were seen as more 
prolific, dispersed or uncontrollable than later preferable and could give rise to 
retrospective regret or uncertainty about how this may have been received. 
Gemma suggested that talking about her experience had been a kind of 
compulsion, she explained:  
[j]ust after it [late termination owing to foetal spina bifida] 
happened to us, I had to tell everybody, virtual strangers and baby 
groups (upon the conception of my second pregnancy). [T]hat 
went on for a good two years, it was like some kind of confession. I 
don't know what people thought about this, but I had to get it out 
all of the time.  
Given the ambivalence around the context of terminations following positive 
foetal anomaly diagnosis, a confessional-compulsion can be understood as 
pertaining to complex, multifaceted emotions. This contrasts with the findings 
of Rillstone and Hutchinson (2001) that women who have had terminations 
after diagnosed anomalies tend to limit disclosure of these past experiences in 
subsequent pregnancies, owing to the re-emerged rawness and fear that others 
would judge. ‘Shame’, a word used by Gemma in a subsequent interview, is 
explored by Probyn (2005) as a powerful, bodily intensity which can have varied 
subsequent effects (see Duncan 1994 on dieting). Subsequently, silence and 
secrecy are not the only possible responses. Scarry (1985) argues that 
‘confessions’ are demonstrations of one’s world destroyed by extreme physical 
pain, to which I add that intense emotional pain is also capable. Anne also 
described a situation in which a kind of ‘blurting out’ experience occurred in the 
relatively mundane setting of a supermarket with an unknown other (a cashier):  
there’s one or two people who I made the mistake early on of 
telling, just random people {laughs} which I don’t do any more, 
you know. Unless I was pushed to, I would never purposefully just 
tell random people but like – when I was in the supermarket 
[shortly] afterwards and [… a female cashier assistant] was kind of 
badgering me going well erm ‘oh is it your day off today?’ ‘no, I’m 
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not at work at the moment’ ‘arr why are you not at work at the 
moment?’ {sigh} ‘I’m on leave’ ‘oh right are you off sick or 
something?’ ‘no, I’m on maternity leave’ ‘arr that’s nice, when do 
you…’ ‘right, my baby died’ {laughs} and that just shut her up 
which felt really awful. 
Though this specific supermarket instance was fleeting, the emotional legacy 
held importance potentially because it resonated with the uncomfortable/silent 
responses from known others (including close friends). As Bowlby (2011) 
demonstrates, friendships are an important form of care for most people, 
involving co-presence in spaces such as the home. However, finding that 
“people don’t know how to respond to it [stillbirth], it’s a very frightening thing, 
people don’t know what to say to you”, Anne had not always received the kinds 
of care and support expected/hoped for. She explained: 
I had a friend who I was very close [to] – who I’m now not close to 
because… she just has had no idea what to say, she’s a bit 
frightened of talking about it and about him [my son] and what 
happened, so she’s been SPECTACULARLY unsupportive. 
Anne recognised a cultural discomfort with deaths unsettling the linear 
trajectory of ‘birth-life-death’ (and potentially rebirth/reincarnation – Minogue 
and Palmer 2006), that “people don’t want to discuss babies or children as 
deaths at all” because it “feels very unnatural to have your children die”. 
However, the consequences of this societal discomfort for Anne was to render 
talking about her experiences, which also included miscarriage and fertility 
problems as well as stillbirth, even more difficult and vulnerable to insensitive 
or unsupportive responses and non-responses. 
Concluding Remarks 
McLean and Flynn (2012 p2) comment that miscarriage—to which I 
would add other kinds of pregnancy loss including stillbirth, terminations and 
neonatal death as well as fertility treatments—are “not merely” medical 
conditions or events, but also “emotional experience[s] with consequences 
stretching beyond the hospital stay”. Thus, pregnancy losses ‘stretch’ beyond the 
moment and location of occurrence, and are wider social experiences 
concerning different persons, places and times. The first section of this chapter, 
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attending to partners and familial close others, foregrounded the themes of 
marginalisation and de-legitimisation. As shown, male partners like Graham 
can be side-lined in various ways within medical settings, workplaces and more 
broadly by friends within social circles. Whilst there have been some shifts 
which recognise that pregnancy is more than solely a ‘woman’s issue’ and 
attempts to incorporate male partners (Draper 2002a, 2002b, 2003), 
recognition available to men in relation to pregnancy losses often remains 
limited in practice. As O’Leary and Thorwick (2006 p82) argue, “now men’s 
roles are seen as helpful but mostly in terms of how they can support their 
partner”. Difficulties in coming to terms with one’s own experiences, including 
emotional grief and the ‘right’ to express this, also emerged in relation to 
Siobhan who had been intimately involved in the short life of her baby nephew.  
In the second section of this chapter, I considered participant narratives 
which suggested that disclosing pregnancy loss at work can be distressing and 
difficult to navigate. This can concern not only the recall of often physically and 
emotionally painful experiences but also vulnerability regarding potentially 
insensitive comments and actions by others. The ‘closet’ concept, utilised by 
Longhurst (2008) in relation to announcing pregnancy, captures the profound 
ambivalence of disclosing pregnancy losses with simultaneous anxiety and the 
prospect of relief for ‘coming out’. Negotiating knowledge about one’s 
reproductive context in the workplace was a source of concern for many 
participants and ‘untelling’ could be a protracted endeavour, as for Jane and 
Holly after their miscarriages. It is, of course, not only ‘familial and close others’ 
or work colleagues who shape experiences of pregnancy loss; additional persons 
and groups feature elsewhere in the thesis, including medical staff (most 
evidently in Chapters 3 and 5) and online support group users (Chapter 6). All 
of whom can be involved in the ‘social policing of grief’ in terms of the ways that 
emotions and responses to losses are societally shaped and regulated (Walter 
1999; Peskin 2000; Small and Hockey 2001).  
 I have argued that pregnancy loss experiences are social as well as 
medical, and indeed biological processes can have intense social significances. 
For instance, uterine bleeding featured in nearly all participants’ accounts as a 
particularly disruptive and abject bodily fluid, requiring concealment from the 
view of others as well as potentially from oneself, such as during menstruation 
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(Martin 1987; Vostal 2005; Bobel 2010). The negative social connotations 
regarding uterine blood constitutes an example of the ways additional persons 
and communities are involved in processes and meanings regarding pregnancy 
losses, highlighting these as inter-personal and relational experiences. Indeed, 
pregnancy can itself be considered to challenge neoliberal notions of individual 
body-selves since, “[f]or any woman, […] pregnancy will raise questions about 
her sense of identity and embodiment. Is the foetus part of one’s body/self, or is 
it separate? Where do I, the woman, begin, and it, the foetus, end?” (Lupton 
1999 p78; see also Draper 2003). Franklin (1991 p203, italics in original) argues 
that pregnancy complicates and refutes the ease of an individualising approach:  
[t]he very term ‘individual’, meaning one who cannot be divided, 
can only represent the male, as it is precisely the process of one 
individual becoming two [or more] which occurs through a 
woman’s pregnancy. Pregnancy is precisely about one body 
becoming two, two bodies becoming one, the exact antithesis of 
in-dividuality.27  
Pregnancy loss can subsequently mean encountering ambiguous fluids and 
materiality, including that of uterine blood flows, clots and kinds of (embryo, 
foetal, baby and placental) bodies; a topic I will now discuss in Chapter 5. 
   
                                                          
27 Indeed, the argument has been made that all bodies—not only pregnant bodies—are always 
already multiple and complex, with sensations and emotions connecting both within and 
between bodies (Dixon and Straughan 2010; Abrahamsson and Simpson 2011; Colls 2012; Lea 
2012). As Paterson et al (2012 p14) state “the body is not a bounded, unitary object, but 
emergent through relations including sensory ones”. 
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Chapter 5: Bodily Fluids and Flows 
Introduction 
 Bodily fluids and flows are unavoidably present in relation to life and 
death (Hallam et al 1999) and, in the case of pregnancy losses, simultaneously 
so. A key response towards bodily fluids and flows has been of disgust, aversion 
and abjection: “ultimately the basis for all disgust is us – that we live and die 
and that the process is a messy one emitting substances and odors that make us 
doubt ourselves and fear our neighbors” (Miller 1997 pxiv, spelling and italics in 
original). This is not purely based on bacteriology knowledge or evolutionary 
responses to threats of disease (Miller 1997; Curtis 2007); rather, complex social 
and cultural influences participate in the articulation of responses such as 
disgust, the “most embodied and visceral of emotions” (Miller 1997 pxii). 
Prevalent culturally determined hierarchies of bodily fluid secretions identify 
some, like uterine blood, as particularly polluting (Kristeva 1982; Bobel 2010). 
Conceptualisations of some bodily fluids as ‘dirty’/‘dirtier’ than others are “an 
issue of ranked purity, not of scientifically valid rules of hygiene” (Miller 1997 
p176). Thus, responses to bodily fluids like uterine blood and breast milk are not 
simply about the physical characteristics of the liquids or germ/bacteria ‘risks’:  
“bodily fluids create anxiety because of the threat they pose to self-integrity and 
autonomy. Bodily fluids threaten to engulf, to defile; they are difficult to be rid 
of, they seep and infiltrate” (Lupton 1996 p114). As I will discuss in this chapter, 
there are often complex and additionally intense emotional responses to bodily 
fluids and flows when a pregnancy ends abruptly and/or distressingly.  
Douglas’ (1966) seminal insights on ‘dirt’ as matter out-of-place have 
been utilised by Murphy and Philpin (2010) to consider early miscarriage. With 
relevance also to other forms of pregnancy loss, Murphy and Philpin (2010) 
argue that it is widely deemed unacceptable to speak openly about blood, clots 
and ‘products of conception’ (embryonic/foetal entities). Murphy and Philpin 
(2010 p540) comment that nursing practice tends to privilege the psychological 
components, with implications for care, over “the [woman’s] physical body”, 
echoing with my own assessment regarding much of the existing pregnancy loss 
literature. The result being that “this part of the women’s experience remains 
private to her and further serves to distance her from the wider culture” 
(Murphy and Philpin 2010 p540). Hence, I have sought in my research to attend 
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to both the ‘physical’ bodily and emotional dimensions of pregnancy loss 
experiences. I argue that encounters with particular fluids and matter in 
pregnancy losses links to, for example, contemporary funerary practices 
suggesting that it is beneficial for the bereaved to see the body of the deceased to 
facilite ‘grieving processes’ (Worden 1993). Historically, as Davidson (2007) 
notes, stillborn babies were rapidly taken out of sight whereas the contemporary 
approach tends to be encouraging the seeing and handling of the deceased baby 
by women and potentially their partners/wider families to ‘produce’ memories 
and memorial objects. However, some research has supported restrictions on 
viewing and touching the bodies of stillborn babies (Hughes et al 2002), 
participating in ongoing considerations about this issue (Godel 2007; Ludlow 
2008; Hunt et al 2009; Rådestad et al 2009; Hochberg 2011).  
In relation specifically to comments by Cohen et al (1978), Murphy 
(2009) comments that a focus on confirming ‘reality’ through seeing foetal/baby 
bodies overlooks embodied aspects such as the fact that the production of breast 
milk continues after stillbirth. This chapter will consider this and some 
additional bodily fluids and flows as well as encounters with the materiality of 
foetal bodies (see also Chapter 7 on other forms of ‘bodily evidence’ such as 
stretch-marks). Discussion here will be on uterine bleeding and passing, and—to 
lesser extents—lactation, tears (crying) and vomit (morning sickness) to 
consider some of the ambiguities regarding participants’ encounters with these 
bodily fluids, flows and matter. As I will argue, uterine bleeding in miscarriage 
can often be experienced as somewhat betwixt-and-between menstrual blood 
and mortuary visitation. Building on my earlier discussion of ultrasonography 
(Chapter 3), this has particular implications for thinking about the spatialities of 
grief, bereavement, death and dying. This supports my efforts to move beyond—
for instance—hospices, care homes and resuscitation wards as spaces of death 
and/or forthcoming death to consider how pregnancy losses entail a range of 
other kinds of locations at which encounters with death and dying often occur, 
including that of A&E and in the toilet/bathroom of one’s home. 
Encountering Uterine Bleeding 
Bodily fluids and flows are crucial to cultural understandings of 
pregnancy, with amenorrhea (the cessation/absence of menstrual bleeding) and 
nausea (morning sickness) widely considered indicative, whereas the end/ 
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ending of pregnancy is often accompanied by blood (such as in miscarriage 
bleeding). Since bodily fluids and flows are generally deemed taboo and, 
especially in the context of pregnancy losses, can be highly sensitive and 
emotive topics, careful negotiation was required in my research practice (see 
Methodology chapter). However, I considered such an endeavour important 
since there are a range of pertinent, meaningful experiences involving bodily 
fluids and flows which may otherwise be overlooked or silenced. This is often 
the case in nursing practice (Murphy and Philpin 2010) and in one’s social 
encounters with family and friends as well as, I suggest, within the academic 
literature. Speaking as a historian tracing how ideas have emerged and 
developed about pregnancy and the human foetus, Duden (1993 p63, 1999) 
notes that uterine bleeding during suspected/prior to quickening pregnancies in 
the eighteenth-century were largely considered “neither an argument against 
pregnancy nor a reason to be particularly upset”. In contrast, for most of my 
research participants, bleeding during suspected or confirmed pregnancies was 
often experienced as a distressing sign indicating jeopardy if not loss.28  
In relation to miscarriage, light bleeding which then became heavier 
and/or prolonged was often considered “an important marker” which 
“signalled” occurring or forthcoming pregnancy loss (Murphy and Philpin 2010 
p537). The experience of uterine bleeding for participants, indicating or as part 
of pregnancy loss, varied in relation to: the length of the pregnancy/gestational 
age or size/weight and thus medical classification of loss, with implications for 
treatment; medical treatment/processes (natural/expectant, medical or surgical 
management of early missed miscarriages); the location(s) of loss(es) such as 
the EPU, at home or at work; and aspects such as the temporality, duration, 
heaviness and accompanying pain of pregnancy ‘losing’ or post-pregnancy loss 
(recovering from a surgical procedure). I will focus on earlier losses given the 
                                                          
28 Light bleeding or ‘spotting’ can be indicative of implantation (embedding of the blastocyst 
into the endometrium) or, as in Tania’s experience, non-harmful ovarian cysts. However, the 
significance of some bleeding is often very difficult to determine. For instance, Tania had 
experienced some light bleeding in her first pregnancy (ending in full term live birth) and so she 
was not concerned when some spotting occurred in her second pregnancy. However, when the 
bleeding became heavier and with persuasion from her mother, she attended hospital where 
“within minutes of me sitting on the bed I felt something come away. Without going into 
extremely graphic details, I lost the baby” and a D&C was performed that evening. 
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primacy of blood and bleeding in these accounts compared to a recognisable 
‘baby’ and ‘birthing’ processes in later losses. This will involve considering the 
experiences of Jane, Holly and Carla, respectively concerning themes of 
decision-making about management of confirmed early miscarriage, uncertain 
parameters and preparation regarding ‘normal’ miscarriage bleeding, and the 
emotional experiences of blood loss regarding fear and embarrassment.  
Participants whose pregnancies were diagnosed as missed or partial 
miscarriages often faced decisions about their management. For instance, 
having experienced no prior bleeding, Jane found out at the 12 week ultrasound 
scan that her pregnancy was anembryonic and had not progressed past the three 
to four week growth stage. Jane spoke with a registrar who informed her about 
available treatment options, weighing up that of natural/expectant (indefinitely 
waiting until bleeding begins), medical (chemical inducement) and surgical 
(manual procedure to remove uterine contents): all of which tend to involve 
uterine bleeding to varying degrees. To supplement the information provided at 
hospital, Jane also sought out information about the management options 
online when she returned home. She described the reasons behind her decision 
of surgical management: “I felt with the ERPC that the 'messy bit' would all be 
dealt with whilst I was under anaesthetic, whereas I think I would have been 
worried if I had been at home bleeding [with natural/expectant miscarriage 
management], not really knowing what was happening”. Another aspect 
reinforcing Jane’s decision to opt for surgical management was her knowledge 
of a friend’s sister who had “had a pretty awful experience with a medical 
management which was very off[-]putting!”:   
[m]y friend described her [sister’s] experience as being a very 
long, drawn out miscarriage, with a lot of pain and bleeding. 
Despite my friend, her sister and her mother all being nurses, it 
sounded like they were all very scared about the amount of blood 
she lost, and whether she should have actually gone back to 
hospital. Her 2 young children also were there at the time, and I 
think were quite frightened by what was going on [Jane’s own 
child was 18 months old at the time of her miscarriage]. 
Related to the previous discussion on the social context of pregnancy loss in 
Chapter 4, this can be seen as an example in which talking with others produces 
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a network of people whose experiences then intersect in some way with one’s 
own; in this case, the account of her friend’s sister’s pregnancy loss reiterated 
Jane’s  miscarriage management decision. This is often, as for Jane, alongside 
the use of Internet sources and support groups (to be elaborated in Chapter 6).  
Uncertainty regarding the distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘worrying’ 
experiences within miscarriage, including both bleeding and pain, emerged in a 
number of participants’ narratives. Smith et al (2006) also found this lack of 
information to be a major problem encountered by the women who took part in 
their research. For example, Holly subsequently turned to the Internet to gain 
further information about the physiological experiences of miscarriage at just 
under 10 weeks but felt there was a dearth of comprehensive accounts: 
I still don’t know whether that’s [very heavy bleeding and intense 
pain] normal – I’ve not read ANYONE else’s detailed description 
of what happened to them. 
Additionally, with her husband being a GP, Holly drew upon her personal 
network of family and friends to access pain management and sought to 
‘prepare’ herself. However, the limitations of medical professionals 
understandings of such experience was highlighted since her husband “had 
never seen anybody go through it and he said, you know, people come in having 
had a miscarriage and they’ll say it was very painful and he had NO concept of 
what that meant”. As mentioned in Chapter 3, her mother had personal 
experience of miscarriages, although Holly had not really known about these 
prior to the onset of her own. Concerned not to frighten Holly, her mother was 
reluctant to discuss the physicality of her own miscarriages and only divulged 
when realising this silent omission was itself having the undesired effect of 
inducing panic. Though her mother’s miscarriages were felt to have limited 
practical relevance for Holly’s, having occurred several decades ago in a 
different treatment context, the lack of willingness to talk about the physical 
experience was marked. Part of her mother’s reluctance may have also related to 
her step-father’s optimistic approach: “he kept saying, you know, ‘this happens 
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all the time, it could be absolutely fine’, but I really knew it wasn’t fine and it 
was getting heavier and heavier and I was getting more pain”.29  
When she initially started bleeding, Holly’s husband encouraged her to 
go to A&E but her experience there was upsetting, not only because of her fears 
about losing the pregnancy but also owing to the environment and treatment by 
medical staff: 
you don’t have to triage on a huge open counter top with everyone 
and anyone standing there and what if I’d gone in with lots of 
blood and lots of pain and standing there and being asked ‘are you 
passing clots? How many? Are you doing this and are you doing 
that?’ and that’s while you’re standing next to a guy [porter] with a 
ladder waiting to be told where to put a light bulb in and you 
think, you know, that’s not good, that’s not good. It makes you feel 
ridiculous, like a hypochondriac as well and all ‘people bleed in 
pregnancy, you’ll be fine’ when actually I think people know their 
own bodies and know when – I certainly felt like I wasn’t, it wasn’t 
going to be okay.  
Holly foregrounded her participation in the research in terms of wanting to 
contribute to readdressing a lack of knowledge and advice about the physical 
experiences of miscarriage (blood loss and pain) from both ‘medical profession’ 
and ‘lay’ sources. In addition to participating in my research, she had also 
undertaken other activities to contribute her personal experience about 
miscarrying, namely writing a blog and featuring in a women’s magazine article. 
She positioned herself as “lucky” in contrast to the “exceptionally isolating” 
experiences of women who lack practical and/or emotional support during 
pregnancy loss. Holly described herself as having both emotionally supportive 
family and friends, and also benefitting from several family members deemed to 
have ‘expert’ status by virtue of occupation (with her husband and step-father 
both GPs, their colleague-friends, and her mother having been a midwife). 
However, Holly questioned the reliability of these ‘expert’ knowledges; for 
                                                          
29 It may have been that Holly’s step-father was attempting to enact a kind of ‘swan effect’, 
attempting to appear serene to disguise concern, which is a notion Scamell (2011) uses 
regarding the difficulties faced by midwives in balancing intense vigilance and activity with 
calmness and positivity in labour. 
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instance, when she posed questions about the ‘mechanics’ of loss such as how 
much blood she would lose, for how long she would bleed and how much pain 
she would be in – the answers from her husband and step-father were unsure.  
Holly felt more should have been done at A&E, where her blood pressure 
was recorded and a venous blood sample taken, namely in terms of providing 
information about the physical processes she was potentially awaiting: “[the] 
A&E department could of given me some advice, rather than just ‘go away, come 
back in four days’”. Feeling the resources and spaces of ‘traditional’ Western 
medical knowledge were unable or unwilling to inform her, Holly searched 
online for stories of personal experience. However, she felt that the National 
Health Service (NHS) should be “the ones offering concrete advice and support 
and you shouldn’t have to trawl the Internet for stories about what people have 
been through”. A particularly undesirable outcome of this was coming across 
“horrendous horror stories, you can get horrible long term complications that 
you hear about because one person’s had it and they’ve posted online and it’s 
scary, it’s really scary”. Equally, though, Holly felt the NHS Direct website 
underplayed miscarriage “to hear you might get a bit of spotting and a bit of 
cramping, it’s just utter rubbish in comparison to what happens”. This 
contrasted sharply with an online video Holly found of a woman discussing her 
late (21 weeks) miscarriage: “it’s almost false to […] use that as a good example 
of a, of most people’s experience”. Holly suggested, then, that there is a lack of 
information specifically about miscarriages towards the end of the first 
trimester. The video also impacted on her subsequent pregnancy: “THAT 
REALLY stuck in my head, that video, and when we got past 21 weeks with this 
baby – I felt MUCH better”.  
The prospect and experience of miscarrying can be extremely frightening, 
compounded by a stark contradiction between lacking or withheld information 
about the physical processes of miscarriage alongside a necessity to monitor and 
act if/when the bleeding became ‘abnormal’ or dangerous. Holly conveyed the 
necessity of practical resources, information and emotional preparation in order 
to make informed decisions as to whether to seek further medical assistance: 
I think you need to be prepared, you need to have painkillers and 
to know what you can take, what you can’t take, and being careful 
and looking after yourself and knowing what’s what, like if 
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something is wrong and what to do, like being able to spot if you’re 
bleeding too much or… I just don’t think there’s enough 
information […] being told ‘if you’re soaking through [menstrual 
towels quickly] blah blah blah after five days, go to hospital’ but 
I’m sorry – if you’ve been bleeding that heavily for five days you’ve 
lost far too much blood. 
There can be reasons why one would not wish to return to A&E; indeed, 
Holly herself resisted the suggestion from her husband, concerned that 
there might be “something seriously wrong” regarding the extent of pain, 
on several occasions in the following days. The emotional upset of being 
largely ignored and asked ‘intrusive’ questions about her bodily processes 
in the public reception was a key disincentive for returning to A&E:  
the thought of being in A&E while miscarrying – argh, it’s just 
horrendous. I imagine that a lot of women get terrified by it, I 
mean I was really scared, it was horrible, and that’s WITH having 
somebody [my husband, a GP] there who knows what to do and is 
kind of very calm and helping me as much as he possibly could, if 
anyone’s doing that on their own – that’s just… and I think that’s 
really wrong, they [the NHS] should be able to offer you more than 
that. 
Such an account resonates with the arguments made by Murphy and Philpin 
(2010) regarding lacking and inadequate attendance to (and, Holly felt, 
information about) the physicality of miscarriage. Holly recognised that some 
women may not wish to know but that “people should probably have the ability 
to get hold of that information”. The dearth of appropriate information, 
confounded by reluctance from close family members to elaborate on knowledge 
they deemed too sensitive or graphic, caused Holly a great deal of distress. One 
aspect of this pertained to the fact that she had internalised the imperative that 
she must monitor her bleeding but, in practice, would have to do so in the 
absence of certainty regarding the distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘dangerous’.  
 Many participants spoke openly about their experiences of pregnancy 
loss, including the physical and more ‘taboo’ aspects. For instance, Carla was 
not reticent in her descriptions of bleeding, labour/birth and post-delivery 
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(un)healing, and at times seemed to take pride in her capacity to stomach what 
she acknowledged as potentially gruesome. On one occasion, after vividly 
recounting the ripping of her post-delivery stitches when the dried blood 
bonded with the material of a sanitary pad, she even joked “you look like you’re 
going to be sick!” Carla, summarising her reproductive past as “if I actually 
thought about it – I would scream”, described two miscarriages and three 
terminations in addition to the birth of her (living) son. Subsequently, blood 
loss featured in her account in a number of ways and in relation to a number of 
scenarios, but it is her most recent medically induced termination in particular 
that I will focus on here. Carla explained that she had taken the first stage 
pregnancy-ceasing pill but bleeding had still not begun five days later. She 
returned to the clinic where she was told to keep walking to stimulate bleeding 
and Carla was then driven home by her mother:  
[when I] got in the car to go home, everything [was] fine, it was 
like ‘you alright?’, ‘yeah’, and I half fell asleep, stood up at my 
house to get out the car, I stood up and I’ve never had such blood 
gush out of me […] my trainers – I had to throw out ‘cos they were 
covered in blood. 
Her bleeding continued for three weeks with a significant number of large 
‘clots’, regarding which she “ended up actually going to the doctors to say ‘is this 
normal?’ because it’s loads and I don’t know why […] I was so scared”. 
Comparing it to her normally very heavy periods, Carla managed this extended 
bleeding and felt reassured by the doctor that the clots described were normal.  
However, it was clear that the initial “gush” of blood had been troubling 
for Carla not only because of the unexpected quantity/velocity of blood flow, but 
also owing to its public presence. Relating to notions of stigma (Goffman 1963) 
and cultural understanding of uterine menstrual blood (Shail 2007; Meyer 
2005; Vostral 2005), the visibility of this was something that Carla felt an 
imperative to ‘contain’ or, given the street setting, at least dilute:  
my trainers were covered in blood, there was a pool of blood 
outside the house – it was just like ‘shit’, we had to get a bucket 
and wash it away in case people saw, and it was just, like, 
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everywhere at home, in the shower, and I was just, like, there was 
a blood trail through the house that we had to clean up. 
Whilst uterine blood is an abject fluid that can provoke sentiments of death and 
dirt, the specific socio-emotional context of this instance made the need to ‘get 
rid’ of the pool of blood outside her home all the more pressing. The termination 
was an especially highly ambiguous endeavour for Carla, ending a pregnancy 
that had been part of her plans for a “nice little happy family” prior to the 
discovery of her partner’s adultery. As a result, she felt both sadness and a 
degree of relief from closure: 
it was like thank fuck that’s over, let’s get back to having a normal 
life, with the last one it was like right that’s [ex-partner] wiped out 
my life forever which sounds horrible […] but it was like now that’s 
done, dusted, gone, no more problems, I won’t have to see him, 
especially as I found out he was cheating, I couldn’t of coped. 
The emotional intensity of Carla’s experiences of miscarriages and terminations 
emerged in poignant ways and yet it was also very clear from her narrative that 
she supressed a wealth of very distressing experience. She openly stated the 
reasons behind her terminations, highlighting difficult life circumstances with 
her first termination occurring whilst she was under the legal age of consent for 
sexual intercourse and her second which had involved an unreported sexual 
assault. In contrast, the miscarriages were wanted pregnancies and at times 
when she felt emotionally, physically and financially able to support, and be 
supported within a relationship in raising, another child. Although I have 
spoken about the limitations of ‘choice’, this language was crucial to the ways in 
which Carla articulated the different endings of her pregnancies: 
because terminations, they were my choice, where even if when 
I’ve been pregnant when I’ve had a miscarriage, it still should have 
been my choice as to whether I had a kid or had an abortion, 
whereas it wasn’t – the choice was removed. 
Bleeding featured in these ‘choices’ also, implying that the bleeding of 
terminations was anticipated and weighed up against the ‘costs’ of remaining 
pregnant. Whilst the bleeding in miscarriages of wanted pregnancies was 
described as physically similar, these bodily experiences also entailed additional 
124 
 
aspects of sadness, confusion and disappointment – although Carla seemed 
resistant to dwelling on the emotional upset. This constituted a kind of 
guardedness and coping strategy, echoed in her assessment of the support 
advice she had found online: 
[pregnancy loss support websites] go on about how you should be 
feeling, all oh, you know, ‘you should feel sad’, BUT, they don’t tell 
you anything about the fact that sometimes you just want to 
pretend it hasn’t happened and ignore it, oh ‘you should take time 
off work’, NO, if you wanna go back to work as soon as possible so 
you can forget this has ever happened in your life, do it; they don’t 
give you that kind of advice, of get back to your normal life as soon 
as possible, which is the best advice I could ever give anyone. 
Reiterating earlier discussions from both Chapter 4 and the Methodology, a 
helpful approach or comment for one person who experiences pregnancy loss 
may not be deemed as such by another (see also Chapter 6). 
Bodily Fluids Beyond Blood 
Encounters with particular bodily fluids like breast milk had been 
anticipated by some participants under very different circumstances and 
emotional expectations. Whilst the painful schism between anticipated tears of 
joy with actualised tears of sadness in pregnancy loss is one such example, focus 
in the remainder of this section will be on the topic of onset lactation following 
late losses. Such an example entails connections between bodily experience as 
the flesh swells and internally aches with colostrum and milk, exiting the ducts 
from ‘inside’ to ‘outside’ of/upon the skin, prompted by the movement and 
delivery of foetus ‘inside’ to baby ‘outside’ the body. The fluid of breast milk and 
the physical experiences of this leaking or flowing out of the body were 
described by some participants as illustrating or amplifying their emotional 
losses, as well as the physical/physiological losses, in particularly distressing 
ways. The viscerally felt and visible presence of leaking milk post-pregnancy loss 
highlights a disjuncture between the anticipated biological function (to feed a 
living new-born) and particular reality (with no living new-born to feed). That 
is, the presence of milk/lactation forcibly demonstrates an absence of neonatal 
125 
 
life to care for and can reiterate the disjuncture between anticipation/hopes (of 
the past) with pregnancy loss realities.  
 Anne described how her bodily processes, such as post-delivery healing 
and the production of breast milk, continued to occur without recognition that 
her pregnancy had ended at full term in stillbirth. She drew on information 
from online pregnancy loss support groups signposted to whilst she was in 
hospital and from her community midwife who visited to check her stitches and 
“help with concerns such as the fact that my milk came in, that was incredibly 
distressing and stuff so, she came for that kind of support”. These two sources of 
support for Anne could offset one another’s limitations since booking 
appointments with the community midwife meant delays whilst the support 
groups were attributed limited medical legitimacy; they could, as in this case, 
also validate recommendations: 
there was a couple of different [online group] boards and I posted 
and I asked about my milk coming in and how I could stop it 
because I wasn’t seeing my midwife for a couple of days and she 
[the midwife] told me to ring her at any time, she was just 
absolutely wonderful, but I just didn’t want to, or I wanted to talk 
to other people about their experiences and I went on and they 
gave me some advice erm which a couple of days [later] was the 
same advice the midwife gave me. 
Anne recalled the physical pain of onset lactation about three days after her 
stillbirth: “my boobs really started hurting, they went rock hard, they looked 
absolutely massive and they really REALLY hurt”. Anne followed the advice 
from the online group, subsequently reiterated by her midwife, to “wear a tight 
bra all the time, morning, you know, daytime and night, sleep with a tight bra 
on all the time, don’t touch your boobs at all, put breast pads on in case you get 
any leaking”. Anne described how she was:  
incredibly distressed, I was hugely worried about seeing the milk 
because it just seems INCREDIBLY cruel that your body still does 
those things when there’s no baby, when there’s no baby to 
actually and I’d been planning on breast feeding so when there’s 
no baby to actually do that with and yet my milk was still coming 
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in, it just felt all wrong so I was quite… lucky that it just, you know, 
after a week went away basically.30 
Gemma also commented on the emotionality of onset lactation as interplay 
between grief following loss and ‘normal’ physiological/hormonal responses: 
it’s hard to say what’s physical and what’s mental really, I mean, 
you always have a hormonal change at three days after delivery 
with a natural birth but there’s kind of... you know, breastfeeding 
and kind of, they call it the baby blues at day three, yeah, that’s 
normal. I think it was day three when I was just kind of... numb 
really and I can remember just crying and then feeling okay for 
half an hour and then feeling, just crying for half an hour, you 
know, I couldn’t, it was just the first time I’d ever experienced grief 
like that {inhales deeply} and I can always remember the boobs 
{laughs} I had these rock hard, massive boobs that were desperate 
to feed a baby and they were kind of leaking quite a lot so that was 
hard to deal with. 
Additionally, the practical responses to and management of the onset of 
lactation without a living new-born to feed can entail entering spaces and 
situations where this disjuncture is again reiterated. Gemma explained that “we 
had to go and buy breast pads which again is like you’re buying all this stuff in 
the maternity section of Boots or whatever and it’s next to the nappies and you 
kind of, all that stuff I remember being a bit difficult”. The onset of lactation and 
its implications can therefore reinforce the schism between expectations/ 
wishes for a healthy, living baby and actual outcomes of pregnancy loss, 
prompting the “deep emotional anguish” (Doss 2010 p80) of grief. 
Foetal Materiality in Early Pregnancy Losses 
In addition to bleeding and pain as ‘first signs and confirmation’ of early 
miscarriage, Murphy and Philpin (2010) identify the topic of ‘losing the baby’. 
                                                          
30 The desire for cessation of lactation is not the only form of response/management and, in 
Giles (2003), Shelley Abbott provides an account of the death of her infant daughter following 
which she continued donations to a milk bank. She is quoted in Giles (2003 p58) saying that this 
“gave me a kind of hope, something positive to look at, I guess. I knew I was giving a gift, so I 
didn’t feel so sad, or distraught, as I knew my milk was going to somebody”. 
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Sometimes, as in early miscarriages when the embryo may not be identifiable, 
the blood was seen as synonymous with the embryo/‘baby’ of pregnancy loss.31 
Different ‘textures’ and ‘features’ of the uterine blood were mentioned, with 
viscosity and clots, accompanied by strong emotional reactions like distress and 
aversion, contrasted to the women’s ‘normal’ menstrual flows. Whilst early 
miscarriage bleeding can seem a particularly exaggerated form of menstruation, 
the inclusion of embryonic or foetal materiality—whether visibly seen or not— 
renders it particularly distressing (Murphy and Philpin 2010). Though it may be 
identifiable to the trained eye of doctors and nurses who encounter miscarriage 
frequently and are skilled in ascertaining this information (Murphy and Philpin 
2010), many of the women in my research who had early miscarriages were 
unsure about distinguishing between the ‘general’ endometrium blood and 
pregnancy materiality. In contrast to the shadowy images of ultrasonography 
which, in the contemporary era, “we see what we are shown” (Duden 1993 p17), 
most people cannot easily ‘read’ early miscarriage uterine bleeding for such 
distinctions.32 Subsequently, for many of my research participants also, there is 
often a “tension between their actual physical experience of passing blood clots, 
fragments of tissue, gestational sacs […] and their conceptualisation of their 
pregnancy as a baby” (Murphy and Philpin 2010 p538).  
Early miscarriages are atypical bereavements since there is often no 
coherently identifiable or otherwise tangible body (Murphy and Philpin 2010). 
Ambiguities regarding bodily encounters with blood emerged in efforts to 
decipher distinctions in/constituting blood flows (liquids, clots and embryonic 
entities). Many of the women’s early miscarriages entailed a ‘mix’ of bloods 
across time in terms of consistency and colour. Marie explained about her 
second pregnancy loss of three miscarriages in total: “I went to the toilet 
upstairs unaware of a problem and it was only when I wiped that there was 
bright red blood on the tissue. I panicked, I wiped again and it was there again”. 
She visited A&E before returning home where the bleeding and cramping 
                                                          
31 First trimester miscarriages are focused on in this section since, in these, the significance of 
blood ‘with’/‘containing’ embryo and placental material was emphasised whereas later 
pregnancy losses entailed encounters with more recognisable foetal/baby bodies. 
32 A few of the women in the research were themselves medically-trained such as Beth who was 
able to, but dreaded the prospect that she might, identify such distinctions in the materiality 
passed. 
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worsened and, by the evening, she “was passing what looked like tissue and I 
knew then it was all over. My heart sank and I felt so upset to have to go through 
it all over again”. Marie’s first miscarriage had been managed surgically and this 
was also the case for her third miscarriage after the bleeding in her second had 
been very heavy and extended across a significant period of time. The second 
miscarriage bleeding experience had also entailed encountering ambiguous 
materialities, as she was “passing tissue and passing clots and passing lumps of 
bits and pieces of what was left of the pregnancy and more bleeding”. Marie 
summarised her experiences of her ‘natural’ miscarriage: 
I carried on bleeding heavy for that week and the following week, 
by which point I was passing liver type tissue.  I had to ring the 
hospital at this point to give them an update of the bleeding to 
make sure all was "going OK" they were happy with what I had 
passed and how things were going and that was that. I carried on 
bleeding off and on, mainly red blood, for the whole of May. It 
stopped for a few days towards the end of the month and I thought 
it was all over, but then I started bleeding again after maybe 3 
bleed free days and I then bled for a further week. […] It made me 
realise that I was glad that I had opted for a D&C in [the first 
miscarriage] as the natural miscarriage went on for weeks feeling 
much more drawn out.  
Marie described the physical experience of her natural miscarriage as “more 
uncomfortable” and emotionally painful: “every time I saw the blood it was a 
constant reminder of me losing our baby”. This contrasted to the surgical 
management which she “felt [was] over with much quicker as the bleeding was a 
lot less and mainly brown”.  
Additionally, echoing Holly’s earlier comments, Marie received much less 
information in relation to the natural miscarriage as to what might indicate a 
problem/danger with bleeding in contrast to the medical support and 
information for her D&Cs. Marie was aware that the extended and extensive 
bleeding in her natural miscarriage may have been because she had not 
“pass[ed] everything” initially and, aware that this could pose an infection risk, 
she checked her blood “just to make sure there was nothing funny about it, it 
didn’t look or smell really horrible or wasn’t uncomfortable”. In doing so, she 
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encountered ambiguous matter: “a tiny bit of… it wasn’t a clot and it wasn’t just 
blood, I think it was a tiny, tiny bit of tissue that was a little bit of a red tinge”. 
These experiences were so upsetting that Marie “was more determined to have 
another D&C” after the diagnosis of her third (missed) miscarriage because “I 
really didn't want to go through another natural miscarriage as this time there 
would be more to pass than before [as the pregnancy had continued for longer] 
and I didn't want to go through all the pain, discomfort and seeing my baby”. 
She elaborated on this latter aspect, saying “I couldn't bear the thought again of 
having my dead baby inside me I wanted it taken away as it was too upsetting” – 
a topic which I will elaborate on further shortly.   
In addition to the striking visibility of blood and additional distress of 
seeing foetal tissue, some participants described the physical sensations of 
foetal tissue that had been/was being expelled. As mentioned in Chapter 3 and 
forthcoming in Chapter 7, this resonates with Colls’ (2012) discussion of ‘intra-
touch’ and forms of touch which cannot be seen. The conceptual significance of 
vaginal lips (Irigaray  2004) has been utilised by feminist geographers such as 
Colls (2012), Straughan (2012) and Cant (2012) to challenge the (masculinist) 
insistence on space as separation and gap, instead emphasising touch (Paterson 
et al 2012). Linking to this, some participants’ encounters with foetal 
materiality, and potentially the moment of ‘definite’ pregnancy loss, were 
identifiable though intra-bodily (vulva and labia) touch. The sensation of feeling 
prior to seeing foetal materiality as it moved/had moved out of the body and, for 
example, onto underwear or toilet paper, emerged in a number of participants 
narratives. Holly described an abject sensation which characterised a specific 
moment in which a foetal entity (as separate to/from her) was encountered 
through touch (rather than initially through sight). She explained:  
when I woke up I could feel that there was… something in my 
knickers and there was blood everywhere and I knew that if I 
moved there was going to be blood everywhere, so I just lay there 
for a while and [my husband] was not really asleep but I wanted to 
let him sleep a bit longer, erm… and eventually I said, I woke him 
up and said ‘I have to go to the bathroom and you’re going to have 
to help me’ erm… and I just didn’t want to look, awrrrr, horrible, I 
really didn’t want to look but it feels… it just felt like… a lump […] 
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and blood running down my legs and the pain was pretty much 
gone by then, it was just cramps […] I was like waddling to the 
bathroom and he [my husband], bless him, he just… I was 
completely numb by that point and just sat there and he sorted it 
all out and we both looked at it and it was like this little golf ball 
sized… thing. Erm… and lots of blood. 
Distinctions between blood, clots and embryonic/foetal matter had 
emotional and practical implications, such as in relation to degrees of handling 
and the locations deemed ‘preferable’ for these entities to reside. Murphy and 
Philpin’s (2010) research included a woman who took care not to ‘pass’ the 
materiality of the ‘baby’ into the toilet and instead into her hand. For some of 
my participants, the prospect or actuality of the embryonic/foetal matter being 
in the toilet bowl or bin was also particularly upsetting and could induce feelings 
of guilt and remorse. This topic formed part of an email interview exchange with 
Fiona after I asked her what she did following her experience of heavy bleeding, 
intense pain and the felt movement sensation of passing matter: 
I'm trying to write it as just facts but in truth the feeling of shame 
gets me here. Exactly after the miscarriage happened, when I had 
ran to the bathroom and seen what was there on the [sanitary] 
towel, I remember just sitting there for ten minutes looking at it, 
just trying to process it. It was that sensation of not really 
believing what your eyes were telling you, that you're trying to 
think of something else that it must be, that it had to be something 
else because the thought of it actually being a baby was too 
difficult and painful to even begin to comprehend. So you can 
imagine the frame of mind I was in. My first thoughts were 'I can't 
leave it sitting around'[,] it was bad enough that I had to see it let 
alone show it to anyone else or have my two year old walk in and 
see it […] I was at a total loss at what to do, I ended up wrapping 
the whole thing ([sanitary] towel included) in tissue and I put it in 
the bin. Sorry even just writing that makes me so angry at myself. 
In my email reply, I sought to offer reassurance to Fiona that she was not alone 
in having done so and reiterated my own views that there is very little guidance 
or alternative options regarding what to do in such a confusing, potentially 
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emotionally overwhelming situation.33 With relevance to earlier discussions in 
the Methodology, this seemed to provide some consolation; Fiona replied: 
I've never told anyone before (mostly because of the fact that I feel 
I'd be judged for it, little does anyone know how much we judge 
ourselves for it)[.] Even just trying to respond to that question in 
the last email made me quite anxious about it, because to be 
truthful it does make me feel like some sort of a monster, but to 
hear that someone else has also experienced it too, it does help, 
more than I could ever say. So thank you Abi. 
Across different accounts of the physiological experiences of uterine 
bleeding and encountering ‘foetal’ bodies in early- miscarriages and 
terminations, there emerged tensions between respect-love and repulsion-
abjection. This, I suggest, relates to the ambiguous status of foetal materiality as 
betwixt-and-between menstrual blood and bodies of deceased loved ones. 
Worden (1993) suggests that the bereaved can benefit from seeing the body of a 
deceased person they knew, to process the reality of the death, in—for 
instance—a funeral home or mortuary, but should be informed if they body is 
‘mutilated’ (from autopsy or if the cause of the death had been violent). As 
mentioned, there has been much debate regarding the impacts on parents 
seeing/touching their stillborn children with recognition that this can be, 
depending on various aspects, traumatic for some but beneficial and valued by 
others (Rådestad et al 2009). One factor in this involves carefully preparing 
women for what to expect after birth in order to minimise unwarranted fears or 
discomforts (Trulsson and Rådestad 2004; Rådestad et al 2009). Participants in 
my research had often been very unsure about what to expect in early 
miscarriage and about what they might see in/from their blood. In relation to 
wanted pregnancies, including retrospectively so if pregnancy had been 
unknown prior to loss, participants often reiterated the sharp contrast between 
hopes and expectations for a child and their actual encounters.  
Emphasising that ‘death’ must be recognised as entailing multiple 
aspects rather than being treated as monolithic in ‘taboo’ debates, Woodthorpe 
                                                          
33 This is supported by a number of participants and, as Fiona later said, “no one ever teaches 
you how to react in those situations, I mean what are you supposed to do in that event? Put it in 
a plastic container?” The theme of interment will also be explored in Chapter 8. 
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(2010) highlights the widespread discomfort in thinking and talking about the 
materiality of the dead body, including disposal and decay. The notion that the 
dead body is the primary example of abjection ‘waste’ (Kristeva 1982), with 
deceased babies especially so (Minogue and Palmer 2006), pertains not only to 
its status as ‘matter out of place’ (Murphy and Philpin 2010) but also issues of 
temporality. As  Komaromy (2000 p305) argues, “the body immediately after 
death is more than death embodied, it has an ambiguity that is also temporal, in 
that yesterday it was alive and today it is dead”. Thus a ‘baby’ deceased before 
birth, as in miscarriages and pre-partum stillbirths, confounds normative 
cultural notions of the linear temporality of ‘life’. Fiona’s description of her 
experience, accompanied by self-scolding since her miscarriage several years 
earlier, conveyed some of these tensions between care and aversion:  
the remains looked nothing like you'd expect, they looked nothing 
like a baby, (Maybe I was naive, but beforehand I always assumed 
that if you were to ever see something like that, that it would 
actually look like a baby) [...] I feel ashamed at that [putting the 
remains in the bin], at the fact that's where our 'baby' ended up. 
This resonates strongly with Murphy and Philpin’s (2010 p538) comments that 
uncertainties and ambiguities as to ‘what’ is encountered in early miscarriages 
by the women were “reflected in the words they used to describe their 
pregnancy as they revealed a mixed picture in the words used to talk about what 
had been lost”. For instance, Fiona described uncertainty as to what she should/ 
could have done with “it” in her bathroom and that “afterwards, [I felt] the guilt, 
the shame of knowing that, of knowing it was a baby, a life... it's still a lot to take 
in at times”. There are clear links with the observations of Murphy and Philpin 
(2010 p538) who describe how the women in their research also “oscillated 
between using impersonal terms such as ‘it’, technical terms such as ‘foetus’ and 
‘embryo’ and terms such as ‘baby’ and ‘child’”.  
Implications for the ‘Geographies of Death and Dying’ 
 Attending to the encountered bodily fluids and flows of pregnancy losses 
has implications for the ‘geographies of death and dying’ in highlighting spaces 
not usually considered within this remit. The ‘geographies of death and dying’ 
can be understood as a sub-discipline attending to and, within the broader 
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scope of ‘death studies’, inviting recognition of a plethora of locations 
concerning themes of grief, dying, death, bereavement and loss. As Hockey et al 
(2010) note in the introduction to an edited collection, this includes—amongst 
others—spaces of death and/or forthcoming death such as cemeteries, funeral 
parlours, hospices and hospitals (of which sub-spaces can be identified, such as 
the resuscitation ward – Page 2010). Additionally, research on memorial 
benches (Maddrell 2009b; Wylie 2009), tended/decorated graves (Francis et al 
2005), trees (Cloke and Pawson 2008), monuments (Junge 1999; Doss 2002, 
2010; Sargin 2004), cairns (Maddrell 2009a), displays/exhibitions (such as the 
NAMES project AIDS quilt – Lewis and Fraser 1996; Brown 1997; Brouwer 
1998; Junge 1999; Doss 2010) and spontaneous memorial sites (Foote and 
Grider 2010; Maddrell 2010; Doss 2002; Phelps 1998; Azaryahu 1996) have 
foregrounded the importance of space in relation to responses by those 
bereaved.34 The predominant empirical examples in the ‘geographies of death 
and dying’ and more generally in ‘death studies’ have tended to privilege 
normative notions of whom dies, with a focus on those recognisably adults or 
children, with implications for understandings of ‘where’ dying, death, 
mourning and memorialisation are seen to take place. As stated in the 
introduction, it seems pregnancy losses have been largely socially, medically and 
academically ‘silenced’, constituting forms of ‘disenfranchised grief’ (Doka 
2002). Subsequently, pregnancy losses risk exclusion from being seen as 
relevant for consideration since the ‘whom’ or ‘what’ are more ambiguous and 
contested.35  
Legally in the UK, as of 1992, stillbirths are recognised from 24 weeks 
gestation and are issued with death certificates, whilst earlier forms such as 
miscarriages tend to be deemed less significant and not ‘deaths’. However, 
outside of the legal definition, some women (and their families) do understand 
their earlier pregnancy losses to constitute forms of death. This issue concerns 
                                                          
34 In addition, to the spaces at which deaths- and/or responses by the bereaved- occur, the 
concept of ‘consolation-scapes’ (Venbrux and Jedan, forthcoming; following a four-part session 
at the Emotional Geographies 2013 conference) signals a growing attendance within geography 
to the spaces involved in responding to the bereaved. 
35 This is not to discount work which does indeed engage with spatiality and some kinds of 
pregnancy losses in particular contexts, such as Bleyen (2012, 2010) on stillbirth historically in 
the Flemish context and Woodthorpe (2012) on baby gardens in UK cemeteries.  
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questions of where and when ‘life’ begins. Whilst for some, “the moment of 
conception represents the coming into being of a new human individual” 
(Franklin 1999 p69) – for others, the logic is that ‘arrival’ into ‘life’ of a person is 
marked by birth and post-partum breath.36 The latter dominant logic holds that 
deaths before births are not really deaths at all since no ‘person’ yet existed in 
terms of independently breathing. Subsequently, claims to having one’s grief 
recognised are rendered unstable and illegitimate, with mourning and 
memorialisation practices often deemed excessive and unrequited by social 
others who have diverging interpretations of the significance of the events. As 
evidenced in the notion that death occurs when “[t]he body that sustained itself, 
whether for a few hours or the lifetime of a long marriage, is now unsustainable” 
(Hockey et al 2010 p10), normative understandings of death require the subject 
of loss to meet particular biological and post-partum criteria. 
Regardless of medical, legal or otherwise understandings of where ‘life’ 
and therefore ‘death’ can be attributed, some persons within the research 
regarded their early pregnancy losses as deaths and bereavements. Of course, 
pertaining to the complex issues of reproductive politics, it should be 
emphasised that this view/vocabulary use is not universally the case for all who 
experience pregnancy losses (Kevin 2011). However, in addition to some of the 
aforementioned comments by Marie (this chapter) and Tessa (Chapter 4), 
several other participants (Helen, Tania, Caroline, Diane and Penny) used the 
vocabulary of death in describing their encounters with embryonic/foetal 
materiality either directly or as mediated through ultrasonography scans. 
Exemplifying this alongside a sense of uncertainty conveyed through her 
language use (Murphy and Philpin 2010), Holly reflected on her miscarriage: 
I don’t know whether I thought of it as MY BABY or whether I 
thought of it as this thing, this dead thing, I think I probably 
thought of it more as this dead thing and it’s horrible to think of a 
dead… tiny… thing… inside you and about to come out. 
This was one evident way in which “[t]here is an aura of uncertainty around” the 
events of pregnancy losses (Frost et al 2007). As is foregrounded throughout my 
                                                          
36 It should be noted that this is not unanimously agreed upon; hence, even for neonatal deaths 
in which a baby survived after birth for potentially several hours, days or weeks, social others 
may refute recognition that this counts as having really been ‘alive’ and thus having died. 
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research, different meanings of the word ‘loss’ can include aspects of 
materialities, possibilities, imagined futures and/or refer to events of death.  
Ambiguity is widespread as to the experiences of bodily flows in which 
uterine bleeding—involving matter which is inanimate/not alive but has 
previously been or may have been thought of as animate/alive—can be 
understood as betwixt-and-between that of menstruation and corpses. It is 
evident that, for some participants, their pregnancies involved a person or 
forthcoming person. Duden (1993 p107) argues that contemporary discourses of 
pregnancy, with conceptions detected with urine tests (Chapter 3) at ever earlier 
points, underpin the “acquisition of a new consciousness” for pregnant women. 
Duden (1993 p109) argues that efforts are made to impute meaning by 
transforming “the dynamic equilibrium of that open process into a “something.” 
[…] [such as by naming] the cybernetic process “a life””. Subsequently, it can be 
understood that particular activities produce social identities for the ‘expected 
child’ and are supported by this orientation towards pregnancy. Embryos and 
foetuses are relationally rendered meaningful as ‘babies’ (or not) with others 
and within particular socio-political contexts (Morgan 1996). ‘Realness’ is 
produced with “each cup of coffee or glass of wine abstained from, and each 
person informed of the impending birth” (Layne 2000 p322) and “family lives 
are dreamed into being” (Hockey and Draper 2005 p54). Activities like 
decorating the nursery and choosing names are “inherently social”, largely 
accepted by social circles in anticipation of (live) birth (Murphy 2012a p126). 
Pregnancy losses disrupt the linear trajectory in which a living child is 
anticipated to occupy the social identity produced for it. In early pregnancy 
losses, blood-body fluids and matter are instead encountered alongside the 
emotional distress of ended (or altered) anticipated hopes, dreams and futures. 
The dead body occupies a powerful position in contemporary society, 
provoking grief but also abjection, anxiety and fear (Hockey et al 2010; 
Valentine 2008). Worden’s (1993) suggestions that the bereaved view the 
(normative adult/child) deceased body concern particular places of encounter. 
Funeral parlours, Hallam et al (1999) demonstrate, are spaces at which work is 
undertaken to restore/cosmetically fashion the corpse in order to manage the 
responses of the bereaved to viewing to minimise aversion by seeking to reflect 
the person that was, potentially including details such as the deceased’s glasses 
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for the final viewing and/or burial (Harper 2012). As an example of the 
institutional sequestration of death (Fowler 2004), the spaces of funeral 
parlours enable funeral directors to present themselves as not merely ‘selling’ a 
funeral but as facilitators of grief work (Ariès 1976). Encouragements such as 
Worden’s (1993) thus refer to the professional funeral industry which itself can 
play a part in legitimising, along with medical and legal definitions, the grounds 
of ‘normative deaths’. Such a carefully managed, aesthetically sanitised, 
professional environment scenario is often not the case for pregnancy losses, 
especially in relation to early miscarriages. The locations in which women and 
potentially their partners, like Holly’s husband, encounter the ambiguous blood-
body matter include the spaces of bathrooms and toilets. These are important 
locations for discovering, checking/monitoring and therefore encountering 
uterine blood loss and potential pregnancy remains in addition to being 
potentially amenable spaces for emotional support (as mentioned in Chapter 4).  
Whilst the toilet may be deemed the preferable location for the 
containment and disposal of bodily fluids like menstrual blood, pregnancy loss 
uterine bleeding can occupy a more complex position. As Martin (1987) skilfully 
demonstrates, menstrual fluids tend to be equated with ‘waste’ and thus this 
form of bleeding tends to be seen as appropriately disposed of instantaneously 
(with modern toilet systems) in order to preserve the ‘civilised’ self. However, as 
Fiona implied, when the uterine bleeding pertains to early pregnancy loss and 
contains (whether visibly/recognisably so or not) material which is ambiguously 
or certified to be bodily matter of the ‘deceased’, the toilet or bathroom bin can 
be seen as an unsuitable, even disrespectful, location in line with social 
conventions for the ‘respectful’ treatment of corpses. The blood flow, containing 
matter, of early pregnancy losses can thus occupy a position betwixt-and-
between menstrual ‘waste’ and bodies of the deceased. To return to the topic of 
social- and biological- life and death, this highlights that there is diverging 
consensus regarding what qualifies as a ‘dead’ body, given that “[f]lesh is 
variously read; variously attributed with the status ‘alive’ or ‘dead’” (Hallam et 
al 1999 p81). For participants whose pregnancy losses were not legally classified 
as ‘deaths’ yet nonetheless experienced their pregnancy losses as these, uterine 
blood fluid and flow may be explicitly or implicitly understood to constitute or 
contain the materiality of the dying and deceased.  
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Additionally, as conveyed in the quote by Holly earlier, the very 
pregnancy-losing bodies of women can be seen as sites in which processes of 
dying and death occur in contrast to normative deaths as bodily detached/ 
separate events, with the option to travel to a funeral parlour or mortuary to see 
or touch the dead body. Helen explained that “you want to know if there is a 
dead baby inside you, no matter the stage of pregnancy” and Caroline stated: 
I’ll never forget it, thinking oh god I’ve got this poor dead baby 
inside me and trying to be chirpy for my two children and I went 
back on the Monday to A&E and begged please, please, you know, 
please sort this out now, I can’t walk around like this.  
My discussion of uterine bleeding in early pregnancy loss highlights the toilet/ 
bathroom as an example of the kinds of spaces brought into view when an 
expanded (but not totalising) scope of the ‘geographies of death and dying’ 
remit is utilised. By engaging with pregnancy losses, taken for granted notions 
about who/what dies, where death occurs and how this can matter are exposed 
– subject to further examination, particularly with regards to termination 
debates (Kevin 2011), and elaboration. As discussed in Chapter 3, I argue that 
this can also include ultrasonography spaces, waiting rooms and the circulation 
of such medical technologies (visually and/or audibly as ultrasonography 
images, videos and sound clips) which extend into ‘everyday’ spaces such as 
one’s living room (via TV) and cafés (via mobile phone technology). The spaces 
of toilets and their entailed practices have been arguably under-researched in 
the discipline of geography and social sciences overall (Dodge and Kitchin 2012; 
Schapper 2012). However, these are important locations in some pregnancy 
losses experiences—as sites where uterine bleeding is often detected and 
continues to be monitored or observed, sometimes over extensive periods of 
time—in distressing, frightening and otherwise intensely emotional ways. 
Concluding Remarks 
 In this chapter, the presence and/or prospect of blood has been shown as 
relating to decision-making, such as around miscarriage management options, 
and to convey different meanings including that of forthcoming/confirmed 
pregnancy loss and fear for one’s own health with haemorrhage or infection. 
With a range of responses to pregnancy losses possible (Reagan 2003; Keane 
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2009), the emotional aspects of the discussed examples have included sadness, 
grief, embarrassment, relief (as in Carla’s termination) and abjection/horror. I 
have re-focused attention onto aspects of pregnancy loss experiences which, 
owing to taboos and social prohibitions around bodily fluids, are otherwise often 
‘missed out’ of or framed as background information in the relevant scholarship. 
The example of uterine blood loss highlights this flow/fluid as simultaneously 
physiological and thus of medical interest but also with significant social and 
emotional implications and therefore pertinent to social science and humanities 
research. Pregnancy losses challenge a neat separation of ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ 
health, instead demanding the recognition of interplay between the biological 
and social, material and emotional, bodily and cognitive. Additionally, as I have 
argued, attending to the topic of bodily fluids and flows in pregnancy loss 
highlights a range of emotionally-imbued spaces, such as bathrooms and toilets, 
pertinent to the ‘geographies of death and dying’. 
The conviction of participants about the inadequacy of information on 
blood loss and pain received from medical staff was often supplemented by 
searching for information and discussion online as well as through personal 
networks of friends/family. Crucial to this dissatisfaction was the view that the 
advice about ‘what to expect’ was both frighteningly serious and yet vague or 
otherwise unclear. Many of the women spoken to had not felt informed about 
the extent of amplitude, longitude nor intensity of bleeding and pain with an 
uncertainty as to what constituted ‘too much’ and therefore presented a 
potentially urgent medical crisis for their own lives. Subsequently, not knowing 
where the line between normal and abnormal or acceptable and dangerous was, 
many women (and their partners and/or families) contended with a significant 
degree of uncertainty and anxiety. The uterine blood encountered was 
sometimes monitored or examined by the women themselves in terms of 
quantity, duration, colour, smell, felt sensation and texture/consistency, with 
the identification and handling of embryonic/foetal matter emerging as 
particularly ambivalent yet significant theme for many participants.  
In addition to medical information, a perceived lack of emotional support 
expected (or hoped for) from medical staff was described by some participants, 
somewhat contradicting Murphy and Philpin’s (2010) findings that nurses tend 
to focus on emotional support to the detriment of physical manifestations of 
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early miscarriages.37 For example, Helen recounted being given verbal 
information about the medical management of miscarriage by a registrar who 
was “very matter of fact, nice enough but I can’t say I engaged with him”: 
[a]fter he left, I popped to the toilet and when I came back there 
was a leaflet about the [M]iscarriage Association left on the bed. It 
was good to be given this but really, I wanted a friendly and 
understanding nurse to talk to me about how I felt about it all. I 
am not the sort of person to call an organisation and declare I was 
upset – but I did want to talk about it.  
Leaflets can be an appreciated provision to supplement verbal information, but 
one which cannot be a substitute for real-time ‘in-house’ emotional support.38 
For Helen, being signposted by a deposited leaflet to charity organisations for 
emotional support was insufficient. Indeed, after her second miscarriage at 20 
weeks, Isabel “felt as if I should be talking to someone about what had happened 
[…] but I was reluctant to contact anyone because I didn't want to be a burden 
and waste their time”. Subsequently, some participants—either out of 
dissatisfaction with, or to augment, information and support received from 
medical staff as well as social others—turned to the Internet. These virtual 
settings can provide opportunities to engage in mutual support and consolation 
in contrast to the silencing dismissal of wider society. Particular bodily aspects 
usually considered ‘private’ can be ‘shared’ online in various ways (Longhurst 
2009). In Chapter 6, I will now consider participants’ engagements with online 
support groups and, in particular, highlight some of the tensions and 
differentiations involved amongst multiple users.  
                                                          
37 Disappointment with medical staff was not unanimously described. Jane, herself a medical 
worker, felt “uneasy” about online support group discussions “over bad hospital care […] 
because I feel that all hospital workers do their best for their patients”. Some participants 
expressed appreciation for specific caring gestures from medical staff encountered. For instance, 
Tessa was “trembling uncontrollably” before her D&C when her gynaecologist “put his hand on 
my shoulder [...] it was a very reassuring touch”. Caroline also recounted an occasion when the 
surgeon performing her third D&C “knelt down in front of me, and he said ‘I am so sorry’ and… 
for me…  {teariness} […] it just meant so much… even 10 years later I still think [about that]”. 
38 Such leaflets were unevenly deployed across and within participants’ experiences; for 
example, Victoria was given two leaflets for her first miscarriage but none for her second which, 
after dismissive treatment by medical staff at an EPU, was then found to be an ectopic. 
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Chapter 6: Online, Pregnancy-loss ‘Support’ Groups 
Introduction 
Participants’ experiences of using the Internet for social, emotional and 
medical support and information highlighted notions of community and 
belonging but also the themes of stigma, exclusion and marginalisation. Kitchin 
(1998 p388, p393) posits that geographers are particularly well suited to 
consider the “complex spatiality of cyberspace”, attending to the “social, cultural 
and political implications” as well as the economic dimensions (also Dodge and 
Kitchin 2001). Relevant to my interests is academic work on computer-
mediated support groups for health and reproduction, including that which has 
considered online pregnancy loss groups specifically (Gold et al 2012).39 Across 
these contexts, online support groups have been associated with a range of 
‘positive’ outcomes for users. For instance, Malik and Coulson (2008) identify 
several benefits of online infertility groups predominantly used by women 
pertaining to the ‘unique’ nature of being online such as relative anonymity, 
24/7 access and convenience. Whilst Malik and Coulson (2008 p110, p112) 
recognise some “negative effects” for users, such as risks of becoming pre-
occupied or overcome with distress and the potential for misunderstandings 
without verbal/body language cues, their participants may have been motivated 
to partake in their research precisely because of “particularly positive online 
experiences”, thus potentially underestimating disadvantages.  
My interest in the online ‘terrain’ of pregnancy loss relates partly to the 
methodological underpinnings of this research, in which recruitment was 
facilitated through several online discussion groups and social network sites. 11 
of the 24 research participants solely used email interviews with another four 
mixing email interviews with those face-to-face, telephone and/or Skype. All 
participants were computer literate to varying degrees and—given that 
recruitment posts were placed, and thus seen, on support groups—the vast 
majority disclosed having used/continuing to use the Internet in relation to 
                                                          
39 The research on online support groups/communities includes those pertaining to: multiple 
sclerosis (Parr 2002); chronic illness (Crooks 2006); the Deaf community (Valentine and 
Skelton 2008); diabetes (Armstrong et al 2011); HIV/AIDS (Bar-Lev 2008); ‘problematic’ 
pregnancies including diagnosed foetal anomalies (Lowe et al (2009); infertility (Malik and 
Coulson 2008); and parenting/mothering (Madge and O’Connor 2002, 2005). 
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their pregnancy losses for information, support and/or buying memorial 
items.40 For many participants, online activities such as searching for 
information and visiting support group sites formed part of their overall 
recounted experiences of pregnancy losses. Although Malik and Coulson’s 
(2008) research included some ‘lurkers’ in online infertility groups, it seems 
that the wider scope of my pregnancy loss research—interested in topics other 
than online group usage—coupled with qualitative interviews, rather than 
online questionnaires, may have enabled the airing of some more overtly critical 
views about the online pregnancy loss support groups.41 
Given that pregnancy losses are intensely corporeal experiences, I will 
provide an overview of geographical literatures tracing the overlapping relations 
between virtual spaces, ‘real’ spaces and bodily spaces (for example: Parr 2002; 
Madge and O’Connor 2005). Following this, I will consider the ways in which 
participants discussed using the Internet to seek information about pregnancy 
loss, linking to literatures about caution regarding the unregulated/unverified 
distribution of medical information online and challenges to the possession and 
scientific authority of medical knowledge (Broom 2005; Henwood et al 2003). 
Focus will turn to online pregnancy loss support groups/communities to 
consider how these can be “validating environment[s]” (Gold et al 2012 p70). I 
will then critically examine the validity of the label of ‘support’ in relation to a 
number of participants’ ambivalences, reservations and/or responses of 
deliberate dis/non-engagement with the online groups for various reasons. As 
will be discussed, some of these views chime with my own concerns regarding 
the potential, “in the age of the public fetus” (Duden 1993 p55; Taylor 2004a, 
Lupton 2013), to cast further stigmatising lines of fracture and intolerance in 
relation to the topic of termination and other aspects of reproductive politics.  
                                                          
40 In contrast to this, only a limited number of participants described: seeking ‘hardcopy’ 
information about pregnancy loss such as books from the library or requesting paper leaflets 
from organisations; knowing of and/or engaging with face-to-face or telephone based- 
pregnancy loss support groups; or having seen and/or bought items offline specifically described 
as pregnancy loss memorial objects. 
41 ‘Lurkers’ in this context refer to those persons who view the online group interactions but do 
not themselves post or otherwise participate out of, for example, caution or cynicism. 
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Online Geographies and the ‘Online Terrain’ of Pregnancy Loss 
In 1998, Kitchin stated that “we are still unsure as to the new spatialities 
which cyberspace instigates” (p399) and encouraged further research to 
examine the ways in which social relations are affected. In response to Kitchin’s 
(1998 p403) assertions that “geography remains paramount – cyberspace, 
rather than providing an alternative world, exists in a symbiotic relationship 
with real space”, works attending to themes of embodied experience have 
emerged (such as: Parr 2002; Madge and O’Connor 2005; Crooks 2006; 
Valentine and Skelton 2008) with particular relevance for thinking about the 
highly visceral nature of pregnancy losses. As Hine (2000 p114) highlights: 
[r]ather than transcending time and space, as some theorists 
predicted, the Internet turns out to have multiple temporal and 
spatial orderings [... which] help to differentiate areas within the 
Internet and to make them meaningful as a set of social contexts. 
A diverse array of cyberspace activities around pregnancy loss constitute an 
online ‘terrain’, including: information-seeking (via search engines, on specific 
sites such as NHS Direct, through support groups) about medical terms and 
services (like  family planning clinics, the British Pregnancy Advisory Service); 
for support provision and reception (textually, including specific vocabularies 
such as ‘rainbow babies’ and ‘angel-versary’); commercial exchanges of 
memorial items (themed pin badges, teddies, bracelets and so on – often 
routinely ‘advertised’ on the forums as small businesses started/run by women 
who openly disclose having had pregnancy losses); online memorial sites (such 
as the ‘Forget-me-not meadow’ memorial page); campaign work (like 
organising/advertising for lobbying activities such as furthering research on 
stillbirth prevention and birth-death certificates); and sites concerned with 
religious evangelism or otherwise propagating pro-life views.42 
Echoing Denzin’s (2004) comments that online social researchers must 
be ‘bricoleurs’ in piecing together and adapting existing research methods, tools 
                                                          
42 These activities are not mutually exclusive to one another and may coexist on one webpage or 
in a series of different threads on a uniting website. Indeed, mourning and memorialisation can 
occur on ‘general’ websites and other media, as Walter (2011) considers in relation to celebrity 
deaths and online news websites. 
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and techniques, my research approach to online pregnancy loss support also 
entails bridging established understandings of ‘real world’ communities and 
communications with emerging explorations of these online. For instance, 
Layne’s (2003a) research on face-to-face pregnancy loss support groups 
highlights a number of ways in which such settings—purposefully facilitating the 
sharing of ‘similar’ experiences—can be beneficial: ‘breaking the silence’ by 
claiming pregnancy loss grief as legitimate and, subsequently, validating 
particular identities such as of ‘baby’ and of being a ‘real mother’. Subsequently, 
insights about face-to-face support groups are pertinent to some of the 
experiences expressed by my participants; however, whilst coexisting inter-
relatedly on a continuum, online communications and spatialities can also differ 
from those offline (Kitchin 1998; Dodge and Kitchin 2001; Madge and O’Connor 
2005; Valentine and Skelton 2008; Longhurst 2009). As conveyed in Madge 
and O’Connor’s (2005) hyphenated ‘cyber-space’, there are connections 
between ‘offline’ and ‘online’ lives and spaces: these are not radically distinct 
from one another but equally they are not the same and cannot be subsumed as 
identical. I mentioned some of these differences in the Methodology chapter, 
such as the ways that facial expressions are often ‘absent’ from written text yet 
can be conveyed and made apparent through emoticons or the narration of 
physical demeanour. Subsequently, online communication and communities 
can echo dimensions of offline support, such as emphasising emotional 
consolation, but not necessarily in a duplicate or straightforward manner.  
Of particular interest in relation to the coexisting, interplay of different 
spaces has been scholarship (such as Parr 2002) responding to the earlier 
theorisations of the Internet as, firstly, entailing a near-complete transcendence 
of the physical body and, secondly, that such a state of existence would be 
desirable and liberating. From such a perspective, the Internet is deemed to 
offer the potential to efface the material identity/difference reference points of 
users, thus supposedly enabling opportunities to navigate around/away from 
identifiers which risk discriminatory (sexist, racist, homophobic) encounters. 
However, as Parr (2002 p76 italics in original) notes, far from the material body 
being disregarding in cyberspace, it can in fact be “the cause or focus of travels 
in virtual worlds”. In relation to pregnancy loss, this is indeed the case: 
participants often described browsing websites and/or posting on discussion 
groups to acquire information about their embodied processes as they occurred 
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(such as during uterine bleeding) or were prospective (as with different forms of 
miscarriage management: expectant/natural, surgical, medical). Additionally, 
evidenced by prominent social networking sites, many online activities and 
spaces continue to foreground personal identity in terms of visibility with profile 
pictures as well as in textual/auditory content.  
In this way, it is clear that bodies are always present online, even if only 
by virtue of an embodied person positioned at a computer whilst viewing or 
contributing to websites and forum threads, and that “nobody lives only in 
cyberspace” (McGerty 2000 p89). However, Parr (2002 p75) argues that:  
[i]t’s relatively easy to begin to argue that the physical body is 
sometimes forgotten in virtual space, and seek to recall it as an 
academic project. It is less easy to understand how virtual space 
both enables a sense of technological disembodiment and yet 
simultaneously reconstitutes and reinforces the physical body. 
As such, “[b]odies in virtual spaces are nothing if not complex” as they are 
“reasserted and reconfigured” within/through exchanges online, shaping not 
only how the bodily experiences of others are comprehended but potentially also 
informing how one’s own bodily experiences are understood and narrated by 
oneself (Parr 2002 p86). Subsequently, as Madge and O’Connor (2005) note in 
relation to discussion groups for parenting, there may be circumstances in 
which particular details deemed undesirable are omitted in the ‘performance’ of 
mothering online via talk and/or photo-sharing – yet key material, bodily 
aspects remain and in fact serve as the rationale of the group. That is, the 
existence of children and oneself as a ‘mother’ is not being denied but rather this 
embodied, lived context is utilised as the core unifying identity/theme of the 
group as (sometimes strategically with some omissions) conveyed in peer 
interactions (Madge and O’Connor 2005).  
Likewise, pregnancy loss support groups exist precisely because of 
particular kinds of bodily experiences, thus refuting the assumption that the 
body is “irrelevant and invisible” online (Kitchin 1998 p80; Parr, 2002), even 
though the actual bodies of group users are not necessarily (visually, materially) 
evident to fellow users or observers. Bodily experiences, however, are 
represented in various (textual) ways and are subsequently reconfigured, 
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sometimes in relation to familiar objects and/or ways likely to be familiar to 
particular people as assumed shared references, such as between women and 
menses. Thus, akin to the use of comparative vegetables and fruit sizes during 
pregnancy to help conceptualise foetal development with Holly commenting 
about her 26 week pregnancy that “apparently it’s the size of a cucumber at the 
moment”, comparative reference points in both online and offline discussion 
can also be employed about the heaviness and rapidity of uterine bleeding.43 For 
instance, Esther described: “I get heavy periods normally so that’s fine but this 
[miscarriage bleeding] was like nothing on this EARTH and to give you an idea I 
was shifting through the super thick sanitary towels in less than two hours”. 
Thus pregnant and pregnancy-losing bodies come to be textually, but sometimes 
visually via photographs/images, evoked presences online in ways which involve 
their bodies being “reasserted and reconfigured” (Parr 2002 p86).  
Resonating with observations about online groups for infertility (Malik 
and Coulson 2008) and parenting (Madge and O’Connor 2005), Fox and Rainie 
(2000) argued that women use the Internet more frequently than men to seek 
health information. This likely pertains not only to the physiological centrality 
of women’s bodies in reproduction but also socio-cultural tendencies to be 
deemed primarily responsible for child-rearing and attending to the bodies of 
family/infants as well as their own (McKie et al 2004a, 2004b; Williams and 
Crooks 2008). Such practices participate in the wider performative ‘doing’ of 
family, with iterative processes of capturing, ordering, preserving, recalling and 
narrating family histories and futures in various ways (for example: Rose 2010 
on family photos; Emslie et al 2003 on storying genetic inheritance). In 
addition, pregnant women—as well as women trying to conceive and providing 
postpartum care—are subject to a plethora of advice around, and coercion to 
monitor, their bodies.44 ‘Disciplining’ reproductive bodies includes issues of: 
diet, cigarette/drug abstinence, ‘moderate’ exercise, submission to a range of 
                                                          
43 Another example of comparisons with the size of familiar foods was Rosie, who described the 
changes regarding her diagnosed Polycystic Ovary Syndrome: “my ovaries were scanned at the 
beginning of IVF and were a bit like smooth almonds, the last scan I saw of them they were like 
a little bunch of grapes, so… they’re definitely getting more and more cysts on them”. 
44 This point also links to work looking at, for example, discourses around cervical cancer 
screening as an ‘embodied obligation’ of health surveillance (Howson 1998), negotiated in 
relation to different women’s personal lives (Armstrong 2007; Armstrong and Murphy 2008). 
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diagnostic measures/interventions and being ‘keepers’ of medical and/or 
speculative knowledges about biological inheritance (Markens et al 1997; 
Longhurst 1999; Abel and Browner 1998; Root and Browner 2001; Emslie et al 
2003; Lupton 2011). Pregnant women are not only expected to obey their 
doctor’s expert advice but also to themselves seek out, and comply with, 
‘reliable’ (biomedically-endorsed) information, such as from books, magazines 
and the Internet (Abel and Browner 1998; Lowe et al 2009). Discourses around 
maternal health and, crucially, infant survival/health ensure that such 
information carries significant responsibilisation weight and particular 
emotions (fear, shame, guilt, stigma) can be utilised with the intent to ensure 
compliance – although punitive approaches can backfire (Daniels 1999). As 
such, embedded in a wider context of Foucauldian discipline, online resources 
such as the NHS Direct website (Parr 2002) and discussion groups such as 
‘babyworld.co.uk’ (Madge and O’Connor 2005) are now commonly used by 
many. 
Subsequently, the ‘online terrain’ of pregnancy loss can be seen as an 
extension of longstanding (self)disciplining practices concerned with pregnancy, 
health and care for women, involving: bodily vigilance, health-information 
seeking, emotional encounters, pre-natal and post-natal care, longitudinal 
responsibilities for parenting, and recounting and remembering ‘family’. Yet, 
simultaneously, pregnancy losses also complicate and unsettle ‘preparation-for-
parenting’ and ‘parenting-in-practice’ activities and expectations. Narratives of 
‘family’ with linear expectations and hopes for a living, growing child are 
disrupted by events of pregnancy loss, often leaving little to no material 
artefacts evidencing that a child socially and/or biologically existed (Bleyen 
2010; Layne 2000; see also Chapters 7 and 8). Subsequently, one’s identity as a 
parent/mother may be questioned by potentially oneself and others (Murphy 
2012a, 2012b). The dominant rhetoric surrounding pregnancy of celebration 
and joy, alongside high expectations of medical heraldry and narratives of 
constantly-progressing scientific advancements, can have devastating 
consequences for pregnancies with ‘unhappy endings’ (Layne 2003b).  
Particular ‘risk’ discourses compound the insistence on being a 
‘responsible’ parent/mother at all stages of pregnancy and, in some instances, 
pre-pregnancy with punitive and condemning consequences if/when pregnancy 
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losses occur (Gallagher 1987; Warren 1989; Pollitt 1998; Daniels 1999; Hartouni 
1999). Thus, if “[d]isease and death are no longer regarded as forces of nature 
but as unnatural affronts to our proper state of being” (Miller 2004 p41) and the 
maternal womb is deemed the ‘first environment’, responsibility-blame can be 
problematically and unfairly attributed to women who experience pregnancy 
losses (including by themselves). Pregnancy loss support groups can thus 
provide spaces to negotiate and challenge the wider context of individualising 
and perhaps excessive responsibility placed upon women for pregnancy 
outcomes that are often beyond their control and antithetical to their own 
wishes, and redefine themselves as valuable (not ‘failed’) mothers and/or 
women. 
Since many participants had used websites aimed at providing 
information and discussing their pregnancies, it is logical that some also sought 
out web-based groups specifically about pregnancy loss or used particular 
discussion threads during/following these. Again, reiterating how Internet users 
do not merely leave their physical bodies ‘behind’, since their pivotal focus 
reinstates and mobilises around particular bodily experiences and processes, 
this realigning of online groups pertains to the changing bodily specifics at hand  
as ongoing pregnancy shifts to pregnancy loss. For example, Anne described 
using multiple discussion groups on the same pregnancy/parenting website in 
relation to the different events and stages of her second pregnancy which ended 
at full term in stillbirth. Anne’s transition from the ‘general’ pregnancy forums 
to the more specific ‘pregnancy and infant loss’ board highlights the ways in 
which online engagements with informational and discussion groups do not 
simply ‘cease’ when pregnancy loss occurs, but follow the embodied 
temporalities being experienced in the ‘offline’ world. For some women in the 
research, learning of pregnancy loss was immediate and certain, meaning that 
their identification with one discussion group generally on pregnancy could 
change abruptly to one on pregnancy loss. For others, the drawn-out diagnosis 
or ambiguous occurrence of pregnancy loss entailed significant periods of 
waiting and being ‘in limbo’, meaning that this embodied situations also 
translated into uncertainty about which online groups they should/could use.  
As I have suggested, the ‘online terrain’ of pregnancy loss is comprised of 
multiple spaces, networks and activities, around sometimes contentious and 
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contested topics/viewpoints – making it a complex, interesting and important 
research site. This includes, for instance, work attending to the relationship 
between stillbirth photography and digital production, storage and image 
modification (Mander and Marshall 2003; Godel 2007; Pauwels 2008; 
Gersham 2009; Keane 2009; Davidsson Bremborg 2012). For Godel (2007), the 
vast diversity of content, structure and usage across stillbirth photography 
websites renders it difficult to comment on uniting/essential features. My use of 
the term ‘terrain’ is not intended to signify stability or coherence; rather, I 
recognise that, because pregnancy loss support is in many ways still inchoate 
given its marginalisation from the mainstream, online resources/activities exist 
on a largely ad-hoc basis with implications for how potential users ‘come across’ 
or miss pertinent spaces and resources.45 
Information-seeking Online 
Across participants, the most frequently reported use of the Internet was 
to search for practical information, although this activity often merged and 
blurred with using discussion support groups for requesting and sharing 
information.46 Commonly recalled information found online about pregnancy 
loss included details about the physical processes, miscarriage management 
options, campaigns (around awareness-raising and resource-allocation) and 
signposting to support services (whether these be discussion group, email, 
telephone or face-to-face based, as well as some further reading/leaflets and 
PDFs). Some participants appreciated the information found online whilst 
others deemed it inadequate, often linking—in both cases—with feeling 
underprepared and ill-informed by medical staff. The ways in which search 
engines operate, varying depending on the specific words entered, means that 
                                                          
45 Some participants conveyed a sense of ‘chance’ in locating particular information or resources 
online about pregnancy loss, raising issues of online “spatial legibility” (Dodge and Kitchin 2001 
p172; see also Lowe et al 2009). Isabel, for example, described how she “just stumbled across it 
[a pregnancy loss support/information website] and just out of curiosity I thought I’d have a 
look and a read through” which she then used, viewing but not posting, several times.  
46 This is despite requests on many of the sites that the discussion provisions are for emotional 
support rather than medical information. Moderators of the discussion boards were largely 
described by research participants as supplementing, rather than dominating or controlling, the 
groups, thus supporting the widely held self-help ethos but somewhat masking the moderating 
that does occur and the consensus-determined rules at play (Drentea and Moren-Cross 2005). 
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the ad-hoc results can be deficient. As Fiona summarised, “I wanted more, I 
wanted answers, information”. For Holly, the online information about 
pregnancy loss was largely deemed inadequate and inappropriate for her 
miscarriage circumstances and she commented on one pregnancy loss website 
in particular which she found very difficult to navigate. Her experience supports 
the need for further attendance to the spatial cognition of such websites in order 
to successfully support users in “navigating, searching and understanding of 
information spaces” (Dodge and Kitchin 2001 p172). 
Lay uses of the Internet for health information entail a number of 
benefits as well as provoking some concerns. For instance, it can be seen as 
democratising and empowering patients with a renegotiation of roles, by-
passing medical ‘gatekeepers’ and negating bias/strategies which might limit 
treatment options (Broom 2005). Yet, the potential for transforming the 
patient-doctor boundary is not embraced by all. Although half of the 
participants approaching/undergoing menopause in the research by Henwood 
et al (2003 p590, p601, p602) used the Internet in their “information 
landscapes”, some of women conveyed “great concern about appearing to over-
step the boundary between ‘expert’ and ‘patient’” and that the ‘informed patient’ 
would be “exerting extra pressures on an already busy [health] professional”. 
This reluctance resonates with comments from prostate cancer medical 
specialists interviewed by Broom (2005 p331) whom articulated finding 
Internet-informed patients to be “annoying or irritating”. For many of my 
participants though, using online information was not deemed an actively 
chosen endeavour but rather an unfortunate result of ‘proper’ medical 
establishments being unwilling or unable to provide required/wanted 
information.47 Anne, speaking about her first pregnancy loss which was an early 
miscarriage, turned to the Internet for information about the anticipated 
physical processes because she felt she had not received adequate information 
                                                          
47 This motivation was also mentioned by Kivits (2004) who also noted that the information 
gleaned from independent searches is often strategically managed during subsequent 
consultations with one’s doctors. This can be an especially important negotiation for those who 
struggle to be seen by medical professionals as ‘credible patients’, such as for women who 
experience chronic pain and/or illness (Werner and Malterud 2003; Werner at al 2004; Crooks 
2006). Subsequently the ‘informed patient’ can be understood as both a de- and re- investment 
in the authority of medical professionals (Kivits 2004). 
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from the hospital: “I was very worried about what I would see, would I see 
anything, you know, at that stage […] I could of really done with a doctor talking 
to me about those kinds of things as well [as finding information online]”.  
The specialists in Broom’s (2005) study expressed concerns about the 
potential of Internet use to overload patients with (inaccurate) information. 
This concern about the quality of online health information is especially acute 
given that, as conveyed by my own participants as well as those in other studies 
(Hardey 1999; Henwood et al 2003), information searching via the Internet 
tends to be ad-hoc and unsystematic. It is not only that unreliable (misleading, 
gaping) medical ‘information’ can be found online or, as Holly suggested, that 
this coveted knowledge may be absent/difficult to access but, given the sensitive 
context, that distressing sites and sources may be returned. In addition to the 
video encountered by Holly (Chapter 5), Fiona suggested that the returned 
search engine image results could contribute or compound distress more so 
than seeing the materiality of one’s own miscarriage: 
I kept going back to [the Internet], because I'd go online looking 
for a specific thing and after I came away from it there'd be 
something else that I'd thought of […] The only thing that really 
got me sometimes on these sites there'd be images popping up, for 
instance on google if you were to type in miscarriages and go to 
images they'd be pictures of actual miscarried babies. I thought 
that after everything I'd seen that it was horrendous. Before the 
miscarriage it would've been a terrible thing to see, after it these 
images were haunting.  
Though not specifically mentioned as something encountered by participants 
when searching for (textual or visual) information about pregnancy loss online, 
I have concerns about additional distress which might arise from exposure to 
deliberately emotionally manipulative and propagandist images of foetuses on 
‘pro-life’ websites or other media outlets. Such images, often knowingly 
gruesome, are intended to invoke horror, guilt, shame and grief in viewers 
(Stabile 1999) and can do so regardless of the form or context of pregnancy 
losses experienced.   
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Whilst I have suggested here and in Chapter 4 that it is predominantly 
women with physiological experience of pregnancy losses who seek/receive 
support, online information-searching was described as an activity that other 
family members sometimes also engaged in. For instance, Siobhan explained 
how she took on the role of information-seeking on behalf of her pregnant sister 
who had received a diagnosis of a rare, terminal, genetic disorder affecting one 
foetus of twins. Describing herself as more computer- and educationally- 
competent than her sister, Siobhan spoke about the online information and 
support-resource locating activities in a number of ways. This included being a 
form of care towards her sister, protecting her from information she deemed 
unnecessarily distressing, such as rare complications, and accompanying 
‘extreme’ visual images. Siobhan looked online: 
primarily for me to get a grasp and then if I knew I understood it 
then I could explain it or manipulate it in such a way to my sister, 
to pass on the information, but leaving out the things that she 
wouldn’t HAVE to find out unnecessarily that might make her 
more stressed or worried. 
Lowe et al (2009 p1481) suggest that the Internet can provide valuable access to 
information, especially for rare diagnoses, and permit multiple re-reads as well 
as specialised inquiries, subsequently helping some to feel “more in control of 
the situation”. Thus, seeking information online was done by Siobhan to help 
inform her sister of the medical situation, with preparation for the almost-
certain outcome of neonatal death and alleviating self-blame, as well as for 
Siobhan to inform herself in order to confidently occupy her anticipated role as 
birth partner. Following the birth and neonatal death of her nephew, Siobhan 
also attended meetings about the post-mortem autopsy results in which she 
found the use of medical jargon and the delivery of the information frustrating. 
This was despite her considerable Internet-based ‘information literacy’ 
(Henwood et al 2003) about the disorder: 
Siobhan: they tried to break it down but it was still very 
medicalised which was quite difficult to understand and I went 
with her [my sister] for that reason, erm, because - well this might 
sound pretentious, but erm, my sister is not very literate and she 
has quite a difficulty with understanding big words, as she would 
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say, so I was there to try and help her understand and I found it 
quite difficult to understand some of it. And I actually went home 
with the findings and went through them by Googling some of it. 
Abi: even having done the research [online], it was still quite…? 
Siobhan: still quite difficult to understand, yeah […] this doctor 
that presented the findings […] seemed very nervous and she 
seemed to like fall over herself quite a lot which is understandable 
if it’s your first time [presenting findings], but I think in terms of 
how it made my sister understand – it wasn’t very helpful really or 
what was appropriate. 
Whilst many participants used search engines to try and decipher the 
medical terminology they had encountered in, for example, hospital, this 
practice sometimes returned additional medical language. It was discovered at 
the 12 week scan that Jane’s second pregnancy had stopped developing around 
the three/four week point. A message from a discussion group moderator, 
rather than the sonographer or doctors at her EPU, revealed and explained new 
medical terminology to her: “[the moderator] described my experience as an 
anembryonic miscarriage which is a term I hadn’t heard of before”. In addition, 
and linking to Chapter 5, a key domain of searching online for new or 
supplementary information concerned uterine blood loss, including the onset, 
duration, heaviness and regarding differential tissues in the flow. This 
sometimes also pertained to uncertainties about whether medical services ought 
to be contacted or visited. Lara, unintentionally pregnant and unfamiliar with 
the UK health system, considered both pregnancy and miscarriage to be unusual 
for “people our age” so that looking online was a first call endeavour rather than 
asking her peers. Another underpinning aspect can be limited opening hours 
and operating practices of local health/medical facilities (McLean and Flynn 
2012; National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 2012). Fiona, unaware 
she had been pregnant prior to miscarrying, explained that: 
[t]he doctors in my local surgery split their time between different 
towns so I knew that there would be no chance of being able to 
speak to my own G.P at the time. Even to visit A & E at our local 
hospital, you have to phone NHS 24 beforehand unless it's an 
absolute emergency. 
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Various kinds of decision-making processes drew on online information 
searches. For instance, Gemma, situated with the difficult “individualized 
decision-making around prenatal testing” (Ginsburg and Rapp 1999 p280), 
looked for information online following a positive diagnosis of spina bifida. 
McHaffie (2001, speaking about neonatal end-of-life care) and Hunt et al 
(2009, in the context of terminations following diagnosed foetal anomalies), 
foreground the importance of having access to comprehensive, 
multidimensional resources to support decision-making. However, Gemma 
“only found stories of people who had continued with the pregnancy and 
descriptions of their beautiful, brave amazing children today […] there really 
wasn’t anything to support parents in making a decision online”. This resonates 
with comments by Ginsburg and Rapp (1999) that (multiple) knowledges about 
foetal diagnosis are segregated, foreclosing ‘socially informed consent’.  
Recollections of related online activities tended to be fragmented in 
terms of how different piece of information were found online. These can 
retrospectively merge in order and timing; as Gemma commented: “my 
memories might be getting mixed up here from post-delivery and sort of pre-
delivery and various Internet searches”. Many participants in the research could 
not remember specific details like the names of viewed websites or routes 
through searches and potentially conflated the information, content and layout 
of multiple sites in their interview narratives. It is likely that this relates to the 
ubiquitous manner in which many individuals use the Internet for information 
searches, potentially very frequently and cyclically as new queries develop. It 
could also relate to the emotional distress and shock of pregnancy losses 
rendering one’s memories/recollections “a blur”, a verbatim remark by Anne, 
Victoria, Fiona and Isabel. There was, however, a strong emotional recollection 
of feeling a ‘need’ to locate and accumulate information via the Internet. 
Through doing so, many of the participants learnt of and sometimes began 
engaging with online pregnancy loss support and discussion groups.  
Online Support Groups and Consolation 
Similar to information-seeking, engagement in online support and 
discussion groups also followed changing circumstances from pregnant to no 
longer pregnant/undergoing pregnancy loss. It was often within these virtual 
locales that both the statistical frequency and ‘human’, emotional realities of 
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pregnancy loss were encountered. This was sometimes contrasted to their 
‘offline’ lives and the ‘real/geographical’ spaces they inhabited; Anne said:  
I’m very lucky, I’ve got a lot of friends all or most of whom have 
been wonderful, but... it’s been really good to talk online, on this 
community, with women in the same situation because I don’t 
physically know, I don’t know anybody else in my real life {laughs} 
if you see what I mean, my ordinary kind of, normal life, who’ve 
had a stillbirth – I don’t actually KNOW of anybody. 
In online support and discussion spaces, users can: read posts from others; 
write one’s own posts, for example about physiological situations; pose 
questions and provide responses like offering recognition of one another’s 
experiences; share inspirational or consoling quotes, sometimes one’s own 
poetry, and images including photographs, pregnancy loss related symbols such 
as rainbows, footprints or the blue-and-pink ribbon, and, controversially, 
ultrasound scan images within messages or as signature lines and profile 
thumbnails; and signpost to other information sources and/or websites.  
Comprised of these activities, such sites can be highly valued as remarked 
Anne: “it’s a HUGELY supportive community and that’s been incredible for me”. 
Some information from this group appreciated by Anne was practical, like the 
cessation of onset lactation (Chapter 5), but she also praised opportunities for 
emotional support with efforts to legitimise and normalise particular feelings: 
what you find is... we all say the same things, we all say really 
similar things when we first, you know, lose a baby, we have very 
similar thoughts and you just want someone to tell you it’s normal, 
you just need someone to say ‘this is okay, whatever you think at 
this time is okay’ because you think some really wacky things 
{laughs} you just need to be reassured it’s alright. 
As Anne suggested, online support groups for pregnancy losses can therefore be 
“validating environment[s]” (Gold et al 2012 p70), with the articulation of and 
collective responses to emotional narratives a potentially very important 
dimension of sense-making regarding one’s lived experiences (Bar-Lev 2008).  
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The online groups were sometimes described as preferable to face-to-face 
support. For instance, very few women, let alone their partners (linking to 
Chapter 4), were offered professional counselling at the time of their pregnancy 
losses. For some who had later pursued this route via their GPs, there were 
potentially additional restrictions including around childcare. Victoria explained 
that her GP had given her a telephone number to arrange counselling but that 
“it looks as though it is [m]ore [for] women who have had abortions and anyway 
I would not have anyone to look after my [young] son”. Other issues included 
that many of the known face-to-face support groups met infrequently, meaning 
limited support, and at times which clashed with other commitments. 
Additionally, some groups met a considerable distance away from participants’ 
homes and/or in hospitals/EPUs, environments which could serve as traumatic 
reminders. In contrast, online groups were often seen as beneficial in terms of: 
asynchronous yet often rapid response communications; 24/7 availability for 
use at ‘unsociable’ hours and convenience, providing one has Internet access; 
anonymity and being comprised of strangers, at least initially, thus minimising a 
feeling of being ‘burdensome’ to known others; allowing the disguise, 
moderation or self-composure of emotional expression but, conversely, also 
being perceived as pseudo-private spaces for candid emotional expression.48 
  Online ‘support’ was articulated by several participants as involving: 
recognition; empathy with/from those concurrently and sympathy from those 
who felt compassion without direct/current experiences; consolation; an 
opportunity to share; and a sense of belonging. The reciprocity of giving and 
receiving support was often foregrounded; for instance, Anne felt the online 
discussion groups provided her with “REALLY vital support, so I just want to be 
able to give that support to someone else”. Subsequently Anne had posted on 
the support groups about “things that have helped me cope […] and as you 
know, it is very much a cycle of support, most women post on their when they 
need support and then also… are able to give a lot of support as well”. This 
                                                          
48 This prospect of anonymity, as perceived to be a benefit of online groups in other studies also 
(for example: Malik and Coulson 2008), links to earlier discussions in Chapter 4 about talking 
to an otherwise unknown researcher. For instance, Anne commented that she is “in some ways 
more open [in the online support groups], because I’ve been able to post saying ohh, you know, 
‘this is a particular issue’ or ‘I’ve been thinking this’, you know, ‘does anyone else think this’ 
whereas I wouldn’t necessarily go tell my mum I’ve been thinking that or whatever”. 
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included sharing her experience of finding it beneficial to view her son’s coffin 
prior to the funeral (see also Chapter 8) and she later moved to also being a 
moderator. Similar observations about ‘passing on’ support have been made 
about face-to-face pregnancy loss groups whereby members feel a need to ‘pay 
back’ (Layne 2003a). However, some participants such as Isabel valued the 
choices of engagement available in online groups, meaning that “it’s up to you 
when you actually do the posts or have a look at what people are saying”.  
Different degrees of participation, including lurking but not posting so 
that one need not even be identified as ‘present’ in the group, can be facilitated 
by the groups being online. Isabel explained:  
I think it is good to do it [talk/think about pregnancy loss] online 
because you’re not face-to-face and so erm… I don’t know, even 
though it’s nice to have somebody with you to sort of give you a 
hug maybe or comfort or hold your hand or something like that 
but at least if it is online it is slightly more private… in that 
somebody can’t actually see how you look, like if you’re sat there 
crying your eyes out or something and you’re more in control of 
what you tell people as well. 
Face-to-face support groups, in contrast, entail visible bodily presence and 
physical proximity to one another whilst cyberspace discussions about 
embodied experiences and processes do not require one’s actual material body 
to be present. Describing the time between suspected missed miscarriage and 
the onset of bleeding, Esther described feeling “like the world had stopped […] I 
didn’t want to go out, I didn’t want to do anything, I didn’t want to see 
anybody”. Several days after the news of suspected miscarriage via blood tests, 
Esther’s mother visited and attempted to re-establish a routine by “doing things 
like... the shopping and making us eat and making me leave the house and 
making me have a shower and brush my hair and MAKING us have some 
normality about life”. Whilst this encouragement can be helpful, it could also be 
comforting that in an online support group one need not worry about their 
bodily presentation: staying in pyjamas and/or unwashed, both of which some 
participants described as related to their shock and distress; emotional displays 
of crying; or interruptions such as having a break, logging off and/or taking 
some time to articulate one’s thoughts before voicing/typing them.  
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 Those who experience pregnancy losses are positioned between the 
painful realisation of the statistical frequency and the enduring public 
perception that these events are abnormal. Through the coalescing of persons 
using the groups precisely because they have experience of pregnancy loss, the 
online spaces challenge their otherwise conferred ‘abnormal’ identities and 
bodies. In these groups, pregnancy loss experiences are ‘normal’ in the sense of 
being a presumed prerequisite for use. The online groups translate (some of) the 
statistical frequencies of pregnancy losses into a visual-textual ‘presence’, as 
cyberspace sites populated by those with similar experiences to varying degrees. 
The groups can thus be seen to materialise a response to the question phrased 
by Letherby (1999 p178) as “[c]an an event [like miscarriage] that is statistically 
so common be ‘abnormal’?” and reaffirm Ivry’s (2010 p6) comment that 
“pregnancy is a much more common experience for women than birth”. The 
sociality enabled by online pregnancy loss collectives can therefore be 
experienced as one of support, recognition and consolation, contrasting to other 
spaces in which inter-personal relations have been uncaring, potentially well-
intentioned but nonetheless insensitive and/or ignorant. Subsequently, Holly 
noted, the online groups can feel “like a little club {laughs} [in which] you can 
see the support that the women give each other”. Caroline, who experienced her 
four miscarriages prior to Internet access/proliferation, had relied on telephone 
support. Whilst praising the support she had received then, Caroline 
commented that she thinks “it’s good that these women come together [online] 
and support each other” now that “the Internet has taken off”.  
For some participants, their engagement in the online support groups 
also benefited their wider, ‘offline’ lives. Lisa explained that, for her, “the 
[online] support was overwhelming [in a positive way] and it encouraged me to 
be able to talk to friends and family about what had happened”. However, the 
merging of the offline and online is not always without hitches. For instance, 
some of Jane’s Facebook friends, whom she had informed of her miscarriage via 
private message, wrote on her profile wall prior to her being able (or choosing) 
to disclose her experiences to her family-in-law. She explained: “I don't think 
anyone actually stated [on my Facebook wall] what had happened, but it was 
easy to work out when most people knew I was going for my scan that week”. 
This ended up being, at least in one sense, beneficial as it meant that Jane 
“didn't actually have to 'tell' them” herself, which was something that she had 
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been finding especially difficult. Likewise, Esther had found it helpful to use 
Facebook to communicate about her experiences of pregnancy loss: “I actually 
then made the conscious choice to communicate to friends and wider family 
what had happened using that [Facebook] message”. For Esther this “was a way 
of telling my friends where I was, what was wrong, because a lot of them knew 
something was wrong and it was a way for me to say ‘this is what is wrong’ and 
unconsciously ask for their support”. When I asked Esther about received 
responses, she elaborated: 
oh, you know, it’s things like that that actually tell you who your 
friends are, your real friends, your true friends, people who really 
REALLY care about you and the response I had to that was 
phenomenal, it really was. People who care about us, people who 
sent messages of love, it really was – it was a response that really 
touched both of us [me and my husband]. 
However, as will be discussed in the following sections, it is not the case that the 
online pregnancy loss groups are exempt from producing or entailing negative 
experiences in various ways for some individuals.  
‘Support’ Challenged 
 Several aspects emerged in the interview narratives of my research which 
elaborate on ‘negative’ aspects regarding online support groups, beyond the 
potential distress from reading collective experiences and/or 
misunderstandings with taking posts ‘the wrong’ way (Malik and Coulson 
2008). In this section I will outline four somewhat interconnected aspects. The 
first will concern the ways that online support groups can highlight the lack of 
recognition and appropriate support within one’s wider, offline life and yet also 
retain this unevenness as ‘enclaves’. The next aspect pertains to well-entrenched 
critiques of the concept ‘community’ in which boundaries of belonging are 
delineated in opposition to those ‘excluded’ and deemed ‘outside’. For those 
pregnancy losses entailed particularly stigmatised components, such as 
termination for Gemma, or deviated from the predominance of users being 
women who have physiologically experienced pregnancy loss, as for Siobhan, 
the groups were anticipated as not ‘for’ them and that they could be 
‘unsupportive’. This lends to a consideration of hierarchies and I will discuss 
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some of the ways in which stigma can be displaced onto others. As this section 
will address, the language of ‘support’ can mask the ways differences between 
pregnancy losses can fracture or exclude some persons from the groups.  
Enclaves 
It is apparent that some women, in my research and beyond (see Gold et 
al 2012), find the online groups incredibly valuable and were able to utilise 
confidence and communication skills developed here to benefit wider (offline) 
lives, but this was not the case for all participants. Whilst there are attempts to 
further disperse awareness about and support resources for pregnancy loss, 
such as The Miscarriage Association moving beyond their online presence with 
the blue envelope campaign launched in February 2013, it is unclear as to how 
successful these are in countering longstanding and widespread denigration.49 
The online groups potentially constitute enclaves in which appreciated forms of 
‘support’ and recognition are contained rather than distributed more widely. 
Demonstrating interplay between offline and online space (Madge and 
O’Connor 2005), participants and my own informal observations suggested that 
comments in the online pregnancy loss groups frequently consist of ‘venting’ 
about experiences in the offline world. This includes insensitive comments from 
family members, withdrawn partners and dismissive treatment by medical staff 
but also responses of silence on a societal scale. As Penny explained in the 
context of miscarriage: “no one else talks about it[,] only other women who have 
been through it”. Thus, whilst the support online in the groups can be valuable, 
this is often contrasted to ‘offline’ lives, with the discrepancies forming a core 
feature of the online group dialogues. 
A number of participants were acutely concerned that their involvement 
in the online groups might be visible to known others. This included, for 
instance, that the groups are visible to or can be accessed by anyone with an 
Internet connection and, for support groups/pages on Facebook, were linked to 
their profile. There was awareness that online posts, often about experiences 
which occurred offline and pertain to wider embodied lives and encounters in 
                                                          
49 The blue envelope campaign entailed the simultaneous display of posters at prominent 
railway stations and the wider dispersal in ‘everyday’ spaces of blue envelopes foregrounding the 
statistical prevalence of miscarriage to encourage more open discussion about these events as 
well as signposting to the MA helpline (The Miscarriage Association 2013b). 
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‘real’ space, might be seen by known others and have implications offline. For 
instance, Victoria was a member of several groups on Facebook: “but I very 
rarely join in the discussions as I do not want my [Facebook] friends to be able 
to see what I write”.50 This is understandable in terms of protecting one’s 
privacy, but it also highlights a tension in which there is salient reluctance for 
such information/discussion to ‘leak out’ of established support group contexts. 
As Esther summarised, “some people don’t like incredibly personal things on 
Facebook” and thus pregnancy loss experiences may be tightly guarded rather 
than aired. A few participants suggested that they were more forthcoming in 
offline contexts, having more control over who ‘knows’; Beth explained that she 
does not “really hide the fact I had a miscarriage. I don't shout it down the street 
or post about it on Facebook, but if I am in a [face-to-face] conversation with 
someone about our pregnancies then I don't mind talking about it”.    
Subsequently, for some, it seems that the online support groups are 
potentially an unwanted source of information about their lives—that they had a 
pregnancy loss and/or more detailed information about this—which they wished 
to be kept apart from their social relations with others who are also or 
potentially known offline. The ways in which the online groups can in effect 
produce a form of sequestration of pregnancy loss experiences is therefore 
something that users unintentionally reaffirm through their reluctance and 
fears about such information and conversations breaching the boundaries of the 
specific online groups and entering the knowledge of others. This is in contrast 
to aspirations about pregnancy loss recognition being dispersed into wider 
social settings, as the notions of awareness-raising and the comments made 
frequently about the desirability of breaking the ‘silence’ suggests, with the goal 
of altering the perceived mainstream overlooking of these experiences. Frost et 
al (2007) have discussed the ways miscarriage is sequestrated as a private 
                                                          
50 Even if a person does not actually post in such Facebook groups, their ‘membership’ may still 
be visible to others and thus inferred that they have personal experience of pregnancy loss. 
Some pregnancy loss support groups on Facebook also have ‘private’ groups so that activities in 
these groups would not show up in the feed of the users’ ‘friends’. Knowing this, I signposted 
Victoria to the existence of a private group, similar to those she described about miscarriage and 
ectopic pregnancy losses, which she joined but was not using “at the moment as I am very 
emotional and every time I read someone's story it makes me cry!” The fact that the narrated 
experiences of other users on the online groups could be overwhelmingly distressing was an 
observation also made by Malik and Coulson (2008) in their research on infertility. 
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matter; whilst undoubtedly an improvement on this, widening the scope of 
recognition, I am suggesting that the online groups can themselves be 
constantly renewed enclaves struggling to expand awareness further.  
The online support groups can also expose users to a seeming collective 
consensus that diverges or jars with their own experience and time-limited 
opportunities or financial capabilities. Whilst particular values and responses 
towards pregnancy losses can be supported which might otherwise be 
demonised or misunderstood by outside/offline others, these do not always sit 
comfortably with everyone. This is especially the case if the time frame in which 
the seeming predominant or ‘best practice’ memory-making and memorial 
approaches of others could be implemented in one’s own situation has passed; 
for instance, Isabel joined an online support group after her late miscarriage: 
when I started reading stuff like that [about what others had done 
after their pregnancy losses], then that’s when I started getting 
ideas in my head and thinking oh no I should of dealt with it 
differently, I should of given him a cuddle and should of seen him. 
Isabel did not visit any online support groups until after the birth of her 
deceased child at 20 weeks gestation because “[a doctor] said to us as well ‘don’t 
start looking on the Internet, don’t start googling all of this because you’ll read 
loads of horror stories and you’ll read lots of things and it’s just not a good 
[idea]’”. As it turned out, the doctor himself presented a disturbing image to 
Isabel, resonating somewhat with the ‘meat’ comments made to Anne (Chapter 
3). Whilst it is important to provide some preparation to the sensorial specifics 
of encountering deceased babies (Rådestad et al 2009), some comments can 
exacerbate upset, dread and fear. The doctor who advised Isabel not to see or 
cuddle her baby “said that at that stage, that the foetus would be, I don’t know 
whether he described it as a foetus, but, you know, the baby would be – he 
described it as it would look like an alien sort of thing”. Isabel implied that, if 
she had visited the groups and if the doctor had been more careful with his 
wording, she may have reconsidered the decision about contact:  
I was just sort of erm going by the advice that I was given and then 
I was just, I suppose I was thinking I’d deal with it in that way, as 
if it wasn’t happening type thing so I didn’t want to see him, I 
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didn’t want to cuddle him or anything… but in hindsight I wished I 
had like given him a cuddle because, you know, that was my little 
baby and… you know, it’s sad really. 
Exclusions 
There are a number of ways that the online pregnancy loss support 
groups, as with other cyberspace communities, “are not all-inclusive and are 
subject to geometries of power” (Dodge and Kitchin 2001 p55). In processes of 
(re)constructing individual and group identities within the online support 
communities, there remain exclusions and exceptions such as those who feel 
that they are not/would not be welcome. As I discussed in relation to Siobhan in 
Chapter 4, the groups can be widely perceived as ‘belonging’ to women who 
physiologically experience pregnancy loss, linking to feelings that the grief of 
social others (like siblings) is not legitimate and should not be seen or heard 
(Peskin 2000). In addition, feeling ‘unwelcome’ in the online groups, and 
potentially other forms of support such as face-to-face meetings, can stem from 
the ways in which particular forms of pregnancy losses are stigmatised or 
deemed ‘less’ significant than others. Earlier in the chapter, I demonstrated that 
the online groups can constitute exceptional spaces in which the frequency and 
impact of pregnancy losses are revealed: (virtual) locations populated by those 
with these experiences as opposed to the rest of one’s (offline) life in which one 
may not know anyone else who has, as for Anne, experienced stillbirth. Notions 
of normality specific to the group context are produced through the collation of 
persons in the online spaces, permitting particular assumptions to crystallise 
about the ‘we’ inhabiting and the ‘what’ of their experiences. I argue that the 
particular kinds of pregnancy loss experiences represented or anticipated to 
constitute those predominantly experienced by group users  can have the effect 
of rendering other experiences ‘outside’ or, especially if they unsettle some of 
the core assumptions and discourses being utilised, ‘unwelcome’. 
The online groups enable ‘normalisation’ in that everyone ‘there’ is 
assumed to have experiences of pregnancy loss, yet the variety and 
circumstances of pregnancy losses are not necessarily the same. For instance, 
pregnancy losses pertaining to terminations for foetal anomalies are often in a 
particularly difficult position: narratives of choice and autonomy are deeply 
inadequate but it cannot be said that agency is entirely removed either. It was 
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clear that Gemma’s decision to terminate a 21 week pregnancy after an 
ultrasonography diagnosis of foetal spina bifida was deeply ambivalent, 
commenting on one occasion that “it was almost like I knew the decision was 
[already] made in a way” and on another that: 
I can't even think back to the decision making process, I don't 
know how we decided what we decided, I know that it was rushed, 
I couldn't cope with the situation and wanted it 'treated' or 
resolved as quickly as possible, I wish now I had given my baby 
more time. 
Certainly, this had implications for the ways Gemma felt about the prospect of 
engaging with online or face-to-face support groups. In addition to limited 
online support resources relevant to her circumstances, she also conveyed a 
sense of feeling that she was not eligible to seek socio-emotional support and 
that her legitimacy to do so might indeed be contested by others: 
I didn't find much support or discussion around pregnancy 
termination [online], [there was] support for those who continue 
with a pregnancy like this, and for those who have lost babies 
naturally, but I didn't feel entitled to use these networks as there 
was a lot of guilt involved in what happened to us. 
This echoes with Layne’s (1999) comments that discussion of termination is 
often side-lined within miscarriage support group newsletters, and I suggest 
this is also the case in many online support groups. Although Gemma had not 
felt able to seek and/or receive support online or in a face-to-face group, she 
explained that she would like to provide support to others but that “I am not 
sure how to do it”: 
Gemma: [after seeing a message about online miscarriage support 
group, I first] thought oh I would really like to give support to 
other people who are in the same situation as I was in but it’s less 
easy to kind of [do]. I don’t think people would just advertise 
that... do you know what I mean?  
Abi: advertise your situation?  
Gemma: yeah, like erm, you know, ‘have you ever terminated a 
pregnancy? Do you want to offer support to other people who 
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might be in that situation?’ {laughs} erm, so I guess there’s a sense 
that there might be some stigma or some kind of emotions 
attached to making that decision from other people and so you 
don’t always want to bandy it around casually. 
Gemma had not received actual responses of rejection or exclusion from the 
support groups, not having used/posted in them, but the fact that she 
anticipated such responses is significant. As I will now discuss, the fact that the 
online groups were not experienced as welcoming or suitable for all pertains to 
additional ways in which pregnancy losses are differentiated which, whether 
intentionally or not, can enable forms of problematic comparison.   
Hierarchies 
One predominant social and academic assumption regarding pregnancy 
loss has been to consider later gestation losses ‘more significant’ with stronger 
and longer levels of grief, depression and anxiety than earlier losses (Toedter et 
al 1988; Goldbach et al 1991; also: Brier 2008 gives a comprehensive summary). 
Hence, building upon the pioneering work of Peppers and Knapp (1980), some 
scholarship has focused in recent years on miscarriages in an attempt to 
unsettle this presumption and demonstrate that a shorter gestational duration 
does not necessarily mean that the experience is felt as a less profound loss 
(Layne 1996, 1999, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Letherby 1999; Davidson 2007). 
Caroline recalled talking with her friend who “had a stillborn child”, though 
technically this was neonatal death as the child died several days after birth, 
around the same time as Caroline experienced her first miscarriage of four. 
Evident within this recounted dialogue was a challenge to the normative 
assumption that miscarriages are less significant than later pregnancy losses. 
Caroline explained:  
[my friend and I] talked a lot and she said to me, she said 
‘[Caroline], I would rather of gone through my whole pregnancy, 
the birth and the death of my daughter than ever to have gone 
through what you’ve gone through because I ENJOYED my 
pregnancy, I got to know my daughter, I birthed her, I loved her 
and I buried her’ and she said ‘you’ve never had any of that and yet 
still that child exists for you’, she said ‘for you that child was still 
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alive’ and, you know, that’s coming from her. I was quite shocked 
because I always think it’s worse if you go full term and THEN lose 
a child, I do, I think it must be horrendous but she didn’t think of 
it in that way. 
Caroline also elaborated on the ways her friend received tremendous support 
from the hospital and her wider social network after the neonatal death of her 
baby which contrasted to the lack of support Caroline had herself received: 
[my friend] said that never at any point did she feel lonely, she 
said she had amazing support, they [medical staff] talked to her 
through EVERY minute, you know, every minute of the day, 
through what was happening, because it was clear she [the baby] 
was going to die as soon as she was born – you know, there was no 
chance she would survive, you know, but she [my friend] felt 
supported, she felt she had a healing process to go through after, 
somewhere to go visit, people would talk to her because she’d lost 
a BABY, you know, this was a person, with a NAME and a 
birthdate and all sorts and she said she thought miscarriage must 
be just so lonely. 
Whilst these conversations constituted a form of valuable support and 
extended recognition between Caroline and her friend, I am also conscious of 
the need for a word of caution regarding approaches of comparing experiences. 
In ‘elevating’ recognition of the emotional significance of pregnancy loss 
experiences which are typically left on a ‘lower rung’, such as miscarriages, a 
hierarchical approach remains intact even as the ‘levels’ within them are shifted 
internally. In the context of the conversation Caroline described, this was 
negotiated between the two women. However, I am aware of the potential for 
this narrative to be deployed elsewhere, including on online groups which—as 
Malik and Coulson’s (2008) respondents recognised—are exposed to additional 
risks of being taken the ‘wrong way’/out of the specific context and received as a 
diminishing or undermining of other’s pregnancy losses. The potential to posit 
distinctions about the most ‘lonely’ or otherwise distressing pregnancy losses, 
therefore, risks perpetuating an albeit revised hierarchy with a top to bottom 
pecking order. No participants overtly conveyed feeling that their pregnancy 
losses had been deemed less ‘worthy’ than that of others within the online 
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groups, although comments were made about feeling disappointed and 
somewhat isolated from other users if one was unable to find others in similar 
contexts of medical conditions. However, as for Gemma, concerns about 
different values like stigma being attached to particular forms of pregnancy loss 
meant that some participants had chosen not to engage with the groups at all. 
In addition to details such as medical classification, other factors can be 
utilised in the (re)constitution of hierarchies and boundaries between normal-
‘deserving of sympathy’ versus abnormal-‘undeserving of sympathy’ pregnancy 
losses. This potentially includes: number of losses; whether the woman has any 
pre-existing living children; use of artificial/assisted reproductive technologies 
(ARTs); conditions affecting infertility; sexual orientation; marital status; 
economic circumstances, as linked to private IVF treatment; age, with teenage 
pregnancies deemed ‘mistakes’ whilst women over 35 years being deemed to 
have ‘missed their chance’, both prone to stigma; and history or consideration of 
terminations. This is not to imply that different circumstances are insignificant, 
since clearly they can have very practical and emotional implications. For 
instance, Peel and Cain (2012) highlight that lesbian couples using ARTs like 
sperm donor insemination who then experience miscarriages are faced with 
additional difficulties conceiving again. For several of my participants, various 
diagnosed conditions could also complicate and reduce the chances of 
subsequent pregnancies, as for Rosie in relation to PCOS. Subsequent to three 
years of trying to conceive with the intervention of ovulation-regulation 
medicine and an ectopic pregnancy requiring the removal of one of her fallopian 
tubes, Rosie and her husband were considering adoption. Clearly, the 
circumstances of pregnancy loss are not all the same, with crucial implications. 
However, my point is that various factors can be brought into 
conversations in particular ways which, whether intentionally or not, can 
diminish some pregnancy losses as less significant whilst elevating others. 
Having living children does not ‘un-do’ or negate the fact of pregnancy losses 
previously or subsequently and yet this is a common attitude/comment 
encountered (Layne 2003a). Indeed, participants sometimes reinstated this 
notion themselves in the sense of feeling resentful regarding others reproductive 
and familial lives, relating to the remarks made by Holly about the assumption 
that others around you have/had relatively ‘easy’ pregnancies. Many 
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participants found it incredibly distressing to see other pregnant women, young 
babies and children especially those who would be about the age of their own if 
these pregnancies had not ended in loss. After her miscarriage, Holly felt like 
“there was just pregnant women everywhere and I was like ‘for God’s sake!’ 
{laughs}” This upset included a notably visceral dimension for Caroline: 
I could NOT bear pregnant women – I used to feel physically ill 
when I saw pregnant women, physically ill, I wanted to go and 
throw up, and new-born babies was almost like you’d put yourself 
on the crucifix, no exaggeration, and you were being hammered - 
it was just SO [emotionally] painful. 
Some participants spoke of circumstances that highlighted the ‘unfairness’ of 
their situation; as Jane explained: “I had feelings that it wasn't quite fair that I 
had lost my baby who would have been given so much love and care when there 
were other women having baby after baby and not being able to look after 
them”. Whilst not wishing to denigrate the upset of women who experience 
pregnancy losses in response to such scenarios, I believe there are some 
important tensions highlighted. 
Displaced Stigma 
Pregnancy losses are vulnerable to stigmatisation, given that such events 
flout linear expectations of ‘joyful’ pregnancy culminating in live birth and 
challenge the onus placed on pregnant women to be all-powerful determiners of 
their pregnancy outcomes. Many of the women spoken to were conscious that 
others might assume they had done something ‘wrong’ to cause the pregnancy 
losses. Isabel described how, in response to her sitting with crossed legs, a 
family member made a comment to her whilst she was pregnant following a late 
miscarriage: “she said something like erm… oh ‘if you cross your legs you’ll kill 
your baby’ […] I was just absolutely shocked, I couldn’t believe she said that”. 
Feelings of responsibility were sometimes internalised to a point of questioning 
even seemingly untenable, minute actions as ‘risky’. Murphy (2012b) suggests, 
in the context of stillbirth, that some women reject stigmatised identities by 
seeking to ‘change the world for the better’ such as via: medical litigations to 
prevent similar mistakes happening to others, if this was found to be a factor; 
participating in the training of health professionals in terms of bereavement 
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care and education; and actively discussing stillbirth within their social circles 
in order to raise awareness. Some of these aspects emerged as significant also 
for my participants. Anne, for example, recounted a number of ways she was 
engaged in improving the socially, economically and psychologically inadequate 
environment encountered, including as a moderator on an online group and 
lobbying for funding further/continued preventative research on stillbirth. 
Another strategy to reclaim moral identities, as for some of Murphy’s 
(2009, 2011) participants, is to discursively differentiating oneself from 
activities such as smoking, taking drugs and drinking alcohol whilst pregnant: 
hallmarks of sanctions imposed around pregnancy. However, the ways in which 
stigma pervades pregnancy losses means that there is scope to shift 
‘discreditable’ identities onto others deemed ‘worse off’, as in Bush et al’s (2001) 
study on industrial air pollution. That is, to ‘shake’ one’s own stigmatised/ 
stigmatisable identity by accentuating another as more stigmatisable. Of course, 
this is not the only response to situations subject to stigma and I do not suggest 
that this is necessarily a deliberately malicious strategy. It is, though, an 
unfortunate implication that can occur when comparison is facilitated by 
demarcated boundaries and hierarchical levels entailed in efforts to ‘prove’ the 
significance of particular experiences. In displacing stigma onto ‘worse off’ 
others, dimensions of one’s life can be highlighted as something to be pleased 
about or grateful for (Bush et al 2001). However, it can also have deeply 
problematic implications for the ‘worse off’ others if affirming oneself as 
morally-appropriate and non-culpable conversely engages stigmatisation and 
critique of pregnant women who do/did engage in activities deemed risky. 
Consequently, boundary lines between blame-worthy and innocent can be kept 
intact by those who safely identify as having ‘followed the rules’, and thus are 
deemed blame-free, in contrast to ‘irresponsible’ others. Subsequently, for 
women, including in this research, who had engaged in activities that are 
stigmatised, regardless of whether these were medically linked to causes of 
pregnancy loss, this was particularly difficult to navigate. 
As I have suggested, there are multiple points around which distinctions 
could be made with regard to pregnancy losses, but of particular concern to me 
are those which attempt to differentiate between persons deemed innocent 
victims versus those who ‘chose’ the experience (via termination or in relation to 
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alcohol, smoking and/or illegal drugs during their pregnancies). In seeking to 
make such a distinction, the complexity and difficulty of different life 
experiences are negated. As I have argued, the language of ‘choice’ is severely 
lacking in relation to experiences such as Gemma’s termination following the 
detection of foetal anomalies.51 The realisation that some others might 
stigmatise her experience in this way underpinned Gemma’s decision not to 
partake in receiving or giving support in the online or face-to-face groups. Thus 
some participants knew about the forums but deliberately avoided them as they 
felt these spaces would be less welcoming to their involvement, less receptive to 
hearing about their pregnancy loss experiences and potentially hostile. 
Subsequently, it is important to recognise that, although the groups can provide 
fantastic, vital support for some people, there are also some who do not feel that 
they ‘should’ or ‘could’ partake. It is important to recognise that online groups 
“act as moral agents” (Bar-Lev 2009) and can include rather aggressive, 
consensus-based policing of belonging around particular norms and values 
(Drentea and Moren-Cross 2005). I am aware that this may well be the case for 
others regarding pregnancy loss groups beyond my research participants.  
 As also mentioned in Chapter 5, some participants described being 
irritated by other users whom they perceived as being ‘overly’ emotive and/or 
positing unhelpful advice. Helen felt “irritation/frustration” towards someone 
online who “basically ranted and gave everybody […] a full update of what was 
happening and her outrage at the way she had been treated by the hospital”. 
Helen’s annoyance pertained partly to feeling that the other group user had a 
“lack of understanding surrounding what scans can and can't do” (see also 
Chapter 3). Ambivalently, Helen simultaneously highlighted legitimate reasons 
to be distressed, regarding medical staff demeanour, whilst admitting that her 
reactions to other people’s written stories online are not always sympathetic:  
I have found myself feeling frustrated with people when they are 
talking about the same experiences I had of early miscarriage – 
                                                          
51 Saxton (1998 p384 italics in original) argues for recognition of a key “distinction between a 
pregnant woman who chooses to terminate the pregnancy because she doesn’t want to be 
pregnant as opposed to a pregnant woman who wanted to be pregnant but rejects a particular 
fetus, a particular potential child […] Prenatal screening results can turn a ‘wanted baby’ into an 
‘unwanted fetus’”. 
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they seem so wound up about it – just as I was [then]. For me 
[now], it’s just the way it is – though the way we are treated by 
medical staff at that stage really needs some attention.  
Reflexively, Helen said: “perhaps it's actually regret that I spent a lot of energy 
feeling really frustrated and consumed with it [early miscarriage] – and wished I 
could have been a bit more 'take it as it comes' or 'what will be will be'...”  
Carla had browsed some support groups in relation to two miscarriages 
but found that the content diverged significantly from her expectations: 
Carla: like you know when you get bored and search on Ebay and 
you don’t know what you’re looking for until you see it and then 
you just buy it, it’s that kind of thing only I wanted them [the 
groups] to tell me what to do but nothing jumped out and there 
were NUTTERS on them, like they [some users] didn’t seem like, 
some of the stuff people were writing didn’t seem real, it was like 
someone writing bullshit   
Abi: what kind of stuff was that about?   
Carla: it was like, there was like little 14 year olds like ‘I think I had 
a period, I think I was pregnant, I am so upset’ and it was like 
...you’ve no idea about the real world, why are you on here?!  
The ways other users spoke about their pregnancy losses jarred with Carla’s own 
approach: “I’m very kind of matter of fact about everything as like over and 
done with, don’t think about it anymore”. Carla felt that the online groups were 
populated by “people who had no idea about the real world” and the kinds of 
online discussions that took place adopted an approach that she herself 
considered irrational or senseless: “there were some people like ‘arr I’ve been 
off work for three months’ and it is like WHY? It’s not going to reverse 
anything, get back to work, get your arse in gear and plus if you get back to work 
you kinda forget about it a bit quicker”. The groups had, for Carla, an ill-fitting 
dogma which posited advice that she felt would actually exacerbate the 
emotional and mental issues entailed. Though suggesting she was initially open 
to the idea of using/posting on the groups, Carla ultimately did not – as she felt 
“I can’t be bothered with this so I just left it. I think if there had been one 
[group] that was just kind of like... even half sane people I would of wrote 
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something on it, but there wasn’t anyone sane on there”. Aspects of ‘netiquette’ 
(Dodge and Kitchin 2001) in the groups, such as sharing sympathies and 
encouraging further reflection/dwelling on experiences of pregnancy losses, 
were discordant with the indeterminate but presumably more pragmatic and/or 
stoic support that Carla had hoped she might find. 
 A plurality of pregnancy loss experiences—varying in terms of medical 
events, social circumstances, emotional reflections, and so on—render the 
sentiment that the forums provide access to other like-minded individuals with 
essentially the same experiences somewhat tenuous. In processes of 
(re)constructing individual and group identities, there inevitably remain 
exclusions and exceptions which fracture down numerous lines, including that 
of stigma and the ‘undeserving’. Thus, the positive rhetoric of ‘support’ and 
‘community’ can mask some very disagreeable tensions and exclusions, an issue 
which seems—as based on participant comments and my own albeit limited 
observations—largely visibly/vocally absent from discussion within the 
groups.52 There is resonance, I find, with Charmaz’s (2008 p11) comments that: 
[t]he core is enacted and made real in people’s lives—by both 
those who enforce barriers and boundaries and those who 
experience them. People interpret the core, represent it to others, 
and act on their interpretations. Silence protects and perpetuates 
an established core. 
Malik and Coulson (2008) acknowledge that their research respondents may 
have participated in their questionnaire precisely because they felt a sense of 
belonging and advocacy for the groups. In my research, recruitment was 
predominantly through online groups, but extended also to social network site 
snowballing with the re-posting of my CFP in other cyberspace sites/contexts. 
This, and with the use of qualitative interviews, meant that I was able to speak 
to some individuals detached from and/or unaware of the Internet-based 
pregnancy loss support groups. This has permitted consideration of some of the 
                                                          
52 As mentioned in the Methodology, I developed a degree of familiarity with the online support 
groups in order to appropriately navigate and negotiate activities such as disseminating my CFP 
on suitable threads. However, it was not my intention to produce ethnographic accounts of the 
support groups or to analyse the content of posts/comments from the groups as have Seale et al 
(2010) in their research on sexual health, breast- and prostate- cancer. 
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more problematic dimensions of the online groups, allowing for an exploration 
of factors which contest the assumption that the online groups are of benefit in 
all cases and further foregrounding the need to nuance notions of ‘support’. 
Concluding Remarks 
Online support groups are a significant component of the online ‘terrain’ 
of pregnancy losses, demonstrating cyber-space as an interplay between offline 
and online spaces/lives (Madge and O’Connor 2005) with physical bodies being 
simultaneously “reasserted and reconfigured” (Parr 2002 p86). Although many 
of my participants stressed very positive, valuable assets gleaned from using the 
support groups and/or seeking information online, there were also some 
accounts which highlighted reasons to be more cautious and critical. I have 
outlined several ‘negative’ aspects with implications for the online support 
groups not because my participants overwhelmingly critiqued the groups, but 
because these seem to be relatively undertheorised in pertinent academic 
literatures. Certainly the ‘positive’ dimensions identified by Malik and Coulson 
(2008) in their research on online infertility groups were also expressed by 
many of my participants. However, beyond the few ‘negatives’ Malik and 
Coulson (2008) identify, I have elaborated on several other components 
regarding marginalisation, stigma and exclusion. Similar to nuancing ‘the 
Internet’ in shifting representations of this from being an empowering, 
liberating technology to recognition of the multiple, complex and potentially 
contradictory implications, I suggest that such insights must also be 
acknowledged in relation to Internet sub-tenets such as online support 
communities. Boundaries which have long permeated ‘real/geographical’ 
spaces, distinguishing between inside-outside, do not merely dissolve online. 
Just as the Internet “simultaneously reconstitutes and reinforces the physical 
body” (Parr 2002 p75), so too there are other socio-emotionally saturated 
boundaries in ‘cyber-space’ (Madge and O’Connor 2005).  
Potential problematic dimensions of the online groups include enclaves 
(the sequestration of support resources), exclusions (crystallising particular 
inside-outside boundaries), hierarchies (risking the legitimisation of some 
experiences at the cost of undermining others) and displaced stigma (affirming 
oneself by discrediting others). Through my discussions of these, it is reiterated 
that the online terrain of pregnancy loss is visited, utilised and ‘inhabited’ by 
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many persons with different perspectives, contexts and engagements. The 
online support groups, then, are a prime example of ‘cyber-space’ (Madge and 
O’Connor 2005); the fact that Gemma anticipated being unwelcome in the 
online and face-to-face pregnancy loss support groups demonstrates an overlap 
in offline and online spaces regarding the operating hierarchies which quantify 
and order particular circumstances for which, she feared, her experiences might 
be deemed undeserving and/or outside. Despite the contemporary nature of 
online technologies and usages, historical factors are not erased: some 
longstanding ways of thinking about earlier pregnancy losses as less significant 
are being challenged but not necessarily in a manner which overhauls 
hierarchical thinking, hence there are tenets of contingency too. 
‘Support’ is powerful yet tricky and what constitutes a ‘supportive’ 
gesture or comment varies across situations. Those who experience pregnancy 
losses often encounter societal responses of trivialisation, exemplified by 
comments such as ‘better luck next time’ and that ‘it was for the best’ (Letherby 
1999; Rowlands and Lee 2010). Such comments can certainly communicate 
dismissiveness, implying that pregnancies are inter-changeable as well as 
negating additional practical (fertility/conceiving) difficulties. However, it 
should also be noted that, for some participants, ‘well-intended’ comments are 
preferable to complete silence and/or pretences of ignorance. Additionally, 
‘disapproving’ responses can come from those with personal experience of 
pregnancy loss, such as with the frustrations felt by Helen and Carla. 
Consolation is clearly not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ endeavour and providing support is 
precarious, as also discussed in the Methodology. Having personal experience of 
pregnancy loss does not guarantee abilities to decipher the ‘right’ response; as 
Isabel explained one reason why she views but does not post in the online 
groups is that:  
I just wouldn’t know what to say to somebody who was saying ‘oh 
I’m feeling really bad, I’ve just lost a baby’ and stuff and even 
though I’ve been through it [miscarriages: one at 10 weeks, one at 
20 weeks] myself and I’m seeing all these other people writing 
things online, I just wouldn’t know what to put {laughs} so I don’t, 
I just read it. 
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There is not necessarily a straightforward division between those who 
have experienced pregnancy loss and thus are ‘in the know’ versus those who 
haven’t, although this is a sentiment largely at the basis of the support group 
ethos.53 In this chapter, I have suggested that this can lead to some troubling 
silences in, and exclusions from, online groups and, linking to the Methodology, 
I consider my approach towards self-disclosure as seeking to suspend or 
otherwise trouble the ‘split’ between these divisions. This is not to claim that 
autobiographical elements are absent from the thesis though since, as Volvey 
(2012 p125) comments, “the sensuous and emotional experiences attached to 
the practice of fieldwork-as-withness entails an increasing questioning of 
researcher self-identity”. Particularly pertinent to this is my interest in ‘the 
body’, a simultaneously academic and personal-emotional node of constant and 
sometimes disquieting fascination. As such, this chapter has offered a response 
to the comment that “if we look in other places on the Internet we can see that 
there are still other bodily stories to be told” (Parr 2002 p86). In the subsequent 
chapter, I shift away from the topic of coalescing, reconstituted bodies in the 
online context to think about the stories entailing the ‘individuated’ and yet 
relational skin, as the fabric and contoured surfaces of bodies.  
                                                          
53 In some situations/for some individuals, the distinction between insensitive outsiders and ‘in-
the-know’ insiders was felt to hold. Graham commented that it is “difficult for people [who have 
not had pregnancy losses] to know what to say, and they often end up saying 'the wrong thing'” 
and Diane felt that “all [the people] that were there [at the face-to-face support group] had been 
through the same thing so understood exactly what I was going through and no one said hurtful 
things as they knew what to say and what not to say”. However, my point here is that the 
‘sensitive insider’ versus ‘insensitive outsider’ distinction is not inevitable and can pertain more 
to the accumulated emotional intelligence/competency of the ‘consoler’ in relation to 
deciphering the specific preferences at that time/in that setting with the ‘griever’, rather than 
being about having personal experience or not of pregnancy loss per se. 
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Chapter 7: Bodily Externals and Contours 
Introduction 
The skin, “as a boundary-object” and “site of exposure or connectedness” 
(Ahmed and Stacey 2001 p2), far exceeds being merely an object of medical 
interest. Though the skin “does not simply contain the body” (Ahmed and 
Stacey 2001 p14), it occupies an important component in the deeply embodied, 
visceral experiences of pregnancy loss. The topic of bodily surfaces regarding 
skins and the additional adornments placed on/into these—such as clothing, 
jewellery and tattoos—have received considerable attention in recent decades in 
the scholarship of social science, arts and humanities (for example: Ebin 1979; 
Polhemus 1988; Rubin 1988; Sanders 1988, 1989; Benson 2000; Caplan 2000; 
DeMello 2000; Pitts 2003). Within this literature, it has been recognised that 
bodily surfaces constitute an important component in the production of human 
relationships and self-identity, often symbolising transition and status, used in 
various ways to express and communicate values and experiences.  My focus in 
this chapter will be on the ways in which some participants’ skins, in terms of 
topographical surfaces and contours, feature in their narratives about 
pregnancy loss experiences. In foregrounding women’s external skins, I affirm 
the call to “theorise and reframe pregnant women [rather than solely foetuses] 
as the subjects of gestation [and, I add, of ended gestation]” (Tyler 2001 p81). In 
relation to pregnancy loss, this includes not only stories about the skin but also 
the ways in which stories can be told through the skin.  
The skin is a topographical surface, covering and accommodating bodily 
contours and registering sensations including different kinds of touch 
concerned with movement, temperature and intent (Paterson et al 2012) which 
can affect at varying depths within- as well as between- bodies (Lea 2012). 
Simultaneously personal-individual in that it “holds the body together, 
delineating it as a bounded systematic wholeness, and holding organs, blood 
and corporeal fabric together” (Lea 2012 p33), the skin is also social as a site 
affected and engaged by inter-personal relations, alongside non-human actants 
and practices such as food and eating (Mol 2008). The ways in which visual 
marks or inscriptions and visibly altered contours can ‘communicate’ draws the 
theme of agency into consideration. Some skin-based body modifications are 
inadvertent and/or by-products whilst others are intentionally acquired, and the 
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connotations of skin marks can entail disconnect between the intended/ 
preferable meanings of the ‘wearer’ and those ‘read’ by other individuals. 
Subsequently, some participants highlighted that their skin-based modifications 
were carefully negotiated with recognition and anticipation of insensitive 
responses from others, given the societal discomfort and/or disavowal of 
pregnancy loss. For some individuals, activities—including the acquisition, 
display/concealment and narration of skin-based modifications like tattoos—
were thus carefully deliberated in a way demonstrating the skin as a locale 
“where boundary negotiations take place” (Benthien 2002 pxi).  
This chapter will begin with an exploration of a prolific sentiment 
expressed about pregnancy loss, that of failure and blame in relation to one’s 
body, which I argue has potential implications for how stretch-marks may be 
conceptualised. Building on this, I will consider the physical girth/contours of 
bodies in pregnancy and pregnancy-loss in light of several participants’ 
comments, linking to maternity clothing and normative ideals of female 
corporeality. Refuting the stigmatising discourse of ‘failure’, I will then suggest 
that another conceptualisation of stretch-marks would be to perceive them akin 
to descriptions of memorial tattoos as appreciated reminders. Framing these 
examples of skin-based body modifications in a manner of reclamation furthers 
feminist politics of voice and recognises the agency/abilities of individuals 
within their various relationships, social networks and communities to engage 
in ‘meaning-making’, if desired. However, with the potential of this limited in 
actuality, I will discuss the theme of negotiating (in)visibility in relation to both 
actualised and anticipated encounters with others,  such as friends and family as 
well as strangers, for memorial- tattoos and jewellery. 
‘Failed’ Bodies 
Pregnancy losses can be ‘ambiguous losses’ (Boss 1999; Cacciatore et al 
2008) in which answers about the medical causes often remain unclear in 
addition to a profound emotional sense of the illogical and/or unfair nature of 
such events. Some participants in this research felt that their bodies had failed 
or that they were themselves to blame for the pregnancy loss occurrences, even 
when causes were disputed or indeterminable. ‘Failure’ is a highly emotionally-
charged term referring to curtailed agency, an inability to determine outcomes, 
and often implicitly accompanied by a degree of moral culpability that one could 
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or should have been able to control events. When pregnancies have ‘unhappy 
endings’ (Layne 2003b), and because of perceptions around medical heraldry, 
the question of ‘cause’ often turns to the woman who was carrying the 
pregnancy and links to the vast array of prescriptive advice pregnant women 
encounter.54 As mentioned in Chapter 6, prolific and prevalent advice is 
deployed not only in medical encounters but also in numerous, mundane, often 
uninvited engagements with family, friends and even strangers as well as 
actively sought online (Longhurst 1999, 2008). The content of such advice 
entails lifestyle/consumption, medical compliance and enduring commonplace 
beliefs regarding ‘maternal impressions’ (Markens et al 1997; Longhurst 1999; 
Abel and Browner 1998; Pollitt 1998; Morgan 1999; Lupton 2011).  
Subsequently, as reflected in the comments of Anne that one’s pregnancy 
“becomes a bit [like] public property”, many women described feeling 
overwhelmed by the pervasive advice ‘offered’ and responsibilities placed on 
them. As Longhurst (1999, 2008) notes, this can lead pregnant women to feel 
that they are not seen by others to be a person in their own right, but rather 
have become perceived as a mere vessel, existing to serve the interests of the 
pregnancy they carry. There is often intense interpersonal interest, by known 
and unknown others, in sometimes quite tangible ways in engaging with the 
foetus (‘baby’) at the expense of the pregnant woman’s own wishes, privacy and 
consent. This notion is reinforced by: rhetoric such as the ‘maternal 
environment’ (Rothman 2007c; Tyler 2001; Michaels and Morgan 1999; Stabile 
1998; Stanworth 1987); debates regarding ‘maternal-foetal conflict’ (Markens et 
al 1997) and ‘foetal patienthood’ (Casper 1999; Woliver 2002; Williams 2005); 
and visual imagery such as the infamous Life magazine photos by Nilsson of the 
‘spaceman foetus’ devoid of reference to the uterus, let alone body/self (Tyler 
2001; Fox 2000; Michaels 1999; Hartouni 1997, 1998; Duden 1993; Petchesky 
1987). Spallone (1989) argues that women have been displaced as the core 
subjects of reproduction by a range of others, including that of the couple, 
embryos, the foetal patient, and medical practitioners. Simultaneously, 
however, there remains enormous onus on women—pregnant, but also planning 
                                                          
54 This links to the suggestions by Lock and Kaufert (1998 p21) that the history of medicine has 
largely been narrated “as an heroic tale about the conquest of the enemy, whether it be human 
or nature – a narrative of progress, and of the betterment of humanity in general”. 
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or trying to conceive—to bear responsibility for their reproductive futures, 
including the health and outcomes of their pregnancies.55  
As noted in Chapter 6, many participants in the research made comments 
which attributed their behaviours, attitudes and bodies with considerable 
responsibility for ensuring the outcomes of a healthy, happy new-borns. In 
instances of pregnancy loss, such an expectation placed on oneself, and by 
others, is therefore called significantly into question. This can lead to 
individuals re-evaluating their actions for anything that could have jeopardised 
the pregnancy/ies, a psychological ‘busyness’ to pinpoint a cause, as well as 
deploring a lack of ‘intuitive’ bodily or ‘maternal’ awareness that ‘something was 
wrong’. Lara, for example, emphasised that “I don’t do drugs or I don’t smoke, I 
didn’t drink that much either so I don’t really know what I did wrong”, before 
tentatively suggesting that ‘over’ plucking her bikini line could have caused her 
miscarriage.56 Subsequently, some women internalise an association with 
‘failure’ and culpability which seeps into their identification as ‘mothers’ and 
‘women’. Such feelings are testament to the “enduring centrality of motherhood 
to women’s sense of self and to women’s sense of individual responsibility for 
the fate of their pregnancies” (Kevin 2011 p854) and links also to the ways in 
which women without children, voluntarily and involuntarily, have long been 
                                                          
55 In discussing reproductive responsibility, Daniels (1999 p88) argues that “[c]ultural 
assumptions about male invulnerability and female susceptibility have deeply shaped the nature 
of scientific research on fetal risks”. Whilst drawing attention to the biological and social 
dimensions of paternal impacts (like exposures to viruses/toxins affecting sperm and the social 
context of paternal actions including around forms of abuse and encouraging addictions), 
Daniels (1999) discusses gestation as an additional component in entailing body-labour as well 
as genetic material for pregnant women over their partners/impregnators (see also Hird 2007 
on pregnancy as ‘maternal gifting’). Whilst gestation is recognised as a more direct route of 
exposure for foetal risk, Daniels (1999) also highlights an array of ways in which placing sole 
responsibility onto pregnant women, especially when this is accompanied by punitive treatment, 
negates the more complex situation around foetal health which includes, for example, issues of 
environmental and occupational/workplace exposure to toxins. 
56 Lara explained: “it does hurt when you pull out a hair from like your private area and things 
like that, I don’t know if there is a nerve that is connected to where it [embryo] is and maybe 
could have caused it… I don’t know”. Such hesitancy in disclosing this pertains, I argue, to 
simultaneous concerns that the suggestion might be “a bit too silly to mention” but also fear that 
might be a culpable action, both possibilities being subject to negative judgments. 
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deemed pathological for ‘failing’ to confirm to societal expectations about 
reproductive norms (Hird 2003; Letherby and Williams 1999; Tonkin 2012). 
Several participants commented that the medical language used by 
professionals about pregnancy loss caused upset and could amplify feelings of 
‘failure’.57 These comments resonate with Martin (1987, 1990) regarding the 
repetitive use of ‘failure’ and ‘waste’ discourses in describing women’s bodily 
processes as found in medical texts. Helen explained that:  
terms [such as ‘failed pregnancy’ and ‘spontaneous abortion’] are 
also very negative, and made me feel worse about myself – in that 
my body had ‘failed’ or I had ‘failed’. It added to my sense of guilt. 
I didn’t feel guilty in the way I think lots of others do – when they 
over analyse every alcoholic drink they had or try to find causes 
based on their own actions – but just in terms of me, I had failed 
to support this baby to grow inside me. 
Some participants reported encounters with known social others which had 
brought a sense of having ‘failed’—at the pregnancy, as a mother, as a woman—
acutely to the fore. Whilst the origin of the term ‘stigma’ derives from physical 
branding on the skin to visually demarcate someone as disreputable, stigma and 
accompanying feelings of shame, blame, guilt and failure can be evoked in many 
ways (Goffman 1963). As Charmaz (2002) notes, seemingly mundane moments 
as well as unusual instances can produce lasting stigma with impacts on self-
identities. For example, Caroline recalled the stigma induced by persons who 
(physically, socially) distanced and differentiated themselves from her: 
I had friends crossing the street after my third miscarriage […] 
they’d cross the street to avoid me, you know, because I think they 
just didn’t have a clue what they were going to say and I found that 
very hurtful, you know. I thought well it’s not really my fault. 
Additionally, as for Siobhan, discussed in Chapter 4, stigma can be internalised 
and anticipated with regards to encounters which may never materialise but 
nonetheless detrimentally impact one’s own sense of identity and esteem.  
                                                          
57 Some medical language is particularly triggering, sometimes owing to the historical origins, 
such as the tendency to refer to miscarriage as ‘spontaneous abortions’ (Letherby 1999; Jonas-
Simpson and McMahon 2005; Frost et al 2007; Henley and Schott 2008). 
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 As a result of the prevalent notion that pregnancy losses are 
demonstrations of ‘failure’, since women’s identities and bodies remain largely 
tied to reproductive/sexual capacities as they have at numerous historical 
periods (Friedan 1963), unintentional topographical marks such as stretch-
marks might also be similarly associated with connotations of ‘failure’. Several 
participants conveyed a sense in which various changes to their bodies resulting 
from pregnancies that had ended in loss and/or their management, such as by 
surgery, had impacted on their bodily-esteem and sense of self-worth. There 
were several occasions when participants spoke of low self-worth and body-
images, for which I felt impelled to intervene (see also Methodology chapter on 
interview encounters and consolation). The following email interview exchange 
with Victoria entailed the discussion of bodily changes such as weight-gain for 
which I sought to negotiate and hopefully alleviate some of the accompanying 
suffering pertaining to her sense of ‘failure’. Victoria had experienced two 
miscarriages (one ectopic) in close succession only a few months prior to 
research participation, with continued ramifications. This included three itchy 
scars following a laparoscopy which had required the removal of one fallopian 
tube and she was extremely apprehensive about possible future pregnancies: 
[excerpt from Victoria to Abi]:   
I have no self-esteem! I do not work and am home with my 18 
month old every day, I would not have it any other way but I do 
think it has affected my confidence. Plus I have put on a LOT of 
weight over the past year and that has had a very bad effect on my 
confidence too, I do not want my partner to have to be seen out 
with me as I look so awful  
[…] 
[excerpt from Abi to Victoria]:  
I’m so sorry to hear about the ongoing difficulties and to hear how 
badly affected your confidence is at the moment. I hope you won’t 
mind me saying so- but in the course of doing this research, I’ve 
found that the feelings you express (about lowered confidence, 
feeling bad about things that happened during the miscarriages 
and feeling unable to speak to anyone for fear of ‘burdening’ them) 
is unfortunately something that many other women feel also. 
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Sometimes it can help to know that you are not alone in having 
those kinds of feelings[.] 
Stigma and Skin-based Marks  
For many, the enduring distress of pregnancy losses far exceeds the 
actual events of occurrence, having potentially both emotional and material 
impacts in their ongoing lives. Retaining the traces of past experiences, skins are 
matter both object-like in terms of amenability to inscription and lived. As 
Ahmed and Stacey (2001 p2) comment: 
[s]kin is temporal in the sense that it is affected by the passing of 
time or, to put it differently, it materializes that passing in the 
accumulation of marks, of wrinkles, lines and creases, as well as in 
the literal disintegration of the skin […] The skin is also spatial in 
that it expands and contracts[.] 
I suggest that the disintegration of the skin is also spatial, constantly undergoing 
‘loss’ and ‘death’ as surface cells are shed and deposited with inter-personal 
skin-to-skin touch entailing “[t]he dead you […] being rubbed away by the dead 
me” (Winterson 1996 p123). Experiences, internal and external, can leave 
visibly overt skin-based marks and sensorial alterations. For instance, Kristeva 
(1980 p237) vividly captures pregnancy processes in her description: “[c]ells 
fuse, split, and proliferate; volumes grow, tissues stretch, and body fluids 
change rhythm, speeding up or slowing down. Within the body, growing a graft, 
indomitable, there is an other”. Through creating and sustaining embryos/ 
foetuses, women’s pregnant bodies undergo a plethora of physical as well as 
potentially emotional changes which, as we have seen, can be interrupted by 
pregnancy loss at numerous points and in numerous ways.  
The deeply embodied, visceral experiences of pregnancies and pregnancy 
losses can leave marks, including on/in the skin, which may be imbued with 
various connotations and meanings. For instance, Benthien (2002 p3) notes the 
ways in which the skin has often been imagined as “a fragile parchment unable 
to protect against violence”. This notion of fragility and vulnerability resonates 
with the emotions reported by many participants of feeling out of control, 
frightened and uncertain as to the practicalities and meanings of their 
pregnancy losses. Davidson (2008) and Murphy (2009) both argue that the 
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bereavement mantra prevalent until the onset of ‘continuing bonds’ theories in 
the late 1990s (Valentine 2008) posited that it would be ‘best’ to forget/move on 
from stillbirths and, I add, other pregnancy losses. Whilst there have been 
improvements, including in hospital best practice protocol (Davidson 2007, 
2008), pregnancy loss grief is still often subject to silence and sequestration 
(Frost et al 2007). However, it is not only the emotional intensity of pregnancy 
losses but also the presence of physically ‘telling’ marks which are potentially 
negated, as well as internal, contour, flow-based changes in/on/of the body 
(Murphy 2009). In this context, stretch-marks—as unintentional and, within 
wider western culture, undesirable outcomes of changes in bodily girth—could 
be seen as inscriptions also imbued with ‘failure’ and ‘fragility’ after pregnancy 
losses.  
Stretch-marks are caused when the dermis layer of the skin is strained as 
the body expands, whether through pregnancy, growth spurts as in puberty or 
otherwise changes in weight. The skin heals, leaving jagged lines clustered 
around corresponding contours—most often the breasts, stomach, hips and 
thighs—which often, with time and/or treatment, pseudo-assimilate to the 
surrounding skin pigmentation whilst retaining a sheen. The extent of stretch-
mark coverage in terms of quantity and noticeability varies according to a range 
of factors. Not all participants in the research developed stretch-marks during 
pregnancies that were later lost, sometimes because pregnancy loss occurred 
prior to significant changes in body size or because of different degrees of skin 
elasticity. Additionally, some participants noted that the bodily experience of 
previous pregnancy losses had left little to no obvious bodily changes or marks 
at the time/shortly afterwards but later discovered visual and/or sensorial 
impacts in subsequent pregnancies. Regarding her first pregnancy which ended 
around 21 weeks, Gemma explained:  
I didn’t have a massive bump – I think your muscles are much 
tighter in the first pregnancy. I guess those lasting marks probably 
kind of remain though... the way my body responded to the second 
pregnancy and the third pregnancy, so labour was easier the 
second time because my body had already been through that 
process. My muscles were probably already looser so I probably 
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had a bigger bump with [second pregnancy] than I would of done 
and then got stretch-marks. 
The topic of pregnancy bumps links to Colls’ (2012) work on relations 
between vision and touch concerning bodily surfaces and flesh. Colls (2012 
p233) offers a reading of the nude female bodies of Jenny Saville’s art “premised 
upon distinctly geographical relations of proximity and intimacy in ways which 
surprise and challenge our understandings of what a fleshy body can do”. 
Rethinking the relationship between vision and touch through the work of 
Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray, Colls (2012) highlights intra-body touching and the 
ways in which this can be hidden from view. Citing Irigaray’s (2004 p139) 
examples of intrauterine life and the sexed specificity of labia lips which “touch 
themselves in her, within and inside women, without having recourse to seeing”, 
Colls (2012 p242) describes thighs pressed together in Saville’s painting 
Propped as that which “hints at and yet hides that which is hidden between her 
legs”. In a similar manner, pregnancy bumps can be understood to visually 
demarcate through pronounced contours whilst simultaneously concealing and 
yet, as discussed in Chapter 3, interior ‘happenings’ are also sometimes 
intensely and abruptly ‘present’ through felt sensations like foetal movements.58 
The topic of skin, stretching to accommodate the physiological contours of 
pregnancy, also highlights maternity clothes as a kind of proxy skin. 
As Longhurst (2008) argues, clothes are a site at which subjectivities are 
produced in and through social interactions, with maternity clothing occupying 
somewhat of an unusual position. Owing to the limited temporality of use, even 
in full-term pregnancies, maternity clothes subsequently tend to be highly 
mobile, circulating between family members, friends and neighbours (Gregson 
and Beale 2004). Maternity clothes evidently relate to changes and/or pre-
emptive changes of the physiological pregnant body and link closely in various 
ways with esteem (Reinharz 1988). In terms of purchasing new maternity wear, 
Longhurst (2008) comments that some pregnant women are reluctant owing to 
reasons of costliness given limited temporality of use, disdain towards the styles 
available and/or ambivalence towards ‘pregnant corporeality’ such as 
discomfort with bodily changes regarding ‘bigness’. However, in the context of 
                                                          
58 In addition, discussed in Chapter 3, medical-technological visualisations of uterine interiors 
such as via ultrasound can be seen to enact a form of “skinning” (Duden 1993 p7). 
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pregnancy loss, there can be additional aspects associated with the materiality 
and emotionality of maternity clothes. Several participants described the 
excitement about obtaining maternity clothes as balanced against a wish to be 
cautious and restrained before they physically required the clothes and/or had 
reached particular gestational stages. Some women interviewed conveyed that 
wearing maternity clothes ‘legitimately’, when their bodies physiologically 
required with (hopefully) a ‘successful’ pregnancy, was a kind of status marker, 
participating in a much-desired ‘rite of passage’ of ‘becoming a mother’ (Clarke 
2004). For those whose pregnancy losses occurred prior to acquiring or wearing 
maternity clothes, missing out on having and shopping for such apparel can be 
an additional component in their meanings of ‘loss’. Others, following their 
pregnancy losses, were left with unused maternity clothing and/or other baby 
paraphernalia, such as cribs, which they either stored in their homes or 
returned to the shop purchased from. 
It was not always the lack of opportunity to have or wear maternity 
clothes lamented, but sometimes the necessity to continue wearing these whilst 
the physicality of the body in terms of girth/contours retained the appearance of 
pregnancy following loss. In such instances, maternity or ‘bigger’ clothes 
derisively highlighted one’s body as a ‘failure’. Natalie described having to 
continue wearing maternity clothes as her physiological circumstances slowly 
resumed to normal. Her latter miscarriage of two was managed medically by 
several ERPCs as one operation unintentionally causing a painful false uterine 
passage, with ongoing complications at the time of interviews months later:  
I’d already put on weight and so actually when you miscarry, the 
last thing you want to be doing is wearing your bigger clothes but 
they’re absolutely the only clothes you can get on at the beginning 
[…] so that is very depressing. That you’ve been pregnant, it’s not 
worked out, you’re not having a baby but yet you still can’t get in 
your pre-pregnant clothes as it were, you’re still wearing these 
larger sized clothing but for absolutely nothing at the end of it 
other than upset and hurt […] [Eventually] I was determined that I 
didn’t want to wear the big jeans so I just put them away and I 
squeezed into my other clothes {laughs}  
185 
 
Several participants made disparaging or contemptuous comments about 
their pregnancy loss stretch-marks and/or weight-gain. These changes, 
concerned with the surfaces and contours of the body, could be seen as imbued 
with notions of ‘failure’ as a result of pregnancy losses which are typically 
disregarded as trivial or shameful experiences in wider society. However, I 
suggest that contextualising dislike, aversion and embarrassment of such bodily 
features/changes within wider normative ideals of female corporeality offers 
another explanation for participants’ comments. Linking to the statement that 
“whether externally bound or internally managed, no body can escape either the 
imprint of culture or its gendered meanings” (Bordo 1990 p109), feminist 
scholarship has considered the ways that women have long been subjected to 
beautification expectations as a form of disciplining. For women, the flesh—in 
terms of appearance, consistency and mass—occupies a central concern for 
(self)regulation and modification as a “constant, intimate fact of everyday life” 
(Bordo 1993 p17). Subsequently, aversion towards stretch-marks, cellulite and 
larger bodily-girth described by participants can be conceptualised not only 
through the lens of ‘pregnancy loss’ per se but rather of pregnancy changes and 
female bodily ideals more generally. Although in pregnancy loss the ‘reward’ 
(baby/ies) for changes to women’s bodies are arguably absent, the significance 
of body image is a theme consistent throughout many women’s lives in 
contemporary Western societies. As such, women who have live births/living 
babies often also describe feeling intensely dissatisfied about aspects of their 
‘post-baby bodies’ (Earle 2003; Upton and Hann 2003; Jordan et al 2005; 
Longhurst 2008; Clark et al 2009).  
Preoccupations with ideals of female corporeality centred around slim, 
taut bodies and pristine skins are one of the most powerful strategies of 
normalisation in Foucauldian terms of (self)disciplining (Bordo 1990). Drawing 
on Chernin’s (1981) term ‘tyranny of slenderness’, Bordo (1990 p90) argues that 
bodily ideals continue to recede from realistic attainability and that, for many, 
“to be slim is simply not enough – so long as the flesh jiggles”. In relation to 
both pregnancy losses and pregnancies previously or subsequently resulting in 
living offspring, several participants described a ‘need’ to lose weight in order to 
‘return’ to their pre-pregnancy body states. In addition, there were comments by 
some participants that they would feel uncomfortable in spaces, such as when 
out with their partners, as for Victoria, or at the swimming pool where strangers 
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might see their stretch-marks. In relation to body size/weight, there is an 
expectation that one must work, with considerable time, energy and/or money, 
to ‘control’ and ‘rectify’ unruly bodies within consumerist capitalism (Bordo 
1990). Whilst surgical and topical treatments are available to minimise stretch-
marks, no participants reported using, or planning to use, these. Rather, both 
Anne and Rosie conveyed a sense of acceptance whilst somewhat playfully 
commenting about their ‘bikini bodies’ being affected. Rosie commented: “I’ve 
got the scars on my body from the ectopic which are still very obvious every time 
you look in a mirror and I’ll now never wear a bikini, that’s for sure – so there 
goes my bikini modelling career {laughs}”. Others, however, found the 
accumulated presence of such marks on the skin devastating, such as Carla who 
had acquired the majority of her stretch-marks during her first pregnancy prior 
to two miscarriages and three elective terminations: 
Carla: my arse… nobody sees my arse, I hate it, it’s not just 
stretch-marks, it’s like this [corrugated] radiator, my stretch-
marks are like dented into my arse. I’ve got stretch-marks on my 
legs, all over my boobs, all over my belly erm...  I’ve got a few on 
my back, I even ended up with some on my ankles – I’m absolutely 
covered […] [During the pregnancy] I ate loads, but I did find out 
from the midwife – the younger you are [the more stretch-marks 
likely], because your skin hasn’t stretched and hadn’t stretched on 
my back, I ended up with loads  
Abi: did you get any stretch-marks after the other pregnancies? 
Carla: I got a few off… my first miscarriage because at 12 weeks, I 
already had a tiny little, not a lot, bump and my arse had expanded 
quite a bit so I ended up with stretch-marks I never had before just 
there [stomach] and some there, only a few though, but I think it’s 
probably ‘cos it [the pregnancy] didn’t go far enough on  
Abi: do you feel differently about the stretch-marks from the 
miscarriage than those from your pregnancy with [living child]? 
Carla: I hate them all equally {coughs} I just hate them because 
I’m [mid-twenties] and I look like a 90 year old, like want to take 
your clothes off? Oh no! It’s like I wouldn’t ever wear a top like 
where you wouldn’t wear a bra and I will not wear dresses, skirts 
or anything, I wear jeans and trousers and that’s it.  
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 Whilst other individuals may feel differently, Carla suggested that her 
feelings towards particular stretch-marks are not tied to the specific causes of 
the bodily changes (pregnancy loss or not): “I don’t feel differently for the 
different ones [stretch-marks] I’ve got, they’ve all just kind of merged into one”. 
Rather than viewing some of her stretch-marks as embodiments of ‘failure’ 
(when miscarriage occurred), it appears that the aesthetics of all of these, in 
disrupting the smooth, blemish-free skin ideal, caused Carla to feel so negatively 
and subsequently adopt cover-up dressing strategies. Such comments support 
the notion that, for some individual at least, it is not necessarily the outcome of 
pregnancy loss per se causing them to feel unhappy towards bodily changes 
such as skin sagging and stretch-marks. Upton and Han (2003) note that the 
postpartum body tends to be scrutinised in a different way to the ‘public’ 
pregnant body, with the former involving broader ideologies about female body 
norms. As such, the reasons for some participants’ ambivalent body images may 
pertain to dislike of bodily changes in pregnancy/following birth generally 
(Earle 2003; Upton and Han 2003; Jordan et al 2005; Longhurst 2008; Clark 
et al 2009) in line with broader cultural normative ideals about women’s bodies 
(Bordo 1990, 1993; Duncan 1994; Frost 2005).  
Reclamation and Appreciated Reminders  
 Far from monolithically denoting ‘failure’ in terms of pregnancy loss or 
otherwise, stretch-marks are open to a number of interpretations, including 
those resonating with memorial tattoo narratives of appreciated reminders. 
These two forms of skin-based body modification seemingly entail divergences: 
whilst stretch-marks are seen as unintended and unwanted side-effects of 
changing body sizes/weight, Harlow (2005 p42) comments that “[p]erhaps the 
ultimate form of inscription is the self-inscription of tattooing”. Yet, I argue that 
to pit them as oppositional would be an impoverished reading since there is 
agency evident in the ways that participants ascribe meaning and purpose to 
their stretch-marks, similar to those found in memorial tattoo narratives. There 
is a need to expand a notion of ‘agency’ that goes beyond the initial intention or 
cause of a skin marking, to think about the abilities of individuals, and their 
various social support networks and communities, to engage in ‘meaning-
making’, emphasising the potential for multiple understandings of the physical 
inscriptions on and of skins. This foregrounds Benthien’s (2002 p12) comments 
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that “the skin in and of itself has no intent, even if it may very well express 
intention. One can communicate with the skin, and one can communicate about 
the skin”. Thus, research participants engaged in “narrating with their bod[ies] 
and of their bod[ies]” (Oksanen and Turtiainen 2005 p113) in relation to 
memorial tattoos and stretch-marks, demonstrating a plethora of possible 
meanings, interpretations and styles of communication.  
 Anne highlighted how skin-based modifications can be valued by the 
‘wearers’ as appreciated reminders in relation to the stretch-marks she 
developed during a pregnancy which ended in stillbirth: 
Abi: are you bothered more by the stretch-marks being more kind 
of visible to other people?  
Anne: well because I’ve never really had a bikini body {laughs} ha 
nobody ever really sees them, it’s only my husband and me that 
really see… to be honest, now that we’ve lost him… I don’t mind 
them at all […] So when that [PUPPP]59 started in my stretch-
marks I really, really hated them but now we’ve lost him it’s, it’s 
just a, it’s, it’s, it’s, a mark on me, a PHYSICAL mark on me that I 
had him which is good for me because our life is very much the 
same as it was before, but it’s dramatically different as well so 
because we have no other children, you know, our days are much 
the same as they were before. We don’t have to book a babysitter 
when we go out on a night, there’s nobody making mess in the 
house but us, all the things we thought would have an impact on 
our life hasn’t because we don’t have him  
Abi: hmm 
Anne: so our lives in some ways are very much the same as they 
were before so for ME, it’s incredibly… wonderful to have 
reminders that we had him and that he existed and one of those 
reminders is my stretch-marks  
Abi: yeah  
Anne: so, I don’t mind them at all. 
                                                          
59 Pruritic Urticarial Papules and Plaques of Pregnancy (PUPPP) is a skin rash experienced by 
some women during pregnancy; it tends to be extremely itchy but is otherwise harmless. 
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These sentiments resonate with the descriptions given in research generally on 
memorial tattooing (for adult bereavements) and those marking other/ 
additional ‘traumatic’ experiences (Springer 1997 on violence in adolescence; 
Brouwer 1998 on HIV+ status disclosure; Otte 2007 and Gentry and Alderman 
2007 on post-Hurricane Katrina). Indeed, Western elective tattooing in general 
has highlighted the centrality of self-expression and supportive functions in 
relation to the practices of acquiring/having these skin marks (DeMello 2000; 
Kosut 2000; Pitts 2003; Oksanen and Turtiainen 2005). As Oksanen and 
Turtiainen (2005 p128) argue “[t]attoos function as shields for subjectivity 
when everything else seems uncertain”, suggesting that the physicality of a 
tattoo—but potentially also the process, including pain, of being tattooed—can 
help console individuals regarding the unpredictability and instability of the 
future. Tattoos can ‘ground’ acknowledgement by making tangibly present the 
trace of an event or person in one’s life. In this way, tattoos can “serve as 
memory maps and tool kits helping subjects structure their experiences” 
(Oksanen and Turtiainen 2005 p120-121) which, I suggest, is also the case for 
Anne’s stretch-marks.  
 Shortly before our first interview, Anne also acquired a small memorial 
tattoo on her wrist of a printed image from a baby sleepsuit that she had bought 
and her stillborn son had worn. The image and meaning of the tattoo connected 
with a wider context of care and recognition in which family members also 
participated. In addition to noting the support provided by both her parents and 
parents-in-law, Anne spoke about valued time spent with her sister:  
Anne: she actually went with me to get a tattoo in memory of my 
son so... she, my sister, is covered in tattoos so she went with me 
as it was my first one {laughs} […] I’d sort of decided to get a 
tattoo so that, apart from the stretch-marks I have {laughs} of 
which I have many {laughs} I’d have a permanent... reminder, 
which is an odd thing to say because I’m not going to forget him, 
but something, a permanent mark really on my body that’s about 
him […]   
Abi: yeah... did your sister get a tattoo as well? Did she get 
something also in memory of your son?   
Anne: no she didn’t, no, but my sister really surprised me actually, 
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she doesn’t have children, she’s really, she was really, she’s never 
really shown an interest in children, she didn’t want to have any of 
her own but she was just so... chuffed about us having him, she 
was so excited and she’d actually bought a little outfit for him, a 
little {laughs} pirate themed outfit, don’t ask   
Abi: {laughs}  
Anne: {laughs} a little pirate themed outfit for him and she texted 
me a few weeks ago and told me that she was going to keep the 
little outfit and she was going to, this might sound a bit strange, 
but she was going to get like a teddy bear or something like that 
and put the outfit on [that] so she kind of has a permanent 
reminder of him really in her house   
Abi: yeah   
Anne: which... now I’m saying it out loud, it sounds a bit weird 
{laughs} 
Abi: no, not at all   
Anne: but I was touched by it because... you know, we don’t talk a 
lot or we never really used to talk a lot in depth about things but 
she’s been completely brilliant about this, very open to talking to 
me about things, very sad herself about what’s happened and, you 
know, so actually one of the massively great things is that it’s 
brought us all together much more as a family and my mum has 
really got to know my mother-in-law and father-in-law a lot and 
she never did before, they’d hardly ever seen each other and 
they’ve [now] spoken quite a lot on the phone so it’s really kind of 
brought us a lot more together.   
As Layne (2000) notes, those who experience pregnancy losses often 
encounter the ‘realness problem’ in relation to the socially prevalent notion that 
a ‘real’ baby did not exist and is not worthy of grieving or memorialising. A 
range of ‘baby things’ can be drawn on to resist this cultural denial of pregnancy 
loss, including ‘index’ material objects such as  locks of hair, worn clothes and 
foot ink prints which retain qualities of bodily traces of the deceased (Layne 
2000). Thus, without a tangible embodied social identity, material objects can 
be used by parents to articulate the pregnancy loss “as the death of a person 
rather than the outcome of an unproductive pregnancy” (Bleyen 2010 p84). For 
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Anne, her stretch-marks provided physical evidence of her relationship with her 
son and the memorial tattoo, which entailed sharing the process of acquisition 
in the company of her sister and the significance of worn baby clothes, offered 
further recognition. As such, these skin-based marks and their wider context, 
including the unworn baby clothes kept by her sister, resonates with continuing 
bonds theories in which Anne’s family were ‘brought together’ to include the 
living and deceased (see also Chapter 8).  
Since, for each person, “[t]he choices I ma[k]e in any current moment 
will depend on the story line I take myself to be living out” (Davies 1992 p69), 
participants demonstrated abilities to forge preferable narratives with meanings 
attributed to their stretch-marks and memorial tattoos. The diversity of 
narratives through which stretch-marks could be read or seen to ‘speak’ 
highlights Ahmed and Stacey’s (2001 p6) comments that “although skin may 
have a testimonial function, the act of bearing witness to trauma, injustice, 
violence and the pain of others cannot involve simply the transformation of skin 
into voice”. Rather, the meanings of skin-based marks for individual ‘wearers’ 
vary and cannot be assumed decipherable without their elaboration, such as 
those provided in the research interview conversations. As Ellis and Bochner 
(1992 p79) highlight, “[t]he act of telling a personal story is a way of giving voice 
to experiences that are shrouded in secrecy”. By speaking about their 
experiences and related tenets such as stretch-marks, I argue that participants 
engaged in processes of integrating these with their lives as well as breaking the 
cultural ‘silence’ around pregnancy loss (Layne 2003a, 2003b). Given the social 
attitudes towards pregnancy losses, the approach described by Anne can be 
understood as a reclamation narrative which counters that of ‘failure’ and 
refuses the imperative socially-implied expectation to ‘move on and forget’.  
Whilst ‘failure’ is one possible storyline linking to shame and silence, 
another is that of ‘reclamation’ in which skin-based marks as material ‘evidence’ 
could be cherished for evoking memories and potentially functioning as kinds of 
embodied memorial sites. As discussed in Chapter 5, the site of death for pre- 
and intra- partum pregnancy losses can be understood as the reproductive, 
interior body. Hirsch (1989 p166) argues that “[n]othing entangles women more 
firmly in their bodies than pregnancy, birth, lactation, miscarriage, or the 
inability to conceive” and it is therefore significant that the body is also 
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sometimes used as a site to ‘ground’ memory and enact memorialisation. 
Though certainly true that stretch-marks and memorial tattoos, when seen or 
felt, can invoke sadness regarding losses—of the anticipated baby/babies and/or 
multiple hopes, dreams and expectations—we have seen that such topographical 
marks can also be experienced as positive, heart-warming facilitators of 
remembering. Thus, singular and collections of accumulated skin-based 
modifications, including stretch-marks and memorial tattoos, were appreciated 
by some participants precisely because they can “remind their bearers of the 
durability of human relationships as well as the hardships encountered in life” 
(Oksanen and Turtiainen 2005 p124). By embracing counter-narratives to that 
of ‘failure’, such as those which reiterate the shared bodily history of pregnancy 
with wished-for ‘baby/ies’ and ongoing ‘bonds’ following losses, some 
participants demonstrated that skin-based modifications like stretch-marks 
could partake in producing and maintaining the affirmative meanings they 
wished to convey.  
Visibility and Legibility  
 Participants described negotiating aspects of visibility and legibility, 
recognising their skins and thus skin-based modifications/marks to be 
simultaneously private (self) and public (exposed to others) as a “medium of 
communication with the world” (Benthien 2002 p23). It was appreciated that 
“skins, as well as other bodily surfaces and folds, expose bodies to other bodies, 
rather than simply containing ‘the body’ as such” (Ahmed and Stacey 2001 p4) 
and that, being an interface between self and world (Benthien 2002), skins 
involve “dialogue[s] between the body, self-identity and society” (Kosut 2000 
p99). Participants reported different experiences and encounters regarding both 
known and unknown others in relation to their external skin marks like 
memorial tattoos. It was also remarked that there are times, places and 
situations where this visibility and legibility is more carefully guarded against. 
Given the parallels in participants’ narratives, I will also explore the use of 
memorial jewellery as an example of valued material objects which, in some 
circumstances, were worn and thus constituted highly visible stimuli for 
conversations (Riches and Dawson 1998).  
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Since “tattoos compel one to gaze” (Kosut 2000 p82), ‘wearers’ may seek 
to pre-emptively manage undesirable gazes from others.60 The visual-textual 
legibility and location on the body of tattoos were important considerations, 
with some participants weighing up a desire for high visibility against risks that 
this may incur. Several participants described a sense of enjoyment from 
glimpsing and remembering the meanings behind their tattoo(s) as well as 
appreciated inquiry from others. Anne’s memorial tattoo was valued as a 
‘permanent’ reminder on her body about him and in a pseudo-visible, semi-
private location on her body:  
[the tattoo is] on the inside of my wrist, so that I can see it when I 
want to and also, you know, people might ask me about it and 
that’s okay because... then I’ll be able to tell them, you know, that I 
have a son. 
Such a comment reverberates strongly with Oksanen and Turtiainen (2005 
p128) that “[t]attoos articulate as memory maps written in flesh that enable life 
stories to be told”. However, several participants also expressed concerns that 
memorial tattoo visibility might attract unwanted and intrusive inquiry, 
exposing them to situations where they felt that they might be pressured into 
explaining the tattoos and/or subject to hurtful comments. Of the participants 
in the research, Anne had chosen the wrist whilst Fiona and Diane had both 
chosen the space between their shoulder blades for their memorial tattoos; all 
functioning as relatively flexible bodily locations for negotiating visibility (‘on 
show’ or not) given the predominant climate in their country of residence of the 
UK.61 Narratives about the decision-making processes around acquiring the 
                                                          
60 Although not directly mentioned by any participants here, it has been noted in academic 
literatures that tattooed women often face additional issues regarding stigma compared to their 
male counterparts (Atkinson 2002; Pitts 2003; Mifflin 2013). 
61 Owing also to cultural norms about propriety and ‘sexually’-delineated locations of 
predominant occurrence (breasts, hips, stomachs, bottom), stretch-marks were unanimously 
deemed overtly private and their visibility to most others disagreeable. Thus, stretch-marks 
were not talked about as skin-based modifications which participants made deliberate attempts 
to ‘show’ or ‘allow to be seen’. Instead, these tended to be subject to concealment such as by 
Rosie and Anne, regarding the end of their ‘bikini bodies’, and Carla who described clothes she 
would (jean/trousers) and wouldn’t (skirts, dresses, bra-less tops) wear in order to hide her 
stretch-marks and contain looser flesh. 
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tattoos often included issues such as anticipated responses, from both known 
and unknown others, and issues of the design, size and style of the tattoo.  
In weighing up the benefits and risks of visibility and legibility in relation 
to memorial tattoo acquisition, some participants’ narratives retained 
significant tensions. Reflexive about intentionality, motivation and the degree to 
which subconscious factors may have participated, Fiona spoke about her choice 
of a tattoo in another language to mark an early miscarriage:  
[the tattoos are] all personal, I don't really want anyone reading 
them and knowing what they mean (which is a double standard if 
anything, if I didn't want anyone knowing then I should never 
have gotten a tattoo in the first place)[.]   
Such an account reflects an ambivalence between a tattoo as able to provide 
recognition and acknowledge losses in a way which “situates pain and charts life 
experiences” (Oksanen and Turtiainen 2005 p127) whilst attempting to 
minimise a sense of overexposure. Both imperatives tend to be strongly felt and, 
it seems, often remain somewhat unresolved. The act of literally inscribing the 
existence of pregnancy losses onto bodies within a society which tends to 
socially and medically disavow these events is highly significant; however, 
within such a context where pregnancy loss is largely relegated as a ‘private’ 
issue, “[t]he more intense the need to veil the innermost parts, the greater the 
fears that develop about being involuntarily exposed” (Benthien 2002 p31). This 
has resonance with my discussion in Chapter 6 regarding the tensions between 
dispersing awareness of pregnancy loss and protecting individual privacy. 
Another aspect that Fiona employed for negotiating this tension between the 
simultaneously private-public nature of her tattooed skin was careful verbal 
narration. This strategy began from the moment of the tattooing process:  
[t]he tattooist himself did actually ask what it meant as he was 
curious because I'd done the design myself but to be honest I gave 
him the non-committal 'it's personal' reply. It was during that 
period of time where I didn't want to speak about it. 
When I asked her how the tattooist reacted, as well as any other individuals to 
whom she had refused elaboration of the tattoo meaning, Fiona said: 
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[p]eople's responses are usually quite similar, they usually tend 
not to push any further and just leave it at that […] When I say 
that 'it's personal' I try to respond in a way that they know that I'm 
not trying to be rude or cutting, but just that I honestly don't want 
to explain or go in to it. The people that really know me, know that 
if I want to talk, I'll offer up the subject myself but to push me in to 
talking about it when I don't want to won't achieve much. 
Hence, when the tattoo is visible on “a rare night out”, Fiona has “had a few 
questions asking what it means [and] I usually tell them the same thing[,] that 
it's personal[,] and people thankfully don't really push the subject”. In 
confidently adopting this approach of firmly but politely rejecting the invitation 
to explain the tattoo to unknown others, Fiona is able to dress without feeling a 
need to cover up her tattoo(s).  
Whilst location and aesthetics of skin-based markers are relatively fixed, 
subject to the possibility of cover up by clothes/jewellery, their meanings and 
emotionalities are subject to alteration. “Since life is constantly changing, the 
tattooed body cannot be static” (Oksanen and Turtiainen 2005 p122) and 
meanings can shift or fluctuate with re-evaluation across time and space. This 
does not mean, however, that previous meanings simply evaporate since the 
skin is “both already inscribed, or marked, and is always yet to be inscribed” 
(Ahmed and Stacey 2001 p14), in processes of becoming and changing. Ahmed 
and Stacey (2001 p15) acknowledge that although skins can “acquire new 
meanings, new forms, new shapes […] [they still carry] traces of those other 
[including historical] contexts in the very living materiality of its forms”. Diane 
had a total of three tattoos at the time of our interviews, the most recent from 
about five years ago marked her experience of seven miscarriages. She acquired 
her first tattoo prior to any of the miscarriages and her second tattoo following 
five miscarriages, prior to conceiving her second living child. This second tattoo 
is of an angel, a symbol particularly prevalent within pregnancy loss imagery 
(Layne 2000) and although Diane found affinity with through cherub 
ornaments representing her “lost babies”, she did not perceive this to be a 
memorial tattoo. Instead, it was chosen on an aesthetic basis: “I had the angel 
one just because I liked it[,] no reason behind it”.  
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It was Diane’s third tattoo which she described as her “baby loss” one, 
acquired following two additional miscarriages and the birth of her third living 
child. This tattoo again featured imagery associated with memorialisation 
generally and pregnancy loss specifically: hearts, cursive font, angel wings and 
halos. This tattoo, along with a number of cherub/angel and teddy bear 
ornaments (see Chapter 8), took on particular significance after Diane was 
required to disassemble her informal memorial garden when moving house. 
Though her memorial tattoo was rarely visible, except on holidays to warmer 
climates, to the extent that her preadolescent daughter was unaware of the 
tattoo or miscarriages, it held enormous personal value: 
[I] haven‘t really been asked about it to be honest but if [I] ever 
was [I] would be more than willing to tell them what it means to 
me, it means my babies are always with me even if they are not 
living, even though they were never born they were still my 
babies[.]  
Layne (2000) implies that the lack of pregnancy loss mementos can underpin 
the social denial of such losses and their grief legitimacy. Subsequently, proxy 
symbols of angels and footprints are often used to invoke thoughts of the 
wished-for children (Layne 2000). Diane explained her reasoning: 
I wanted the tattoo done for me to feel that my babies are always 
with me, as we who have early mc [miscarriages] don’t have 
anything to remember our babies by[.] 
With the ‘disenfranchised grief’ (Doka 2002) of many pregnancy losses and a 
lack of objects which had physical connection/contact with her to-be-babies, 
Diane utilised the imagery of angels in rendering her own material skin a 
memorial location: a place literally ‘touched’, by her pregnancies as well as the 
tattoo needles and ink, and marked as a testament to her experiences. 
Whilst jewellery tends to be a less enduringly part of the body compared 
to stretch-marks, scars and tattoos, the close proximity of these objects to/on 
the skin resonates with tattoos in various ways.62 Both tattoos and jewellery can 
                                                          
62 Although minimising/concealment products and laser-removal treatments are available, 
stretch-marks, scars, tattoos can be seen as being/becoming permanent parts of the skin. In 
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‘add’ to or otherwise decorate the skin, altering it to varying degrees of 
adornment durability. Memorial jewellery has a long history in the UK, entailing 
different trends and customs of which the Victorian era famously consisted of 
complex and prolific requirements for socially-apt mourning attire (Taylor 
1983). In relation to pregnancy loss, motifs of angels/cherubs as well as foot 
prints featured in pieces of memorial jewellery that some participants had been 
given or purchased. As Layne (2000 p338) states, memorial jewellery “serves 
not only to constitute that which was lost as ‘a child’ but also, just as 
importantly, the woman as ‘a mother”. In contrast to some material objects 
associated with bereavement generally, such as graveside flowers, and those 
specifically in relation to pregnancy loss such as balloons (Layne 2000), lit 
candles (Bleyen 2010) and bubbles (Davidsson Bremborg 2012) – memorial 
jewellery can be seen as a ‘hard’, lasting good (Layne 2000). For instance, Jane 
bought a bracelet from Ebay “made of beads with a little silver pair of angel 
wings which was made specifically for sufferers of miscarriage”. However, Jane 
rarely wore the bracelet because her young son “took quite a shine to it and liked 
pinging the beads” and she felt her husband would prefer not to see the visual 
reminder of the bracelet since “[his] approach to life is that if he ignores 
something bad then it generally goes away, or at least is lost underneath the 
surface”. Whilst Jane had only worn the bracelet a few times, it was clearly very 
appreciated as a tangible thing to see/have, providing a material presence more 
‘concrete’ than other memorial activities such as joining an online memorial 
site: 
I'm always scared that I'm going to forget important events in my 
life. Therefore, the bracelet represented something real and 
concrete, so that every time I saw it or wear it, I remember what 
happened. The [online memorial meadow] is lovely, but I have to 
remember it’s there, and make a conscious thought to go and look 
at it, which I will probably forget after a while. 
 Pertinent to cherub/angel imagery, particular features of material goods 
can resonate with dominant cultural conceptualisations and descriptions of 
new-born infants: as soft, cute and delicate (Layne 2000; see also Chapter 8). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
contrast, items of jewellery tend to be more de- and re- attachable, though piercing jewellery is 
somewhat of an exception since these breach the flesh and alter skin surfaces also. 
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Some items of memorial jewellery also embodied some of these qualities, 
though not without practical problems around robustness, problematising the 
‘hard’ enduring quality that Layne (2000) associates memorial jewellery with. 
Esther had bought a silver bracelet with an angel charm as her “remembrance 
thing, my token that it will never leave me”. She had worn the bracelet every day 
since but “it’s a fragile little thing... and I’ve broken it three times!” In addition, 
Esther valued a counter-part piece to the bracelet which she and her husband 
bought at the same time: 
we’d talked about getting... a something […] a... a... something we 
could have in the house that reminded us of what we’d lost, 
without it being obvious […] so that a visitor to our home, a friend, 
anyone that came into our home wouldn’t necessarily know what it 
was or why it was there and we’d gone through ideas, things like a 
picture frame, an ornament, erm... in the end we actually settled 
on a jewellery stand because neither of us actually wear jewellery 
to bed so at night we take our wedding rings off and we put them 
on the jewellery stand. So we both wanted something that would 
be used every day, which it is, and it’s not obvious why it’s there. 
The jewellery stand was a practical and highly meaningful counterpart to her 
memorial bracelet. The packaging of the bracelet was also significant: “it was the 
card that spoke to me more than the bracelet did” in emphasising ideas of hope, 
faith and belief. For Esther, the bracelet was chosen for evoking possibility 
regarding future children since she had been pregnant once, achieved through 
fertility treatment, and so hoped to become pregnant again to have a healthy 
baby, as well as being about “remembrance of the baby that we’d lost”. In a later 
interview, I asked Esther whether, after finishing her fertility treatment without 
a subsequent pregnancy, the meaning of the bracelet and the packaging message 
had changed: 
the meaning changed to remind me that sometimes dreams 
change […] so just because the original dream didn’t come true, it 
doesn’t mean that I don’t still have dreams and it doesn’t mean 
that THOSE dreams won’t come true. Just because that ONE 
[dream] wasn’t meant to be, doesn’t mean that dreams, new 
dreams, new hopes, new […] won’t come true […] and it reminds 
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me that even, even though what I originally wanted when the 
bracelet was bought for me… isn’t going to happen… I’ve still got 
dreams, I’ve still got a future and they can still come true for me 
[for instance, in relation to adoption]. 
Hence, the memorial objects described served an important purpose through 
which Esther expressed not just a profound sense of loss, but also the intensity 
of her marital relationship and shared hopes for their revised familial futures. 
 Akin to my approach to skins in general, jewellery and clothes mediate 
“between the body and others and as such [are] both public and private” (Layne 
2000 p338). As an item worn every day, and one which she described as 
aesthetically pretty but unusual for her taste in jewellery, Esther recalled a 
number of occasions when she had been asked about her bracelet. These 
encounters had sometimes opened opportunities to talk about her experience: 
people often comment, especially if I’ve got short sleeves on, you 
know, ‘pretty bracelet, isn’t that lovely’ and they see that it’s the 
wings and most people do ask the significance of it and I’m not shy 
in any way, shape or form so I’m quite happy to tell people the 
significance of what it is for ME. And most people [say] ‘oh, oh, 
very sorry to hear that happened.... okay’ and the conversation 
rolls on but a few people will actually spend time, you know, 
talking about it. 
There had been a number of times when Esther felt that the inquirer was not 
only inviting her to talk about her experiences but that “it’s almost like they 
wanted me to open the conversation to allow THEM to talk about it”. As such, 
through a conversation about her bracelet, Esther discovered that an older 
female friend had experienced a late miscarriage a number of years previously:  
Esther: she then shared with me HER experience and we had a 
really good cry on each other. But she, what she felt, what she said 
was that she’d wished she’d had something… PHYSICAL as a 
memory because at the time when she’d lost her baby, there hadn’t 
been anything. So, she’d not had a funeral or a remembrance 
service, nothing, it had just happened and she’d gone back to work 
however many days or weeks later […]  she said if she’d of had it at 
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the time – it would have been wonderful, but she didn’t need it 
now 
Abi: hmm, so do you find it a good thing to have that bracelet to 
kind of prompt those erm I don’t know if bonds is the right word 
but, you know, getting to know people in ways that maybe you 
hadn’t before?  
Esther: it’s been useful, it’s been useful, I wish I didn’t NEED a 
physical something to start those conversations, I wish that people 
felt comfortable enough to start them without it but I would rather 
have it and be able to use it to talk to people than not have it at all. 
Drawing on Riches and Dawson (1998 p136), as “more than records of 
memory”, memorial objects can function as “social props” for conversations 
about loss and/or bereavement. In the context of pregnancy loss, objects like 
memorial bracelets can foster connections between women on an informal, 
small scale basis, linking to Rosie’s workplace toilet example (Chapter 4) and 
some participants’ positive experiences of online support groups (Chapter 6). 
Concluding Remarks 
Skins and contours, as prominent sites regarding “the accumulations of a 
lifetime” (Winterson 1996 p89), are amenable to modifications and inscriptions 
of different kinds. In relation to pregnancy loss experiences, stretch-marks may 
denote rippling notions of ‘failure’ around pregnancy loss and flout normative 
feminine beauty ideals, but they can also convey sentiments of fond 
remembrance. Whilst stretch-marks were disliked and disguised by some, as 
with Carla’s stretch-marks – for others, like Anne, these could be valued 
reminders as ‘evidence’ of past experiences of pregnancy. Sometimes visible 
skin-based marks or objects were actively sought and, as with Esther’s bracelet, 
appreciated for the potential to strike up conversations about pregnancy losses. 
However, it is not possible to simply apply meanings to skins with the secure 
knowledge of how these will be ‘read’ by others and participants demonstrated 
that skin-based modifications and symbiotic material objects are subject to 
careful negotiation regarding visibility and legibility. Speaking of tattooing 
specifically, but to which I add other forms of marks on and alterations to the 
skin, Oksanen and Turtiainen’s (2005 p122) comment that “although the 
picture on the skin has a relative permanence, the affects connected to it change 
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with the flow of life”. Thus, the meanings about and engagements with skins 
marked or adorned in some way by pregnancy loss experiences are not static, 
but are dynamic and open to further spatial and temporal change.63 
I have argued that skin-based marks following pregnancy losses are not 
devoid of meaning nor attributed singular ‘readings’ and stretch-marks do not 
deterministically denote a sense of ‘failure’. Rather, bodily exteriors and 
contours are subject to a range of possible interpretations, as shaped by 
numerous factors and contexts (Benthien 2002). As for Anne, whilst she 
disliked her stretch-marks itchy with PUPPP during her pregnancy, they 
became important embodied reminders of her cherished stillborn son in her 
past, ongoing and future life. Thus, in relation to pregnancy losses, skin-based 
marks can be particularly significant given the absence of material, embodied, 
living children or children-to-be (Bleyen 2010; Layne 2000). Examples 
discussed have supported a conceptualisation of skin surfaces and contours as 
potential repositories of memory and recipients of memorialisation. Within this, 
linking to discussions in Chapters 3 and 5, women’s bodies are foregrounded as 
primary sites of loss and potentially another’s dying and death, making the 
skin—as an interface between self and world (Benthien 2002)—a particularly 
suitable space at which dialogues are held between emotional states like grief 
and their expression with resultant memorialisations.  
The themes of memory and memoriality have underpinned much of the 
discussions in this chapter on skins. Paralleling Rosenblatt et al’s (1976) 
distinction between grief and mourning, I suggest that memory (like grief) can 
be understood to denote internally held feelings in response to an event whilst 
memoriality (like mourning) refers to the ways such feelings are expressed in 
terms of culturally defined acts physically performed. Hence, ‘memory’ and 
‘memoriality’ are not discrete, radically different distinctions but relate to one 
another in porous ways. As such, some skin marks are acquired or ‘reclaimed’ as 
kinds of memorials embodied by the bereaved through acts, denoting agency 
and investing energy, concerned with meaning-making and narration. Thus, 
                                                          
63 The longer term context is a topic with scope for further research to consider, for instance, 
how further physiological changes (including fading, stretching, discolouration) over extended 
periods of time may impact upon the meanings held about these pregnancy loss related skin-
based modifications.  
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marks on/of the skin can be attributed the role of ‘memorialising’ or providing 
testament to something deemed significant, even if the existence of these was 
not initially ‘intended’ in such a way as with stretch-marks. Memoriality, in 
relation to the themes of materiality, absence, presence and continuing bonds 
theories, will now be further considered in Chapter 8.    
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Chapter 8: Pregnancy Loss Memorialisation 
Introduction 
Memorial practices testify to the significance of losses and, in the context 
of pregnancy loss, do so within a wider social environment which largely 
responds to such events with silence and/or denigration (Layne 1999). In 
contrast to other chapters in the thesis which have predominantly focused on 
the embodied experiences of ‘pre’- and ‘during’- pregnancy losses, Chapter 7 
and this chapter attend more so to the post-occurrence ways that pregnancy 
losses are re-asserted, marked and narrated by those with such experiences in 
their ongoing lives. This chapter demonstrates, through several examples, that 
the themes of ‘absence’ and ‘presence’ are pivotal to thinking about 
memorialisation practices and objects which fundamentally attempt to convey 
meanings held about experiences of loss. Scholarship attending to ‘material 
culture’ in relation to memory and mourning has highlighted memorial objects 
as tangible entities with social meanings and uses (Hallam et al 1999; Garattini 
2007; Gibson 2008; Doss 2010; Hockey et al 2010). For instance, Riches and 
Dawson (1998) find evidence of ‘continuing bonds’ grief theory in how bereaved 
parents (re)construct social identities for their deceased children with particular 
objects and conversations. This was also the case in my research on pregnancy 
loss although, as Diane commented (Chapter 7), the scope of existing material 
objects ‘belonging to’ or ‘reminding’ of pregnancy losses specifically can be 
relatively limited, hence her creation of one in the form of a memorial tattoo.  
Memorialisation concerns relations between the bereaved and deceased, 
but also involves wider social contexts which, for pregnancy losses, include 
medical staff, family members, friends and online support group users 
(Chapters 3, 4 and 6). In particular, online and face-to-face pregnancy loss 
support groups play important roles in informing viewers/users about different 
kinds of memorial activities and events. This is in the sense that memorial 
practices are “private and personal but formed by the collective in narratives. 
The private rituals seem to need affirmation from others, a negotiation, and 
reconstruction forming the norms and values of ritualization” (Davidsson 
Bremborg 2012 p163). Support organisations, like MA and Sands in the UK, 
have campaigned for various forms of ‘memory-making’ in institutional settings 
such as hospitals with the collection and production of material artefacts in 
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anticipation of memorialisation. Following stillbirths and neonatal deaths, but 
potentially also used for other pregnancy losses, ‘memory’ boxes are used in 
hospitals – containing disposable cameras and hand-foot print kits, functioning 
as a place-object in which to store additional mementos such as ID bracelets, 
hats or blankets (Layne 2003a, 2004, 2006; Komaromy et al 2007). As 
mentioned (Chapter 5), there are ongoing debates as to which factors hinder or 
facilitate ‘healthy grief’, concerning aspects such as seeing deceased bodies and 
keeping mementos (Henley and Schott 2008; Rådestad et al 2009). However, 
when conversations and actions are carefully enacted by medical staff, it is 
possible to dispel notions that it is ‘abnormal’ to grieve, mourn and memorialise 
these events (McHaffie 2001; Davidson 2008; Rådestad et al 2009). 
The structure of this final empirical chapter, relating to the concepts of 
‘presence’ and ‘absence’ and grief theories of ‘continuing bonds’, will be as 
follows. I will outline the topics of memory, mourning and memorialisation in 
relation to pregnancy loss upon which I will elaborate four sets of examples 
from my research. The first will focus on examples of memorialisation 
concerning the material presence of embryonic, foetal and baby bodies in terms 
of official and informal graves. I will then discuss symbolic ornaments as kinds 
of physical substitutes for, or in addition to, the physicality of deceased 
embryo/foetal bodies. In the third set, I will consider ‘index’ examples:  material 
objects involving ‘traces’ of previous but now absent bodily presences, such as 
ultrasonography scan images and, in relation to stillbirth and neonatal death, 
photographs. The fourth and final set of examples will focus on memorial 
practices which are deliberately ephemeral either as events, like releasing a 
Chinese lantern, or in terms of the ongoing pace of ‘everyday’ embodied life.   
Remembering and Memorialising Pregnancy Losses 
Absence can be partially invoked and ‘placed’ through materiality, 
leaving different kinds of presences and traces with subsequent effects (Meyer 
2012). Material memorial practices and objects are thus recognised as 
significant responses to loss (Garattini 2007). In this chapter, I draw on the 
ways absence and presence “hold together” (Meyer 2012 p109 italics in original) 
to produce an account of (re)collected pregnancy loss memorialisation. Tonkin 
(2012 p6) comments that if a woman doesn’t have a child biologically but had 
planned to, “she engages in a process of accommodation to a life in which her 
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fantasy is not embodied, and that this process is often a lengthy one, fraught 
with ambivalence, and social and emotional complexities”.64 Memories of the 
past as well as (shifting) anticipated futures are also crucial in my thinking 
about experiences of pregnancy loss. Finding affinity for understanding the 
experiences of my own participants, the language of ‘absence’ and ‘presence’ as 
utilised in Tonkin (2012) and recent geographical work on bereavement (see 
Maddrell 2013) will underpin my subsequent discussions.  
Demonstrating the ways in which experiences pertain to not only 
individual persons but also socio-cultural collectives, Connerton (2011) 
emphasises that narrative-practices of ‘mourning’ and ‘legitimation’ are 
fundamentally intertwined. The testimonial genre, underpinned by the 
imperative that “[s]urvivors need to tell the truth about a historical 
catastrophe”, can entail varied “texts of mourning” such as those involving the 
media of cloth, paint, literature, cinema, photographs, songs and festivals 
(Connerton 2011 p22, p26). Connerton (2011) also argues that memories are 
retained and articulated through bodily actions including gestures, 
comportment and speech as well as deliberately in material forms such as 
memorial monuments. Mourning and memorialisation entail intentions to 
convey to others, and remind oneself, that the losses they represent are 
significant and worthy of acknowledgement. Individuals and potentially their 
social circles can be motivated by memories and emotions regarding pregnancy 
loss to ‘do’ something as a means of testifying to the significance of their 
experiences which they may or may not see as pertaining to the death of a 
person. In doing so, these endeavours can confront and counter the wider social 
attitude towards pregnancy loss perceived to be one of silence and/or 
denigration, resonating with Doka’s (2002) notion of ‘disenfranchised grief’. 
As with Victorian mourning customs (Taylor 1983), orientations towards 
memorial practices are strongly related to and shaped by the wider context 
regarding what is deemed appropriate for the bereaved to do, say, wear and so 
on. In suggesting that memorial practices are influenced by the social, cultural, 
                                                          
64 Relevant to my research, several ‘circumstantially childless’ women researched by Tonkin 
(2012) spoke about waning fertility so that their intentions and anticipation for (biological) 
children would shortly be or had been surpassed and some mentioned previous experiences in 
which pregnancy had been briefly embodied but had ended in termination or early miscarriage.  
206 
 
economic, historical, political and legal contexts in which they occur – this is not 
to imply that memories are somehow detached and independent of such 
influences. Consider the efforts to distinguish ‘healthy’ from ‘unhealthy’ grieving 
following bereavements generally and pregnancy loss specifically, as based on 
internal feelings as well as outward behaviours and impacts. Subsequently, ‘grief 
policing’ also concerns efforts to monitor and implement limitations on internal 
and external responses to bereavements in line with those considered by others, 
including psychology-trained experts as well as wider society, to be ‘acceptable’ 
and appropriate (Walter 1999; Small and Hockey 2001). Memories internally 
held and memoriality externally enacted are both subject to monitoring and 
regulation by oneself and others. Therefore, wider social attitudes, dialoguing 
with prescriptive notions of normality—including in line with reductionist 
approaches to grading and measuring grief as evidenced in a number of studies 
in the discipline of psychology (Small 2001)—can restrictively delineate what is 
deemed appropriate or not to ‘do’ during/following events of pregnancy loss.  
Memories, with scope for pregnancy loss memorialisation, can be held 
about many different aspects of one’s experiences. Regardless of whether legally 
considered a death of a person in relation to gestational age and/or post-partum 
breathing, this can include memories pertaining to the construction/attribution 
of social identities during, and even prior to, pregnancy and which can continue 
after loss (Layne 1999; Hockey and Draper 2005). In capitalist societies, 
‘mothering’ from pregnancy onwards often entails acquisition of material 
objects ‘for’ or ‘belonging to’ the forthcoming baby such as clothes, bottles, cribs 
and toys (Layne 1999; Taylor 2004b). Subsequently, Miller (2004) suggests, 
shopping plays an important part in pregnant women developing themselves as 
‘mothers’ with the relational counterpart of ‘baby’, as energy is also transferred 
to constructing the baby’s identity such as through buying booties and 
sleepsuits. The expectation is that a living child will be born to grow and occupy 
the social identity that the parents and their social circle often construct for 
them in lieu, as well as use the material goods. This trajectory is disrupted in 
events of pregnancy loss – however, as Layne (1999, 2000, 2003a, 2004) 
highlights, material objects may still be utilised to confirm and further develop 
the existence of the ‘baby’. Thus, ‘real things’, as tangible, concrete items 
associated with- or owned ‘by’- the ‘baby’ can denote ‘realness’ of the pregnancy 
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loss (Layne 1999, 2000, 2003a, 2004) and, subsequently, grief felt and the 
validity of mourning and memorialising. 
The materiality of mourning and memorialisation can be understood to 
highlight not only the ‘legitimacy’ of an experience, but also attest to willingness 
to retain recognition of it, resonating with grief theories of continuing bonds 
(Silverman and Klass 1996; Small 2001). Processes of constructing social 
identities exceed biological lives, occurring before birth and continuing after 
death (Hockey and Draper 2005), and thus entail relationships between the 
living and the unborn and/or deceased as often mediated by material objects. 
Continuing bonds theories in the context of pregnancy loss can emphasise the 
enduring ways in which identities are (re)constructed of the ‘baby’, as parents 
and/or a family unit (Murphy 2009, 2012a, 2012b) with recognition of these 
experiences retained beyond the time-setting of actual occurrence. Indeed, 
Kempson and Murdock (2010) show that those who never knew about their 
deceased sibling(s), including because they were born subsequently, can become 
‘memory keepers’. Walter (1996) suggests a model of grief in which the bereaved 
construct a durable biography to enable integration of the memory of the dead 
into their ongoing lives. One primary way in which this is done is via 
conversations with others who knew the deceased (Walter 1996). However, in 
the context of pregnancy loss, the social circle able and/or willing to engage in 
practices of (re)creating the identities of such ‘children’ may be very limited and 
precarious. Wider social others, whom often had been encouraging and were 
themselves engaged in the social construction of the forthcoming-baby during a 
‘healthy’ pregnancy, may then retract this investment and instead disapprove, 
trivialise or actively hinder mourning and memorialising efforts when 
pregnancy losses occur (Murphy 2012a).  
Building on recognition that palimpsestic, multi-vocal memories reside 
in space with traces of the forgotten, geographical scholarship has highlighted a 
range of localities whereby efforts to remember (memorialise) take place and 
leave material deposits. Some ‘geographies of death and dying’ examples were 
mentioned in Chapter 5, such as spontaneous memorials, monuments and 
memorial benches. Bleyen (2010) and Woodthorpe (2012) argue that pregnancy 
losses memorialisation tends to be aesthetically-materially different, in terms of 
a playful tone and more extensive/prolific accumulations, to that found at adult 
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graves. As Woodthorpe (2012 p147) highlights, memorial gardens for babies and 
‘nearly viable foetuses’ in the UK can seem like “colourful, ornate and youthful 
area[s]” to the visitor. Davidsson Bremborg (2012) notes some specific 
memorial practices around events like stillbirths such as blowing bubbles at 
grave sites in the Swedish context. In addition to the material objects left at 
memorial sites, whether these are the actual graves or collective cenotaph-style 
sites like memorial gardens, the physical layout of the space is significant. In 
Woodthorpe’s (2012) research with crematoria and cemetery managers, 
particular conceptualisation of baby gardens emerged as bounded communities 
akin to crèches, nurseries or playgrounds where the babies were ‘together’ in 
shared companionship. One cemetery manager anticipated bereaved parents to 
dislike a bounded baby garden located near a war memorial grave section; 
however, this location was embraced since the soldiers (graves) were seen as 
protecting the “vulnerable and defenceless [baby garden] residents” 
(Woodthorpe 2012 p148). Graves will be the first set of examples I now discuss.  
Physical, Bodily Presence: Graves 
Encountering embryonic/foetal bodies and placental materiality outside 
of the woman’s body featured prominently in Chapter 5; here, I further consider 
this topic in relation to mourning and memorial activity-spaces. That pregnancy 
losses over 24 weeks gestation are currently in the UK legally considered deaths 
and must be registered as such has implications for, for instance, funerary 
practices. Both Diane and Fiona suggested that early miscarriages are not 
widely socially recognised and that this links to a lack of material evidence left 
by, and indeed of, those ‘persons’ now deceased. Subsequently, some pregnancy 
losses are more likely than others to be offered, encouraged or regarded as 
appropriate for funerals in addition to other memorial practices by the hospital, 
for example, whilst others are not and indeed it may be largely considered 
improper to do so. Amongst research participants, attendance at official 
funerals was discussed by Siobhan (neonatal death of her nephew), Ben 
(stillbirth of his niece), Anne (stillbirth of her son), Isabel (late miscarriage at 20 
weeks), and Tania (miscarriage at 14 weeks). In addition, Lara and Caroline 
spoke about informal burials in gardens or parks of their early miscarriages.  
Coffins, as interfaces between the bodies of the bereaved and the 
deceased, can be evocative sights/sites since these materialise the loss and bring 
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home the physical reality as a powerful symbol of absence (McHaffie 2001; 
Valentine 2008). The emotional intensity was felt to be especially so for 
pregnancy loss funerals in which the visual aesthetics of the coffins are 
simultaneously small and yet ‘too large’ by virtue of existing at all and/or in 
relation to the size of the contained body. Ben, speaking of the funeral of his 
stillborn niece, described the sight of “a tiny little baby’s coffin” as a “powerful 
thing” which had noticeable impacts upon not only the funeral attendees but 
also onlookers who encountered the funeral procession: “I just remember that 
everybody stopped in the street and just kind of bowed their heads down […] 
they were very kind of affected by it”. The sight of “a tiny white coffin” was also 
commented on by Anne who visited the funeral home with her husband to “see 
what the coffin looked like so it wasn’t a massive shock”. McHaffie (2001 p229) 
suggests that funeral directors have additional responsibilities in the context of 
baby deaths to help prepare the bereaved for these sights and that they might 
potentially offer “less exceptional and heartrendering [options], such as an 
ordinary wooden coffin”. Finding it helpful in preparing her, “because to see a 
tiny coffin is a HUGE shock”, Anne had passed on this advice to visit the funeral 
home to other online support group users (as mentioned in Chapter 6).  
Some participants had not anticipated funerals being offered in relation 
to their pregnancy losses which, whilst denoting legitimacy of the bereavement, 
can also be tinged with ambivalence. Following her late miscarriage, Tania gave 
a noncommittal response to a nurse informing her “that the hospital has 
religious services for all the babies that have been lost […] I'm not religious so 
[I] didn't want to attend but I just asked her to send me some information closer 
to the date”. Several days later, the hospital called “to say they had arranged a 
funeral service for my baby as they thought that was what I wanted […] it was 
booked and would still go ahead with or without me”. Tania’s husband was 
concerned about the impact attending might have on her, but she explained “I 
couldn't have my baby there in a coffin alone, no matter how many weeks it was 
I wasn't going to have a ceremony with no-one there”. The experience of the 
funeral was fraught, although Tania and her husband “both felt much peace 
afterwards”. She recalled watching “as they brought out a baby sized coffin 
which was horrendous, I knew my baby was tiny in there but the size of the 
coffin just made it so much worse”. The visual sight of the coffin prompted 
divergent feelings: “my baby was only 14 weeks old [gestation] and I didn’t feel 
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comfortable with a full funeral service” alongside recognition of the magnitude 
of loss entailing projected futures and the identity of the child-that-could-have-
been:  
it was so hard because it felt as though it was a much older baby 
inside that coffin […] we couldn't help but think who that baby 
may have become, we were going to miss watching him (I felt it 
was a boy) grow up, whether he'd love football as much as his 
brother, whether he'd have the cheeky smile like his sister. 
Thus, as for these participants, the specific aesthetic qualities of many 
pregnancy loss coffins were intensely emotionally triggering, in materially 
foregrounding ruptured linear expectations about the life of the forthcoming-
baby with biological- absence, loss and/or death. 
The offer of an official funeral also diverged with Isabel’s expectations 
and she was “amazed” that the hospital arranged a funeral “seeing as he was 
considered to be a 'late miscarriage' [at 20 weeks] and not a still[-]birth”. She 
added that “[e]ven if he was a still[-]birth, I would not have expected a funeral” 
and “thought that was really nice of them to do that”. Isabel also spoke about the 
specific aesthetics of the funeral, including “a white flower wreath in the shape 
of a teddy bear”. White flowers, symbolising purity and innocence, were also 
present at the funeral described by Tania who “placed a white rose on the 
coffin”. After the funeral, Isabel and her sister relocated the teddy bear flower 
wreath to a relative’s grave in a nearby churchyard. This grave then became a 
key proxy site visited in the absence of another fixed place, as her son’s ashes 
were scattered at the crematorium some distance away: "[I] can, you know, go 
somewhere and go and talk to him. So normally if… if I’m thinking of him or 
something, I’ll take flowers over to the relative’s grave and sort of like talk to 
him there”.  
Facilitated through the located, material bodily remains, the site of 
burials and ash-scattering can allow the bereaved to retain connections with the 
deceased (Francis et al 2001, 2005; Davies 1997; Voller 1991). In contrast to 
ashes, which “are one step removed from the [coherence/likeness of the] body”, 
burial sites are particularly important in facilitating or permitting ‘connections’ 
with the deceased as “trigger[s] for memory” and a “basis for a continuing 
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relationship perpetuated through visiting the grave and often engaging in 
conversation with the dead” (Davies 1997 p175). In addition to the issue of 
proximity to her home, this factor may also underpin Isabel’s preferred location, 
the burial site of another relative near by, for retaining connection to her son.  
Connections between the two sites for Isabel, from the funeral at the 
crematorium to the pre-existing grave in a nearby cemetery, were facilitated by 
the movement and materiality of the teddy bear flower wreath. As a ‘vehicle’, the 
wreath linked the locations so that the proxy grave supported ongoing 
connections between Isabel and her deceased baby, as exercised when she visits 
to think about and talk to him. ‘Proxy’ sites, where their own pregnancy losses 
were not/yet physically located, were also used by some participants for 
remembrance and memorialisation. For instance, Penny sometimes visited a 
baby garden at a local crematorium and hoped to eventually have the ashes from 
her miscarriage transferred to this site. She described it as a “very beautiful” 
place, allowing “a bit of closure” and “a chance to say goodbye”, although she 
anticipated that the relocation of the ashes from her miscarriage would mean 
that the distress would “all come back and I will struggle again”. Isabel 
mentioned another example of connections between sited experiences 
associated with different deceased persons, highlighting that pregnancy loss 
funerals can trigger and ricochet with other experiences of bereavement: 
I just wanted it [the funeral] to just be quiet and so just REALLY 
for me and [my husband] to go, erm… but [he] didn’t want to go, 
erm I think one reason was because of HIS family past and 
because his, his mother passed away when he was a teenager and 
so I think possibly it was a link to that. He didn’t want to [go] 
because the funeral was at the same place so I don’t think he 
wanted to be reminded of that. 
With the exception of her sister, Isabel decided not to tell other family members 
about, or invite them to, the funeral as she was acutely aware of the scope for 
‘social policing’ of her grief, heightened especially by longstanding family 
politics with her mother. She explained: “I didn’t really want a big fuss and, you 
know, everyone to be crying and looking at me and sort of like judging me, the 
way I was behaving and stuff like that”. When I asked if the prospect of her 
behaviour being assessed at the funeral related to the specific circumstances of 
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pregnancy loss, Isabel responded: “yeah, I think, YEAH, because if sort of like 
you knew somebody then you’d be able to talk about them but… it’s a different 
situation isn’t it, for a baby you’ve not even sort of had, you know, has LIVED”. 
In this way, pregnancy losses can entail additional tensions and pressures 
regarding ‘grief policing’ (Walter 1999; Small and Hockey 2001). 
Such sentiments were also echoed by Ben about the funeral for his 
stillborn niece. Regarding a notebook which had been passed around to funeral 
attendees, he explained how his sister, the mother of the stillborn baby, had: 
Ben: really wanted to document the time, the life of the child, even 
though the child wasn’t, she viewed it as being alive – as if it had 
lived and even if it had only lived in her, her womb, but it still lived 
and she wanted to document this very short life as detailed as she 
could, erm  
Abi: how did you feel about participating in that? Like, did you 
write in the notebook as well?  
Ben: I wrote in it but I really struggled to write something and I 
thought it was a really good idea at the time and I understood the 
reasons behind it but I remember just thinking what can I write to 
[a] person I didn’t know. 
This recollection foregrounds the additional difficulties faced for constructing a 
‘durable biography’ of the deceased (Walter 1996), given lacking/limited shared 
memories. Similar to Isabel’s husband’s previous experience of bereavement 
underlying his decision not to attend the funeral, Ben also implied that multiple 
experiences of bereavement can connect with one another. The funeral of his 
stillborn niece had been the first funeral Ben attended “of a young person rather 
than […] very very old people in the family who’d passed on”. Subsequently, it 
was “REALLY different, I mean REALLY different from any other funerals, 
there was so much more anguish”. Since then, Ben had attended an additional 
funeral for his father which was coincidentally on the anniversary of the funeral 
for his stillborn niece. Additionally, the two graves are located side-by-side in 
the cemetery meaning that when Ben visits his father’s grave primarily, he also 
visits and engages with that of his niece. These visits then become part of a 
wider conversation between Ben and other members of his family: 
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[at the graves, I say] hello to her and treat her as if she was some 
kind of {laughs} like distant family relative and there’s just always 
a little small talk [with other family members afterwards] going 
“yeah I saw [niece], she’s fine, her grave is looking well”, because 
we always take good care of it and make sure that it’s erm and all 
the plants and everything are well tended to. 
Reiterating that there is often specific aesthetic qualities of pregnancy/baby loss 
graves markedly different to those traditionally of adult graves (Bleyen 2010; 
Woodthorpe 2012), Ben remarked at the contrast between these two graves: 
my dad’s grave still doesn’t even have a tomb stone on it {laughs} 
two years after his death ‘cos we can’t decide what to put on it so 
we just haven’t done anything, it’s quite funny, {laughs} it looks 
like an abandoned piece of grass and then yeah [my niece’s] grave 
is always PRISTINE with so many decorations. 
 ‘Informal’ burials were undertaken by some participants regarding their 
early pregnancy losses which neither required nor were permitted official 
registration of death. Resonating with Murphy and Philpin’s (2010) 
observations about language uncertainty, Lara explained how, after an early 
miscarriage, she and her partner “buried it beneath a tree that I could see from 
my window so we can be close”. Lara’s hesitation, saying “I don’t know if I’m 
supposed to have buried it in the place that I did”, could pertain to issues of 
legality but also social propriety. The site chosen evokes connotations with 
‘nature’, a theme which frequently features in pregnancy loss narratives (Layne 
1999); indeed, gardens and parks were also commented on by some of my other 
participants. Layne (1999 p269) suggests the popularity of ‘natural’ settings and 
“garden memorabilia” pertains to the ways that such imagery “normalizes the 
child’s death”. After a series of traumatic hospital encounters, Caroline 
described how she stayed at home whilst miscarrying a fourth time, recalling 
her assertive sentiments: “I’m going to deal with it as I wanna deal with it and I 
will bury whatever comes out in my garden, and I don’t care about what they 
think or say”. As with visiting formal graves, the chosen burial site for the 
remains, under a pre-existing cherry tree, provided a space at which Caroline 
could maintain relationships with all four of her miscarried ‘children’:  
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I just thought it was nice because it was quite a blossom-y tree and 
I liked it, I liked the tree and I like the garden ‘cos it’s peaceful and 
yeah, the baby’s still [buried] there […] [I] probably look like a 
mad woman {laughs} but I go [outside sometimes] for a little 
natter.  
Through the memorialising actions of visiting (official, unofficial) graves—as 
well as actions such as talking to the deceased, leaving flowers, tending the 
vegetation and cleaning a memorial stone/plaque—“the cemetery enables the 
living to remember the dead and to construct meaning through social action and 
the materiality of the grave” (Francis et al 2005 p19). Thus, graves can be 
physical locations at which the social presences of pregnancy loss ‘babies’, which 
are also absences of embodied persons, are acknowledged and incorporated into 
the lives of those participating in such memorialisation activities.  
As suggested so far, whilst the locations at which the specific material 
bodies of pregnancy losses are interred can provide focal points, there is also 
flexibility and more fluidity regarding the spaces which can permit such 
emotional and physical connections. This includes the example described by 
Isabel in which the primary site visited was transferred from the crematorium to 
another relative’s grave. Another example was given by Caroline, who 
demonstrated that her relationships and engagements with the subjects of her 
pregnancy losses did not necessitate being near the cherry tree. Characterising 
herself ambiguously in relation to religion, Caroline nonetheless suggested her 
receptiveness and perhaps hope as to the possibility of an afterlife:  
sometimes I lie in bed at night and natter because you don’t know 
what’s beyond do you, just have a little natter, you know, ‘this is 
what’s going on and so on’, 10 years on and I still talk to them, why 
not, it’s not hurting anybody. 
With heaven constituting a particular spatial reference (Grainger 1998), 
Caroline’s practice of talking to her deceased ‘babies’ wherever she is suggests a 
belief in omnipresent afterlife as able to traverses space-time differences 
(between where Caroline is and where the deceased ‘are’). Whilst she has one 
informal burial site, being at the location of the physical bodily remains of the 
deceased is not necessary to her continuing bonds. Memorialisation can thus be 
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transferred elsewhere and, Caroline implied, potentially everywhere and 
anywhere. This is particularly salient for those without interment sites for their 
pregnancy losses and, as I will now discuss, who utilise other objects with 
symbolic currency in the absence of, or in addition to, such bodily materiality.  
Symbolic Absence-Presence Through Material Objects 
Rendering the absence of a loss/deceased entity present in the form of 
objects, memorial ‘things’ “resonate with [contemporary] beliefs in the symbolic 
and emotional power of material culture” (Doss 2010 p71). As noted, this is a 
key observation in the literature on death, loss and material culture (Riches and 
Dawson 1998; Hockey et al 2001, 2010; Maddrell and Sidaway 2001, Doss 
2002, 2010; Gibson 2008) and on pregnancy losses specifically (Bleyen 2010; 
Woodthorpe 2012). As Bleyen (2010 p17) notes, the use and acquisition of 
‘things’ to evoke memory and enact memorialisation pertains to the ways that 
“the invisibility of someone who has died—perhaps most tellingly when they had 
no previous embodiment lodged in the memories of their survivors—can work 
to powerfully evoke their presence”. Engagements between the bereaved with 
such objects are simultaneously physical and emotional, potentially resonating 
in ways with some kinds of sensuous experiences entailed in ‘parenting’ living 
children. Regarding the material culture surrounding pregnancy loss, tying into 
the wider interlinks between mothering and capitalism (Taylor 2004b), Layne 
(1999, 2000, 2003a, 2004) highlights a range of gift-giving practices and 
scenarios in which objects are used to represent pregnancy losses. Some aspects 
of these will now be discussed in relation to Diane, who had a cabinet containing 
various items memorialising her pregnancy losses as well as the remains of one 
eight week embryo in a test-tube container. 
Although not the only research participant who owned memorial ‘things’, 
Diane seemed to have the most prolific and extensive collection pertaining to 
seven miscarriages. The collection was incredibly important to Diane yet she 
feared being negatively judged about particular components: “I think only the 
lady from the mc [miscarriage] support group knows about the loss I have [in 
the test-tube] at home so I have never really had a reaction from anyone, but I 
have a feeling people who don’t understand would think it was odd”. Given her 
anxieties, I was privileged that Diane was willing to talk with me, commenting “I 
don’t share [this] with any one in case they think I’m odd but I will share with 
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you”, and offered to “send you a photo if you wish[,] I wouldn’t mind at all”. 
Though two of her previous miscarriages had been surgically managed, Diane 
was asked only the third time about disposal preferences on a consent form – 
indicating that taking the embryo remains home was an option. With written 
recognition that this was possible, and the implication that others had done so, 
Diane felt legitimised in requesting to take home the embryo remains. She had 
originally planned to bury the remains in part of her garden dedicated as a 
memorial with plants and ornaments to her miscarriages. However, saying “[I] 
couldn[’]t bring myself to do it”, Diane was ultimately glad that she had not 
done so as she had since moved home: “I cried when packing up all the things 
out of my old garden as that was my special place and when I was feeling really 
sad I used to sit on the wall looking at all the things I had done for my babies”.  
Diane had created a memorial collection in a cabinet with the 
accumulation over time of, amongst others, angel/cherub ornaments and teddy 
bears. These can be understood as “objects which stand in for the child who has 
died [… and] serve a figurative purpose in making present the absent baby” 
(Bleyen 2010 p17). In addition, such surrounding items in the cabinet were 
considered by Diane to create a suitable space for the embryo remains, nestled 
within a “fancy pot” ‘held’ by a small teddy bear toy. Angel imagery is 
particularly salient in representing miscarriages (Layne 2000, 2003a; Keane 
2009) and, additionally, “[s]tuffed animals, teddy bears in particular, intimate 
lost innocence” (Doss 2010 p71) as with Isabel’s flower wreath, Anne’s sister’s 
teddy in baby clothes and Woodthorpe’s (2012) example in which one teddy 
bear left in the hedge of a baby memorial garden can soon proliferate into many 
as others visitors/users add their own. Teddies are a common gift given to 
forthcoming pregnancies in which a living baby is anticipated, but, as in this 
case, can also be given ‘in memory’ following pregnancy losses. For Diane, it 
seemed that the nearby proximity of the placed teddy bears was a reversal of 
touching and holding between ‘baby’ and ‘teddy’. The disrupted usual 
expectations of active touch by the baby/child were further emphasised by the 
juxtaposed sizes, with the teddy being much larger than the very “small” ‘baby’:  
the teddy ornaments are there for my babies as they were not here 
to be able to have their first teddy when [they were] born […] the 
217 
 
teddy in the box with my loss is holding the test tube, so instead of 
my baby holding its first teddy – the teddy is holding the baby[.] 
The material presence of Diane’s collection of teddy bears symbolically ‘owned’ 
by the “lost babies” can be understood to involve the kinds of gift-giving 
practices identified by Layne (1999, 2000, 2003a, 2004). Such material objects 
and associated practices of ‘gifting’, in multiple relations/directions, render the 
deceased baby an absence-presence in the lives of the living (Layne 1999, 2000, 
2003a). For example, following pregnancy loss, gifts can be given in the name/ 
on behalf of deceased babies, such as with donations to charitable organisations 
offering pregnancy loss support and furthering research (Layne 1999, 2003a). 
The teddies in Diane’s cabinet, ‘for’ the miscarried babies and ‘holding’ one 
miscarried embryo, can be understood as examples of gifts given to the deceased 
babies which simultaneously constitute memorial objects. The teddies are gifts 
‘to’ the miscarried children (‘given’ after the miscarriages have occurred) but 
they are also kinds of memorial objects which Diane has gifted to herself 
(perhaps, in sentiment, ‘from’ the babies) to keep, display and, indeed, care for. 
As Murphy (2009, 2012a, 2012b) shows, in recognising that social 
parenting occurs during pregnancy simultaneously with biological parenting, it 
becomes possible to consider the activities of ‘caring’ and ‘attending to’ 
(touching, looking at, smelling) memorial objects as forms of negotiating and 
maintaining parental identity in addition to the post-life social identities of the 
babies. Murphy (2009) argues for recognition of the ways in which ‘bereaved 
parents’ continue to actively ‘parent’ their stillborn children through various 
social activities, including with the example of cleaning the child’s grave instead 
of their bedroom. Families and/or individuals can continue to (re)construct 
particular relationships with the deceased child, restoring and supporting one’s 
identity as a mother/parent (Murphy 2009).65 Thus, Diane can be understood 
as having collected various things ‘for’ her miscarried children – organising, 
cleaning and preserving these in the cabinet as well as with other objects 
dispersed throughout her home. Layne (1999, 2000, 2003a) and Murphy 
(2009) foreground the physicality and tangibility of material objects involved in 
                                                          
65 As such, I suggest that the aforementioned example of Anne’s sister’s plans to dress a teddy in 
a baby grow previously bought constitutes an example of enacting the identity of ‘being an aunt’ 
via objects which, given the circumstances of stillbirth, are also memorials. 
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such practices of ‘active parenting’ with (relational) identity constitution. ‘Baby 
things’ as memorial objects embody “shared qualities of babyhood which are so 
culturally valued” (Layne 2000 p339, 2003a), evident in the ‘softness’ and 
‘cuteness’ of Diane’s teddies. In the same ways that one can interact with living, 
moving and growing babies, ‘baby thing’ memorial objects can enable physical 
engagements like intentional touching and looking. Layne (2000 p324) 
describes how such objects permit this by being: 
sentiently apprehended in the same ways that living children are, 
but that dead children (once they have been buried or disposed of) 
no longer can be. They can be touched, held, caressed, hugged, 
and gazed upon. […] Like children, they can also be cleaned, 
protected, and displayed for the admiration of others. 
This denotes an active notion of loss, as tasks of parenting are missed (Murphy 
2012a), and of memorialisation whereby objects are cared for (Garattini 2007).  
Diane recognised that the presence of the memorial items inside her 
home and in the garden could become such staple and everyday components 
that they slip from awareness. This is not to say that they are simply erased; 
they are present and seen but in a way that is normalised as part of her life and 
home space, much like living children. Diane explained that the objects in her 
cabinet, foregrounding meanings of absence, are presences “to remember my 
babies” but that “to be honest I forget it [the embryo] is there”. Thus, the objects 
and bodily remains are ‘constant reminders’ (Murphy 2009) but in a familiar, 
partially noticed way. This likely pertains to elapsed time, with the vast majority 
of Diane’s miscarriages occurring over a decade ago, as well as other life 
pressures such as a demanding job and attending to her living family/children. 
Another aspect, I suggest, is that the memorial objects are no longer simply ‘in’ 
her home but are physically and emotionally central to the constitution ‘of’ her 
home as such. The objects are an “assertion” of her feelings on the miscarriage 
losses (Layne 1999 p268), powerfully anchoring continued bonds to (sub-
locations of) her home and thus firmly incorporated into Diane’s life so that 
constant recall is not necessary. That is, memorial objects can be memory 
prosthesis: materially present, allowing one not to have to continually 
cognitively recall the past, thus permitting a kind of ‘background’ remembering. 
However, this may only be momentarily, especially given that recognition of 
219 
 
having ‘disremembered’ can have the paradoxical “effect of drawing attention to 
them, and so causing them to be remembered” (Connerton 2011 p41). This, as I 
will shortly discuss, can also be the case for ‘index’ memorial objects.   
Traces of Physical Absence-Presence: Scan Images and Photography 
Photographs, hand-foot prints and ultrasonography images—as indexical 
items (Layne 2003a; Keane 2009)—refer to the biological bodily existence of 
embryos, foetuses and babies and are objects crucial to practices of 
contemporary social identity construction both pre-birth and post-death 
(Hockey and Draper 2005). Ultrasonography images, usually taken whilst 
pregnancies were ongoing and considered viable, as well as photographs and 
hand-foot prints, which can be taken following birth before and/or after death, 
are kinds of material objects which embody a notion of directness or proximity 
to the now-lost baby/pregnancy (Layne 2000, 2003a). The status of these as 
objects, however, can go unnoticed when focus is on the images depicted in/on 
them, thus potentially obscuring various social practices (Edwards 2001, 2005; 
Batchen 2004; Edwards and Hart 2004; Gibson 2008; Rose 2010). The 
production of image-objects like ultrasonography scans, photographs and foot-
hand prints intimately depend on particular technologies—such as ultrasound 
machinery, paper-ink and cameras—embedded within networks of relations and 
environments, involving ultrasonography technicians, medical rooms, nurses, 
darkrooms and photographic process workers. These collections and 
connections underpinning production are often, however, backgrounded or 
overlooked when such image-objects are understood as having directly ‘touched’ 
the foetus/baby and produced the object as a material ‘fact’ of their previous 
presence. When image-objects depicting the subjects of loss are utilised for their 
abilities for reminding, engagements with them such as displaying and ‘merely’ 
looking can be understood to constitute memorial acts (Batchen 2004). 
Worden (1993) suggests that seeing the deceased body can help the 
bereaved confirm and accept the death, especially if this occurrence is 
unexpected and sudden as, I add, is often the case with pregnancy loss. With 
precedents in Victorian practices of post-mortem photography regarding child 
and adult subjects, Riechers (2008) notes that contemporary stillbirth 
photographs may also be used in this way. Such photographs have the benefit of 
being amenable to re-viewing, storage, reproduction of additional copies, 
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dispersed viewing and display as well as to being digitally re-touched (Mander 
and Marshall 2003; Sassoon 2004; Godel 2007; Gersham 2009; Keane 2009; 
Davidsson Bremborg 2012). Photographs, as material presences, invoke the 
absence of the persons/entities depicted (Batchen 2004; Prosser 2005; Gibson 
2008) and foreground the impossibility to retrieve memories in entirety (Legg 
2007), including aspects of smell and touch (Pattison 2007). Ultrasound images 
as well as ink prints may be used to this purpose in the absence of photographs 
pre- or post- death; all of these may subsequently be used in pregnancy loss 
memorialisation. As with ‘baby things’ (Layne 2000, 2003a), these image-
objects can be viewed, touched, kissed, caressed, squeezed, displayed and 
shared as well as printed onto other objects such as coasters (Rose 2010).  
Subsequently, such image-objects can be present in, or brought into, a 
range of ‘everyday’ spaces and practices. For instance, Siobhan described 
ultrasonography and photographic images of her nephew, who died 45 minutes 
after birth, placed in: the homes of her family members; displayed in frames and 
on the fridge door as well as kept in a memory box; carried in Siobhan’s purse; 
and further circulated with an obituary notice in a local newspaper. The 
emphasis on the physical body of the deceased in such image-objects, albeit 
mediated and produced through forms of technology, highlights the strong links 
with “[p]re- and post-life identities […] At either end of the life course, 
therefore, the body-to-be and the body-that-was, in their parallel invisibility, 
constitute powerful focuses for representation and identification” (Hockey and 
Draper 2005 p48). In particular, such image-objects can help “recover the body 
from the sequestration of hospital management and the obscurity of the womb 
and the tomb” (Hockey and Draper 2005 p48). Siobhan commented on the 
enjoyment of thinking about her nephew as facilitated through photographs: 
“it’s quite nice to see the picture of him where he looks quite content or erm… 
whenever, because the pictures I have of him are when he was alive, so it’s quite 
nice to have him, it’s quite nice to have a picture of me and him as well”. She 
knew at the time that the photographs would be the only ones of her nephew 
and subsequently would be important image-objects to aid her memory of him 
in the near future. Explicit about her preference of these, regardless of image 
quality, over those taken after he had died – the photographs of her nephew 
alive were key to Siobhan’s recovery of some happiness, that he had been a 
living presence in her own life, amidst her sadness and sense of injustice.    
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 However, it was not always possible through the acquisition and use of 
such image-objects to ‘reclaim’ the person-body from the experiences of hospital 
encounters and the incomprehensibility of (simultaneous) pre-birth and post-
death. For example, in relation to her stillbirth, Anne described knowing and 
articulating to medical staff that “we definitely don’t want any photographs, 
definitely, definitely, and they did ask us a few times whether we did but we just 
both instinctively decided, KNEW, we didn’t really want them”. One reason 
pertained to anxieties “because we knew he’d already died before he was born 
so... sort of... nobody can tell you what you’re going to see, you know, and I 
think we were both just really worried”. Anne’s experience of stillbirth 
heartbreakingly contrasted to the anticipated live birth:  
I haven’t actually talked to my husband about this – but I’m sure 
my husband had imagined the birth as well as I had, you know, 
you imagine giving birth to a baby and you talk when you’re doing 
your birth plan with your midwife like about skin-to-skin contact 
and seeing your baby straight away and {teary} all those kinds of 
things and, and, things being so different to how you imagine 
they’re going to be, it just really throws you, you know, we were 
just distraught. 
A comment from one of the attending midwives “made things significantly 
worse for us”, dramatically confounding Anne’s apprehensions about seeing her 
son. She recounted how, following a short rest after the birth, in the morning:  
[a midwife] said “oh do you want to see him?” and we said “yeah 
we do” and she said “well I think you’re better off seeing him 
whilst he’s still fresh”... which is a really horrible thing to say and 
conjured up all kinds of images about... oh, all sorts of stuff really 
because it made him sound like a bit of meat and that he was going 
to go off and that’s troubled us significantly since and we’ve 
actually {sigh} fed that back to the hospital that it was a 
completely horrible thing for her to say. 
Whilst there are a range of factors—such as time elapsed—which can impact 
bereaved parents’ experiences of holding a stillborn baby, potentially making 
the difference between a tender or frightening encounter (Rådestad et al 2009), 
222 
 
this comment was clearly inopportune and it subsequently amplified distress. 
Although Anne ultimately did see her son on several occasions during the 
hospital stay, she chose not to have photographs taken. She explained how the 
shock of the experience meant that “the things you’d normally do after a birth if 
the baby was alive, you know, hold them and feed them and take pictures of 
them, none of those really felt like options to us. So erm we just couldn’t do it 
basically”. She commented that she has since had a few occasions of “panic” 
about not having any photographs: 
because I can’t really remember what he looked like, I sort of can 
and sort of cant, erm... but I’m glad we didn’t, we both 
instinctively knew we didn’t want a picture […] because he’d 
already died, you could tell he was dead, looking at him properly, 
you could tell he was dead, I know people talk about born sleeping 
but he didn’t look like he was sleeping, he looked dead and the 
LAST thing I would really want sitting about is pictures of him 
dead basically {teary} 
Her grief and shock, further exacerbated with the midwife’s insensitive 
comment, meant that Anne and her husband chose not to have photographs 
taken and instead preferred to have the ultrasonography scan images on display 
at home. She explained that “[w]e want to remember him during the pregnancy 
when he was moving about a lot and you know, the, erm, that’s why we still have 
the scan pictures up and stuff, we want to remember him when he was alive”. 
 Such visible displays in one’s home following pregnancy loss can be 
understood to “make an assertion regarding the value of that [baby’s] existence, 
that it was deserving of recognition” (Layne 2003a p130). Anne explained how 
framed foot prints and a scan image featured prominently as a presence in their 
home and yet these were now something she (and others) had become 
accustomed to seeing, normalised “within the sphere of everyday family life” 
(Layne 1999 p266). She recounted: “when we first put the footprints up, one or 
two people commented on it, but now people are used to seeing them and the 
scan pictures, so they just don’t make any comment about it really”. As 
discussed in relation to Diane, such familiarity is not the same as being 
‘forgotten’ and, linking to Connerton (2011), recognition of having normalised 
these presences can, paradoxically, demand attention and reinvigorate 
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remembering. Indeed, during our second telephone interview, the ongoing and 
familiar presence of the ultrasound image and foot prints as part ‘of’, not merely 
‘in’, Anne’s home also became apparent as presences in our conversation: 
[the scan is] on the living room mantle-piece, in fact I’m looking at 
it right now {laughs} because I’m in my living room, there’s a 
picture, there’s one of his 20 week scan pictures – the one we liked 
the best and there’s also… a bit further along, to one side, is his 
foot prints as well in a frame so we still have those out.  
Pregnancy loss image-objects can invoke a range of different emotional 
responses; for example, whilst (some) photographs are fondly appreciated, they 
can also prompt controversy and responses of disapproval (Layne 2003a). As 
mentioned, both Anne and Siobhan highlighted their preferences of image-
objects which “normalize the baby’s life” (Layne 1999 p269) and expressed 
varying degrees of dislike and/or discomfort towards those which depict the 
baby when deceased. For instance, Siobhan kept in her purse a photograph of 
her nephew taken whilst he was alive, which she had shown to some friends:  
whenever I did show them photos, because they asked to see 
photos like, they recognised him as a baby – they didn’t think of 
him as just somebody, or as just as if he’d died before he’d lived 
really and they wanted to see the pictures of him and they thought 
that he looked like a little boy and they thought he was nice. 
In this way, the photograph served to ‘equalise’ by conveying and socially-
sharing, with responses of validation, an orientation that recognised Siobhan’s 
nephew as a much loved person and, to cite the title of Layne’s (2000) paper, a 
‘real’ baby. Ben, speaking about photographs of his stillborn niece, also echoed 
this notion: 
my dad always used to put pictures of his grandchildren up erm 
and I think for a brief time he had the photos like propped up on 
his desk […] But erm {laughs} with time you get new 
grandchildren and then all the photos change and he took down 
the babies that have grown up and then replaced it with new 
babies so kind of it [a photograph of my stillborn niece] really had 
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its share in our house in the same way that all the other photos of 
the grandchildren have had. 
Favoured image-objects can therefore feature prominently in significant lived 
spaces for numerous family members affected by pregnancy losses and, as with 
the photograph of her nephew retained in Siobhan’s purse, can be kept close to 
one’s body as a valued possession available to access anytime and anywhere. 
However, echoing Anne’s comments, participants sometimes expressed 
varying degrees of discomfort with regards to (some) photographs. For instance, 
Ben reiterated on a number of occasions that the photographs of his niece were 
not “morbid” but, as he did so, retained a trace of ambivalence perhaps 
pertaining to anticipated negative responses/expectations of others: 
during the funeral I remember there were cards and a photobook 
– it had photos of the corpse, of the body and erm like photos of 
my sister and her, the father, with the, like with, like, holding the... 
the body. NOT in a kind of creepy kind of family photo way but 
just {laughs} photos of them with the child. 
Siobhan felt especially uncomfortable, finding it “odd”, that a post-death 
photograph of her nephew featured in an obituary notice that her sister placed 
in the newspaper: “that kind of put me off more”. She had assumed an etiquette 
of baby death obituaries to exclude such images and she conveyed the ways she 
felt that the photographs taken once deceased were not able to capture the 
memories she prefers to recall about him, further rendering experiential details 
such as the kinaesthetics and sounds of his ‘living’ absent. Siobhan explained: 
he looked differently when he was dead and that’s what’s quite 
shocking for me because it was only me and my sister that got to 
see him when he was alive. By the time my family had come up to 
see him, and because it was in the middle of the night, they [have] 
only seen him dead and he’d changed because when he was alive 
he looked, he looked, not that he doesn’t look like a real baby but 
he looked like a normal baby like… largely, without, obviously if 
you don’t count the difficulties he had with his brain which they 
covered with a hat. He looked like and really acted like a real baby 
and moved and made noises like a real baby but they never got to 
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see that. So I’d kind of prefer that they have the pictures of him 
when he was alive than when he was dead really. 
The social context of viewing is particularly important here. It was not ‘seeing’, 
or having others see, the deceased body of her nephew per se which Siobhan 
objected to. Indeed, recognising the unusual circumstances, the open wake had 
been valuable for, as I suggested, ‘equalising’ her nephew as ‘real’ and loved: 
we were advised, actually, by the undertaker not to have an open 
coffin because he was a baby and he was so small and because of 
his injuries [birth defects] as well. Erm… but my sister felt very 
strongly that she wanted people to see that he wasn’t, that he was a 
NORMAL baby, whatever normal is, but that he was a baby 
regardless of his troubles. Some of the people who came to pay 
their respects didn’t go to see the baby because, they, maybe they 
were frightened, or they didn’t want to see… what they thought 
was going to be a gruesome sight. But whoever did see the baby 
said they were glad to see it, largely, because he was a little baby 
and he did live.  
It seemed, therefore, that the issue which caused discomfort regarding the 
photographs was the fact that there were images of her nephew whilst alive 
which Siobhan deemed preferable,  especially given that the newspaper obituary 
permits unfettered viewing by those who did not know the family or necessarily 
understand the context of their bereavement.  
The topic of unintended or uninvited viewing also emerged in the 
narratives of other participants, pertaining to recognition of the tensions and 
possible upsetting scenarios that keeping the image-objects may lead to. 
Conveying the inadequacy of language for making sense of her experience of a 
late termination following a positive prenatal diagnosis, Gemma explained that 
“[w]e had pictures and footprints taken at the 'birth' (There isn't a name for it? 
'Delivery' would be more suitable)”. As such, her experiences involved “two 
intertwined presses […] of making the decision to end an abnormal pregnancy 
while negotiating a relationship with the unborn child” (Bryar 1997 p566; Hunt 
et al 2009) with memento items. Gemma had never had these image-objects on 
display in her home and she kept them, with “just a few other little bits”, in a 
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box. Gemma explained, however, that her “partner thin[k]s it is time to let them 
go, he is worried that the kids might find them, he thinks it is too sad, but I want 
to keep them for now”. Subsequently, the life-course of such memento and 
memorial objects can be shaped unknowingly by persons whose possible 
inadvertent viewing and comprehension of these would be undesirable. This 
concern prompted reflection within an interview as to whether Gemma 
anticipates telling her children about her experiences of pregnancy loss: 
that’s a tricky one, I think when they’re much, much older, yeah 
and I think partly, you know... also for practical reasons too 
because it [spina bifida] is something that runs in [families], 
people can be more prone to […] yeah, it might happen to them... 
but I don’t think it’s something that I’d want to talk to them about 
until they were like adults, like 16 or something. 
Thus, the pre-empted, future use and retention of such image-objects can 
concern not only the preferences of the woman who physiologically experienced 
pregnancy losses and, as for Gemma, her partner – but also involves 
consideration about how these items may upset and inform familial/social 
others such as one’s living children (Forhan 2010), including those subsequent 
whose siblings were never known (Kempson and Murdock 2010). It also raises 
the issue of ‘legibility’ regarding whether memorial objects or practices are 
comprehended by others and/or explained in these terms. This, along with the 
theme of temporality, links to the next and final set of examples: ‘ephemeral’ 
memorialisations, appreciated precisely for their capacity to invoke ‘briefness’. 
Ephemerality and Invoked Absence-Presence 
Some forms of memorialisation seem particularly apt for pregnancy 
losses owing to their particular ephemeral qualities, able to capture and 
represent precarious and fleeting traces of ‘presence’ in the face of enduring 
embodied absence. One example mentioned earlier is bubble-blowing at the 
graves of stillborn babies (Davidsson Bremborg 2012) which, I suggest, may be 
chosen precisely because this activity entails acknowledging the fragility and 
temporary existence of each iridescent sphere as a presence prior to popping or 
being blown away. Such qualities of bubbles can therefore be understood to 
symbolically echo the ways in which the ‘babies’ of pregnancy loss are brief and 
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elusive presences followed by forms of persistent absence in the lives of the 
bereaved. Thus, as Doss (2010) discusses in relation to temporary memorials 
composed of flowers and letters amongst other materials, some things are 
chosen and utilised precisely because they are transient or impermanent. Of 
course, and as we have seen, this is not the case for all participants and the 
prospect of relatively short-lived memorial goods could evoke additional upset. 
Speaking about choosing a water feature to function as a memorial, Marie 
explained: “I wanted something for the garden and the most obvious would be a 
bush or a plant or something like that but I’m not exactly green fingered and I 
think if I’d bought a plant and it died, I think I’d be devastated”.  
Certain kinds of memorial practices which some participants had 
engaged in can be understood as deliberately rejecting the kind of longer-term 
permanence evoked by stone grave markers or other enduring ‘hard’ objects. 
This resonates with comments about fabric-quilt memorials by Connerton (2011 
p14-15) in relation to the different materialities of memorial objects/practices:  
[w]hen a memorial is made of stone or bronze or steel, the rhetoric 
of the material implicitly claims that the memory of the dead 
recorded there will last forever. Cloth carries no such illusions of 
enduring witness. It is fragile, it fades and frays, it needs mending. 
It remembers the dead by sewing together mere fragments of their 
lives. 
Material durability can be significant in conveying particular meanings and 
tenets of pregnancy losses experiences. For example, Holly described how she 
and her husband released a Chinese lantern on the beach whilst on a break away 
following her miscarriage. Though the holiday was booked in advance, it 
provided an opportunity to physically and psychologically recover:  
what we decided to do was to release a Chinese lantern thing on 
the beach because we wanted to do something […] and on the last 
night we decided that we’d have a picnic on the beach and we’d 
light the Chinese lantern. Erm, and the weather was amazing and 
it was really lovely but I spent the three days dreading that, 
dreading the idea of that, and I couldn’t sleep or anything, I was 
just like really worried about it, but I thought, you know, we gotta 
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do it - partly because [husband] really needed it, erm and I think 
he was right in that we needed something just to say ‘this has 
happened’. 
The act of ‘releasing’ the Chinese lantern was not irrelevant nor a hindrance to 
the communication of Holly and her husband’s emotions and meanings about 
their pregnancy loss but rather, I suggest, crucial to the expression of these. 
Holly described how “it was getting really cold and it was pitch black by this 
point {laughs} and it was like come on, we’ve got to do it […] it was really hard 
but I’m so glad we did it”.  
The notable strand of grief research from the 1990s onwards, collated 
under the label of ‘continuing bonds’, can be considered resistant, or at least 
reluctant, to engage in the modernist downplaying of interdependency and a 
drive towards model building (Silverman and Klass 1996; Silverman and 
Nickman 1996; Stroebe et al 1996; Small 2001). This ethos stems from an 
awareness of the risks emergent from imposing prescriptive judgements as to 
what constitutes ‘abnormal’ or ‘pathological’ grief (Rosenblatt 1996; Silverman 
and Nickman 1996; Walter 1996) alongside an appreciation that different ways 
of thinking about death, grief and mourning exist in other cultures and have 
dominated in the Western context at other points in time (Ariès 1976, Silverman 
and Klass 1996; Stroebe et al 1996).66 The continuing bonds approach entails a 
concentrated interest in the various ways in which attachments and 
relationships are maintained with the deceased, thus challenging the prevailing 
discourse of the twentieth-century that bonds must be broken in order to permit 
‘healthy’ investment of energy into new (living human) relationships (Klass 
1996; Silverman and Klass 1996; Stroebe et al 1996; Walter 1996; Small 2001).  
The act of releasing the lantern for Holly did not seem to be a ‘letting go’ 
in a sense of readings of Freud (1917) positing mourning as a severing of ties, 
forgetting and resolution (a return to ‘normal’) but, rather, as evident in the 
continuing bonds theories, marked recognition whilst readjusting an anticipated 
future with integration of what has happened. Releasing the Chinese lantern can 
                                                          
66 For example, the influential work of Ariès (1976) considers the history of Western attitudes 
towards death from the Middle Ages through to the twentieth-century, identifying a shift from 
the ‘public affair’ of dying with gathered persons in the bedchamber sequestrated to hospitals, in 
addition to changing notions of ‘ownership’ and ‘appropriate use’ of deceased bodies. 
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therefore be understood as a kind of ‘performative utterance’ akin to the 
example described by Davies (1997) of throwing soil upon the lid of the coffin 
with the corresponding spoken words of committal. Holly explained that “doing 
the lantern thing… was really quite powerful, seeing it kind of go off into the sky 
[…] something special for us to do”. In declaring their recognition of the loss of 
their much-wished for baby through this act, Holly and her husband ‘released’ 
their expectation for this pregnancy—to themselves, to one another and to 
potentially others—to become an embodied child in their lives whilst the 
marking of this absence constituted a memorial presence. Akin to the discussion 
by Klass (1996) of both internal and external worlds, Holly’s narrated 
experience regarding her loss thus highlights “the intersection of the past, the 
present, the personal and the social” (Small 2001 p42). 
Since Holly conceived a second time soon after her miscarriage, she had 
had to “push it [thinking about the miscarriage] away” in order to cope; 
however, her approach towards her miscarriage loss was not of definitively 
‘breaking bonds’ and she instead signalled intention in the future to find ways to 
maintain and express the significance of her experiences. With her second 
pregnancy at the time of interview going well and the would-have-been due date 
for her first pregnancy coming up, she had “been thinking about it more the last 
couple of weeks” including how she and her husband might mark and 
memorialise subsequent anniversaries. This signifies a rejection of ‘forgetting’ 
and ‘replacement’, and instead recognises grief as a potentially life-long 
accompaniment—albeit of varying intensities and temporalities (Rosenblatt 
1996)—as bereavements and losses are integrated into ongoing lives (Marris 
1991; Grainger 1998; Ribbens McCarthy 2006). Finding resonance with the 
continuing bonds approach for many of the participants’ experiences in my 
research, I posit that this example of the Chinese lantern release for Holly was 
not an event marking or signalling the annihilation or defeat of her grief 
regarding her pregnancy loss. Her grief was not ‘mended’ by the release of the 
lantern, since this would imply a return to a stable state as if bereavement and 
its consequences could simply be ‘undone’ (Davies 1997); instead the event, and 
as further evidenced in her discussion of a desire to enact subsequent memorial 
practices in the foreseeable future, marked her and, it seems, her partner’s 
commitments to retaining and continuing bonds to the miscarriage loss.  
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In addition to Holly’s Chinese lantern, propelled by the wind filling the 
hollow balloon-like case and leaving a briefly visible glow in the night sky, 
candlelight featured in a number of participants’ memorial activities. Lit candles 
tend to be short-lived object-activities, with the knowledge that the flickering 
flame present is limited by finitude of the wick or will eventually be blown out. 
Diane had attended and helped chaperone a number of memorial candle light 
services held in cathedrals in relation to her seven miscarriages. With most of 
her miscarriages occurring over a decade ago, her involvement with these 
memorial services over a number of years demonstrated the ways in which she 
continued to maintain bonds with her losses through remembering and 
memorialising them. As with the short durations in which candles are lit before 
burning out, memorial services are also events with necessarily limited time of 
an hour or so. Diane found it “comforting to know there [is] something every 
year to remember all the lost babies which[,] most of the time[,] are well and 
truly forgotten about”. When I asked Diane whether the location of the 
cathedral held any significance, she replied that it would not matter to her 
where the service was held and that “I would be happy to attend any building if 
it was remembering lost babies”. Given the wider context in which pregnancy 
losses are largely overlooked, public recognition through a cathedral service can 
confer symbolic and socially powerful connotations of acknowledgement and 
legitimacy – thus facilitating or constituting consolation.67  
Hence, such public religious buildings with traditional roles in death 
rituals like  funerals and loss remembrance can be seen to partially compensate 
for a lack of wider social recognition and the ‘marooned’ online space enclaves 
of recognition and consolation (see Chapter 6). For Diane, the opportunity for 
individuals (namely women) to physically gather was important, producing a 
visible, material and emotional presence of collective memorialisation: “it is a 
lovely service where we write names cards and they are read out in the service to 
remember our babies” in addition to lighting candles. Though the cathedral 
setting held no additional religious ideological value for Diane, it was a space 
willing and able to support pregnancy loss grief rather than to deem it 
                                                          
67 This is in contrast to other bereavements which tend to have different/additional spaces 
amenable for memorialisation. For instance, in the context of royal deaths, this can include 
condolence books in supermarkets and laying flowers at existing war memorials (Walter 2001).  
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pathological or ignore it entirely.68 The rise of events such as miscarriage 
memorial services can be linked to the growing voices of pregnancy loss 
movements supported by their online accessibility/presences, but also the 
efforts of feminist theology to extend recognition of the need for religious 
support. For example, Ward and Wild’s (1995) Human Rites book includes 
resources for the recognition of miscarriages and terminations. Elsewhere, there 
are theological reflections on stillbirth, including on hospital chaplaincy baptism 
practices (Newitt 2004). Feminist-influenced theology, Jones (2001 p228) 
suggests, can ‘speak’ to women who experience pregnancy losses and/or 
infertility to “give meaningful shape to this particular event [or series of events 
in their lives]”. Many memorialisation practices neither demand nor reject 
commitment to organised religion/beliefs and instead pertain to a “more 
nuanced understanding of the widening spectrum of beliefs and related 
practices in societies such as the UK” (Maddrell 2009a p677). Thus, whilst some 
individuals may not hold robust beliefs, if any at all, around organised religion – 
they may still appreciate and benefit from the recognition of various kinds of 
pregnancy losses in a wider sense beyond their private/familial lives.  
Another example of intentionally ephemeral or ‘soluble’ memorial 
practices concerns Fiona’s apple pie making and eating in relation to her 
ongoing tending of an apple tree as memorial. Fiona explained that she took her 
young son to buy an apple tree on the first anniversary of her miscarriage which 
they then planted in the garden “in a place where we could always see from the 
window as a remembrance”. Whilst the apple tree itself is a relatively long-term 
memorial ‘thing’, the fruits also constituted a form of memorialisation for Fiona: 
“[w]e then usually use the apples to bake something and share it with the 
family”. The consumption of food is “an act of incorporation, as a social practice 
through which people make themselves, both biologically and socially” 
(Hamilakis 2002 p126; also: Lupton 1996; Bell and Valentine 1997; Probyn 
2000) which, in this instance, is also a memorial practice. Fiona reflected on the 
experience of seeing the tree grow as she retrospectively conveyed, not having 
known of the pregnancy prior to the onset of uterine bleeding in miscarriage, 
that she would have liked to seen and cared for the baby that could have been: 
                                                          
68 However, there is also good reason to be cautious about potential pro-life motivations 
underpinning religious support/facilitation of pregnancy loss memorialisation specifically (Doss 
2010) and in ‘the foetus’ generally (Casper 1999; Franklin 1999; Mason 1999; Stabile 1999). 
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“[t]he thing was basically just a stick when we bought it but four years on it’s 
flourished in to [a] beautiful tree that flowers and we can pick apples from every 
summer”. Layne (2003a p187, p188) notes how ‘redemptive nature’, by “always 
culminating in spring”, thus “offers the hope of death defeated and 
transformed”. Indeed, such symbolic elements of the apple tree were recognised 
by Fiona, commenting on the links between gestational progression and the 
cyclical blooming of botanical seasons: 
it begins to bud and flower in spring, which is around the time the 
miscarriage happened. By Summertime/July which is 
coincidentally about midpoint between when the baby was lost 
(March) and when it should've been due (October) [s]o we have a 
tree with around a good 10 - 15 apples which are always big and 
healthy looking[.] 
This links to an example of a ceramic mushroom urn, containing ashes of a 
stillborn baby, discussed in the Flemish context by Bleyen (2010). The 
participant in Bleyen’s (2010) research had photographed the ceramic 
mushroom urn throughout the changing seasons and added these to an album, 
much as one would with photographs of a living, growing baby over time. 
Through this material object, embedded within the outside environment of 
changing seasons, “the stillborn baby was being given a life course” (Bleyen 
2010 p77), resonating, I argue, with the way Fiona spoke about the memorial 
apple tree in relation to her miscarriage.  
The practices of baking and eating apple pie links to powerful discourses 
of domesticity, mothering, homeliness, generosity and nourishment. Fiona felt 
it was “kind of symbolic to see something good, something beautiful growing in 
the memory of the baby” and articulated the apple fruits as a kind of gift: 
[the apple tree is] always having something to give us. As for 
making food from it, it just seems right to be doing something with 
what it's produced and not wasting it. 
On one level, the apple tree is something that Fiona cares for and which she 
enjoys watching “spring to life each year”, adding with humour “it's amazing to 
see it flourish really against the odds of my deadly gardening skills”. This links 
to earlier comments about ways in which ‘caring’ for memorial activities and 
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objects can entail ways to ‘actively parent’ following pregnancy losses (Layne 
1999, 2000, 2003a; Garattini 2007; Murphy 2009). The apple fruits, as kinds of 
‘gifts’, also quite literally nourish her and her living family as a source of food 
which, through the activity of a shared dessert, can be understood as a collective 
act of remembering the miscarriage loss – although whether her young son is 
currently aware of the meaning of the tree/fruit was unclear. Consuming the 
apples in such a context is a physical, bodily incorporation of ‘by-product’ 
memorial entities and becomes part of a wider activity of memorisation, 
bringing the social identity of the deceased baby into the presence of the 
emotional imaginary with lived practices of communal eating in the family unit. 
This resonates with comments by Davies (1997 p43), in the context of funerary 
meals, that “[i]t is in the household that life must go on and this makes it all the 
more important that it is in the house that the party should occur”. The example 
of Fiona’s thus links with the theme of using of food in consolation, such as that 
given to the bereaved by friends/family and shared at wakes, as well as 
literature foregrounding connections between and in the constitution of 
physical matter, environments, bodies and emotions (for example: Mol 2008).  
As with some examples mentioned in Chapter 7 whereby tattoos and 
jewellery were not immediately legible or recognisable as denoting 
memorialisation of pregnancy losses, this is also the case for some ‘ephemeral’ 
practices. Anne, for example, described a memorial in the form of her approach 
within her ongoing life in which she sought to try new things as a testament to 
the memory of her stillborn son. This pertained partly to the complexity of not 
being able to easily determine specific anniversary (birth or death) dates so that 
some memorial practices, such as giving presents and eating birthday cake 
(Davidsson Bremborg 2012), were not considered suitable for the somewhat 
confounding situation. As Anne explained: 
when it comes to the date that he died [and] the day he was born 
which is sort of a day after [he died] and [it’s] a confusing way 
around […] but when we come round to that time, we’re definitely 
going to do something, we don’t know what it’ll be yet, we’ve 
actually just decided to erm to do erm something a bit special this 
year […] Basically we’re doing a year of new things so we’re, we’re 
visiting places we’ve never been and we’re trying things we’ve 
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always wanted to try and have never got round to, reading books 
and watching films we’ve always meant to and never done, so 
we’re just basically not putting anything off, we’re going to have a 
year of doing new things, just stuff basically in honour of him. 
Rather than choosing particular objects or events, Anne and her husband sought 
to memorialise through embodying a particular ethos in which the constant 
absence-presence of their son enriches their disposition towards multiple 
activities in their lives. In this way, he is a presence but one which is subtle in 
the sense that the reasons behind their dispositions were not immediately 
obvious, to the extent that Anne had been ‘participating’ in this living memorial 
for some time but had not yet explicitly explained this to her family. Anne and 
her husband’s living memorial to their stillborn baby entailed plans: 
to spend our free time during the whole year kind of doing LOTS 
of fun, interesting things erm and he’s inspired that, you know. So 
we’re doing those things, we won’t be sad when thinking – 
although we might well be on his birthday and on the day he died 
– but through the year, we’re getting to experience lots of new 
things and that’s, that’s because of him so that’s how we’re 
choosing really to… celebrate his life really. 
This approach resonates with Anne’s preference for the ultrasound 
images and her narration of her stretch-marks as affirmative gestures, 
remembering his life “as tiny as it was” rather than his death. Trauma shatters 
one’s world, requiring the re-building of one’s life as recognisably different 
(Janoff-Bulman and Berger 2000; Updegraff and Taylor 2004). Some of the 
activities Anne recounted doing so far were clearly stillbirth-related, such as 
lobbying for parliamentary support of Sands campaigns. In addition, as part of 
“looking for opportunities to do stuff”, Anne described visiting some tourist 
sites: “we’d never been there before {laughs} even though it was horrendously 
expensive, it was a new thing, so we went in there”. This can be understood as 
relating to the sensuous economies of late capitalism (Howes 2005 also cited by 
Lorimer 2012) in which, rather than the acquisition of material objects per se, 
embodied encounters are sought. Whilst some of these exceed capitalist gain 
since ‘free’ activities were also valued by Anne, it raises what I label as ‘sensorial 
memorialisation’ which might also include activities such as remembrance 
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scholarships (Foote and Grider 2010), travelling/holidaying to particular 
destinations to scatter ashes (Maddrell 2010) and fundraising with participation 
in marathons. Whilst these examples have particular temporalities, they ‘add’ to 
the life experiences of ‘living-on’ in ways that continue bonds with the subjects 
of loss. Anne’s embodied memorial speaks to particular qualities of her 
experience as the corporeal relationship of pregnancy made possible her son’s 
physical being, imagined and anticipated as a forthcoming and living baby. 
Although his biological living is now absent, his valued presence for Anne’s 
continues and—through her changed but ongoing life—develops, albeit in ways 
that are not necessarily immediately obvious to others in terms of memoriality.  
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has considered the ways memorialisation, in (re)creating 
connections between the bereaved and deceased/subjects of loss, entail absence 
and presence in both material and emotional terms. In doing so, I have drawn 
from pregnancy loss and/or death studies scholarship to attend to a number of 
participants’ memorialisation practices and objects. This has included those 
pertaining to the physicality of deceased bodies (coffins, funerals, graves), 
symbolic items (teddies, angels), ‘index’ image-objects retaining traces to the 
now-deceased (ultrasonography scans, photographs, hand-foot ink prints) and 
deliberately ephemeral/transient activities (Chinese lanterns, eating apple-pie, 
lived/embodied memorials). The examples have illustrated that social identity 
and relations between bereaved and deceased are often “tied to the body – but 
not limited to the body” (Hockey and Draper 2005 p54). Themes of absence and 
presence have weaved throughout my discussions in various ways; for instance, 
the presence of deceased remains foreground the absence of embodied living, 
whilst the memorial objects and ‘index’ items in one’s home can become such 
pervasive presences representing absences that they stop being overtly noticed. 
In the fourth set of memorial practices discussed, I argued that the specific 
qualities of absence and presence in pregnancy losses, in terms of being brief 
‘lives’ following by enduring embodied absence, are utilised. Thus, whilst some 
material ‘baby things’ used in memorialisation embody qualities of ‘babyhood’ 
such as softness, cuteness and preciousness (Layne 2000, 2003a) – some 
‘ephemeral’ memorial objects and practices convey precarious and brief ‘life’. 
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The themes of spatiality and temporality have featured in this chapter on 
memorialisation and I am in agreement that “an investigation of the social life 
of things uncovers epochs and eras co-existing in the spaces of the present, 
whether their reach is far into the past or onwards into an indeterminate future” 
(Hockey et al 2005 p139). I also support the notion that the physical body space 
is important in many ways to memorialisation, but also add that the nature of 
many pregnancy loss experiences require and permit flexibility regarding this. 
As for Isabel, it is possible to ‘transfer’ emotional connections from one site 
associated with her pregnancy loss son to another location more proximate 
through objects like flower wreaths. In addition, in the absence of the actual 
physical remains of participants’ pregnancy losses or, as for Diane, of most of 
their pregnancy losses – other objects and events can be especially valuable. 
Some forms of memorialisation become pervasive features in one’s life and 
inhabited spaces, regarding particular rooms or pieces of furniture in their 
homes but also their own skins and bodies as with memorial tattoos (see 
Chapter 7). Familiarity, however, does not necessarily equate to forgetting and 
can instead attest to successfully incorporating absences-presences and 
continuing bonds in the ongoing lives and inhabited spaces of the bereaved. In 
various ways different forms of memorialisations constitute experiences which 
participate in ‘temporal ordering’ and narration, such as in the research project, 
around “the pivotal event” (Layne 1996 p132) of pregnancy loss.  
Memories, narratives and memorialisations of pregnancy loss are shaped 
in wider contexts with a variety of responses possible such as acceptance, 
rejection, encouragement and dismissal. Social attitudes regarding pregnancy 
losses and provisions for grieving and memorialising mutually influence one 
another and produce particular contexts in which these embodied (material, 
discursive, emotional) experiences and understandings are negotiated. As 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, this involves partners, family members and work 
colleagues but also online support group users who may promulgate 
memorialisation attitudes and approaches absent in much of one’s ‘offline’ life. 
Given the wider cultural denial and dismissal of pregnancy losses prominently 
argued by Layne (1999, 2000, 2003a, 2003b), memorialisation practices and 
objects can be understood as resistance to normative notions that these 
experiences do not ‘count’. That pregnancy is a relationship (Rothman 1989; 
Franklin 1991; Lupton 1999; Woliver 2002) has implications for Davies (1997 
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p42) comment that “[b]ehind all grief lie experiences shared with the one who is 
now dead”. In the context of pregnancy losses, this includes particular embodied 
and corporeal experiences as reflected in the body as a site for memorialisation 
through, for example: wearing jewellery and the acquisition of tattoos (Chapter 
7); visiting and tending graves; ‘caring’ for memorial ornaments and toys; and 
‘living’ memorials. This chapter on memorialisation, in foregrounding material-
emotional relations, has brought together a variety of ways in which ‘loss’ has 
featured throughout this thesis – leading onto my closing discussion.  
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Closing Discussion 
In this closing chapter, I will outline a number of key conceptual and 
empirical contributions as organised around three intersectional nodes which I 
have developed across the thesis. These three nodes foreground the important 
stakes in researching experiences of pregnancy loss and are as follows: material-
emotional-relational bodies; sensitivity, resistance and pregnancy loss; and 
feminist reproductive politics, loss and death in geography. These three nodes 
also highlight some of the ways that my research has been influenced by, but 
also diverged from, previous research on pregnancy loss, regarding 
methodology and/or in the discipline of geography. For example, there are a 
number of ways in which I differentiate my research from the work of Linda 
Layne (1996, 1999, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2006, 2010b, 2012), the 
anthropologist who I have cited prominently throughout the thesis. Layne’s 
work, also using the label ‘pregnancy loss’, has been incredibly valuable to my 
research, constituting a source of inspiration and many rich insights. However, 
there are also differences in terms of approaches towards such research in 
addition to the focal topic content.  
As discussed in the Methodology chapter, my research has entailed me 
largely ‘suspending’ disclosure of whether or not I have personal experiences 
regarding the research topic. In contrast, Layne foregrounds her identity in her 
research as a woman who has experienced multiple miscarriages and 
member/user of various support groups. At times, as others have noted (Reagan 
2003; Keane 2009), this overt investment may be a particular factor 
underpinning limits to critical analysis. In particular, I find a number of 
oversights in Layne’s work such as: largely reductive assumptions about the 
emotional responses and meanings about pregnancy losses; the predominant 
omission or otherwise sidestepping of termination; and a limited critique of 
(face-to-face) support groups. These are all aspects which I have sought to 
engage further in my own research, as well as challenge the dismissive tones 
which I identify in Layne’s (2010b) ‘blissful ignorance’ reproach towards urine-
based home-kit tests (discussed in Chapter 3). In addition, although both 
identifying as feminist academics, my affiliation to the discipline of geography 
has meant that spatiality has been very much at the forefront of my research.    
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My thesis sought to further understandings of pregnancy loss experiences 
and make particular interventions into the discipline of geography through the 
empirical focus of pregnancy loss. In doing so, I have utilised literature: on 
qualitative social research methodologies; from multiple disciplines, including 
anthropology, sociology and history; from fields, like that of death studies; and 
from sub-disciplines, such as the geographies of death and dying, emotional 
geographies, feminist geographies, geographies of the body and online 
geographies. The first node emphasises bodily experiences as physical, 
emotional and social as I return to the opening justification that recognition of 
these interconnections can enable richer accounts of pregnancy loss. The second 
node brings together the issues of sensitivity and resistance to foreground 
methodological and thematic aspects as ambivalent, precarious and yet vital. 
The third and final node concerns my efforts to re-orientate understandings of 
reproductive politics, loss and death within geography. I will then outline 
several future research directions before providing my final closing remarks. 
Material-emotional-relational Bodies 
I sought in my research to “create a woman-centered discourse of 
pregnancy loss” (Layne 2003a p239) which “reframe[s] pregnant women as the 
subjects of gestation” and “re-envelops the foetus within the pregnant body” 
(Tyler 2001 p81). Whilst post-partum and separated embryonic, foetal and baby 
bodies feature in the thesis (notably in Chapters 5 and 8), pregnancy as a 
relationship between women and foetuses is reiterated. In the events of 
pregnancy loss, relationality does not necessarily cease since (redefined) bonds 
continue as indicated by many of the cited examples of memorialisation 
practices. In an attempt to disrupt the tendency to privilege embryos, foetuses 
and babies at the expense of women, I repeatedly sought to refocus attention on 
the material, social and emotional bodies of women themselves. As such, my 
research has elaborated on the embodied experiences of women who have had 
pregnancy losses, rather than primarily on foetal/baby bodies. My desire to 
focus on embodiment also responds to a divergence I identify in the pregnancy 
loss literatures, whereby the social sciences tend to focus on grief in a manner 
which often backgrounds the bodies of women and the medical literatures 
largely focus on the physiological events of pregnancy loss without appreciating 
the complex, extensive, wider experiences. Thus, my interest in material-
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emotional bodies is a strategy both to resist the tendency to efface women when 
the foetal subject is privileged and to develop accounts of pregnancy loss which 
attend to aspects which are otherwise largely overlooked.  
Bodies, the “most immediately and intimately felt geography” (Davidson 
and Milligan 2004 p523 italics in original; Rich 1986), feature prolifically and 
prominently in the thesis and do so in relation to other spaces such as hospitals 
and cemeteries. Amongst others, this has included bodies: living, conceiving, 
pregnant, waiting, distressed, bleeding, birthing, no-longer-pregnant, lactating, 
bereaved, crying, grieving, remembering, talking and typing. Bodies are also 
social, involving relations between women and their embryos, foetuses and 
babies before, during and after pregnancy losses, but also with others such as 
partners, family members, friends, medical staff, work colleagues, online group 
users, tattooists, strangers and so on. That some pregnancy losses are 
considered deaths—validated legally, medically, personally and/or socially—
means encounters with deceased embryo, foetal and/or baby beings; for others, 
in relation to their own encounters, there is intense ambiguity as to what the 
bodily fluids and ‘body-like’ materialities from ended pregnancies ‘are’, 
potentially betwixt-and-between menstrual blood and normative corpses. This 
issue concerns matter deemed ‘out-of-place’ and ‘out-of-time’; as Douglas (1966 
p36) argues, discomfort towards, and potentially the rejection of, matter ‘out of 
place’ can concern “any object likely to confuse or contradict cherished 
classifications”. Pregnancy loss materiality, ‘unformed’—“an apt symbol of the 
beginning and of growth as it is of decay” (Douglas 1966 p161)—or otherwise in 
undesirable form, disrupts the presumed qualities anticipated in reproduction 
of living and progressing bodies during pregnancy and post-partum.  
Countering the culturally-pervasive narrative of joyful pregnancies, 
encounters with ambiguous matter discussed in this thesis have included: 
deceased embryos, foetuses and ‘babies’ inside living women; encountering 
unexpected bleeding and expulsion of foetal and placental bodily materiality; 
premature birth; onset lactation following loss; underdeveloped or anomaly 
pregnancies; seeing/holding stillborn babies; and tiny coffins. This raises the 
issue that death involves the transition of bodily matter which, in instances of 
pregnancy loss, entail additional and potentially disconcerting qualities of 
ambiguity. As Woodthorpe (2010) notes, it is not necessarily the knowledge that 
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death does occur/has occurred per se which evokes emotional, social distancing 
in contemporary Western societies but rather the thought of, or contact with, 
the physiological matter and decomposition of, dead bodies. Whilst aversion 
and fear were responses towards the materiality of pregnancy losses for some—
whether concerning residing in the internal body (as with missed miscarriages 
or pre-partum stillbirths), tactile contact with the external body (as with feeling 
and/or touching pregnancy losses intra- and post- partem) or more physically 
distanced viewing—feelings of sadness and profound loss were often also 
recalled. The tension between these sets of feelings, and the difficulty of 
reconciling resultant actions as demonstrated by Fiona, was also marked 
through the indeterminacy of language used to describe ‘what’ or ‘who’ was 
encountered (Murphy and Philpin 2010). 
Embodiment denotes “our being through our bodies” (Moss and Dyck 
2002 p10) and constitutes both a primary condition for the project—which 
depended on embodied, recollecting and ‘speaking’ participants—and a theme 
in the research. In addition to bodily interiors (Chapter 3), surfaces (Chapter 7) 
and the flows between bodily internals and externals (Chapter 5) – I discussed 
relations to other body-selves (Chapter 4), ‘reconstituted’ bodies online 
(Chapter 6) and memorialisations as embodying simultaneous absence and 
presence (Chapter 8). Always changing, physical bodies are emotionally and 
socially embroiled in the accumulative, ‘lived out’ and ‘lived through’ nature of 
experience. Women who have physiologically had pregnancy losses, therefore, 
can have direct experience of a whole range of bodily aspects, pertaining to: 
their interiors as imagined by themselves and others, and technologically 
‘viewed’ in medical and domestic settings; external skins, contours and bumps; 
fluids, such as blood; and materialities like embryo, foetal and baby bodies. 
However, owing to the wider cultural denial of pregnancy losses and general 
societal discomfort towards particular elements of ‘death’ and ‘bodies’, many of 
these embodied experiences can be disavowed, trivialised or (self)censored. 
Subsequently, even when narratives about pregnancy loss are ventured in the 
presence of others – particular aspects deemed ‘too graphic’ or otherwise 
squeamish may be ‘sanitised’ or euphemised. In contrast to this predominant 
and everyday situation, I sought for my research to offer an alternative 
opportunity in which participants could openly discuss these aspects, if wanted. 
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Resonant with the quotation by Winterson (1996) which opened the 
thesis, I have sought to consider some of the ways that the physical and 
emotional bodies of women who experience pregnancy loss retain palimpsestic, 
but sometimes largely indiscernible, traces. For instance, Chapter 7 considered 
how some participants utilise their physical bodies to ‘speak’ or convey 
something about their pregnancy loss experiences in ways—such as with 
memorial tattoos—which are not necessarily visible, or intended to be legible, to 
others. Whether unintentional in their production or deliberately acquired, a 
variety of bodily marks, alterations and sensations can “illustrate biographical 
stories” and serve as “communicative devices” offering support “as people strive 
to (re)tell plausible self-narratives” (Kosut 2000 p96). I have sought to bring 
‘the body’ back into focus as a material entity, recognising embodiment as 
entailing fleshy physicality—of organs, tissues and fluids—as well as 
emotionality, and situate biology in relation to social contexts. This echoes a 
wider advocacy in geographies of health (Hall 2000) and links to Lindemann’s 
(1944) pioneering work which argued that bereavements alter the ‘sensorium’. 
However, the ways in which bereavement and grief are bodily experienced tends 
to be disregarded in social contexts (prompting hiding) and has been overlooked 
in a vast array of subsequent academic accounts (Hentz 2002). Whilst much 
grief scholarship attends to cognitive dimensions, Hentz (2002) argues there 
has been a relative lack of interest regarding how bodies ‘remember’ and 
‘encode’ grief such as visceral responses like tiredness on dates retrospectively 
recognised as bereavement anniversaries.  
There is resonance also with regards to the ways in which existing 
pregnancy loss literatures have largely focused on validating the cognitive and 
emotional dimensions of grief with less interest in further exploring ‘the body’. 
Certainly, previous academic accounts of pregnancy losses implicitly concern 
bodies and tend to mention common experiences of bleeding, cramping and 
passing matter but often in ways which largely concede to a biological domain. 
As I hope to have shown, bodies are physical entities and always already social, 
discursive, emotional and relational. Pregnancy loss experiences are shaped by, 
for instance, the routinised and prolific use of reproductive technologies 
interacting with physiological bodies, including around urine tests, in medical 
and ‘domestic’ settings, and ultrasonography scans. There are aspects which do 
not leave physical marks on the body but nonetheless elicit visceral sensations 
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and alterations (Chapters 3 and 7). For instance, using home-kit pregnancy 
urine tests may be distressing experiences but do not leave tangible ‘evidence’ 
on the material body as do stretch-marks and puncture sites/bruises of blood 
tests, at least temporarily. However, the embodied experience of using urine test 
kits can remain present in one’s recollected body-self history, potentially 
emerging emotionally and sensorially in abrupt ways with the onset of 
subsequent menstruation and the use of additional pregnancy tests (Chapter 3). 
Sensitivity, Resistance and Pregnancy Loss 
Entailing an array of emotionally-fraught, ‘sensitive’ topics, pregnancy 
losses are difficult, deeply distressing experiences for many – yet I resist the 
implication that this therefore disqualifies discussion. To self-censor such 
research from ever occurring would be another way in which pregnancy losses 
are neglected from (academic and wider) recognition. Ethics in this research 
were processual and sought to be emotionally-attuned, with recognition that 
there can be no guarantees of ‘successful’ or apt ethical deployment despite 
efforts to be constantly vigilant, sensitive and willing to revise decisions, such as 
those about conversation and conduct within interviews (Corbin and Morse 
2003). Emotional dynamics are more than just practical issues to be ‘controlled’ 
since “emotions are integral to research relationships” and constitute rich 
interpretive resources (Bondi 2005 p232). Attending to these shaped the kinds 
of ‘data’ produced, drawing my attention to particular examples in sometimes 
intensely visceral, emotional and ‘haunting’ ways. Though not always 
unanimously achieved, I sought not to ‘shy away’ from the intensity of emotions 
involved in participants’ experiences shared during research encounters. As 
Langer (1997 p54-55) articulates in the context of Holocaust testimony, this is 
because “[p]ainful memories are not always disabling, and narratives about 
them […] rarely “liberate” witnesses from a past they cannot and do not wish to 
escape”. Talking about pregnancy loss, as in the interviews, is thus not a 
‘solution’ to painful experience but nor does it need to be deemed a ‘problem’ 
either. From this perspective, to prohibit such research from occurring or to 
close down all ‘intense’ discussions in the research poses—rather than solves—
ethical queries, such as about different channels of silencing in operation.  
In this way, although inevitably accompanied by hesitations about 
efficacy, I identify feminist sentiments of ‘resistance’ at the basis of my research 
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with attempts to: draw on multiple experiences of pregnancy loss; acknowledge 
the ‘personal is political’; and offer ‘small’ gestures in research encounters of 
emotional support and practical signposting to resources. My project, and the 
kinds of discussions about pregnancy losses I have developed within it, can be 
seen to constitute a form of resistance to the wider societal approach of silence, 
denigration and marginalisation. This is in the vein of a particular propensity 
for feminist researchers to identify forms of resistance given that “[t]he image of 
women’s unquestioning subservience is hard for us as feminists to accept, both 
in examining ourselves and in interpreting the lives of those with whom we 
conduct research” (Lewin 1998 p164). Women’s relationships with biomedicine 
has been a particularly key domain for such findings, with feminist researchers 
locating forms of resistance offering reassurance that hope persists (Lewin 
1998). Forms of resistance can be conscious, unconscious, direct, indirect, 
overtly disobedient, quietly subversive, premeditated and, as Wade (1997) 
notes, opportunistic. The identification of subtle resistances rejects “[t]he 
notion that the act of resisting must entail direct communication or 
confrontation [which] is based on highly masculinist assumptions and obscures 
recognition of acts of resistance that are not stereotypically masculine in nature” 
(Lorentzen 2008 p74). This latter notion fits more aptly with Martin’s (1987 
p188) defining of ‘rebellion’ as “[f]orcing or persuading other people to change 
the way they talk or act, beyond the single instances of resistance [for unknown/ 
future others in similar positions to benefit from]”. Within my research, there 
were important and admirable examples of this, such as Anne’s involvement in 
educating midwives on their treatment of patients who have stillbirths and 
lobbying for funding from parliament for further stillbirth research.  
Differentiated to that of ‘rebellion’, Martin (1987 p187) describes 
‘resistance’ broadly as the refusal “to accept a definition of oneself and saying so, 
refusing to act as requested or required”;  two examples of which in her research 
resonate with those in my own on pregnancy loss. The first example of 
resistance, in relation to menstrual bleeding in the workplace, is “turning 
private spaces to seditious purposes”, such as using toilets as a kind of 
‘backstage’ for solidarity (Martin 1987 p177). With menstruation largely deemed 
a ‘disgusting’ and ‘shameful’ bodily process, Martin (1987 p97) recognises 
potential: “if what my body does must be kept secret, then I can use that 
opportunity to keep other things I do secret also”. For Rosie, workplace toilets 
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had been the setting of a frank conversation about pregnancy loss and infertility 
with an ‘acquaintance’-colleague. Given the perceived workplace atmosphere 
that such topics were not suitable for open discussion or could be the subject of 
duplicitous conversation, the two women aired their experiences in the semi-
private setting of the toilets and offered one another advice and encouragement. 
Martin’s (1987 p177) second example concerns menopause whereby resistance 
is enacted through “publicly nam[ing] their state, claiming its right to exist as 
part of themselves in the public realm”. A number of memorialisation practices 
could be discussed in these terms; for instance memorial jewellery and tattoos 
can invoke conversations about pregnancy loss. In addition are occasions when 
participants had openly and unabashedly, at least at the time, stated their 
occurrences of pregnancy losses. For instance, Anne’s encounter with a pushy 
supermarket cashier in which she stated her recent stillbirth and Gemma telling 
a variety of persons about her foetal anomalies termination. Whilst both women 
described ambivalence or regret retrospectively, they nonetheless engaged in a 
refusal to suppress their experiences by vocally communicating them in 
‘everyday’ contexts where such disclosures are unexpected. 
Yet there are concerns that ‘resistance’ “is rapidly becoming a word that 
covers anything, defines itself, and may be said to exist because we insist that it 
does so” as well as concern that its deployment can negate the ways in which 
hegemonic complicity occurs simultaneously (Lewin 1998 p164). I am aware 
that my framing of the above examples may not be considered in such ways by 
the participants cited and that it is important to also consider the limitations 
regarding these activities. As I discussed in Chapter 6, in relation to online 
support groups, particular exclusions and hierarchies can be reiterated or go 
unchallenged. In addition, the support groups can constitute enclaves, 
characterised by the concern held by some that their online ‘disclosures’ of 
pregnancy losses inside support groups might ‘leak’ out and become known to 
wider others such as Facebook friends. As with the earlier example mentioned 
regarding Rosie in her workplace toilets, there is a degree to which the online 
support groups can contain recognition/awareness of pregnancy losses and 
continue to sequester this rather than effect changes in wider social contexts. 
This links to discussions in my Methodology chapter about negotiating tensions 
between exposure to risks and prospective benefits from pursuing challenging 
discussions about pregnancy loss, for oneself and others. Another sentiment of 
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‘resistance’ concerns the ways I have academically situated the project in 
relation to feminist geography, seeking to challenge the logics of ‘male-stream’ 
geography (Rose 1993) through pregnancy loss. If researching fleshy, leaky, 
female bodies is something of a difficult topic for ‘squeamish geographies’ 
(Longhurst 2001), then researching deceased and bereaved bodies in 
reproduction is especially so. As I will elaborate in the third node below, I have 
subsequently challenged feminist refusals to engage with pregnancy loss and 
refuted that the ‘who’ and ‘where’ of dying, death and bereavement are already 
and definitively known.  
Feminist Reproductive Politics, Loss and Death in Geography 
Emphasising notions of relationally and socially attributed life, 
personhood and death (Franklin 1991; Morgan 1996; Addelson 1999; Hallam et 
al 1999; Hartouni 1999; Layne 2003a) has allowed me to retain a commitment 
to feminist reproductive politics as I sought to attend to the meanings women 
themselves hold about their pregnancy losses. With my particular interest in 
body spaces, I sought to develop a series of accounts about pregnancy losses. 
This included recognition that some pregnancy losses are legally and medically 
deaths or are considered as such by those intimately involved, highlighting 
pregnancy loss as a topic for further consideration in the growing sub-discipline 
of the geographies of death and dying. This is not without caution and the way 
in which this could unintentionally invite or permit pro-life sentiments remains 
a serious ‘dilemma’ (Kitzinger and Wilkinson 1997), reiterating the need for a 
critical consideration of the legal and political ramifications that the vocabulary 
of death may have (Kevin 2011). To be clear, I do not argue for all and every 
pregnancy loss to be deemed/labelled a death, bereavement and/or loss but, 
instead, to recognise that this is how some women view these events. This is 
sometimes also legally and medically legitimised, as in stillbirth and neonatal 
death, and/or validated by their extended social networks, but not necessarily. 
That some pregnancy losses are legally, medically, personally and/or in certain 
social settings/groups considered deaths, need not erode other facets of feminist 
reproductive rights such as demands for safe, accessible and cheap 
contraception and termination facilities, women’s healthcare, and support for 
childcare. My research has brought together two sub-disciplines—feminist and 
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death and dying geographies—which, given the stakes, I consider crucial in the 
context of pregnancy losses. 
My use of the label ‘pregnancy loss’ was a deliberate decision, amenable 
to a variety of readings that neither necessitate nor prohibit identification with 
that of ‘death’. ‘Loss’ can be understood in a physical sense, referring to the 
materiality of ended pregnancies whether this be blood, ‘clumps of cells’ (Fox 
2000), embryos, foetuses, babies and/or, in ectopics, fallopian tubes. The 
naming of these material entities as ‘losses’ does not necessarily require 
particular emotional responses. Another understanding of ‘loss’ refers to 
curtailed or ruptured expectations, hopes and dreams which may prompt the 
(re)construction of social identities for oneself (as a mother) and others (as 
one’s child). For some participants, recurrent pregnancy losses and fertility 
complications meant that particular aspirations in relation to biological kinship 
entailed tremendous emotional turmoil and uncertainty about their futures. 
Subsequently, in trying to conceive or during later pregnancies, anxieties 
regarding this array of losses could crystallise and re-emerge in experiences of, 
for example, using urine home-kit pregnancy tests with feelings of haunting 
precarity (Chapter 3). The physiological circumstances and/or emotionally 
traumatic past experiences for some meant abandoning earlier familial ‘dreams’ 
and adjusting to new prospective futures, such as pursuing adoption. There can 
also be a loss of prior beliefs and orientations, such as of innocence, regarding 
dominant narratives of reproduction as natural, joyful and happy (Layne 1996, 
2003a, 2003b, 2006). The lexicon of ‘loss’ can, as I have suggested, accompany 
accounts of bereavements by death but also other kinds of disruptive and grief-
inducing life events (Updegraff and Taylor 2000; Davies 2005) such as 
relationship breakdown/divorce (Rosenblatt et al 1976), chronic illness 
(Charmaz 2002, 2008), ‘fading’ identity in old age (de Medeiros 2009), 
dementia (Hallam et al 1999), industry closure (Walkerdine 2010), and 
displacement by disaster events such as Hurricane Katrina (Curtis et al 2007; 
Otte 2007) amongst other circumstances of homelessness (Robinson 2005).  
I sought to accommodate complex, multiple understandings of ‘loss’, 
with recognition that such experiences have specific and differing “contours” 
(Kevin 2011 p849), in order to attend to an array of spatial contexts. In this 
research, I have explored a range of ways in which different participants’ 
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experiences of pregnancy loss shaped, and were shaped by, various spaces. In 
addition to—and yet always involving—body spaces, this has included 
ultrasonography rooms as locales in which no-longer-progressing, deceased 
and/or shortly-ending pregnancies are encountered (Chapter 3). Another set of 
examples concerns various mourning and memorial activity locations such as 
graves (official, informal, proxy), cathedrals, beaches, and homes and gardens 
(Chapter 8) but also other sites that cannot necessarily be anticipated such as 
the way in which wearing of memorial jewellery can spark enquiries and 
conversations in which experiences of pregnancy loss are shared. Particular 
spaces featured in the thesis a number of time in different ways; for instance, 
toilets and bathrooms can be locations in which pregnancies are ‘revealed’ via 
urine-tests (Chapter 3) and end with bleeding/passing matter (Chapter 5) as 
well as sites for reciprocated emotional support with others (Chapter 4). 
The attention to the spatiality of pregnancy loss in this research has also 
highlighted a number of differences in contrast to other experiences or contexts 
of loss, death and bereavement. For example, Chapter 5 included a discussion of 
the ways in which some pregnancy losses can entail encounters with embryonic 
and foetal bodies in toilets: spaces not usually considered, in academic literature 
or more broadly, to be a space of death and dying. Such toilet/bathroom settings 
tend to diverge starkly in physical, social and symbolic terms to the efforts 
which are often made in professional funeral parlours to provide a consoling 
and aesthetically sanitised environment in which deceased bodies are 
encountered. Careful management of various aspects of viewing and visitation 
in funeral parlours and chapels of rest in hospitals, for instance, are thought to 
support the bereaved and facilitate their grieving (Worden 1993). Yet 
encounters with such bodies/materiality in toilet spaces regarding, for example, 
miscarriages often involve contact with taboo and ambiguous bodily fluids, 
entities and textures. As a result, these experiences can be deeply frightening, 
including with uncertainties regarding the intensity of uterine bleeding (as 
explored in Chapter 3), and invoke additional feelings of abjection towards what 
is felt and/or seen. Some participants articulated emotional tensions resultant 
from such scenarios, with strong and not easily reconcilable responses including 
love for the ‘baby’ alongside disgust at ambiguous, dead/non-living matter. 
249 
 
As evidenced in the aforementioned example, some pregnancy losses can 
differ in important ways from other kinds of losses/deaths. This also has 
implications for various aspects of scholarship. For example, Chapters 7 and 8 
both highlighted the ways in which pregnancy losses can leave little to no 
physical ‘mementos’ to be utilised in subsequent memorialisation practices 
alongside reluctance, or hostility, from others to engage in socially recognising 
the validity and desire for these. Subsequently, when the bereavement is not of a 
‘person’ according to criteria of having lived post-partum (i.e. an infant or 
adult), there are additional difficulties in constructing ‘durable biographies’ 
(Walter 1996) and/or otherwise maintaining ‘continuing bonds’ (Rosenblatt 
1996; Silverman and Klass 1996; Silverman and Nickman 1996; Stroebe et al 
1996; Small 2001). One of the key contributions of the thesis has been to 
foreground an array of spaces which might otherwise be overlooked as locations 
of loss and/or death; when considered in relation to pregnancy loss experiences, 
with presumptions in the academic literature about the subjects of death and 
dying challenged, these geographies come into focus as significant.  As such, the 
thesis has entailed reflection on normative assumptions about who dies (post-
partum/‘individual’ children and adults) and is bereaved in accordance with 
particular criteria (social- and biological- life), the temporalities and processes 
of dying (sometimes prior to, rather than succeeding, birth) and the spaces of 
these experiences.  
In challenging that the subjects of death and bereavement are already 
known in the geographies of death and dying, it is essential to retain feminist 
emphasis on women’s bodies, lives, relations and emotions. I consider 
pregnancy losses as neither firmly inside nor relegated outside of the remit of 
the geographies of death and dying, instead positing my framings of the topic as 
an ‘ambivalent, feminist, emotional geographies of loss’. Such an approach 
simultaneously seeks to acknowledge the significance of pregnancy loss 
experiences for some whilst refuting prescriptive expectations about emotional 
responses or otherwise reactions. To disregard pregnancy loss altogether further 
denies and negates many women’s lived experiences (Layne 1999), but this does 
not mean that all women’s narratives (like those propagating pro-life stances) 
must be ‘validated’ by feminist researchers (Kitzinger and Wilkinson 1997). My 
research corroborates that in hearing an “expanded account of women’s 
reproductive experiences, feminists will clearly have to contend with numerous 
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foetal interpretations, gendered meanings, and political stances” (Oaks 1999 
p195). Pregnancy loss is certainly challenging to research – it “is not a nice 
topic” but remains “a fact of life” with potentially significant emotional as well 
as physical implications (Layne 2003a p249). For this reason, academic 
exploration of pregnancy losses are valuable, potentially benefitting study 
participants and enriching literatures to provide fuller or additional 
understandings of these experiences. This has relevance for policy implications, 
such as hospital protocols, and the diversity of spatialities I have discussed 
highlights the scope to further improve an array of environments within which 
embodied understandings and relationships regarding ‘loss’ are negotiated. 
Future Research Directions 
Just as bodies “cannot be static” with the constant changing of life 
(Oksanen and Turtiainen 2005 p122), this is also the case for research 
trajectories which are inevitably open to additional understandings still to be 
gleaned from prospective research engagements. The ways in which different 
persons experience pregnancy losses as related to particular notions of 
normative reproduction and ‘appropriate’ reproducers constitutes a significant 
avenue for additional research. This recognition invites further work on cultural 
differences and the developing world context, as mentioned in the introduction 
chapter (van der Sijpt 2010 on Cameroon; also Ryan 2009 on assisted 
reproductive technologies). Attitudes regarding who is deemed a suitable 
‘reproducer’ entail factors such as race, class, disability, sexuality, marital status 
and age (Luker 1996; Ladd-Taylor and Unmansky 1998; Woliver 2002; Kuttai 
2010) with historical traces and precedents (Reekie 1997). Not excluding all of 
these factors, amongst others, the theme of age and ‘generational relations’ 
emerged in my research. For instance, I was sometimes positioned by 
participants as a ‘young’ woman whose reproductive life was forthcoming rather 
than past, current or surplus (Methodology chapter). Several participants 
described their own experiences of pregnancy and/or pregnancy loss at a 
‘young’ age (Carla, Lara, Fiona and Gemma) or made observations about ‘young’ 
pregnancy and motherhood as stigmatised based on the treatment of their 
relatives (Siobhan). Social anxieties pervade debates on teen pregnancy, notably 
around notions of promiscuity and contraception (Fine and MacPherson 1992) 
because “[t]een pregnancy operates outside the norm of legitimate 
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reproduction, marking it as a site of moral concern and state control” (Pillow 
2006 p216). Relevant to this, the concepts of ‘teen’, ‘young’ and ‘older’ pregnant 
women/mothers are historically, socially, culturally and politically negotiated, 
as well as shaped by the aforementioned varying axis of differences. 
Since reproductive decisions should include being “able to choose legal, 
safe abortions [… and being] able to choose, rather than be coerced and shamed, 
to continue their unplanned pregnancies” (Woliver 2002 p4), the positioning of 
teenage and ‘young’ pregnancy as a problem curtails the possibility of genuine 
‘choice’. If a lower teen pregnancy rate is implicitly deemed a success, there are 
serious questions to be raised about whether the role of terminations in 
‘achieving’ this is really quite so laudable. That is, given the stigmatising 
rhetoric towards teen pregnancies, termination can feature in public discourse 
as ‘the right choice’ or a ‘solution’ given—as Woliver (2002) notes—the array of 
societal ills teen mothers are blamed for. Drawing on wider dismissive attitudes, 
this may unfairly position other pregnancy losses such as miscarriages as ‘for 
the best’ also. There are several implications which could be considered: the 
additional negation of any grief or emotional ambivalence and thus also 
potential memorialisation practices; peer-to-peer knowledge about pregnancy 
generally and pregnancy loss specifically, such as when and where to turn to for 
information and/or medical assessment; the role of educational institutions; 
and treatment by medical staff who may, knowingly or unwittingly, channel 
judgmental attitudes in different settings such as during GP appointments, 
ultrasonography scans, during labour/birth, and in the delivery of postnatal 
care. Numerous tenets of participants’ experiences hold relevance for thinking 
through some of these, such as Gemma who had previously considered foetal 
anomalies primarily relevant to ‘older’ women than herself, Lara who was 
anxious about recurrent miscarriages of planned pregnancies in her future and 
Carla who described some of the medical staff encountered in her first 
pregnancy as “the most horrible people I’ve ever met”. 
There is scope to reflect further on issues of public engagement with the 
topic of pregnancy loss and certainly the aforementioned interest in teenage and 
‘young’ pregnancy loss could have significant policy ramifications. In addition 
there are other issues of public concern, including the prospect of ‘Missing 
Angel’-style bills operating in some US states whereby certificates of life, as well 
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as of death, are officially issued to parents of stillborn babies whereby stillbirth 
is regarded in the US as those over 20 week gestation as opposed to the UK 
definition of 24 weeks or more (Doss 2010). Communicating and translating 
research findings beyond academia requires careful reflection on how to 
adequately convey the complexity and diversity of pregnancy loss experiences. 
This endeavour—as well as issues such as that of certification potentially on the 
UK horizon—would require attentiveness to feminist reproductive politics. For 
instance, dispersing narratives of pregnancy loss outside of academia and 
beyond the enclaves of (online, face-to-face) support groups must capture a 
diversity of views without propagating intolerance. Doing so is certainly easier 
said than done, but one potentially productive approach could be with 
ethnographic fictions which bring together research ‘data’ material to produce 
composite stories able to appeal to reality “in the sense that things like these 
happened to people like these” (Angrosino 1998 p101 italics in original; also 
Inckle 2005, 2010). Ethnographic fiction stories, ideally rendered accessible and 
widely available, could enable readers “to experience something of what the 
people among whom we conducted our research have experienced” and do so in 
a manner which addresses “life as it is lived, rather than life as it is analysed and 
dissected through the language of positivistic science (Angrosino 1998 p97). 
There is also scope for future research to consider the past experiences of 
women in older generations, inviting recognition of the ways pregnancy losses 
have been responded to in other eras, places and circumstances – bearing in 
mind that these narratives may be very different and even oppositional to the 
dominant one of grief explored in the contemporary pregnancy loss literature 
(Reagan 2003). Pregnancy losses are experienced in diverse ways, not 
necessarily always seen as sad, distressing or traumatic events (Keane 2009), 
and may be considered ‘best left in the past’. However, some women vividly 
recall their pregnancy losses and grieve these many years/decades later 
(Letherby 1999; Davidson 2007; Murphy 2009), as was the case for participants 
like Caroline, Diane and Lisa. Additionally, participants sometimes mentioned 
those for whom this was the case in their interviews in terms of their own 
mothers or older family friends. Further consideration of familial histories could 
quite significantly widen the known scale of women, as well as potentially their 
partners/familial others, affected by pregnancy losses. It also raises questions 
about the prospect of extending recognition and negotiating support which 
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might be appreciated presently. Of course, not all women are or, if 
intergenerational reproductive histories were considered further, would be 
interested in recollecting their experiences and/or memorial activities – yet 
others may welcome the possibility. Whilst some activities are not 
retrospectively possible for many of those whose losses physically occurred long 
ago (seeing/touching the foetus/baby, burial/cremation, taking photographs, 
hand-foot ink prints), some mourning and memorialising activities may be of 
interest such as art therapy (Seftel 2001, 2006; Douglas and Fox 2009), creative 
writing and participating in official or private memorial services. 
Research attending to older generations could provide opportunities to 
bring these experiences into recognition in their own right and enable 
exploration into the ways emotions and memories can resurface across/in-
between body-selves in later generations’ reproductive (multi-generational) 
lives. Given that one’s mother is often a key source of support regarding 
pregnancy losses (Cecil 1994) or, counteractively, can compound distresses with 
insensitivity – questions are raised about intergenerational experiences of 
pregnancy losses. There is evidence from my research that past experiences of 
familial others’ pregnancy losses can feature in the recent, current and 
forthcoming lives of later generations (between mothers and daughters or 
between sisters). My reading of the concept of postmemory (Hirsch 1997) in 
Chapter 3 challenges the notion of distinct, individual, bounded body-selves and 
experiences (see also: Dixon and Straughan 2010; Abrahamsson and Simpson 
2011; Lea 2012). Postmemory suggests that another’s past (reproductive) 
experiences can ‘travel’ across bodily boundaries to unintentionally re-emerge 
in the present lives of later generations, resonating in ways which are felt but 
not necessarily as clear manifestations. If postmemory is understood as a 
resurfaced and displaced remembering—a simultaneous absence and presence 
which can have ‘real’ effects but remain non-verbalised/un-verbalisable—this 
could have significant implications for ongoing debates about responses to 
recent, current and future pregnancy losses. Thus, thinking about the concept of 
postmemory highlights an opportunity to ‘trace’ an inter-generational account 
of pregnancy loss which would fundamentally recognise the ways in which 
kinship is socially and biologically produced, and contribute to multidisciplinary 
work on ‘intergenerational’ relationships (Peskin 2000; Pillemer and Lüscher 
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2004) including that specifically concerned with bereavement in ‘the family’ 
(Gilbert 1996; Baddeley and Singer 2010; Forhan 2010).  
*    *    * 
The contribution of my thesis has been to draw attention back to bodies 
in thinking about various experiences of pregnancy losses. The physicality of 
bodies tend to be paradoxically overlooked in nursing encounters in medical 
settings (Murphy and Philpin 2010) and, I argue, much of the relevant existing 
academic social science and humanities literature. Drawing on participants’ 
narratives, I have sought to foreground pregnancy losses beyond medical events 
as experiences in which both themes of materiality and emotionality are central. 
My thesis is comprised of (re)collections emphasising the embodied and 
relational experiences of pregnancy losses, as enabled by my bringing together 
of feminist and death and dying geographies. At the onset of the thesis, I quoted 
from a novel by Winterson (1996 p89) that “[w]ritten on the body is a secret 
code only visible in certain lights; the accumulations of a lifetime gather there”. 
The various ‘sediments’ of experiences regarding bodies has been a thematic 
interest throughout my research and, in addition, I perceive there to be a 
parallel in terms of conducting research and writing. To close by reworking the 
earlier opening quotation: written in this thesis are attendances only articulable 
through certain frames; the accumulations of my research gather here.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Vignettes of Participants 
Anne, now in her mid-thirties, experienced two pregnancy losses: one 
miscarriage estimated about five to six weeks gestation and one stillbirth at full 
term. Anne and her husband experienced difficulties conceiving these 
pregnancies, with the probable cause pertaining to her endometriosis. Anne’s 
second pregnancy became overdue and she began to leak small amounts of 
amniotic fluid, though this was dismissed when she spoke on the telephone to 
medical staff. After a visit from her midwife, she was referred to the maternity 
unit for foetal heart monitoring but then sent home as the observations were 
deemed normal. However, Anne began feeling very ill that evening with strong 
contractions and she returned to the maternity ward where a foetal heartbeat 
could not be found. Foetal death was diagnosed and Anne was slowly induced a 
couple of hours later, giving birth the following evening. The post-mortem 
results did not yield a definite cause but suggested several options, relating to 
the fact that the pregnancy was overdue and the warning signs of amniotic 
leaking had not been addressed, that either the placenta malfunctioned or that 
the leaking of amniotic fluid over several days had allowed an infection to set in. 
Ben, now in his mid-twenties, spoke about his sister’s pregnancy which 
culminated in the stillbirth of Ben’s niece about a decade ago. Ben had not had 
much contact with his sister during her pregnancy or the birth owing to living 
some distance away. As such, Ben mostly spoke about the experience of 
attending the funeral and the ways in which he and his family have since 
incorporated the memory of his niece into their lives, including by visiting her 
grave and shared conversations. A teenager at the time of the occurrence, Ben 
recalled his mother explaining the term ‘stillbirth’ but there had been little 
further discussion beyond this. Although the cause of the pre-partum foetal 
death was inconclusive from autopsy reports, there was some speculation that it 
could be related to alcohol consumption during the pregnancy. This was the first 
bereavement Ben had experienced of a “young person” and his response was 
simultaneously sad and compassionate yet confused and ambivalent.  
Beth, after a successful first pregnancy resultant in her now-toddler child, 
experienced a miscarriage in her second pregnancy at nine weeks gestation. The 
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second pregnancy had been planned and quickly conceived, but Beth had 
concerns as it progressed. She contrasted her symptoms to those of her first 
pregnancy which had required hospitalisation for rehydration with severe 
morning sickness and gestational diabetes. Owing to this latter condition, Beth 
had to monitor her blood sugar levels and this out-of-the-ordinary behaviour 
was noted by her colleagues as indicative of her pregnant status for which she 
then had to “untell” following the miscarriage. Beth began bleeding and visited 
her General Practitioner (GP) aware that, as a medical professional herself, this 
constituted a threatened miscarriage. The bleeding became heavier, culminating 
in the eventual passing of the foetal sac at her home. Beth, now in her mid-
thirties, was pregnant at the time of her initial participation in the research and 
continued with email interviews following a successful birth. 
Carla experienced multiple pregnancies and pregnancy losses, with her first 
pregnancy resultant in her living child, followed by two miscarriage and three 
terminations. Now in her mid-twenties, Carla had been under the legal age of 
consent when she became pregnant for the first time. Both of her miscarriages 
were of wanted pregnancies, with the first around 12 weeks gestation and the 
second estimated between eight to 10 weeks. In both instances, she attended 
hospital for ultrasonography scans and possible treatment. The circumstances 
of her three medical terminations, all estimated around five to six weeks, 
included being unable to cope with a second child at that time, a sexual assault 
and learning of her partner’s infidelity. Carla’s experiences clearly included 
some traumatic aspects and she repeatedly conveyed the coping strategy of 
trying to “just ignore it”. This ethos conflicted somewhat with the openness with 
which she spoke in the first research interview, although it later became evident 
that a second interview would not be possible. Without clarification, since 
contact from Carla stopped, I speculate that this may have been owing to a 
reluctance to ‘revisit’ her distressing experiences and/or embarrassment about 
previously rescheduling interviews and a missed meeting. 
Caroline, with her first miscarriage occurring in the late 1990s during her early 
thirties, experienced a total of four miscarriages after the successful births of 
two children. These earlier two pregnancies were “very straight forward” and it 
was a significant shock to Caroline when her first miscarriage was diagnosed at 
a routine ultrasonography scan. Caroline conceived again, feeling that the 
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chances of a second miscarriage were unlikely; however, intrauterine death 
estimated at nine weeks was diagnosed by scan. Her third miscarriage was also 
discovered in this way at around seven weeks. All three of these miscarriages 
were managed surgically by Dilation and Curettage (D&C). In an ultrasound 
scan at 10 weeks of Caroline’s sixth pregnancy, her fourth miscarriage, a foetal 
heartbeat was present but a bleed around the sac was evident. Caroline saw this 
as a looming indicator and when she began bleeding, she refused to return to 
hospital and instead miscarried at home. With her four miscarriages occurring 
over a period of several years, Caroline struggled to secure appropriate medical 
investigation and she researched possible causes for her recurrent miscarriages. 
Although a diagnosis of antiphospholipid antibodies (APS) was eventually given 
and treatment made available, Caroline did not conceive again.  
Diane experienced seven miscarriages in addition to having three living 
children. The distress of these had been a source of dispute in Diane’s marriage 
at times. Five of her early miscarriages were medically confirmed, with three 
treated by surgical management (D&C) and two by medical management 
(tablets). The other two miscarriages were detected with home pregnancy tests 
but ended naturally before she had been able to get an appointment with her GP 
to confirm the results. Her first miscarriage, after the live birth of her first child, 
was confirmed by ultrasound at 12 weeks gestation and was following by two 
subsequent miscarriages before APS was diagnosed. Diane was referred for 
treatment—heparin sodium injections and low-dose aspirin—and after two 
additional miscarriages, she had her second living child. Diane miscarried twice 
more, with the final (seventh) miscarriage diagnosed via ultrasound. She had 
wanted to allow this last one to miscarry naturally but was encouraged to have 
surgical management to minimise infection risk. Her last (tenth) pregnancy 
resulted in the live birth of her third child, also supported by the treatment of 
heparin and aspirin to inhibit excessive blood coagulation.  
Esther, now in her early thirties, became pregnant for the first time whilst 
undergoing fertility treatment with the ovulation-inducing hormone Clomid. 
Esther conceived in her first cycle using this drug but, following a visit to her GP 
to confirm the pregnancy, was referred on to the hospital with a suspected 
ectopic pregnancy. Although this was promptly ruled out, the dropping levels of 
human chorionic gonadotropin (hCG) in the blood tests taken, revealed by a 
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doctor on the telephone, suggested Esther’s pregnancy had probably ended at 
just under seven weeks gestation. In the process of seeking confirmation of this, 
Esther underwent multiple blood tests and scans with long waits in the hospital 
and questions from medical staff which assumed bleeding had already occurred 
when it had not. After miscarrying naturally, Esther underwent eight additional 
cycles on Clomid but had not, at the time of the last interview, conceived again 
and she and her husband were embarking on the process of adoption. 
Fiona, now in her late twenties, conceived her second pregnancy unknowingly 
whilst trialling contraceptive pills to find her preference. She developed pre-
eclampsia in her first pregnancy, requiring Fiona to be intensely monitored and 
hospitalised for bed rest during the latter months. Although she gave birth 
naturally at full term, her new-born stayed on a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit 
(NICU) ward for over a week before being allowed home. It was retrospective to 
the occurrence of her miscarriage that Fiona recognised that she had been 
experiencing pregnancy symptoms, previously deemed fatigue from everyday 
caring for her young child. After feeling some intense pains in her abdomen 
throughout the day, Fiona collapsed whilst home alone with her toddler and, 
only able to get up after several minutes later, felt the passage what she later 
identified as an embryo estimated around eight to nine weeks gestation. Heavy 
bleeding ensued, eventually tapering out, and Fiona telephoned the NHS in 
which a doctor reiterated her assessment that it had been a miscarriage. She 
attended a GP appointment several days later, but found the GP’s examination 
and engagement severely lacking; subsequently most of Fiona’s medical 
understandings were derived from her own diligent searches online.  
Gemma, now in her late twenties, conceived for the first time with an 
unplanned pregnancy in her early twenties. Although the pregnancy was 
unexpected, Gemma and her partner were in a stable relationship and became 
increasingly excited about having a baby. With a routine scan at 12 weeks, her 
pregnancy was progressing well but an anomaly scan at 21 weeks gestation 
clearly showed foetal spina bifida. Gemma and her partner were faced with the 
traumatic decision to continue the pregnancy—knowing that the baby would 
have potentially severe brain damage owing to swelling, limited mobility and 
incontinence—or to terminate the pregnancy. Although ambivalent in speaking 
about the decision, the latter was ultimately settled upon and Gemma attended 
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hospital to be induced and deliver several days later. The highly medically-
managed and medicated termination birth in hospital was in sharp and 
deliberate contrast with Gemma’s two subsequent (live) home births. 
Graham, now in his early thirties, spoke about his and his wife’s experiences of 
11 miscarriages. All bar one of these occurred before the 12 week gestation mark, 
with the majority identified between six and eight weeks, including one ectopic 
which was resolved medically and without the removal of a fallopian tube. Three 
or four of these miscarriages were managed surgically via Evacuation of 
Retained Products of Conception (ERPC), one medically, and the others 
naturally. The latest miscarriage, identified at 12 weeks, had been managed 
surgically. With a prolific number of pregnancy losses stretching across several 
years, Graham noted how there was a sense in which “it all rolls into one after a 
little while”. Graham was acutely frustrated by the inadequate attitudes and 
dismissive treatment from medical staff as well as from some of his wider social 
group towards him as a male partner. Medical causes for the miscarriages had 
not been officially confirmed and, in the absence of medical advances which 
might enable them to biologically have living children, Graham and his wife 
were in the process of becoming adoptive parents.  
Helen, now in her late thirties, miscarried her first pregnancy before 
successfully birthing her two living children. Shortly after learning she was 
pregnant, after a series of inconclusive or otherwise unclear home-kit tests, 
Helen began spotting and visited ‘Accident and Emergency’ (A&E) later in the 
day to seek medical assistance. An internal/transvaginal scan yielded no 
definitive answers and another abdominal scan was booked for a few days later. 
However, an internal scan was needed, showing an embryo sac but a heartbeat 
could not be found – although, because of the early stage of pregnancy, this was 
not necessarily indicative of an ended pregnancy. Across several weeks, with 
multiple blood tests and another inconclusive scan during this time, there 
remained uncertainty as blood results initially indicated a progressing 
pregnancy. Finally, a forth scan revealed the embryo sac to be empty and 
Helen’s miscarriage was medically managed with pessaries administered in 
hospital before she was sent home once bleeding ensued. Helen expressed some 
remorse about the extent to which she had been affected by her miscarriage at 
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the time of occurrence and commented that it had not been the “event and 
drama” previously anticipated, with relatively minimal blood loss and pain.  
Holly, after several months of trying to conceive with her husband, became 
pregnant for the first time in her early thirties. However, between nine and 10 
weeks gestation, Holly began to experience some spotting. After speaking to her 
husband, whose occupation was as a GP, she attended A&E where she was 
dismissively treated and sent home with little clarity on her suspected 
miscarriage. After several days of waiting, with the onset of heavy bleeding and 
pain, Holly felt the passage of the embryo body as she naturally miscarried. The 
physically and emotionally painful experience of her miscarriage remained a 
source of anxiety throughout her second pregnancy, which she had conceived 
soon after the miscarriage. This second pregnancy was ongoing at the time of 
the research interviews and culminated in the live birth of her child. 
Isabel, now in her late thirties, experienced two miscarriages in between two 
successful pregnancies. Isabel’s first miscarriage occurred at 10 weeks with the 
onset of bleeding for which an ultrasonography scan several days later indicated 
no visible trace of the pregnancy remaining. Her second miscarriage was 
unexpectedly diagnosed at a 20 week anomaly scan, after the previous 12 week 
routine scan had been promising. A few days later, Isabel was induced and 
delivered the baby in hospital. Under the encouragement of an attending doctor, 
Isabel declined to see the baby once delivered, although the hospital took some 
photographs to be kept in her medical record in case she later wanted access to 
them. The hospital helped organise a funeral which Isabel attended with her 
sister. Several months later, the post-mortem indicated that, during her 
pregnancy, Isabel had been in contact with Parvovirus and that this had crossed 
the placenta with teratogenic effects. Around six months later, Isabel conceived 
her fourth pregnancy, culminating in her and her husband’s second living child. 
Jane, in her early thirties, attended a routine 12 week ultrasonography scan in 
her second pregnancy, revealing it to be anembryonic and that it had not 
progressed past three or four weeks. Her first pregnancy had been relatively 
straightforward, with minimal morning sickness, in contrast to the more intense 
feelings of nausea and exhaustion in her second pregnancy. Jane attended an 
appointment the day after the scan to discuss miscarriage management options 
although, with online research the prior evening and some knowledge from her 
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medical professional background, she was already inclined towards the surgical 
option. Discharged after the ERPC, she continued to bleed for some weeks 
which, combined with her pre-existing irregular menstrual cycles, she found 
highly frustrating. During the course of participating in the research, Jane fell 
pregnant for a third time, providing multiple updates on the progression of her 
pregnancy and reflecting on the ways in which her previous miscarriage 
influenced her current experience. Jane contacted me shortly after our last 
interview exchange to inform me of the live birth of her new-born.  
Lara, now in her mid-twenties, experienced her first two pregnancies in 
relatively quick succession, both of which were unplanned. Her first pregnancy 
ended in natural miscarriage at around five weeks, with the onset of bleeding 
and confirmation by ultrasound that the miscarriage had been complete. Her 
second pregnancy was terminated, at around the five week gestation point. This 
was by vacuum aspiration as this was the only option offered in the hospital 
attended in her home region of East Asia, in contrast to medical termination 
with tablets/pessaries which would likely be the management method for this 
situation in the UK. During the course of our second interview, Lara voiced her 
suspicions that she was pregnant for a third time—a concern which had re-
evoked memories from her previous miscarriage and termination experiences—
although test results several days later from her GP later indicated that she had 
not been and her belated menstrual period promptly resumed.  
Lisa, now in her early forties, experienced two miscarriages over a decade ago. 
The pregnancy of the first miscarriage had not been confirmed by hCG test and 
Lisa’s GP had been dismissive, suggesting that she had experienced no more 
than a delayed menstrual period contrary to Lisa’s certainty. Her second 
miscarriage occurred around the nine to 10 weeks gestation mark, indicated 
with some spotting for which she attended hospital and a transvaginal scan 
indicated that only an empty embryonic sac remained. Lisa was prepped for a 
D&C the following day but whilst awaiting the operation, she felt the passage of 
the sac. Lisa still underwent the surgery to be sure the miscarriage was complete 
but she suffered an allergic reaction to the anaesthetic, making her very unwell 
and requiring overnight supervision at the hospital. Her third pregnancy 
culminated in the birth of her living child, although this pregnancy had been 
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anxious and difficult owing to complications such as developing gestational 
diabetes, a prolonged labour and premature birth. 
Marie, now in her mid-thirties, began trying to conceive with her husband after 
his vasectomy reversal, discovering a couple of months later that she was 
pregnant. However, the 12 week routine scan showed an empty embryo sac, 
diagnosed as an anembryonic pregnancy, for which Marie underwent a D&C a 
fortnight later. During this time, analysis results from a sample of her husband’s 
semen returned as fully immotile. Nonetheless, Marie conceived a second time 
but some spotting began around six weeks in, which her GP suggested it would 
likely be implantation bleeding. However, the bleeding became heavier with 
cramping and Marie passed the pregnancy tissue subsequently. Several months 
later, Marie discovered she was pregnant for a third time but after a promising 
early viability scan around six weeks,  a private scan at nine weeks revealed a 
missed miscarriage which was managed by a second D&C. During the course of 
her participation in the research, Marie fell pregnant which she said was 
progressing well at 27 weeks in the last interview.   
Natalie, now in her late thirties, experienced two miscarriages: the first 
occurring after the birth of her eldest child and the second miscarriage following 
that of her second living child. Both successful pregnancies had also entailed 
complications, with major (grade four) placenta praevia in the first and a 
significant bleed during the pregnancy with her second living child. Natalie’s 
first miscarriage was diagnosed around 14 weeks, although she had been 
experiencing some bleeding for a fortnight previously. The second miscarriage 
was estimated at around six weeks gestation. For both miscarriages, Natalie 
underwent medical management but continued to experience bleeding for over 
a month after the ERPC for the second miscarriage and she was given a scan 
which showed remaining pregnancy tissues. Subsequently an additional ERPC 
was performed and it was discovered that one of the previous operations had 
created a false passage. As a result, Natalie had been unwell, requiring frequent 
hospital visits, across an extended period of several months. During the course 
of the research, she continued to have some related health problems with 
ongoing medical investigations regarding the false passage. 
Penny, after the successful birth of her two children, fell pregnant for a third 
time after agreeing with her husband that they would like to try for another 
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child. It became evident instantaneously to Penny at the 12 week 
ultrasonography appointment, given her scan experiences with the previous 
pregnancies, that there was something wrong. With an additional member of 
personnel brought in, medical staff members were unable to find a heartbeat 
and the measurements suggested that the embryo had stopped developing 
between eight and nine weeks. Retrospectively, Penny identified divergences in 
the symptoms of the miscarried pregnancy to her previous two successful 
pregnancies. A day or so after the scan, Penny underwent surgical management. 
Although she had relatively little bleeding after the ERPC, she had since 
continued to experience some physical health problems, including multiple 
urinary infections. Penny planned to have the ashes of her miscarriage located 
to a nearby baby memorial garden which she had visited a number of times. 
Rosie, now in her mid-thirties, spent several years trying to conceive with her 
husband before becoming pregnant for the first time. This pregnancy, however, 
was diagnosed as ectopic and required the removal of one of her fallopian tubes. 
Following this, Rosie underwent IVF treatment, resulting in two biochemical 
pregnancies ending before conceiving a fourth time. However, Rosie began to 
bleed and she attended hospital for an ultrasound scan where a heartbeat was 
detectable but the medical staff had grave concerns. Rosie continued to visit the 
hospital for weekly scan appointments, with there seeming to be progress at 
eight weeks. The subsequent scan, however, did not yield a heartbeat and Rosie 
underwent an ERPC the following day. Diagnosed with polycystic ovary 
syndrome (PCOS), Rosie, at time of participating in the research, had a 
forthcoming IVF cycle booked whilst she and her husband were also in contact 
with an adoption agency. Since the adoption process would require her to have 
been finished with IVF for one year minimum and one embryo remained ready 
for implantation, Rosie was torn between deciding the next step.  
Siobhan, now in her early twenties, participated in the research to talk about 
the neonatal death of her new-born nephew following her sister’s delivery of 
twins. Siobhan had researched the likelihood of neonatal death following the 
diagnosis of a rare genetic disorder on behalf of her sister and she was closely 
involved in the labour and delivery of the babies as birth partner. Owing to the 
circumstances of the delivery, Siobhan held the baby for the majority of his 
short 45 minute life span whilst her sister delivered the second baby and had the 
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removal of an epidural catheter. The baby died shortly after being christened. 
During the stay in the hospital, Siobhan and her sister were able to spend some 
time with the deceased baby, struggling with the simultaneous joy and sadness 
of the arrival of the twins. A funeral with an accompanying wake was held 
following an autopsy regarding which Siobhan had also attended a meeting 
about in order to support her sister’s comprehension of the findings.   
Tania, having had two successful pregnancies, experienced her first 
miscarriage in her third pregnancy at around 13 weeks gestation. Although the 
pregnancy had been unplanned and there had been some uncertainty about 
continuing it, Tania and her husband became increasingly excited about the 
news. However, with some initially light bleeding progressively becoming 
heavier and more painful, Tania attended hospital. Within a few minutes of 
arrival, she felt the passage of the pregnancy material and subsequently 
underwent a D&C to complete the miscarriage. The hospital arranged a funeral, 
having taken a non-committal response from Tania at the time to indicate a 
request to do so, which Tania reluctantly attended with her husband. Whilst this 
was a deeply distressing occasion, she felt that attending had provided “much 
peace afterwards”. Speaking about her experiences in the research proved to be 
more difficult than Tania had initially anticipated, leading us to agree indefinite 
suspension of her participation in the interviews until further notice. 
Tessa was the only participant in the research whose experiences occurred 
entirely outside of the UK, living in southern Africa and having heard about my 
research in UK-based pregnancy loss websites and support communities which 
she had visited. Subsequently, there were some noticeable differences in the 
health care system described but also similarities pertaining to the fact that 
Tessa received high quality, private hospital care. Now in her late twenties, 
Tessa experienced a miscarriage in her first pregnancy, following some spotting 
which worsened, requiring a visit to her doctor. The next day, an 
ultrasonography scan was performed at nearly 16 weeks and revealed that the 
foetus had died. A D&C was scheduled for the next day, though this wait added 
to the traumatic knowledge that the pregnancy had likely ended two or so weeks 
before the onset of bleeding. Tessa bled heavily after the operation and was kept 
in the hospital for observations out of concern that she might haemorrhage. 
265 
 
Tessa was pregnant for a second time during the course of the interviews, 
progressing well at 28 weeks at the time of our last interview exchange. 
Victoria, now in her late thirties, experienced two miscarriages around six 
weeks gestation after a successful birth. In the first miscarriage, Victoria had 
progressively heavier bleeding and an ultrasonography scan revealed no 
heartbeat. Victoria was sent home to miscarry naturally, only passing the sac 
nearly a fortnight later. Victoria suspected that she was pregnant for a third 
time a few weeks later and visited her GP who, on learning that she had some 
pain in her side, referred her to an Early Pregnancy Unit (EPU) for a scan. The 
medical staff there were dismissive, reproaching that she could not be pregnant 
and still have had such a recent menstrual period, and sent her home after 
commenting that they could tell little from the scan. She returned to the EPU a 
week later, hoping for a clearer answer on whether she was pregnant, to be told 
that she had a six week ectopic pregnancy and required urgent surgery. Victoria 
was sent home after the operation which entailed the removal of one fallopian 
tube. The scars continued to cause discomfort and Victoria was very anxious 
about conceiving again, which she did whilst the research was ongoing.  
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Appendix 2: Summary of Interview Modes of Communication 
Participant 
Pseudonym 
Modes (and Number) of Interview 
Communications From Participant 
Anne Telephone (2) 
Ben Skype (1) and email (1) 
Beth Email (5) 
Carla Face-to-face (1)* 
Caroline Telephone (2) 
Diane Email (10) 
Esther Telephone (2) 
Fiona Email (8) 
Gemma Email (1) and face-to-face (1) 
Graham Email (6) 
Helen Email (5) 
Holly Face-to-face (2) 
Isabel Email (3) and telephone (1) 
Jane Email (11) 
Lara Face-to-Face (2) 
Lisa Email (5) 
Marie Email (2) and telephone (1) 
Natalie Telephone (2) 
Penny Email (2) 
Rosie Telephone (2) 
Siobhan Face-to-face (2) 
Tania Email (1)** 
Tessa Email (7) 
Victoria Email (6) 
* Contact from participant then ceased without notice 
** Indefinite suspension of participation in the interviews agreed 
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